Opinion
No. CT-01-5093-EFS
October 28, 2002
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION RE STATE CLAIM SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION AND RULE 23(b)(3) CERTIFICATION
On October 1, 2002, the Court heard argument on Plaintiffs' Motion Re State Claim Supplemental Jurisdiction and Rule 23(b)(3) Certification, (Ct. Rec. 130). David Mark appeared for the Plaintiffs. Barbara Duffy and Douglas Smith appeared for the Defendants IBP and Tyson Foods. The Court hereby grants the motion.
I. Background
This case is a follow on to the case of Alvarez, et, al. v. IBP, Inc., CT-98-5005-RHW. There, a representative group of plaintiffs sued defendant IBP, Inc. for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as state law. After a lengthy bench trial, Judge Whaley found in favor of the plaintiffs and entered a judgment of approximately $3.1 million in their favor, (CT-98-5005-RHW, Ct. Rec. 845). Here, several of the named plaintiffs in Alvarez, have filed the present complaint, alleging many of the same violations, including claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage and hour laws, for a time period including and following the Alvarez period. On April 29, 2002, this Court certified a FLSA § 16(b) class, (Ct. Rec. 119). That order directed an opt-in period allowing potential class members to opt-in to the class by returning a signed consent card postmarked by July 26, 2002. Approximately 1,100 people opted into the class by the July 26, 2002 deadline. It appears undisputed that as to those 1,100 workers, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the pendant state law claims. On May 24, 2002, the Plaintiffs filed the present motion. It seeks an order of the Court accomplishing two things (1) accepting supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims, and (2) certifying a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, opt-out class for the pendent state law claims. The motion seeks certification of the following class to decide state law claims:
All individuals performing production work in the Pasco plant processing, slaughtering, and hides division, during any time between November 2, 1998 through May 14, 2002, excluding supervisors, managers, quality control employees, guards, mechanics, laundry room employees, janitors knife room employees, and packaging department employees whose jobs are limited to work performed after the product has been bagged and boxed.
(Ct. Rec. 130).
II. Supplemental Jurisdiction
This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims that are so related to claims in the [original jurisdiction] action . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties." 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Cases form part of the same case or controversy when they arise under a common nucleus of operative facts. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1997). Here, the state law wage and hour claims arise under the same circumstances as the FLSA act claims: both related to IBP's operation of its Pasco plant. In Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 188 F.3d 1031, 1038 (8th Cir. 1999) the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court's certification of two distinct classes because the second had only state law claims. Id. Were that the case here, Fielder would apply, and this Court would lack the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law issues. Currently, there exists an opt-in class of approximately 1,100 individuals, whom this Court has certified as a FLSA class; that order did not address any state law claims. Now, the Plaintiffs seek certification of a state law class. That class would include all workers who do not opt out, including the 1,100 who opted into the FLSA class. Thus, the two proposed classes in this case are: (1) 1,100 individuals who are pursuing FLSA act claims, and (2) 3,900 individuals, minus opt-outs, who are pursuing state law claims. The second class is not distinct from the first class because all members of the first class are also members of the second class, assuming no one who opted into the FLSA case opts out of the state law case. Fielder does not apply because there are not two wholly distinct classes. The language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, allowing for the joinder or intervention of additional parties, seems to contemplate this case. Plaintiffs' citations to cases approving certification of state law wage and hour claims in addition to FLSA cases support this reading. Therefore, this Court has the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law class here.
However, the Court may decline supplemental jurisdiction if, inter alia, the state law claims substantially predominate or otherwise exceptional circumstances provide compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c). Here, IBP bases its predominance argument on the sheer number of potential plaintiffs falling into each category — 1,100 v. 3,900. However, the Court does not view sheer numbers as the relevant comparison. Rather, the determining factor is the relative size of the issues raised by the varying claims. Plaintiffs assert that the only increase in trial time for the state law claims will be a damage report; whereas, the Defendants argue that "there can be no doubt that plaintiffs' state claims will predominate in terms of the complicated issues and trial time necessary to litigate the case . . . ." (Ct. Rec. 278 at 6.) As the Court reads the Complaint, and based on the Court's understanding of Judge Whaley's resolution of Alvarez, the FLSA violations are the state wage and hour law violations, with the only difference being the amount of damage due the Plaintiffs. State law issues do not substantially predominate, and the Court will not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
III. Class Certification
The party moving for class certification has the burden of proving that the class satisfies the prerequisites and a class action ground set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b). See e.g., Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court must engage in a rigorous analysis to determine whether all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). However, an extensive evidentiary showing is not required. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975). All that is necessary is sufficient information for the court "to form a reasonable judgment on each requirement." Id. The court does not examine the merits of the case, see id., and must accept as true the substantive allegations of the class claim, see id. at 901 n. 17.
