Opinion
A140798
01-28-2016
CHARLES LI, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEMAS YAN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City and County Super. Ct. No. CGC10497990)
BACKGROUND
Appellant Demas Yan is an attorney. In March 2010 respondent Charles Li filed suit against Yan, asserting claims for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, unlawful business practices, breach of contract, and fraud. Li's case came on for court trial in 2012 before the Honorable Cynthia Ming-Mei Lee, with Yan representing himself. Evidence was taken over five days, following which supplemental briefs and proposed statements of decisions were submitted by both sides. On March 11, 2013, Judge Lee filed her statement of decision, ruling for Li. The lengthy 15-page statement was comprehensive and detailed, setting forth the evidence and the law supporting her decision.
Most of the facts in the case are not relevant to Yan's appeal, nor, for that matter, is the law on which Judge Lee relied. Suffice to say here that the relationship between Li and Yan arose out of Yan's involvement with properties located on Chenery Street in San Francisco, and an agreement between Yan and one Tony Fu. Yan met Li and Fu in early 2000 or 2001, and Li became involved with the property and/or the agreement.
Thereafter, various lawsuits were filed on behalf of Li, in one of which Li sued Yan. And what then occurred was well described by Judge Lee:
"Yan contacted Li and urged him to dismiss Li v. Yan (I) and pursue the case against Fu, suggesting that they could join forces against Fu as a way of Yan getting 'revenge.' Yan began giving legal advice to Li in person, by telephone, and in extensive e-mail exchange. By then, Yan was a law student. He convinced Li that he had superior strategy and knowledge of the law, coupled with personal knowledge of Fu and his former wife that placed him in a better position to advise Li than his attorney. Yan gave Li legal advice on document preparation, amendment of a party, additional causes of action, and deposition and discovery strategy. [Li's attorney] Mousalam sent a blank Request for Dismissal form to Li so he could dismiss Li v. Yan (I). Li requested Yan's assistance in filling out the form. Yan instructed Li to just sign the form send it to him. Li's confusion caused Yan to request meeting in person for Li to sign the form. The parties met on August 12, 2008, and Li signed his name to the blank dismissal form. Yan handwrote all other entries on the form, and checked the dismissal 'with prejudice' box. . . . Yan filed both forms on August 20, 2007, resulting in dismissal of Li v. Yan (I) with prejudice and dismissal of the bankruptcy claim.
"On August 16, 2008, Li and Yan executed 'Lawsuit Assignment.' (Pl Ex. 100) Yan persuaded Li that if assigned the lawsuit, Yan would be better able to control the suit and properly advise Li. Li relied upon Yan for legal counsel. The Lawsuit Assignment stated in pertinent part: [¶] 'Yan shall minimize any legal cost to Li before Yan getting (sic) his license by doing all the work he can carry on for said case. Once Yan is admitted to the State Bar as an attorney this assignment shall be replaced by a attorney-client contract on the same term as stated above with no requirement that Li pay a retainer.'
"The relationship between Li and attorney Mousalam became frayed. Yan sowed the seeds of dissatisfaction and Li became convinced that Yan was giving him better legal advice and strategy. Mousalam withdrew as counsel on August 28, 2008[,] following a dispute about signing a new fee agreement. Yan instructed Li to represent himself until Yan was admitted to the Bar, which he expected to happen in December. Yan assured Li that he would advise him on the conduct of the suit until that time, when he would assume formal representation as Li's attorney. Li complied and was self-represented, with Yan giving him directions on how to proceed.
"On August 19, 2008, three days after the 'Lawsuit Assignment' was executed, Yan filed Yan v. Sui Ma, Charles Li, Tony Fu (Superior Court of San Francisco, CGC 08-478815). Li was aware that Yan planned to file a lawsuit against Li's former attorney in the Li v. Yan suit for malicious prosecution. Yan told him he was going to name Li as a defendant only as a matter of legal procedure. Yan did not explain the conflict or the potential for liability . . . .
