Opinion
C/A 8:23-cv-02286-TMC-JDA
06-14-2023
Edward Terrell Chandler, Petitioner, v. Warden of Evans Correctional Institution, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Edward Terrell Chandler (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is presently confined at the Evans Correctional Institution. [Doc. 1 at 1.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Judge. For the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner commenced this action by filing a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the standard court form (the “Petition”). [Doc. 1.] Petitioner alleges that he was convicted and sentenced in the Edgefield County Court of General Sessions as follows: he was convicted of burglary 1st degree, kidnapping, strong arm robbery, and criminal sexual conduct in the 1st degree, and he was sentenced to 60 years, 30 years, 30 years, and 30 years respectively as to those convictions. [Id. at 1.] Petitioner's convictions and sentences were affirmed by the South Carolina Court of Appeals.
Petitioner asserts the following ground in the present Petition:
GROUND ONE: Prosecutorial Misconduct
Supporting Facts: Former Solicitor Ervin Maye ordered Inv[estigator] Curtis Morris to request “false” positive presumptive test results from the SLED agency. In which was presented to jury the expert testimony at trial.[Id. at 5.] For his relief, Petitioner requests that the Court vacate or reverse and remand his conviction. [Id. at 15.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se petition filed in the above-captioned case. The review was conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
Petitioner filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This statute authorizes the Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, is frivolous or malicious, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012). Pursuant to this rule, a district court is “authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994).
Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the legality or duration of his custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Under § 2254, a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
This action is subject to summary dismissal because Petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies. The exhaustion of state court remedies is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), which provides that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ....” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Straws v. Padula, No. 4:09-cv-009-HFF-TER, 2009 WL 691190, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2009). “The exhaustion requirement is ‘grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights.'” Washington v. Cartledge, No. 4:08-cv-4052-PMD, 2010 WL 1257356, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2010) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991)). As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “a federal habeas court may consider only those issues which have been ‘fairly presented' to the state courts.” Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 910-11 (4th Cir. 1997) (instructing that, “to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must fairly present his claim to the state's highest court. The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies with the petitioner.”) (citations omitted).
A state prisoner seeking habeas relief ordinarily “must exhaust his remedies in state court” and must “give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 845 (1999); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (explaining the exhaustion requirement). To exhaust state court remedies in South Carolina from a criminal conviction or sentence, a defendant may file a direct appeal. See State v. Northcutt, 641 S.E.2d 873 (S.C. 2007). If a direct appeal was filed and is ultimately unsuccessful (or if no direct appeal was filed), a petitioner may file a PCR application in a court of common pleas. See S.C. Code § 17-27-10, et seq. (1976); see also Miller v. Harvey, 566 F.2d 879, 880-81 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting that South Carolina's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is a viable state court remedy). If a South Carolina prisoner's PCR application is denied or dismissed by a court of common pleas, a petitioner can file a request for writ of certiorari with a South Carolina appellate court. See S.C. Code § 17-27-100; Knight v. State, 325 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1985). In fact, if a petitioner's PCR application is denied by a court of common pleas, the petitioner must seek appellate review in the state courts or federal collateral review of the grounds raised in his PCR application may be barred by a procedural default. See Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 447-48 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that exhaustion requires state prisoners to complete at least one complete round of the state's established appellate review process by presenting the ground for relief in a face-up and square fashion).
Here, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal because Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies. The Court will begin with a brief summary of Petitioner's relevant state court proceedings.
The Court takes judicial notice of Petitioner's state court actions including the original criminal proceedings, his applications for post-conviction relief, and his appeals from those actions. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
As noted, Petitioner was convicted on July 22, 2016, in the Edgefield County Court of General Sessions for the crimes of burglary first degree, strong armed robbery, kidnapping, and first degree criminal sexual conduct, and he was sentenced to multiple terms of imprisonment, including a 60-year term, with credit for time served since February 24, 2015. See Edgefield County Eleventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Edgefield/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by Petitioner's first and last name, and case numbers 2016GS1900378, 2016GS1900381, 2016GS1900382, 2016GS1900383) (last visited June 13, 2023). Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal on July 27, 2016, at case number 2016-001554. The Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on October 9, 2019, and issued a remittitur on November 13, 2019. See State v. Chandler, No. 2016-001554 (S.C. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019), available at https://ctrack.sccourts.org/public/caseSearch.do (search by case number “2016-001554”) (last visited June 13, 2023).
Petitioner then filed an action in the Edgefield County Court of Common Pleas seeking post-conviction relief (the “PCR action”) on March 23, 2020. See Chandler v. State, No. 2020-cp-19-00085, available at the Edgefield County Eleventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Edgefield/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by Petitioner's first and last name, and case number 2020cp1900085) (last visited June 13, 2023). The PCR court entered an order of dismissal on July 26, 2022. Id. Petitioner then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter and/or amend the judgment on August 15, 2022, and a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment on May 11, 2023. Id. Both of those motions remain pending in the PCR court. Id.
Petitioner also filed two notices of appeal from the PCR action in the South Carolina Supreme Court. Petitioner filed his first appeal on June 23, 2022, which was dismissed on June 29, 2022, with a remittitur issued on July 18, 2022. See Chandler v. State, No. 2022-000872 (S.C. June 29, 2022). Petitioner filed his second appeal on February 13, 2023, which was dismissed on April 13, 2023. See Chandler v. State, No. 2022-000410 (S.C. Apr. 13, 2023). A remittitur has not yet issued in that case. Id.
As noted, Petitioner's motions for reconsideration and/or relief from the PCR court's order of dismissal remain pending. And Petitioner's motions in the PCR court address the single ground raised in this action. Therefore, Petitioner cannot demonstrate exhaustion of his state remedies as required by the federal habeas statute. See Boone v. Eagleton, No. 5:17-cv-01160-RMG-KDW, 2017 WL 2729861, at *3 (D.S.C. May 31, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 2731314 (D.S.C. June 23, 2017); Richardson v. Eagleton, No. 4:08-cv-3557-RBH-TER, 2009 WL 3523945, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2009) (dismissing habeas petition where the petitioner's appeal was pending and had not been ruled on by the state appellate courts and noting “he has not exhausted his state court remedies” because “he still has a viable state court remedy which has not been fully utilized”). As such, this Court should not keep this case on its docket while Petitioner finishes exhausting his state remedies. See Hubbard v. Virginia, No. 7:10-cv-00273, 2010 WL 2605351, at *2 (W.D. Va. June 25, 2010) (dismissing action where it was clear that the petitioner had available state court remedies, including his pending appeal in the state court of appeals). For these reasons, the instant Petition is subject to summary dismissal without prejudice.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file an answer or return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).