Opinion
8:24-CV-889 (GTS/MJK)
09-06-2024
KATRON CHAVIS, Plaintiff, v. SYRACUSE POLICE DEPARTMENT Defendant.
KATRON CHAVIS, Plaintiff, pro se
KATRON CHAVIS, Plaintiff, pro se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MITCHELL J. KATZ, United States Magistrate Judge
TO THE HONORABLE MAE A. D'AGOSTINO, United States District Court Judge:
Plaintiff commenced this action on July 18, 2024 by filing a complaint (Dkt. No. 1) together with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. Nos. 2, 6). The Clerk has sent to the court for review the complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as the IFP Application.
I. IFP Application
Plaintiff's IFP Application declares that he is unable to pay the filing fee. (Dkt. No. 6). After reviewing plaintiff's application, this court finds that he is financially eligible for IFP status.
However, in addition to determining whether plaintiff meets the financial criteria to proceed IFP, the court must also consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides that the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action is (i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Harkins v. Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974). Although the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants and must use extreme caution in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and has had an opportunity to respond, the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when plaintiff has paid the filing fee).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).
In addition, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does “demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Houston v. Collerman, No. 9:16-CV-1009 (BKS/ATB), 2016 WL 6267968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2016) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). A pleading that contains allegations that “‘are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them' is subject to dismissal.” Id. (citing Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009)).
II. Complaint
The complaint alleges violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1).
Plaintiff alleges that on September 14, 2023, he was “jumped out on” by two Syracuse police officers at the State Market. (Complaint (“Compl.”) at 4). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that one police officer placed him in a choke hold while the other “beat” him. (Id.). The complaint further alleges that at some point, two additional police officers began punching plaintiff while he was still in a choke hold. (Id.). According to plaintiff, bystanders recorded the incident with their telephones. (Id.). The complaint alleges that plaintiff suffered a seizure, nerve damage throughout his body, and in his right shoulder. (Id.). Plaintiff also complains of headaches, right hand pain, and ongoing pain in his neck, back and spine. (Id.).
The page references to the complaint are consistent with those assigned by CM/ECF.
Plaintiff's request for relief seeks $10,000,000 in damages. (Id. at 5).
III. Syracuse Police Department
Although named in the caption to this action, the Syracuse Police Department is not listed as a defendant in section three of the complaint. Regardless, if the Syracuse Police Department had been so identified, the Syracuse Police Department would not be a proper party to this action as a matter of law. “A police department cannot sue or be sued because it does not exist separate and apart from the municipality and does not have its own legal identity.” Baker v. Willett, 42 F.Supp.2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing claims against county sheriff's department) (citations omitted); see also Jackson v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 07-CV-245, 2010 WL 335581, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2010) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); La Grande v. Town of Bethlehem Police Dep't, No. 08-CV-0738 (LEK/DRH), 2009 WL 2868231, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009) (“Since the Bethlehem Police Department cannot be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [the plaintiff's] [c]omplaint is dismissed as against the Town of Bethlehem Police Department.”); Jenkins v. Liadka, No. 10-CV-1223 (GTS/DEP), 2012 WL 4052286, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2012) (“Because the Syracuse Police Department is merely an administrative arm of the City of Syracuse, it is not a proper defendant.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends dismissing the complaint as to the Syracuse Police Department with prejudice.
IV. Excessive Force Claim
“The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures prohibits the use of excessive force by police officers in arresting suspects .... To establish a Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim, Plaintiff must show that the force used by the officer was ‘objectively unreasonable.'” Wilson v. Flanders, No. 3:23-CV-263 (DNH/TWD), 2023 WL 5018490, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 6, 2023) (quoting Correa v. McLeod, No. 3:17-CV-1059, 2017 WL 2962884, at *3 (D. Conn. July 11, 2017) (citations omitted)). “Determining whether the force is ‘reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the governmental interests at stake.” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, (1989)). A court shall consider “the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the [arrestee] poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. However, “‘[n]ot every push or shove' amounts to a Fourth Amendment violation. Indeed, a “‘de minimis use of force will rarely suffice to state a Constitutional claim.'” Acosta v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-856, 2012 WL 1506954, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012) (citing Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2005)). Moreover, a plaintiff must allege that he sustained an injury from the alleged excessive force. See Wims v. N. Y.C. Police Dep't, No. 10-CV-6128, 2011 WL 2946369, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011). “However, an individual does not need to sustain a severe injury to maintain a claim.” Id. (citing Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1987) (“If the force used was unreasonable and excessive, the plaintiff may recover even if the injuries inflicted were not permanent or severe.”)).