"Yan was admitted to the Bar in December 2008. The parties exchanged e-mails and signed a fee agreement for Yan's representation on January 26, 2009. Yan repeatedly told Li the assignment was unenforceable because of the termination of the contract and Fu's unlicensed contractor status and urged pursuing the fraud case against Fu. On March 20, 2009, Li and Fu participated in an Early Settlement Conference on the case. During the conference, a mediator opined that the Assignment was enforceable against Yan and raised this conflict of interest in Yan's representation. The mediator disclosed a second conflict of interest in that Yan had filed Yan v. Sui Ma, Charles Li, Tony Fu, et al . . . . Yan never disclosed the conflict or obtained a written conflict waiver arising from either circumstance. Li terminated Yan as his attorney two days later. Li v. Fu was settled on March 23, 2009. Yan dismissed Li only from Yan v. Ma, Li, Fu, et al on the same day without prejudice.
"Li hired new counsel and attempted to reinstate Li v. Yan (I) and the claim in Bankruptcy Court, but was unsuccessful in each forum. He was denied relief under Cal. Code of Civil Procedure section 473 due to his delay in requesting relief. The petition for reinstatement of his claim in Bankruptcy Court was denied for similar reason . . . .
"On November 15, 2011, the State Bar of California notified Yan of disciplinary proceedings. The charges included violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-310(C)(3)—conflict of interest relating to failure to disclose the conflict and obtain informed written consent to the potential conflict of interest from Li, and violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068(a)—the Unauthorized practice of law relating to Yan's legal counsel to Li during the pendency of Li v. Fu, prior to Yan's admission to the Bar. Defendant stipulated to the facts in a 'Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition' filed March 16, 2012[,] relating to the conflict and failure to provide a written disclosure and informed written consent to the potential conflict."
Judge Lee's statement included extensive discussion of the testimony of Li's expert witness Merri Baldwin, an expert in legal ethics familiar with the standard of care in the community. The statement devoted over three pages to a description of Baldwin's testimony supporting her expert opinion, which, as described by Judge Lee, was the following:
"In Baldwin's expert opinion, (1) Yan failed to meet the standard of care and fiduciary duty in his representation of Li because of the conflicts of interest, (2) Yan failed to meet the standard of care in the handling of the case, particularly in the action involving Fu, and (3) Yan had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law prior to his admission to the Bar, in his dealings with Li."
Following her lengthy legal analysis, Judge Lee awarded Li $184,000 in damages, legal fees to mitigate the harm of $70,411.42, and "pre-judgment interest to be calculated in accordance with C.C.P. 3287 et seq."
Thereafter, following further hearing, Judge Lee entered an order awarding Li attorney fees in the amount of $142,221.50 and costs of $6,112.45. That order ended with the direction that the parties shall submit further briefing by July 17, 2013, "on the sole and limited issue of the sale of the Chenery Street property," hearing on which will be on July 25. This was to address the value of the property, which was determinative on the prejudgment interest issue.
On July 16, 2013, Yan filed his "Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest." It was all of one and one-half pages, and asserted in its entirety as follows:
"PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS BARRED BECAUSE DEBTOR WAS PREVENTED BY LAW FROM PAYING THE DEBT.
"As plaintiff's attorney Mr. Duy Thai had briefed the court, the Chenery Street properties, consisting of four condominiums, were sold at various times during defendant Demas Yan's bankruptcy. The Chenery Street properties were acquired by Yan prior to filing of bankruptcy, thus the sales proceeds were properties of the bankruptcy estate and were under the control of the bankruptcy court through the United States Trustees Office. The Bankruptcy Code provides that the commencement of a case creates the estate and gives the Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over 'all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of case, and of property of the estate.' See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(e) ."
