Summary
In Chase v. Board of Public Instruction, 1951, 52 So.2d 122, our Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether or not the Dade County Budget Commission had the power to reduce the millage levy approved by the qualified electors as provided by § 10, Art. XII, of the Constitution.
Summary of this case from Bd. of Pub. Inst. of Hendry v. StateOpinion
April 17, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, Stanley Milledge, J.
Hudson Cason, Miami, for appellants.
John J. Lindsey, Edward F. Boardman, and Lucille M. Von Arx, Miami, for appellees.
In July 1950, the Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, hereinafter referred to as the Board, filed its bill for declaratory decree against the Dade County Budget Commission, hereinafter called the Commission. In fine, the bill alleges that the Budget Act, Chapter 21874, Acts of 1943, is (1) invalid because it is a local law regulating a class of officers not municipal and punishes certain crimes in violation of Section 20, Article III of the Constitution, F.S.A., (2) it is a local law, without a referendum and was not advertised as required by Section 21, Article III of the Constitution, (3) it interrupts and destroys the public school system in violation of Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, (4) Sections 9 and 15 of said Act violate Section 16, Article III of the Constitution, (5) it is inoperative as to Dade County because the power to fix the budget of said county is vested in the County Superintendent and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction under Chapter 19355, Acts of 1939, F.S.A. § 227.01 et seq., (6) Section 16 of said Act is repealed by Section 13, Chapter 21989, Acts of 1943, F.S.A. § 237.22, (7) said Act was superseded by Chapter 237, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., (8) said Act deprives the Board of the equal protection of the law and authorizes the Commission to make changes in the Board's recommendations contrary to law.
The Commission answered the bill denying the invalidity of the Budget Act but admitted that it had disapproved certain items and made changes in the budget as prepared by the Board. The chancellor pretermitted adjudicating the constitutional questions raised but as to other issues, held (1) that in so far as Chapter 21874, Budget Act is in conflict with Chapter 23726 and Section 237.05 to Section 237.24 inclusive, the Budget Act is subordinate to and is repealed by Chapter 23726. (2) That the Commission was without power to reduce the nine-mill levy on all taxable property in the Special Tax School District (Dade County) because said tax was imposed by a vote of the freeholders as authorized by Sections 10 and 11, Article XII of the Constitution and could be lowered or increased only by the power that imposed it. We are confronted with an appeal from the final decree so entered.
We think the chancellor was in error in holding that in so far as the Budget Act is in conflict with Chapter 23726, Acts of 1947 and Section 237.05 to Section 237.24 inclusive, it is repealed by Chapter 23726. The Budget Act created County Budget Commissions in Counties of not less than 250,000 population and defined their powers and duties. It is in no sense a local law, it is a general law applicable to counties within its class but potentially applicable to every county in the state; so all the discussion of its uniform application and whether or not it is repealed or superseded by some other general or local law has no application to this case.
Dade County is in the class of counties covered by it, and being so, the question here is how it affects Dade County in relation to Chapter 19355, Acts of 1939, including Chapter 23726, Acts of 1947 and other acts amendatory thereof better known as the School Code. The School Code requires the Board to submit its budget to the State Superintendent while the Budget Act requires the Commission to certify a copy of the Budget to the Comptroller and a copy to the County Board of Public Instruction. The School Code was a general revision of the School law, but the Budget Act was a later expression of the legislature on the question of budgeting and superseded those provisions of the School Code relating to budgeting in counties where Budget Commissions were created.
The legislature undoubtedly intended the provisions of the School Code and the Budget Act to operate in pari materia when possible, but when they are in conflict and both cannot operate, the School Code must give way to the Budget Act. The School Code and the amendments thereto show conclusively that the legislature was conscious of the Budget Act operating in certain counties and made different provisions for budgeting school funds in counties not having a budget commission from those having such a commission. For instance Section 237.19, F.S.A. was intended to control budgeting in counties having no budget commission, while Section 237.22, F.S.A. controls budgeting in counties having a budget commission. Both these sections are part of Chapter 21989, Acts of 1943. The title of § 1080 of the School Code, Chapter 19355, Acts of 1939, recognizes that some counties have Budget Commissions while others do not.
Section 9 of Chapter 21874, Budget Act among other things provides that "Every such budget so adopted by the County Budget Commission for each such board shall be final and shall have the force and effect of fixed appropriations determined by the authority of law which shall not be altered or amended by any such board or officer or member thereof." The act authorizes the Budget Commission to make and control the budget receipts and expenditures of Boards of County Commissions, Boards of Public Instruction, County Welfare Boards and all other county boards and commissions. After all this is done and the budget regularly adopted by the Budget Commission, it becomes final, and whether or not it can be reopened under any circumstances, we do not have to decide, but certainly it becomes binding on both the Commission and the Board.
It is next contended that the Commission was without power to reduce the nine-mill tax levy on the taxable property within the special tax school district (Dade County) because said tax was imposed by a vote of the freeholders in the manner provided by Sections 10 and 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
We construe the final decree to hold that it is beyond the power of the Budget Commission to reduce the millage fixed by the freeholders, as authorized by Article XII of the Constitution. We think the chancellor was correct in this holding. Section 236.33, F.S.A., authorizes the Board of Public Instruction to reduce the tax levy approved by the freeholders if it is shown that there are ample available funds for school purposes from other revenue sources. The Budget Commission resolution of June 15, 1950, in adopting the school budget, together with the accompanying explanatory letter sent by the Budget Commission to the Board of Public Instruction, and the resolution of the Budget Commission of August 17, 1950, reciting its previous actions and refusing to call another hearing on the budget, are construed by us as containing merely a suggestion to the Board of Public Instruction that the millage be lowered as a result of the Budget Commission requiring a reduction of $400,000 in the expenditures proposed by the board. This suggestion to reduce the millage was purely advisory and could not be mandatory on the board.
It was, however, entirely within the power and authority of the Budget Commission to change, alter, amend, increase, or decrease any item and total amount or amounts of the estimate of expenditures or receipts prepared or submitted by the Board of Public Instruction, and to fix, determine, and adopt a budget of all receipts and expenditures for such Board (see Section 9 of Chapter 21847, Acts of 1943), even though the total amount so authorized is less than the amount that would be produced by the proposed nine-mill district tax levy plus the three-mill county levy. If it is less, the Board of Public Instruction would then have the power to reduce the tax levy accordingly.
We find no support for the contention that the Commission has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. After all is said, this suit is nothing more than a controversy between the Board and the Commission over budgeting public school funds in Dade County. The very purpose of the Budget Act was sound financing, to keep the budgets of all county boards balanced and confine their expenditures within the funds allocated to them. Within this field the act of the Budget Commission is final.
A number of budget commissions have been established in this state. The acts creating them generally include substantially the same language as in Section 9 of Chapter 21874, Acts of 1943, authorizing the commission to "change, alter, amend, increase, or decrease any item and total amount or amounts of any estimate of expenditures or receipts prepared or submitted (by the board whose budget is under consideration)." The power exercised by such commission is ordinarily directed toward decreasing or reducing a proposed expenditure. Occasionally such commission will find it desirable to increase a proposed expenditure where such increase is necessary or legally required. The power of the Budget Commission to "change, alter, amend" in any way except to increase or decrease should be sparingly exercised and should not be interpreted as authorizing a budget commission to initiate any expenditure not contemplated or requested by a board unless such new and different expenditure is required by law to be made and has been arbitrarily or unwittingly omitted by the board.
It follows that the decree appealed from is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
SEBRING, C.J., THOMAS, J., and WEHLE, Associate Justice, concur.