1. Prerequisites of a Class Action
To be certified, a class action must satisfy the four prerequisites of typicality, commonality, numerosity, and adequacy of representation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a).
a. Typicality
The prerequisite of typicality requires the claims of the representative party to be typical of the claims of the class. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). "The test of typicality `is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.'" Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508 (quoting Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)).
Here, the Complaint alleges that IBP violated state wage laws, inter alia, by permitting unpaid work to occur at the beginning and end of each day, and failing to pay for meal breaks that are under thirty minutes. Although the exact damage calculations will vary among class members, the injury that occurred is the same. Judge Whaley rejected IBP's argument that individualized damage computations was a sufficient reason to deny FLSA class certification. (Ct. Rec. 289 Ex. 2 at 11.) While it is true that the named class representatives may not have performed the same allegedly unpaid work as each and every other class member, it is sufficient for current purposes that the alleged injury to the named class representatives is similar to the injury to other class members. The Court finds the typicality requirement is met with respect to the state law class.
b. Commonality
The prerequisite of commonality requires the existence of at least one question of law or fact common to the class. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998). The Complaint alleges, and Alvarez demonstrates, that there are common issues of facts and law — IBP's policies at issue in this case apply to all members of the putative class. The Court finds the commonality requirement is met with respect to the state law class.
c. Numerosity
Numerosity requires that the class members be so numerous that joinder is impracticable. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). "Although mere allegations of numerosity are insufficient to meet this prerequisite, a plaintiff need not show the precise number of members in the class." Evans v. U.S. Pipe Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983).
The parties appear to agree that there approximately thirty-nine hundred potential class members. The Court finds that the state law class meets the requirement of numerosity.
d. Adequacy of Representation
The prerequisite of adequacy of representation requires the named defendants to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). That in turn consists of two requirements: (1) that the named plaintiffs' counsel are qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and (2) that the named plaintiffs have no interest antagonistic to those of the class. See Securities Exch. Comm'n v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1992).
Class counsel here handled the Alvarez matter, and IBP does not challenge their qualification and experience. Nor do these named Plaintiffs have any interested antagonistic to those of the class. IBP focuses its criticism of the adequacy of representation by noting that there are several very distinct divisions at IBP, and that the named Plaintiffs know little or nothing about the other divisions. The issue of whether the testimony of these named class representatives will be sufficient to survive summary judgment or prevail at trial is not before the Court. Rather, it is sufficient for current purposes that the name class representatives have no interest antagonistic to the class. The Court finds that the Class has met the adequacy of representation requirement.
2. Rule 23(b)(3) Ground for Class Action
A class action can be certified only if at least one of the grounds set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b) exists. See Amchem Products, 521 U.S. at 614. Here, the Plaintiffs allege that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). The matters to be considered in determining the existence of this ground include
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). The Defendants object that individualized damages questions will predominate over the common questions. Again, Judge Whaley rejected this argument with respect to the FLSA class. In Alvarez, individual questions did not predominate because the Court established a formula by work code for calculating damages. Similarly here, the individual questions are not expected to predominate because, should the Plaintiffs prevail, damages, the only significant individualized issue can be calculated using a formula, similar to that in Alvarez. Further, the Court finds that the individual class members have no identified interest in controlling the litigation of separate actions, this litigation already involves approximately 1,100 of the putative class members, the concentration of this litigation with a case arising under the same nucleus of operative facts is desirable, and the Court does not foresee any difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a state law class not already attendant in the FLSA class. Therefore, the Court finds that one ground, Rule 23(b)(3), exists under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b) and certifies the requested class.
In light of the Court's holding, the Court will, by separate order, convene a scheduling conference to discuss the timing of the notice and opt-out procedure, as well as proposed class notices submitted by the parties. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion Re State Claim Supplemental Jurisdiction and Rule 23(b)(3) Certification, (Ct. Rec. 130), is GRANTED.
2. The Court certifies a state law wage and hour class consisting of:
All individuals performing production work in the Pasco plant processing, slaughtering, and hides division, during any time between November 2, 1998 through May 14, 2002, excluding supervisors, managers, quality control employees, guards, mechanics, laundry room employees, janitors knife room employees, and packaging department employees whose jobs are limited to work performed after the product has been bagged and boxed.
3. By separate order, the Court will convene a scheduling conference to discuss the parties' proposed notice, and opt-in period.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to
(A) Enter this Order; and
(B) Provide copies to all counsel.