The prejudgment interest issue was heard on August 1, 2013. What is in the record are the "Mini Minutes" for that day, which provide in pertinent part as follows:
"This matter came on calendar this day for further hearing on plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees motion and to provide detailed billings history and prejudgment interest.
"Dept. 220, Judge: CYNTHIA M. LEE, Clerk: S. Ravinantapricha. Not reported.
"Duy Thai, Esq. appeared for plaintiff Charles Li. Defendant Demas Yan present in pro per.
"Having considered all papers and evidence submitted, and hearing arguments by the parties, and good cause appearing therefore, the court granted pre-judgment interest from June 15, 2005, to today for the total of 2969 days at the rate of $50.41 per day, for the total sum of $149,667.29. Mr. Thai will prepare and submit the judgment . . . ."
On November 13, a second amended judgment was filed awarding Li a total of $552,412.30, including $149,667.29 in prejudgment interest.
On January 10, 2014, Yan filed his notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The Appeal Has No Merit
On February 6, 2014, before his brief was filed in this court, Li filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was untimely. The basis of the argument was that three judgments had been entered in the trial court: (1) the original judgment on May 7, 2013, specifying $254,411.06 in damages and awarding entitlement to attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest but specifying no amounts for these categories; (2) an amended judgment on June 26, 2013, specifying $254,411.06 in damages, $142,221.50 in attorneys' fees, and $6,112.45 in costs, but still no amount for prejudgment interest; and (3) the second amended judgment on November 13, 2014, with the only change being that prejudgment interest was now fixed as $149,667.29. So, the argument ran, since the first judgment was appealable, Yan was untimely in appealing it, and could only appeal the new matter raised in the second amended judgment, which was the specification of the prejudgment interest amount.
On June 16, 2014, we filed a detailed six-page order that discussed the issue before us, and concluded as follows:
"The motion of respondent Charles Li to dismiss the appeal is denied in light of Yan's first amended notice designating the record on appeal which identifies as an issue on appeal 'whether the pre-judgment interest calculation is supported by evidence or law.' No other issues will be entertained."
On June 25, Yan filed a "Petition for Rehearing of Order Entered on June 16, 2014." We treated it as a motion for reconsideration and denied it on July 25.
On August 14, Yan filed "Appellant's Application to Reconsider Order Entered on June 16, 2014," which was at times a word-for-word rehash of his petition for rehearing. On September 17, we again denied what we had earlier denied.
Yan then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on September 24.
In essence, we have three times told Yan that the only issue we would entertain on appeal is the issue of prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court effectively told Yan the same thing. Yan disregards what he has been told.
On April 29, 2015, Yan filed his opening brief in this court. It is 29 pages long, 12 pages of which are the claimed "Statement of Facts," listed in the index as follows:
"A. The Construction Agreement (Agreement) . . . .
"B. Assignment of the Agreement to Plaintiff Li . . . .
"C. Li's First Lawsuit (Suit #1) and Its Dismissal . . . .
"D. The Agreement Is Not A Joint Venture . . . .
"E. Li's Suit Against Fu for Fraud in assigning the Agreement to Li (Fraud Suit) . . . .
"F. Yan's Role in the Fraud Suit . . . .
"G. Li's Attempt To Reinstate Suit #1. . . . .
"H. Yan's Bankruptcy and Denial Of Plaintiff's Claims . . . ."
Yan's brief goes into detail about many subjects and issues unrelated to the issue of the calculation of prejudgment interest, the one issue we directed him to brief. For example, Yan discusses such things as the claimed lack of merit of the claims for attorney malpractice, the unauthorized practice of law, and related causes of action. Yan's brief is predominantly directed to the "case within a case" principle, and thus discusses construction law, bankruptcy, joint venture, fraud, and enforcement of contracts. Indeed, Yan's focus on these items is perhaps best demonstrated by his "Issues on Appeal," which lists these five:
"Whether Doctrine of Res Judicata bars plaintiff Li's claims.
