Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-10746 Trial Court No. 3AN-09-8163 CR No. 5886
09-26-2012
BRIAN CHARLES, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Sharon Barr, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. W. H. Hawley, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding precedent for any proposition of law.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND JUDGMENT
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael Spaan, Judge.
Appearances: Sharon Barr, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. W. H. Hawley, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
BOLGER, Judge.
Brian Charles was convicted of felony driving under the influence and failing to provide immediate notice of an accident after he drove a truck into a gate at the entrance to Elmendorf Air Force Base. Prior to his arrest, Charles was questioned at the accident scene by Anchorage Police Officer Steven Childers. Before trial, Charles moved to suppress his statements to the officer, asserting that he had not received Miranda warnings. Superior Court Judge Michael Spaan denied the motion, and Charles now appeals Judge Spaan's decision. We conclude that Charles was subjected to a valid investigatory stop and was not in Miranda custody during this interrogation.
Background
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on July 18, 2009, Officer Childers responded to a report of a hit-and-run accident at Elmendorf Air Force Base's north post gate. A black truck had collided with the gate, running through the outer fence and into a second barrier of reinforced steel. The truck was unoccupied when Childers arrived.
An Air Force security officer, Sergeant Kurt Lugar, also reported to the area to search for the missing driver. As Lugar approached the accident site, he noticed Brian Charles approximately 50 to 100 yards away. Charles had dried blood on his nose and a big bruise on his neck continuing down his body at an angle. Lugar questioned Charles and determined that he might have been involved in the accident. He relayed this information to Officer Childers, and Childers then asked Charles a number of questions.
Prior to trial, Charles moved to suppress the statements he had made to Officer Childers, claiming that he had been subjected to custodial interrogation without having been given Miranda warnings. Both Officer Childers and Sergeant Lugar testified at an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
Officer Childers testified that Sergeant Lugar had approached him and told him that he had found someone who might have been involved in the accident. Charles walked toward Childers, and Childers walked up to meet him. After a few questions, Childers said "let's walk over towards the [truck]." He then continued questioning Charles about what had happened.
Childers testified that during this questioning, he was the only officer near Charles and the only municipal police officer at the scene. The next closest person was ten to twenty-five feet away. The other people at the scene included firefighters and security personnel from the base who were there to help clean up the scene and repair the gates.
Childers testified that he did not expressly tell Charles he was free to leave. However, Childers testified that Charles was free to leave and was not in handcuffs because he did not know whether Charles was the person who had been driving the truck. He testified that he was not sure if Charles was an actual suspect until the end of the conversation and that, although he felt that Charles was not being truthful, that did not necessarily mean he was the driver of the truck.
Childers testified that after questioning Charles he placed him in the back seat of his patrol car because it was cold outside and Charles was wet. Childers patted Charles down before putting him in the patrol car. Childers did not draw his gun, and Charles was not placed in handcuffs. Another officer arrived shortly thereafter, and administered field sobriety tests to Charles. Charles was then arrested and charged with felony driving under the influence and failing to provide immediate notice of an accident.
Superior Court Judge Michael Spaan denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Charles had not been in custody for Miranda purposes. Following a jury trial, Charles was convicted of felony driving under the influence and failing to provide immediate notice of an accident.
AS 28.35.030(n).
AS 28.35.080.
Discussion
We generally focus on two inquiries to determine whether a person is in custody and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings: (1) the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and (2) given the totality of those circumstances, whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. The ultimate inquiry is whether there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."
State v. Smith, 38 P.3d 1149, 1154 (Alaska 2002) (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
Smith, 38 P.3d at 1154 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted).
However, in Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings are not necessarily required during a traffic stop, even though the person stopped may not reasonably believe he or she is free to leave. Thus, "[a] suspect is not entitled to a Miranda warning during an investigatory stop, unless they are 'detained under circumstances substantially more coercive than the typical traffic stop, and that coercion actually impairs the free exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.'"
