Opinion
C. A. 1:22-2701-RBH-SVH
08-22-2022
Raymond Chestnut, # 324086, Petitioner, v. Bureau of Prisons, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Raymond Chestnut (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, is in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is currently incarcerated at the Dillon County Detention Center (“DCDC”) in Dillon, South Carolina. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.
I. Factual Background
Petitioner was released from the BOP on February 22, 2020. See United States v. Chestnut, Crim. No. 4:05-1044-RBH at ECF No. 917 (“Chestnut I”).On November 24, 2020, the Honorable R. Bryan Harwell, Chief United States District Judge, issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest for violations of his supervised release. Id. Petitioner was arrested on December 2, 2020, and released on December 8, 2020, on a $50,000 unsecured bond. Id. at ECF Nos. 926, 939.
The court takes judicial notice of its own records. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“The most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable facts is in noticing the content of court records.”).
Petitioner's bond was later revoked, the details of which are not relevant to the instant petition.
On March 4, 2021, Petitioner was sentenced to four months' incarceration for the supervised release violation, followed by an additional 24 months of supervised release. See United States v. Chestnut, Crim. No. 4:05-1044-RBH at ECF No. 996. He was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal Service and served his sentence in J. Reuben Long Detention Center. Petitioner completed his revocation sentence on May 11, 2021.
On September 14, 2021, Judge Harwell issued another warrant for Petitioner's arrest based on alleged violations of his supervised release. Id. at 1011, 1012. Petitioner was arrested on the warrant on October 13, 2021. Id. at 1014. On April 20, 2022, Petitioner was sentenced to thirteen months' incarceration based on the charges contained in the September 14, 2021 arrest warrant. Id. at 1141.
In the instant petition, Petitioner claims the BOP has failed to comply with the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3632, because it has not reduced his current sentence for time credit he earned through recidivism reduction programs and other productive activities he participated in for 90 days during his period of supervised release. [ECF No. 1 at 6]. He requests the court order the BOP to apply credit of at least 10 days for every 30 days that he successfully participated in these activities and change his release date to on or about August 12, 2022. Id. at 7. He admits he has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, but maintains such remedies are futile because he is not incarcerated in a BOP facility and his current facility cannot provide the relief he requests. Id. at 2.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of this petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court,the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).
B. Analysis
“[I]t is well established that defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255.” Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)). Challenges to the execution of a sentence are properly raised in a § 2241 petition. In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1194 n.5.
“The savings clause provides that an individual may seek relief from an illegal detention by way of a traditional 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition, if he or she can demonstrate that a § 2255 motion is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.'” United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2018); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), “a § 2241 petition ‘shall not be entertained' if certain circumstances are present, ‘unless' another condition is present.” Id. at 425 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)). The Fourth Circuit has joined the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in finding the savings clause requirements are jurisdictional. Id. at 424 n.5, 425. If the savings clause requirements are not met, the court cannot entertain the petition.
Petitioner argues he should be awarded time credit for his participation in recidivism reduction programs and other productive activities during his period of supervised release. [ECF No. 1 at 6]. Relevant to Petitioner's argument challenging the imposition of his sentence, the Fourth Circuit recently held a petitioner may demonstrate § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of his sentence when:
(1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence;
(2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law
changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review;
(3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and
(4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429.
Although the First Step Act may be applied retroactively and represents a change in law subsequent to imposition of Petitioner's original sentence, his argument is without merit. The time credit provisions in the First Step Act apply to “prisoners.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3632 (d)(4) (providing “A prisoner . . . who successfully completes evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time credit as follows: (i) A prisoner shall earn 10 days of time credits for every 30 days of successful participation in evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities ....”) (emphasis added). A prisoner is an individual who is “committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of the term imposed, or until earlier released for satisfactory behavior pursuant to the provisions of section 3624.” 18. U.S.C. § 3621(a). Section 3624(e) provides: “A prisoner whose sentence includes a term of supervised release after imprisonment shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation officer, who shall during the term imposed, supervise the person released to the degree warranted by the conditions specified by the sentencing court.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624. Thus, a person subject to supervised release has been “released” by the BOP, is no longer committed to its custody, and is no longer a prisoner under the First Step Act.
Petitioner seeks a reduction in his revocation sentence for completing “90 days” of “recidivism reduction programs or other productive activities” through “US Probation” while “serving his supervised release.” See ECF No. 1 at 6. Petitioner was not a prisoner during the time in question, as he was not committed to the custody of the BOP and had been released with supervision. Because the First Step Act contains no provision for reduction of the time period of supervised release for recidivism reduction programming or productive activities performed during the supervised release period, Petitioner's argument fails.
Petitioner's argument also fails because revocation sentences are separate from original sentences for the purpose of calculating time credit. See Garland v. Johnson, No. 1:19-53, 2019 WL 5106274, at *1 (W.D. La. Aug. 12, 2019) (“However, even if [petitioner] had been entitled to additional good time credit toward his sentence that he did not receive, federal law provides that those credits could not be used either to shorten the period of his supervised release or to shorten the period of any future imprisonment [petitioner] may be required to serve for violating the conditions of his release.”); Crum v. United States, 672 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2009) (“good conduct credits evaporate once parole is granted, and begin anew from zero when a prisoner's parole is revoked”). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained in United States v. Neil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005), “the imprisonment that ensues from revocation is partly based on new conduct, is wholly derived from a different source, and has different objectives altogether; it is therefore a different beast.” Moreover, “the deterrent and punitive purposes of a sentence would not be achieved if a defendant were allowed to build a “time bank” . . . and commit a new crime knowing he had already served his time in advance of the violation.” United States v. Davila, Case No. CR 109-060, 2020 WL 6875214, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 23, 2020); cf. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60 (2000) (“The objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce the terms of supervised release.”).
Because settled law establishes the increase in time credit under the First Step Act should not be applied to decrease Petitioner's sentence for his supervised release violations, he cannot meet the savings clause requirement to show the substantive law changed such that the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect. Therefore, the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Courts have found the First Step Act, although retroactive, does not change the law that good time credits do not survive release from prison. Barkley v. Dobbs, No. 1:19-3162-MGL-SVH, 2019 WL 6330744, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 12, 2019) (concluding that petitioner's revocation sentence was separate from his original sentence “for the purpose of calculating good-time credit”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6318742 (D.S.C. Nov. 25, 2019); Jamison v. Warden, Elkton Fed. Corr. Inst., No. 1:19-cv-789, 2019 WL 5690710, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2019) (“Because petitioner's revocation sentence is separate from his original sentence for purposes of calculating good-time credits, he is not entitled to the good-time credits he would have received on his original 36-month sentence if the First Step Act had been enacted at the time he was serving that sentence.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6828358 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2019); Kieffer v. Rios, No. 19-cv-899 (PJS/SER), 2019 WL 3986260, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2019) (rejecting petitioner's argument that the First Step Act entitled to him to additional GCT credit from his original sentence to be used towards his revocation sentence).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the petition in the above-captioned matter with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).