"Whether Yan's bankruptcy bars award of prejudgment interest.
"Whether Yan's bankruptcy bars Li's claims.
"Whether the finding that there was a joint venture is supported by substantial evidence.
"Whether the finding of fraud is supported by substantial evidence."
On May 7 Li filed a "Motion to Dismiss the Appeal, or in the Alternative to Strike [Yan's] Opening Brief." Yan opposed the motion. On July 8, we entered our order, holding as follows:
"Respondent's opposed motion to dismiss this appeal is denied.All portions in appellant's opening brief, filed on April 29, 2015, are hereby stricken other than arguments and references related to the prejudgment interest only. The second amended judgment which, as we stated in our order of June 16, 2014, 'merely fixed the amount of prejudgment interest, a modification that did not substantially change the amended judgment and did not restart the time for filing a notice of appeal.' The court will disregard the stricken portions in appellant's opening brief."
"Respondent's motion to strike portions of appellant's opening brief is granted.
Against that background we reach the merits of Yan's appeal. And conclude it has none.
To recap, in our order allowing Yan's appeal to proceed, we denied Li's motion to dismiss, "in light of Yan's first amended notice designating the record on appeal which identifies as an issue on appeal 'whether the pre-judgment interest calculation is supported by evidence or law.' " That was it: calculation of prejudgment interest. Yan's brief does not even mention the subject. His appeal must fail.
We do note that Yan's brief does mention the issue of prejudgment interest, though not its calculation. It is in this brief one-page argument:
"B. YAN'S BANKRUPTCY BARS PREJUGMENT INTEREST.
"The lower court granted plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest from 'June 15, 2005 to present'. (Mini Minutes for Aug-01-2013, CT at 413.) The granting of prejudgment interest was in error for the reason that Yan's bankruptcy bars any recovery of prejudgment interest.
"Li had filed his unsecured claims in Yan's bankruptcy. Generally, interest ceases to accrue upon the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. The amount of an unsecured claim is fixed at the time of filing of bankruptcy. 'The amount of the claim will be for principal and unpaid interest accrued as of that date.' Robert E. Ginsberg & Robert D. Martin, Bankruptcy: Text, Statues & Rules, 10.08, Prentice Hall, 3rd Ed. (1993).
"Yan had filed for bankruptcy in December 2004, thus all interest on Li's claims cease to accrue as of December 2004. Here, the lower court's finding that Yan is liable for interest from 'June 15, 2005 to present' is in error because interest on the claims are barred from the date of bankruptcy petition, i.e. December 2004, onward."
Not only does this argument not address the calculation of prejudgment interest, it is also inappropriate because it was not made below, as a comparison of what he argued to Judge Lee shows. Thus, Yan cannot assert it here, under well-settled principles of appellate review.
The leading California appellate treatise describes the rule this way: "New Theories Not Reviewable on Appeal: As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties must adhere to the theory (or theories) on which their cases were tried. This rule is based on fairness-it would be unfair, both to the trial court and the opposing litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal; and it also reflects principles of estoppel." (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2014) ¶ 8:229; accord: Giraldo v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 251.)
We close with the observation that we cannot help but notice that Yan's conduct here does not appear to be the first time he has acted in a way that apparently disregards what is expected of him, especially as a member of the Bar. For example:
On April 24, 2013, the United States Bankruptcy Court issued an order declaring Yan a vexatious litigant.
On April 13, 2015, the Honorable Richard Ulmer of the San Francisco Superior Court filed an order declaring Yan a vexatious litigant.
