Opinion
A-13654
11-23-2022
MELISSA MARIE CHARLES, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Monique Eniero, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Ketchikan, Trial Court No. IKE-19-00500 CR Trevor Stephens, Judge.
Monique Eniero, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Melissa Marie Charles was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of second-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance for possessing, with the intent to deliver, heroin and methamphetamine. At trial, the State presented the testimony of Laneea Naufahu, who testified that Charles had provided her with an airplane ticket from Seattle to Ketchikan and then given her the drugs to carry while on the flight.
Former AS 11.71.030(a)(1)(A) (June 2019) and former AS 11.71.030(a)(1)(C) (June 2019), respectively.
On appeal, Charles raises two claims related to Naufahu's testimony. First, Charles argues that the superior court erred when it prevented her from cross-examining Naufahu about credit cards and checks belonging to someone else that were found on Naufahu when she was arrested. Charles argues that, in doing so, the court improperly restricted her ability to present evidence related to Naufahu's bias toward the State and therefore violated Charles's right to cross-examination.
A defendant's right to cross-examination is not violated whenever a court restricts inquiry into a witness's bias and motivation. Rather, "the trial court retains discretion to limit the specific questions allowed and the specific evidence admitted, as long as the jury receives 'information adequate to allow it to evaluate the bias and motives of a witness.'"
Williams v. State, 480 P.3d 95, 102 (Alaska App. 2021) (quoting Stumpf v. State, 749 P.2d 880, 901 (Alaska App. 1988)).
Here, the superior court allowed Charles to elicit substantial information about Naufahu's potential bias, including that Naufahu had been charged with criminal offenses for the drugs she carried on the plane and that she had made a plea bargain with the State to resolve her case. Naufahu admitted that she avoided significant jail time by accepting the State's offer, that her plea agreement and the terms of her probation required her to testify against Charles, and that she was currently on supervised probation with 18 months of suspended jail time hanging over her head. This was important evidence of bias.
In contrast, the relevancy of the credit cards and checks was questionable. Naufahu had not been charged with any crimes related to her possession of these items, and the prosecutor expressly informed the court that there was not enough evidence to charge Naufahu and that this conduct was not included in the plea bargain. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the superior court acted within its discretion when it precluded Charles from asking Naufahu about the potentially stolen credit cards and checks, and that Charles's right to cross-examination was not violated.
Second, Charles argues that the superior court erred when it precluded evidence of Naufahu's prior convictions for theft and forgery from 2007. (The superior court did admit evidence of Naufahu's more recent convictions for theft, forgery, and merchandise removal.)
We note that the opening brief does not acknowledge that Naufahu was impeached with her more recent convictions for theft, forgery, and merchandise removal; instead, the brief is written in such a way as to suggest that no prior convictions were admitted.
Charles acknowledges that Alaska Evidence Rule 609 generally limits the impeachment of a witness using prior convictions for crimes of dishonesty to only those convictions obtained within the preceding five years. She argues, however, that Naufahu's older convictions should have been admitted under the exception to this limitation for when the prior convictions are "necessary for a fair determination of the case." Charles claims that the older convictions were necessary for a fair determination of the case because they demonstrated "Naufahu's lifelong pattern of dishonesty."
Naufahu's pattern of dishonesty, however, was well-established at trial. The superior court admitted five of Naufahu's prior convictions for theft, forgery, and merchandise removal that occurred within the preceding seven years. As the court found, "five convictions within a relatively short period of time is more than sufficient" to allow Charles to attack Naufahu's credibility. Furthermore, the prosecutor conceded in his closing address that Naufahu had a history of lying. Finally, the court instructed the jurors that they should consider Naufahu's testimony "with distrust" and that Charles could not be convicted based on Naufahu's testimony unless there was corroborating evidence. Under these circumstances, the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that evidence of Naufahu's older convictions was not necessary to a fair determination of the case.
See Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512, 515 (Alaska 1974) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of stale forgeries in part because the witness admitted to multiple more recent forgeries); Kitchok v. State, 2004 WL 1059249, at *2 (Alaska App. May 12, 2004) (unpublished) (affirming trial court's decision not to relax the five-year limit where there was significant other evidence attacking the witness's credibility).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.