Opinion
No. CV 06-500 10 51 S
October 30, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Motion #124.00)
On December 22, 2005, the plaintiff, Suzanne Champagne, filed a two-count complaint against defendants TJ Realty and The Scrapbook Palace, alleging negligence and carelessness resulting in the plaintiff's injury when she fell down a flight of stairs. The plaintiff was a customer of The Scrapbook Palace when she mistakenly entered through a door marked "employees only," believing it to be the bathroom. She thereafter fell down a flight of stairs, causing injury. The plaintiff alleges that as an invitee to the store, the defendants breached their duty to her and are liable for her injuries.
The defendants TJ Realty and The Scrapbook Palace filed a motion for summary judgment on August 2, 2007, and submitted a memorandum of law together with affidavits and depositions. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment on September 7, 2007.
TJ Realty filed a motion with the court on September 27, 2007, pursuant to General Statutes § 17-44, to join the defendant The Scrapbook Palace's August motion for summary judgment. The Scrapbook Palace and TJ Realty are collectively referred to as "the defendants."
DISCUSSION
It is well established that "[s]ummary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).
"[T]he `genuine issue' aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). "`Issue of fact' encompasses not only evidentiary facts in issue but also questions as to how the trier would characterize such evidentiary facts and what inferences and conclusions it would draw from them." United Oil Co. v. Urban Development Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 379, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).
"Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 319, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).
"When a motion for summary judgment is filed and supported by affidavits and other documents, an adverse party, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by [§§ 17-45 and 17-46 of the Practice Book], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, and if he does not so respond, summary judgment shall be entered against him." Farrell v. Farrell, 182 Conn. 34, 38, 438 A.2d 415 (1980).
"[T]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 822 A.2d 1202 (2003). "[O]nly if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Assn., Inc., 264 Conn. 474, 478-79, 822 A.2d 1202 (2003).
In the present case, the defendants presented proof that: the stairs on which the plaintiff fell were in an area not open to the public; only employees and members of their families were allowed access to the basement; customers did not use the basement; the doorway leading to the basement had a red sign on it indicating "Employees Only"; the plaintiff saw and read the sign before opening the door; prior to this incident, no other customer had confused the basement door for a bathroom door; there was a bathroom in the same room as the entrance to the basement, but this bathroom was for employees only and had a sign not only indicating it was for employees only, but also directing customers to a separate room where the public bathroom was located.
The plaintiff filed a response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, putting forth the same facts as the defendants. The plaintiff alleges, however, that she was an invitee and the defendants therefore owed her a duty of care. The plaintiff's memorandum cited the case of Knapp v. Connecticut Theatrical Corp., 122 Conn. 413, 190 A.2d 291 (1937), an action brought in negligence. In Knapp, the decedent was a patron of a theater, who, while looking for the men's room, entered an unlatched door by accident, falling down a flight of stairs and sustaining injuries. The plaintiff brought a civil suit claiming that the theater was negligent in leaving the door to the basement unlocked and providing no warning to patrons. The Knapp trial court addressed the duty owed to the decedent. The court found that the decedent was a trespasser, not an invitee, and was therefore guilty of contributory negligence. On appeal, the Supreme Court revisited the status of the decedent in the theater. In doing so, the court determined that an individual may be an invitee as to one portion of the building and a trespasser as to another. Referring to invitee status, the court stated: "that status does not exist when the invitee is using a portion of the premises to which the invitation has not been extended, either expressly or impliedly, and which the owner would not reasonably expect the invitee to use in connection with the conduct of the business on the premises." Id., 416.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff has left unchallenged the evidence that she exceeded the scope of her invitation by entering the door that clearly marked the area restricted to employees only and by opening the basement door. Under these unchallenged set of circumstances, "the . . . only duty [owed to the plaintiff] was to refrain from causing . . . injury `intentionally, or by willful, wanton or reckless conduct.'" Salaman v. Waterbury, 246 Conn. 298, 305, 717 A.2d 161 (1998). The plaintiff has not presented anything to indicate that the defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of trespassers intruding into this restricted area, and therefore would not satisfy the requirements for the exception to this rule: "Liability in negligence for a dangerous condition on land will attach only if the possessor has actual or constructive knowledge that `trespassers constantly intrude[d] upon a limited area of the land.'" Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, 243 Conn. 552, 560, 707 A.2d 15 (1998).
In addition to the status of the decedent, the Knapp court relied on evidence that the decedent was neither reasonable nor prudent. In the present case, the defendants have put forth similar evidence. They submitted affidavits and depositions showing that the basement door was well marked and that customers had never been invited through the door. Again, the plaintiff did not provide evidence or testimonial assertions that she made a reasonable mistake in entering through the employees' door. To survive a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). The court "may appropriately render summary judgment when the documents submitted demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining between the parties and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 568, 512 A.2d 893 (1986).
Therefore, because the plaintiff has not provided an evidentiary foundation for a genuine issue of material fact, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.