Were that not enough, in the very bankruptcy involved here—the bankruptcy that Yan claims, however wrongly, precludes an award of prejudgment interest—a three-judge bankruptcy panel for the Ninth Circuit filed a decision rejecting two appeals by appellants whose late-filed claims had been denied—the appellants being Yan's father and his sister and brother-in-law. There, in a six-page decision that discussed the history of the claims, the bankruptcy panel ended its decision with the following:
"C. Bankruptcy Aspects
"Besides a lack of proof, overriding bankruptcy principles would also support the bankruptcy court's decision to disallow of Appellants' claims under the circumstances of this case. In re Murgillo [(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1994)]176 B.R. [524,] 533. The record supports the bankruptcy court's explicit concern regarding the timing of Appellants' claims, i.e., that they served no valid bankruptcy purpose, but, instead, were strategically filed so that debtor could avoid paying his postpetition Judgment Creditors who had attached the surplus of this estate.
"Further, debtor has presented a myriad of changing stories in this case. Full disclosure in the bankruptcy schedules is essential to satisfy a significant purpose: That adequate information be available to the trustee without the need for investigation into whether the information is true. Debtor did not list Chiu's claim in his schedules, which were signed under penalty of perjury. Yet, debtor later declared under penalty of perjury that he owed the money when Chiu filed his tardy claim. Moreover, debtor listed his father's claim as $38,000, but he later admitted that he did not list the full amount of the debt because he did not want to create the appearance of questionable large claims from relatives. Debtor's failure to fully and adequately disclose not only has serious consequences, but his change in position demonstrates an intent to play fast and loose with the court, thereby prejudicing the trustee's administration of his estate. Had debtor listed the claims of his relatives as required, the trustee would have, before the Final Account, liquidated other assets to assure distribution to all creditors. Instead, she was prepared to abandon the assets to debtor.
"This later point directly relates to debtor's role in this appeal. His representation of Chiu and Yan as their attorney is truly troubling to this Panel. Where a debtor is a creditor's attorney, the conflict of interest involved is obvious. How can the debtor, as lawyer, advise his clients fully and effectively when the lawyer himself is on the other side of the bargaining table? Allowing Appellants' claims in full would compel the trustee to liquidate more of the to-be-abandoned estate, an obvious negative result to debtor." (Fn. omitted.)
The Appeal is Frivolous
On September 2, 2014, Li filed a motion for sanctions on the basis that Yan's repeated motions were frivolous. Yan filed brief opposition on September 13. We took no action on the motion at that time.
By letter of September 25, 2015, we advised Yan that on our own motion we were considering imposition of sanctions for "taking a frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1); In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654; In re Marriage of Schnabel (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 747, 753.)" The letter indicated that "Any opposition can be made by letter brief, which opposition shall be filed in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(d)." We received such brief from Yan on October, 5, 2015. The brief was 10 pages long, and was essentially a rambling recitation of what Yan claimed to be the facts, asserting among other things, that Judge Lee's "finding is contrary to the evidence."
Code of Civil Procedure section 907 provides that "When it appears to the reviewing court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it may add to the costs on appeal such damages as may be just." And California Rules of Court, rule 8.276, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a Court of Appeal may impose sanctions for "[t]aking a frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay.
"[A]n appeal taken despite the fact that no reasonable attorney could have thought it meritorious ties up judicial resources and diverts attention from the already burdensome volume of work at the appellate courts. Thus, an appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive-to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 650; see also, Keitel v. Heubel (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 324, 337.)
We addressed the issue of sanctions with Yan at oral argument, and his fundamental position was that his appeal presented a legal issue— "res judicata." This, of course, was not the issue we allowed him to brief. Regardless, Yan's position has no merit for several reasons.
First, there is real question whether res judicata was really an issue below. Yan filed a six-page issues/pretrial conference statement that under "contentions and applicable law" stated that "[t]he main issues in this case is [sic] whether there was negligence on the part of [Yan] as an attorney, and if so, if there are damages." The last paragraph of the section said only this: "LI voluntarily caused the dismissal with prejudice on August 20, 2007. YAN did not become LI's attorney until January 2009. Because the contract is barred by the principle of res judicata due to the dismissal with prejudice, there is no damage to LI." That was it.