468 U.S. 420, 436-37, 440 (1984).
Shay v. State, 258 P.3d 902, 905 (Alaska App. 2011) (quoting Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 515 (Alaska App. 1988)).
For example, in Blake v. State, the defendant was driving along the Elliot Highway when he was flagged down by two wildlife protection officers. The officers questioned Blake about a bear that had been killed nearby, and Blake consented to a search of his truck. We adopted the Berkemer rationale, and concluded that no Miranda warnings were required, because Blake was questioned during an investigatory stop.
Id. at 512-13.
Id. at 515.
Likewise, in McCollum v. State, a state trooper stopped the defendant in a grocery store parking lot to question him about some damaged shopping carts. The officer put the defendant in his patrol car, questioned him for five to ten minutes, and told the defendant to "stay put" while the officer briefly left the car. We concluded that no Miranda warnings were required because this investigation did not exceed the scope of a typical investigatory stop.
808 P.2d 268, 268 (Alaska App. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 269-70.
Similarly, in Shay v. State, a police officer stopped the defendant, who was on foot on a rural highway about a mile away from the site of a single-vehicle accident. Shortly thereafter, a state trooper frisked the defendant for weapons, asked him to sit down on the bumper of the patrol car, and questioned him about where he had come from. We concluded that no Miranda warnings were required because this questioning was part of a normal investigatory stop.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 906.
In this case, Charles's contact with Officer Childers appears to have been part of a routine investigative stop like these reported decisions. Judge Spaan found that Childers had reasonable suspicion to stop Charles and question him — Charles was obviously injured and walking alone, early in the morning, near the scene of a traffic accident. And Childers's questioning of Charles took place on the side of a public road, under circumstances much less coercive than the atmosphere of a police station.
Charles challenges one of Judge Spaan's factual findings — the finding that Charles was not escorted by Air Force personnel to speak with Officer Childers. He relies on Sergeant Lugar's testimony at the evidentiary hearing that he and his partner had "walked [Charles] around the search pit." But Lugar's reference to his partner escorting Charles around a search pit was related to the time Charles was with the Air Force personnel before Lugar first approached Childers. Lugar's testimony is not very clear about exactly how Charles ended up with Childers.
We are required to accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In this case, we conclude that Judge Spaan's finding is adequately supported by Childers's testimony. Childers testified that after he was contacted by Lugar, he turned around and saw other base security officers "letting [Charles] walk away from them." Childers testified that Charles appeared to be free, and there was nobody walking with him. Childers later clarified that, although there were people behind Charles, they were at least ten to fifteen feet away from him. Based on this testimony, we conclude that Judge Spaan's finding is not clearly erroneous.
Id. at 905.
Charles also argues that his detention exceeded the scope of an investigative stop because the questioning was confrontational. He points out that Childers stated multiple times that he thought Charles was lying. Childers initially suggested that Charles was lying to protect his cousin (who was the registered owner of the vehicle), but Childers eventually told Charles that he thought Charles was guilty. In his decision denying Charles's motion, Judge Spaan recognized this evidence, but he also found that Childers did not raise his voice or speak harshly with Charles.
The fact that Childers accused Charles of lying does not, by itself, mean that Charles was in custody. In State v. Smith, an officer accused the defendant of committing the crime about which he was being questioned, noted the evidence against him, and told him that he needed to tell the truth. Despite these statements, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the interview was noncustodial because, among other reasons, the officer's demeanor remained calm and his tone of voice was sympathetic.
Id. at 1157, 1159.
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Similarly here, the recording of the interview suggests that Childers was polite, calm, and professional throughout the questioning. We conclude that the nature of Childers's questions did not convert this investigatory stop into a detention that was similar to an arrest.
All in all, the circumstances of Charles's detention were not more coercive than the investigative stops we reviewed in Blake, McCollum, and Shay. Childers did not arrest Charles or impose any serious restraint until Charles was placed in the patrol car at the conclusion of the interview. We conclude that these circumstances did not constitute custodial interrogation.
Conclusion
We therefore AFFIRM the superior court's judgment.