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Chestnut v. Rhodes

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Nov 19, 2021
C/A 1:21-3766-RBH-SVH (D.S.C. Nov. 19, 2021)

Opinion

C/A 1:21-3766-RBH-SVH

11-19-2021

Raymond Chestnut, Petitioner, v. Director Rhodes, Respondent.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge

Raymond Chestnut (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, is in federal custody, but is incarcerated at the J. Reuben Long Detention Center (“JRLDC”) in Conway, South Carolina. He filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the petition in this case without requiring the respondent to file an answer.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner alleges he is being illegally held on detainers in violation of his due process rights. [ECF No. 1]. A review of his underlying criminal case in this court reveals he was arrested on a warrant based on alleged violations of his supervised release. See United States v. Chestnut, Crim. No. 4:05-1044-RBH (“Criminal Case”) at ECF Nos. 1010-1012, 1014. On October 15, 2021, he had an initial appearance on the petition for violations of his supervised release terms. Id. at ECF No. 1016. On October 19, 2021, the Honorable Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge, held a preliminary hearing for Plaintiff, finding probable cause as to all alleged violations except as to violation #4, and she determined detention was appropriate pending Plaintiff's final revocation hearing. Id. at ECF Nos. 1022, 1024.

A district court may take judicial notice of materials in the court's own files from prior proceedings. See United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992) (the district court had the right to take judicial notice of a prior related proceeding); see also Fletcher v. Bryan, 175 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1949).

On November 17, 2021, Petitioner filed a pro se motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his prior sentence for revocation of a supervised release violation, which remains pending.

Petitioner seeks immediate release from custody.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of this petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).

The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).

B. Analysis

1. Parallel Proceedings

As an initial matter, Petitioner is litigating these matters in another case before this court. Efficient judicial administration generally requires the federal courts to avoid duplicative action. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Generally, a case pending in federal court “may be dismissed for reasons of wise judicial administration whenever it is duplicative of a parallel action already pending in another federal court.” Nexsen Pruet, LLC v. Westport Ins. Corp., C/A No. 3:10-cv-00895-JFA, 2010 WL 3169378, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin & Baldwin, LLP, 518 F.Supp.2d 688, 697 (D.S.C. 2007)). Suits are considered parallel if “substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same issues in different forums.” New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 946 F.2d 1072, 1073 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing LaDuke v. Burlington N. R.R., 879 F.2d 1556, 1559 (7th Cir. 1989)). Further, although Petitioner claims he is challenging a detainer, it is clear from the docket in his Criminal Case that he is in detention awaiting a final supervised release revocation hearing.

2. Failure to Meet Savings Clause

In addition, to the extent Plaintiff claims he is illegally detained for the same reasons he argues in his motion to vacate under § 2255, the court does not have jurisdiction over this matter. In his § 2241 petition, Petitioner alleges he is entitled to release from federal custody. “[I]t is well established that defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255.” Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)). Challenges to the execution of a sentence are properly raised in a § 2241 petition. Vial, 115 F.3d 1194 n.5.

Section 2255 contains a savings clause that “provides that an individual may seek relief from an illegal detention by way of a traditional 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition, if he or she can demonstrate that a § 2255 motion is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.'” United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2018); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”). The Fourth Circuit has joined the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in finding the savings clause requirements are jurisdictional. Id. at 424 n.5, 425. If the savings clause requirements are not met, the court cannot consider the petition.

The Fourth Circuit has found § 2255 inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence when:

(1) at the time of the conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction;
(2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review;
(3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and
(4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.
Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429; see also Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34 (providing a three-part test to determine whether section 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction).

Here, Petitioner cannot meet the savings clause because his § 2255 motion remains pending. The change in the law must occur prior to the court's ruling on a petitioner's § 2255 motion, not merely prior to the petitioner's filing of the § 2255 motion. See Lunn v. United States, No. 1:20-cv-00332-WO-JLW (M.D. N.C. Apr. 17, 2020) (“Petitioner cannot possibly satisfy the savings clause because she previously filed a § 2255 Motion . . . and that Motion has not yet been ruled upon . . . through a final order and judgment.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by No. 1:20-cv-00332-WO-JLW (M.D. N.C. Sept. 28, 2020), aff'd, Lunn v. United States, 2021 WL 61870, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 2021); Jamison v. Saad, No. 3:18-cv-147 (GROH), 2019 WL 2488748, at *6 (N.D.W.Va. Feb. 5, 2019) (“Petitioner cannot demonstrate that subsequent to his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion that there was a substantive change in the law, because his § 2255 proceeding is still pending. . . Accordingly, it is impossible for Petitioner to demonstrate any change in the law subsequent to his § 2255 proceeding, until that proceeding is completed.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 1325926 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 25, 2019). Here, Petitioner's first § 2255 motion on his current revocation remains pending in the sentencing court. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to satisfy the requirements of the savings clause test. See Brown v. Bragg, No. 6:18-cv1164-MBS, 2019 WL 161963, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2019); Smith v. Young, No. 5:16-cv07428, 2017 WL 1423951, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 8, 2017) (dismissing § 2241 action for lack of jurisdiction where § 2255 motion was pending in the sentencing court and noting petitioner could seek to amend his motion pending in the sentencing court), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1428721 (S.D. W.Va. Apr. 20, 2017).

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the court dismiss the petition without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).


Summaries of

Chestnut v. Rhodes

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Nov 19, 2021
C/A 1:21-3766-RBH-SVH (D.S.C. Nov. 19, 2021)
Case details for

Chestnut v. Rhodes

Case Details

Full title:Raymond Chestnut, Petitioner, v. Director Rhodes, Respondent.

Court:United States District Court, D. South Carolina

Date published: Nov 19, 2021

Citations

C/A 1:21-3766-RBH-SVH (D.S.C. Nov. 19, 2021)