Opinion
21-CV-3906(KAM)
2021-09-03
Malachi CHAPMAN, on Behalf of Himself and All Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Defendant.
Malachi Chapman, Brooklyn, NY, Pro Se.
Malachi Chapman, Brooklyn, NY, Pro Se.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge.
On July 2, 2021, Plaintiff Malachi Chapman ("Plaintiff" or "Chapman"), commenced this action against the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"). (See ECF No. 1, Complaint ("Compl.").) Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro s e, his complaint also names as plaintiffs a class of "all other[s] similarly situated." (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff has paid the Court's filing fee to initiate this action. (ECF No. 2, Filing Fee.) For the reasons discussed below, the Complaint is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this alleged class action pursuant to the Hate Crimes Act, 18 U.S. Code § 249 ; Conspiracy Against Rights, 18 U.S. Code § 241 ; Deprivation of Rights under color of law, 18 U.S. Code § 241 ; the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute, 42 U.S. Code § 14141, recodified at 34 U.S. Code 12601 ; the False Claims Act, 31 U.S. Code § 3729 ; and Misprison of Treason, 18 U.S. Code § 2382. (Compl. at ¶¶ 204-232.) Plaintiff alleges that a "class of parents" experienced "traumatic events," including seeing their "children forcefully [being] taken away and being submitted to the sexually, mentally, and physically abusive foster system." (Id. at ¶ 16.)
Although his allegations are unclear, it appears that Chapman is involved in an action in Kings County Family Court and that his child was removed and placed into the foster care system. (See id. at ¶¶ 19-28.) Chapman asserts a host of claims against individuals who work in Kings County Family Court. (Id. ) For example, Chapman alleges that Judge Judith Waksberg, a Kings County Family Court Judge, "committed an abuse of process and malicious prosecution" and that John Fasone, a Kings County Support Magistrate, "entered a fictitious order" against Mr. Chapman. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.) Plaintiff also alleges that Kathleen Landaverde, Case Manager at the Appellate Court, "is liable for suborning perjury, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, abuse of process and malicious prosecution, and conspiring both against Complainant's human rights and constitutional rights." (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff's complaint includes a list of twenty purported class members, located throughout the country, and describes their challenges with various family courts. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-203.)
Chapman alleges that "[a]s a result of Defendant's [DOJ's] actions/inactions, [p]arents have lost their children," (Id. at ¶ 216), and further alleges the DOJ's agencies have "subjected the children to child trafficking and child abuse." (Id. at ¶ 219.) Chapman further alleges that Defendant "conspired to fraudulently put innocent individuals[’] names on [the] Child Abuse Registry in order to compensate for the number of child abusers that were missing from registry lists." (Id. at ¶ 228.) Chapman lastly alleges that Defendant "suppressed complaints of high-treason committed by judges ...." Chapman seeks monetary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Matson v. Bd. of Educ. , 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful that a plaintiff's pleadings should be held "to less stringent standards than normal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ); see Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly , the Court "remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally").
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that a complaint "must contain: ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Essentially, Rule 8 ensures that a complaint provides a defendant with sufficient notice of the claims against it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ; Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A complaint that is "so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised," fails to comply with Rule 8. Salahuddin v. Cuomo , 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) ; see Simmons v. Abruzzo , 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995). "When a complaint fails to comply with these requirements [contained in Rule 8 ], the district court has the power, on motion or sua sponte , to dismiss the complaint or to strike such parts as are redundant or immaterial." Simmons , 49 F.3d at 86 (citing Salahuddin , 861 F.2d at 42 ).
Federal court jurisdiction exists only when a "federal question" is presented ( 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ), or when there is "diversity of citizenship" and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal courts "have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) ). When a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Id., see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff's claims, even liberally construed, fail to state claims based on federal question jurisdiction. Moreover, based on the complaint, diversity jurisdiction appears to be lacking to the extent Plaintiff has alleged facts involving New York State court employees. The judicial officers and courthouse staff against whom Plaintiff makes allegations are immune from suit. See Bliven v. Hunt , 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) ("It is well settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions"); see also Chris H. v. New York , No. 16 CIV. 6807 (LGS), 2017 WL 2880848, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017), aff'd, 764 F. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2019) ("A judge or Support Magistrate acting in a judicial capacity is entitled to absolute judicial immunity if (1) the judge or Support Magistrate had jurisdiction over the subject matter before her at the time she took the challenged action and (2) the relevant action was judicial in nature"); see also Burns v. Reed , 500 U.S. 478, 485, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (Certain actors associated with the courts enjoy absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from suit because such immunity is "necessary to protect the judicial process.")