Although the complaint describes the nature of the alleged excessive force and plaintiff's alleged injuries, it fails to delineate which defendant engaged in which specific conduct and therefore runs afoul of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. “[L]umping all the defendants together in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct” fails to satisfy the “fair notice” standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed.Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Solano v. New York, No. 9:20-CV-1378 (BKS/ML), 2021 WL 4134793, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2021) (“Group pleading is generally impermissible as a violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") notice requirements.”); Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F.Supp.3d 578, 598 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Pleadings that do not differentiate which defendant was involved in the unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.”); Holmes v. Allstate Corp. No. 11-CV-1543, 2012 WL 627238, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27. 2012) (“[FRCP] 8(a) is violated where a plaintiff, by engaging in ‘group pleading,' fails to give each defendant fair notice of the claims against it.”), report recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 626262 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2012). The court therefore recommends that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice and that plaintiff be granted leave to amend his complaint to state facts in support of his claim against each individual defendant.
V. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plausibly construed, plaintiff's second claim purports to describe a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Compl. at 5). As a preliminary matter, “there is no recognized claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under section 1983.” Schisler v. City of Rome, No. 6:17-CV-312 (GTS/ATB), 2017 WL 1418296, at *4 (N.D.N.Y Mar. 22, 2017), report recommendation adopted 2017 WL 1411533 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2017); see also York v. City of Johnstown, No. 1:20-CV-1616 (MAD/ML), 2022 WL 2209441, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 21, 2022). Thus, to the extent plaintiff intended to assert this claim under Section 1983 as a stand-alone claim against the individual defendants, the same must be dismissed.
Further, “[d]amages for Section 1983 cases are ‘ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts,' and encompass compensatory damages, nominal damages, punitive damages and presumed damages.” Rodriguez v. Village of Porchester, 535 F.Supp.3d 202, 221 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2021) (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306-11 (1986)). In turn, compensatory damages may comprise of compensation for (1) out-of-pocket losses; and (2) pain and suffering as well as emotional and mental distress. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. 477 U.S. at 307; see also Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir.1993) (“It is settled that a court may award damages for emotional suffering in a § 1983 case.). Pain and suffering include compensation for physical pain, emotional pain and loss of enjoyment of the pleasurable activities of life. See Sales v. Republic of Uganda, 828 F.Supp. 1032, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Plaintiff's first claim alleges that he suffered “significant physical and emotional damage” from the alleged use of excessive force. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5). As such, to the extent that plaintiff's second claim is not predicated on an intentional tort, but merely seeks damages for mental and emotional harm incident to the alleged use of excessive force, the same is already pled in his first claim and is unnecessarily duplicative. In either event, the court recommends that plaintiff's second claim be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to replead.
VI. Opportunity to Amend
A. Legal Standards
Generally, before the court dismisses a pro se complaint or any part of the complaint sua sponte, the court should afford the plaintiff the opportunity to amend at least once; however, leave to re-plead may be denied where any amendment would be futile. See Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Futility is present when the problem with plaintiff's causes of action is substantive such that better pleading will not cure it. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
B. Application
The court recommends dismissing the complaint as against the Syracuse Police Department with prejudice. The court further recommends that plaintiff's claim for excessive force against Detective Fred Lamberton, Police Officer Mackenzie Glynn, Detective Abraham, and Detective DeJoseph be dismissed without prejudice. In deference to plaintiff's pro se status, however, the court recommends that plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to amend to clarify what specific acts each defendant allegedly engaged in so that they will have “fair notice” of the claims against them.
Finally, the court recommends that plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Detective Fred Lamberton, Police Officer Mackenzie Glynn, Detective Abraham, and Detective DeJoseph be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP (Dkt. No. 2) be GRANTED,and it is
Although his IFP Application has been granted, plaintiff will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
RECOMMENDED, that the district court DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY, WITH PREJUDICE, only as to defendant Syracuse Police Department, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that the district court DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to replead, as to defendants Detective Fred Lamberton, Police Officer Mackenzie Glynn, Detective Abraham and Detective DeJoseph, except that plaintiff's second claim is dismissed WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to replead, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that if the District Judge adopts this Order and Report-Recommendation, plaintiff be given thirty (30) days from the date of the District Judge's order, within which to submit a proposed second amended complaint to the court for its consideration, and that plaintiff be advised that any amended pleading must be a COMPLETE PLEADING, WHICH WILL SUPERCEDE THE COMPLAINT, and that plaintiff must include all the remaining facts and causes of action in the second amended complaint. No facts or claims from the original complaint may be incorporated by reference, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that if the District Court adopts this Order and Report-Recommendation, and plaintiff files a proposed amended complaint, the proposed pleading be returned to me for review, and it is
ORDERED, that while plaintiff may file objections to this Order and Report-Recommendation, before plaintiff submits any amended pleading, he should wait for the District Court to rule on the above Orders and Recommendations, and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation on plaintiff by regular mail.
The Clerk shall also provide plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.