Chinn v. General Motors Corporation, Inc.

Full title: AARON CHINN, Administrator of the Estate of Kelli Chinn v. GENERAL MOTORS…

Court: United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

Date published: Dec 7, 2007

CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-11249-RGS (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2007)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-11249-RGS.

December 7, 2007

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

RICHARD STEARNS, District Judge

Kelli Chinn died after a tragic automobile accident that occurred in Old Saybrook, Connecticut on July 9, 2004. Kelli was a front-seat passenger in 1994 Chevrolet Blazer being driven by her mother, Vanessa Chinn. Vanessa lost control of the Blazer while negotiating a turn. The car rolled over, crushing the roof over Kelli's seat. Kelli suffered a broken neck. She remained a ventilator-dependent quadriplegic until succumbing from her injuries at a nursing home in New Jersey on October 22, 2006. On July 6, 2007, Kelli's brother, Aaron Chinn, acting in his capacity as the administrator of her estate, filed this wrongful death and products liability action against General Motors, Inc. (GM).¹ GM now moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.

1 The Complaint asserts common-law claims for product liability (Count I); strict liability (Count II); breach of warranty (Count III); fraud (Count IV); negligence (Count V); and wrongful death (Count VI).

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the parties dispute the applicable law. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law framework of the forum state. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Under Massachusetts' choice-of-law rules, tort claims are governed by the law of the state in which the injury occurred, unless another state has a more significant relationship to the underlying cause of action.Bergin v. Dartmouth Pharm., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 179, 183 (D. Mass. 2004), citing Dunfey v. Roger Williams Univ., 824 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D. Mass. 1993). See also Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 359-360 (1976) ("[T]here also may be particular issues on which the interests of lex loci delicti are not so strong . . . [and] another jurisdiction may sometimes be more concerned and more involved with certain issues than the State in which the conduct occurred."). The place where the injury occurred is "the place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 334 (1983) (citation omitted). Because the accident occurred in Connecticut, the law of Connecticut will govern unless a showing is made that Massachusetts or New Jersey has a more significant relationship to Chinn's causes of action.

GM advocates for the application of Connecticut law, arguing that Chinn has failed to state a claim because of his failure to plead a cause of action under the Connecticut Product Liability Statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572m, et seq., which GM identifies as the "exclusive" remedy for Chinn's claims. In the alternative, GM argues that New Jersey law should apply because Kelli "appears to have been" a New Jersey resident at the time of her death. GM maintains that Chinn's claims are barred under New Jersey law because he did not bring suit until almost three years after the accident (the limitations period for bringing a tort action in New Jersey is two years). In his opposition, Chinn argues that the court should decide the case according to either Connecticut or Massachusetts law. As between the law of these two jurisdictions, Chinn argues that the court need not make a choice at this juncture because there is little or no substantive conflict. See Fratus v. Republic Western Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1998) ("A federal court sitting in diversity need not make a finding regarding which state's law is to be applied where the case's resolution would be identical under either state's law.").

Without a stipulation of the parties, the court is unable to make a choice-of-law determination at this early stage of procedural skirmishing. Without a more robust record, the court is not in a position to determine whether New Jersey or Massachusetts has a more significant relationship to the case than does Connecticut. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must "assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and indulge all reasonable inferences that fit the plaintiff's stated theory of liability." In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the court gives no weight to GM's "presumptions" that Kelli and both of her parents were New Jersey residents at the time of her death as nothing in the Complaint supports either proposition.²

2 In his opposition, Chinn states that Kelli and both of her parents were residents of Massachusetts when she died.

The parties may seek information relevant to a choice-of-law determination during discovery, and to the extent that it is relevant, may renew the issue during summary judgment. In the alternative, they may stipulate that the law of one of the jurisdictions will apply. See Hodas v. Morin, 442 Mass. 544, 549-550 (2004) (where the parties have stipulated the choice-of-law, their intent will be honored unless contrary to public policy).

If Connecticut law does control, GM is correct that Chinn's common-law claims are unsustainable as Connecticut's products liability law provides the exclusive remedy for product-related tort claims. See Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., 212 Conn. 462, 471 (1989). However, even if GM were to prevail on this ground, the victory would be pyrrhic as the defect in pleading is procedural rather than substantive, and could easily be remedied by an amendment to the Complaint. See Hoboken Wood Flooring Corp. v. Torrington Supply Co., 42 Conn.Supp. 153, 157 (1991).

It would seem apparent from the Complaint that the theories underpinning Chinn's claims are identical under Massachusetts and Connecticut law. The only difference is that Massachusetts permits Chinn to frame his legal theories as common-law claims, while Connecticut requires the pleading of a single statutory cause of action. See id. Should the parties stipulate that Connecticut law applies, the court will allow Chinn to amend the Complaint in order to comply with Connecticut's statutory pleading requirements.³ If the choice is to apply Massachusetts law, the motion to dismiss is moot. In the unlikely event the court were to be persuaded that New Jersey law applies, the result would, of course, result in a termination of the lawsuit.

3 Both states provide a three-year statute of limitations for claims sounding in tort. See Mass. Gen. Laws c. 260, § 2A; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss will be DENIED without prejudice. The parties shall, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, submit a joint proposed discovery schedule. In their submission, the parties shall indicate whether they stipulate that the law of a particular jurisdiction, namely Massachusetts or Connecticut, is to be applied by the court.

SO ORDERED.