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Charcoal Hearth Restaurant v. Kandetzki

Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jan 7, 1986
338 S.E.2d 352 (Va. Ct. App. 1986)

Summary

stating one purpose of the after-discovered evidence rule is "finality in the decision making process"

Summary of this case from Wal-Mart Assoc. v. Jones

Opinion

44886 No. 0136-85

Argued September 10, 1985

Decided January 7, 1986

(1) Workers' Compensation — Industrial Commission Review — Newly Discovered Evidence. — The Commission's rule on reopening of cases and taking additional evidence serves two important goals; it assures an opposing party the opportunity to rebut additional testimony and it supports finality in the decision making process.

J. Alvernon Smith, Jr. (Samuel Baronian, Jr.; Smith, Blank, Isaacs, Hinton, on brief, for appellant.

Julia H. Butler (Ashcraft Gerel, on brief), for appellee.


SUMMARY

Employer appealed a decision of the Industrial Commission finding that the employer had failed to sustain the burden of showing a change in condition. The employer contended that the Commission erred when it considered medical evidence adduced after the decision of the deputy commissioner.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission failed to apply its rule on reopening cases and taking additional testimony.

Reversed and remanded.


OPINION


In this appeal from the Industrial Commission the issue is whether a medical report received after a hearing before a deputy commissioner was properly considered by the full Commission upon its review. We conclude that the report should not have been considered and reverse.

Susan Anne Kandetzki was receiving compensation for a work-related injury to her back and right side when her employer, Charcoal Hearth Restaurant, and its insurer filed an application for a change in condition. Following a hearing on June 11, 1984, the deputy commissioner found that her incapacity had ceased and on June 21, 1984, vacated the award.

On December 4, 1984, the full Commission restored Kandetzki's compensation upon finding that the employer had failed to meet its burden of proof. The Commission relied upon a report of Dr. Matthew N. Smith, a neurosurgeon, dated October 4, 1983, but not received by the Commission until August 21, 1984, after the hearing before the deputy commissioner.

(1) Rule 3 of the Industrial Commission, then in effect, provided, in part:

Rule 3 was amended effective September 1, 1985.

After the hearing of a case by a Commissioner, or Deputy Commissioner . . . no additional testimony will be introduced upon review, and any petition for a reopening of the case and the taking of additional testimony will only be favorably acted upon by the full Commission where it appears to the Commission that such course is absolutely necessary and advisable and also where the party requesting the same is able to conform to the rules prevailing in courts of this State for the introduction of after-discovered evidence. A formal petition shall be filed previous to the hearing upon review in all cases where such request is made with the Commission and a copy of the same furnished the opposite party, or his attorney. Such petition shall conform to those required in courts upon applications for the introduction of newly-discovered evidence.

This rule was not followed. A formal petition requesting the reopening of the case and the taking of additional testimony was not filed nor was there any action by the full Commission allowing the case to be reopened and additional testimony taken.

This rule serves important goals. It assures an opposing party the opportunity to rebut additional testimony introduced after the hearing of a case. It also supports finality in the decision making process.

The Commission erred in considering the report filed after the hearing of the case without insisting upon compliance with its own rule. See Pittston Co. v. Folks, 201 Va. 128, 134, 109 S.E.2d 387, 392 (1959). Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's decision and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Benton, J., and Keenan, J., concurred.


Summaries of

Charcoal Hearth Restaurant v. Kandetzki

Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jan 7, 1986
338 S.E.2d 352 (Va. Ct. App. 1986)

stating one purpose of the after-discovered evidence rule is "finality in the decision making process"

Summary of this case from Wal-Mart Assoc. v. Jones

In Charcoal Hearth Restaurant v. Kandetzki, 1 Va. App. 327, 328-29, 338 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1986), we held that in the absence of a formal petition requesting the reopening of the case and the taking of additional testimony, the commission's rules preclude it from considering on review additional evidence or medical reports that were not available to the deputy commissioner.

Summary of this case from Arlington Hospital v. Geisen

In Charcoal Hearth Restaurant v. Kandetzki, 1 Va. App. 327, 338 S.E.2d 352 (1986), this Court, quoting Rule 3 of the Rules of the Industrial Commission, held that "[t]he Commission erred in considering the report filed after the hearing of the case without insisting upon compliance with its own rule."

Summary of this case from Kirk Plastering Co. v. Netherwood
Case details for

Charcoal Hearth Restaurant v. Kandetzki

Case Details

Full title:CHARCOAL HEARTH RESTAURANT, et al. v. SUSAN ANNE KANDETZKI

Court:Court of Appeals of Virginia

Date published: Jan 7, 1986

Citations

338 S.E.2d 352 (Va. Ct. App. 1986)
338 S.E.2d 352

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