Additionally, even if a plaintiff has paid the filing fee, a district court may dismiss the case, sua sponte , if it determines that the action is frivolous. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp. , 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000). An action is frivolous as a matter of law when, inter alia , it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory"– that is, when it "lacks an arguable basis in law ..., or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint." Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co. , 141 F.3d 434, 473 (2d Cir. 1998).
DISCUSSION
I. Class Action
At the outset, the Court notes that to the extent that Chapman seeks to bring a class action on behalf of all other individuals similarly situated he may not do so. It is well settled that a pro se plaintiff may not represent the interests of third parties. Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) ; Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1997) ; see also Kimber v. Tallon , 556 Fed. Appx. 27, 28 (2d Cir. 2014) ("Generally, it is inappropriate for a pro se litigant to represent the interests of a class."); Garcia v. City of New York , No. 15-Civ.-7470, 2017 WL 1169640, at *5 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017) ; Jaffe v. Capital One Bank , No. 09-Civ.-4106, 2010 WL 691639, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) ("[A] pro se plaintiff may not bring an action in which he will serve as both class representative and class counsel.") Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and cannot bring a class action on behalf of others. Consequently, the Court dismisses without prejudice any claims Chapman asserts on behalf of any individual other than himself.
II. Plaintiff's Claims Against the Department of Justice
To the extent that Chapman seeks money damages for the harm he allegedly suffered because of the DOJ's failure to investigate injustices within the family court and foster care systems, his claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is well established that "the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). Such consent to suit "must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text and cannot simply be implied." Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) ). Moreover, "[b]ecause an action against a federal agency or federal officers in their official capacities is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are ... barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived." Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp. , 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–87, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994).) "Bivens authorizes suits against the responsible federal official, not against the government itself, and Bivens -type actions against the United States are ... routinely dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1983). Accordingly, Plaintiff may not maintain an action against the DOJ, a federal agency, for allegedly violating his constitutional rights. See FDIC, 510 U.S. at 484–86, 114 S.Ct. 996 (declining to extend Bivens to federal agencies).
III. Domestic-Relations Exception
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa P.C. v. Dupont , 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), and may only hear cases if there is diversity of citizenship or a federal question at issue. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a domestic relations exception to subject matter jurisdiction that "divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." Ankenbrandt v. Richards , 504 U.S. 689, 703, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992) ; Tait v. Powell , 241 F. Supp. 3d 372, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). The domestic relations exception arises from the Supreme Court's recognition that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States," In re Burrus , 136 U.S. 586, 593–94, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890), and it is equally applicable whether jurisdiction is asserted pursuant to federal question or diversity jurisdiction. See Dowlah v. Dowlah , No. 09-CV-2020, 2010 WL 889292, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2010) ("While the exception finds its origin in an interpretation of the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, it also has been applied to federal question jurisdiction ....").
Although the domestic relations exception is narrow in its focus, Williams v. Lambert , 46 F.3d 1275, 1283 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit has repeatedly held that "subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking in actions directed at challenging the results of domestic relations proceedings," Martinez v. Queens Cty. Dist. Att'y, 596 Fed.Appx. 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2015), and that "a plaintiff cannot obtain federal jurisdiction merely by rewriting a domestic dispute as a tort claim for monetary damages." Schottel v. Kutyba, No. 06-CV-1577, 2009 WL 230106, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) ; Baskerville v. Administration for Children's Services , No. 19-cv-00602, 2020 WL 59826, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2020) (noting that district courts have discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction as long as full and fair adjudication is available in state courts).
Here, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant Chapman the relief that he seeks. In addition to monetary damages, Chapman seeks, inter alia , the removal of his name from the child abuse registry, that "court orders be immediately voided," and that his child be removed from foster care and returned to Mr. Chapman. (Compl. at 42-43.) Accordingly, if the Court were to consider Plaintiff's claims, it would be required to intrude into a family court matter, a position that is wholly inappropriate for a federal court. See e.g., Shivananjappa v. Bhayani , No. 20-CV-1138, 2020 WL 1957528, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2020) (dismissing claims where plaintiff "asks the court to issue custody, child support, and spousal support rulings" as well as claims for unspecified damages); Brown v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-108, 2019 WL 235642, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2019).
CONCLUSION
The complaint is hereby dismissed without prejudice because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and pursuant to the domestic-relations exception. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order and the judgment to plaintiff, note the service on the docket, and close the case.
Although Plaintiff has paid the filing fee to bring this action, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3) that any in forma pauperis appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962).
SO ORDERED .