Opinion
No. 08-3985-ag NAC.
March 6, 2009.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED, that the petition for review is DENIED.
FOR PETITIONER: Donglai Yang, New Orleans, Louisiana. FOR RESPONDENT: Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel; Julie S. Pfluger, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
PRESENT: HON. RALPH K. WINTER, HON. JOHN M. WALKER, JR., HON. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.
Qin Chen, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of an August 5, 2008 order of the BIA, affirming the January 25, 2006 decision of Immigration Judge ("IJ") Annette S. Elstein, which denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). In re Qin Chen, No. A 95 687 538 (B.I.A. Aug. 5, 2008), aff'g No. A 95 687 538 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 25, 2006). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
"When the BIA briefly affirms the decision of an IJ and adopts the IJ's reasoning in doing so, we review the IJ's and the BIA's decisions together." Jigme Wangchuck v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). We review the agency's factual findings under the substantial evidence standard, "treating them as `conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'" Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). "We review de novo questions of law and the application of law to undisputed fact." Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
Here, we find that the agency did not err in finding that Chen, who had not suffered any harm as a result of her brief detention for distributing Falun Gong flyers, failed to demonstrate that she had suffered past persecution. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing what does and does not constitute persecution). Likewise, the agency reasonably concluded that Chen failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Indeed, in finding that her purported fear of persecution was not objectively reasonable, the agency properly relied, in part, on the fact that Chen's father, who Chen claimed was threatened by police for refusing to reveal her whereabouts, has lived unharmed in China since her departure from that country. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that claim of well-founded fear was weakened where asylum applicant's mother and daughters continued to live in applicant's native country).
Chen's remaining arguments are without merit. Contrary to Chen's argument, there was no need for the IJ to consider whether she had established a nexus between her feared harm and a protected ground, because the IJ reasonably found that she failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Second, Chen challenges what she construes as the IJ's adverse credibility determination; however, neither the IJ nor the BIA made an explicit adverse credibility determination. Even so, Chen's argument that the IJ erred in finding her not credible based on the vagueness of her testimony without probing for additional details is not supported by the record, which reveals that the IJ repeatedly requested Chen to provide additional details throughout her testimony. See Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that an IJ may reasonably consider the vagueness of an applicant's testimony in making an adverse credibility finding if the IJ probes for additional, incidental details). Similarly, Chen's additional arguments regarding the IJ's purported adverse credibility determination are conclusory and without merit.
Accordingly, as the agency reasonably found that Chen failed to demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution, it reasonably denied her application for asylum and withholding of removal. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). Finally, because Chen's challenge to the agency's denial of her application for CAT relief is nothing more than a conclusory sentence, it constitutes a waiver of the claim, and we decline to review the agency's decision insofar as it denied such relief. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2005).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).