There are no posttrial briefs in the record, so we do not know if any were even filed. The reporter's transcript does not contain any closing arguments, so we do not know if there were any. So, Yan does not demonstrate that res judicata was an issue.
Judge Lee's tentative statement of decision said nothing about res judicata. And Yan's lengthy opposition to the tentative decision included nine lines that began as follows: "Yan had raised the issue of res judicata in his briefs and arguments. Respectfully Yan requests the court to make a finding as to the applicability of res judicata . . . ." Judge Lee did not, her 16-page statement of decision not even mentioning the subject. In sum and in short, there is a real question whether the issue had been preserved for appeal.
But even if it had, Yan's treatment of the issue in his brief here is superficial at best, not even mentioning the elements of res judicata—or how they might possibly apply here. Yan's appeal is frivolous.
The description in Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 32 is apt. There, in ordering $32,000 in sanctions, the Court of Appeal said this: "Given the facts and controlling legal authority, we believe 'any reasonable attorney would agree that th[is] appeal is totally and completely without merit.' [Citation.] Indeed, given . . . appellate counsels' utter failure to discuss the most pertinent legal authority . . . , and their preparation of a grossly inadequate record, we conclude they knew as much, and subjectively prosecuted the appeal for an improper purpose. [Citation.]"
Sanctions are appropriate here, as they were in similar cases. (See Millennium Corporate Solutions v. Peckinpaugh (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 352, 360-363 [appeal "indisputably has no merit"]; Caro v. Smith (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 725, 738-739 [appeal "lack[ed] even arguable merit"]; Simonian v. Patterson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 773, 785-787 ["[N]o reasonable attorney could have thought this . . . appeal meritorious."].)
Li is not "the only person aggrieved by this frivolous appeal. Those litigants who have nonfrivolous appeals are waiting in line while we process the instant appeal. Several courts have approved of sanctions made payable to the Court of Appeal for the filing of a frivolous appeal." (Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1451.)
At least since 1988, when Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1 was decided, California courts had no difficulty concluding that Code of Civil Procedure section 907 and the appellate court rule authorize sanctions payable to the court. Finnie found that the costs compensable to the courts—and through them the taxpayers—for the expense of processing, reviewing, and deciding a frivolous appeal consisted of "the salaries paid to clerks, judicial attorneys, secretaries, and justices for their time expended[.]" (Id. at p. 17.) The court found that the cost calculation must be made on an objective basis; that is, the current cost of processing "an average civil appeal" (ibid.) which, at the time Finnie was decided, was (at least in this district) determined to be approximately $2,324. (Ibid.)
Since then various courts have assessed sanctions on this basis in varying amounts. The following are illustrative: Marriage of Economou (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 97, 107-108 (sanction of $15,000 as "proper total cost to the state assignable to this case"); Cohen v. General Motors Corp. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 893, 897 (finding $5,908.26 to be cost of average civil appeal); Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1621 (assessing sanction of $10,000, because "[s]urely the cost to process an average appeal has risen [from $3,995] since 1987"); Pollock v. University of Southern California (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1434 (noting $5,908.26 as state's cost to process average civil appeal in 2000).
It cannot be overlooked that Yan is not only a party, but is also an attorney, whose duty is "[t]o counsel or maintain those actions, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him or her legal or just . . . ." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (c); see also Cal. State Bar Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-200.)
In sum, we conclude that a sanction of $9,000 is appropriate, and order that the sanction be payable to Li, as it is he who has been most adversely affected by Yan's conduct.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Li is entitled to his costs on appeal. And Yan is sanctioned in the amount of $9,000, such sanction to be paid to Li within 30 days after this opinion becomes final. The clerk of this court is directed to forward a copy of this opinion to the State Bar upon issuance of the remittitur. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subd. (a).)
/s/_________
Richman, J. We concur: /s/_________
Kline, P.J. /s/_________
Stewart, J.