Opinion
Civil No.: 18-1409 (DRD)
04-08-2020
IN RE: CHASE MONARCH INTERNATIONAL INC., Debtor, Chase Monarch International Inc., Apellant, v. Cherif Medawar, Monsita Lecaroz Arribas, Trustee, Appellees.
Hector F. Figueroa-Vincenty, El Bufete del Pueblo, PSC, Nelson Robles-Diaz, Nelson Robles-Diaz Law Offices P.S.C., San Juan, PR 00919-2302 for Appellant. Solymar Castillo-Morales, Goldman Antonetti & Cordova, San Juan, PR, for Appellee.
Hector F. Figueroa-Vincenty, El Bufete del Pueblo, PSC, Nelson Robles-Diaz, Nelson Robles-Diaz Law Offices P.S.C., San Juan, PR 00919-2302 for Appellant.
Solymar Castillo-Morales, Goldman Antonetti & Cordova, San Juan, PR, for Appellee.
Bankruptcy Appeal
ORDER AS TO RECONSIDERATION
Daniel R. Domínguez, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order . See Docket No. 48. Appellant's Motion focuses on the following matters: (1) the unprecedent effect of the passing of Hurricane María; (2) Appellees purported modification of the Leese Agreement; and (3) the alleged erroneous application of state court precedents established by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in Casera Foods Inc. v. E.L.A. , 108 D.P.R. 850 (1979) and B.P.P.R. v. Sucn. Talavera , 174 D.P.R. 686 (2008). For the reasons discussed below, Appellant's Motion is hereby DENIED .
I. DISCUSSION
First, the Court notes that Appellant incorrectly labeled its petition as one of "reconsideration"; notwithstanding, requests for reconsideration are not available at this juncture. Rule 8022 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure establishes the exclusive avenue for post-judgment petitions before a district court during a bankruptcy appeal; said relief is to be requested to the Court through a motion for rehearing . See Fed. R. Bnkr. P. 8022. See , also , Butler v. Merch. Bank & Trust Co., 2 F.3d 154, 155 (5th Cir.1993) ("Bankruptcy Rule 80[22] provides the sole mechanism for filing a motion for rehearing’ from a final order of the district court sitting in [its appellate] capacity"). Because said Rule does not provide a standard for review, sister Courts -and various Circuit Courts- have upheld the application of the standard for review set for petitions made under Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See , for example , In re Fowler, 394 F.3d 1208, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The district court did not abuse its discretion by looking to a parallel federal appellate rule for guidance in applying a reasonable standard to a motion for rehearing). See , also , Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 Advisory Committee's Notes.
Under Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, "the petition must state with particularity each point of law or fact that the petitioner believes the court has overlooked or misapprehended and must argue in support of the petition." Fed. R. App. P. 40 (emphasis provided). Consequently, "[a] properly drawn petition for rehearing serves a very limited purpose." Anderson v. Knox, 300 F.2d 296, 297 (9th Cir.1962). Said purpose is "is to ensure that the panel properly considered all relevant information in rendering its decision" Armster v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California, 806 F.2d 1347, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the Court must emphasize that, under Rule 40, a motion for rehearing is not a "crutch for dilatory counsel, nor, in the absence of demonstrable mistake, to permit reargument of the same matters." United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 762 (1st Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972) ).
All of the matters addressed by Appellant in its Motion were previously outlined and discussed in its Brief and Reply Brief. See Docket No. 34 and 43. Consequently, in the Opinion and Order entered at Docket No. 47, said matters were properly analyzed and resolved by the Court. Appellant's present Motion does not raise any issue that the Court might have "overlooked or misapprehended"; hence its petition is meritless.