Opinion
NO. 2013 CU 1851
03-21-2014
AMY ANNETTE CENTANNI v. PAUL BRIAN SPRADLEY
AMY ANNETTE CENTANNI ST. AMANT, LA IN PROPER PERSON PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE PAUL B. SPRADLEY HARAHAN, LA IN PROPER PERSON DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
23rd Judicial District Court
in and for the Parish of Ascension, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 96,405
Honorable Thomas Kliebert, Jr., Judge
AMY ANNETTE CENTANNI
ST. AMANT, LA
IN PROPER PERSON
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
PAUL B. SPRADLEY
HARAHAN, LA
IN PROPER PERSON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
BEFORE: PETTIGREW, McDONALD, AND McCLENDON, JJ.
PETTIGREW, J.
This is an appeal by Paul Brian Spradley (Mr. Spradley), the father of a minor child, from an August 14, 2013 judgment that denied his rule for contempt. The trial court found the mother of the minor child, Amy Annette Centanni (Ms. Centanni), did not intentionally violate without justifiable cause the court's previous order regarding custody and visitation of the minor child. Mr. Spradley aiso appeals the judgment on the basis that, without the request of either party, the trial court unilaterally considered and modified its previous order, changing the visitation schedule and imposing all costs of transportation necessitated by visitation on Mr. Spradley. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties herein, who were never married, are the parents of a minor daughter who was born on April 19, 1999. As a result of a filiation action filed by Mr. Spradley in the family court of East Baton Rouge Parish, a March 23, 2000 judgment declared him to be the biological father of said child. That same judgment awarded the parties joint custody, with Ms. Centanni having domiciliary custody, and ordered Mr. Spradley to pay $200.00 per month in child support. The judgment also awarded Mr. Spradley visitation every other weekend, from 7:00 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, together with one half of all holidays and two weeks every summer.
The judgment ordered visitation to be from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. every Friday and Saturday, until the child turned fifteen months old, at which time it reverted to every other weekend.
In May 2010, Ms. Centanni filed a petition in Ascension Parish to make the EBRP judgment executory, and sought an increase in child support, provisions for extraordinary and extracurricular expenses, and more specific visitation. By judgment dated August 31, 2010, the court denied Ms. Centanni's request for increased child support, but ordered Mr. Spradley to pay fifty percent (50%) of all extracurricular expenses and fifty percent (50%) of all school expenses. The court maintained the joint custody of the child, but designated both parents as co-domiciliary parents, depending on which party had physical custody at the time. Visitation was set for Mr. Spradley to have the child every other weekend, from the time she was released from school on Fridays until 6:00 p.m. on Sundays, and every other week, for a week at a time, during the summer. The judgment also provided that the parent receiving custodial visitation (Mr. Spradley) would be responsible for picking up the child from school, and the parent receiving the child at the conclusion of visitation (Ms. Centanni) would be responsible for picking up the child from the returning custodial parent. (The judgment also provided specifics for visitation on holidays.) The judgment ordered that each parent notify the other forty-eight (48) hours in advance if and when the visitation schedule could not be followed. The judgment further ordered the parents to communicate with each other by e-mail or text message, and that all major decisions concerning the child be jointly made and shared - and in the event of a dispute - the issue should be submitted to the court for resolution. Each party was ordered to facilitate and encourage a positive relationship between the child and the other parent, and it was ordered that each party was entitled to immediate access (from each other or from a third party) to all records and information pertinent to the child. Finally, both parents were ordered to assist the child with homework and encourage regular study habits.
PRIOR RULE FOR CONTEMPT
On March 29, 2011, Mr. Spradley filed a rule for contempt alleging several instances of Ms. Centanni's willful disobedience of the court's prior judgments. In that rule, Mr. Spradley alleges that Ms. Centanni signed a stipulated judgment (that is not contained in the record before us), agreeing to perform fifty percent (50%) of the transportation duties related to the scheduled visitation during the school year, specifically, agreeing to pick up the child at 6:00 p.m. on Sundays from a designated location in New Orleans. (Apparently, over the years, the parties moved residences, with Mr. Spradley living in New Orleans at the time of the rule, and Ms. Centanni living in Ascension Parish.) In the rule for contempt, Mr. Spradley alleged that Ms. Centanni failed to perform her transportation duties as ordered by that stipulated judgment, listing seven dates on which Ms. Centanni did not participate in picking up the child, and seven other dates on which she picked up the child at a time other than 6:00 p.m. Mr. Spradley further alleged that as of March 20, 2011, Ms. Centanni had indicated she would no longer be performing any transportation duties in connection with the visitation. Additionally, Mr. Spradley alleged that Ms. Centanni also failed to comply with the stipulation of the previous judgment that she assist with homework and encourage regular study habits. He specifically alleged the child had made thirty-five grades of "F" on tests and assignments, had fourteen absences, and was tardy seven times, since the previous judgment was rendered. The only thing provided in the record before us concerning the aforementioned rule is the court's minutes for May 9, 2011, indicating that the matter was taken up and "after status with the court," the rule was denied.
RULE FOR CONTEMPT AT ISSUE HEREIN
On April 12, 2013, Mr. Spradley filed another rule for contempt (which forms the basis for this appeal), again, alleging that Ms. Centanni continued to actively disregard the court's judgment as it relates to visitation, by refusing to provide transportation for the visitations, which he alleged costs him undue expense and has caused the minor child stress and disruption of her school schedule. He also alleged that Ms. Centanni continued to refuse to provide him with documentation relating to demands for payments for extraordinary and extracurricular expenses, and also continued to refuse him access to documentation regarding insurance, healthcare, and other "critical documents," specifically, the child's birth certificate and social security card. Finally, he asserts that Ms. Centanni continues to refuse to facilitate, and instead, actively interferes with, his relationship with his daughter. In addition to seeking a finding of contempt against Ms. Centanni, Mr. Spradley specifically also sought the'following: (1) that Ms. Centanni be ordered to pay a per-mile rate to compensate him for transportation expenses and that such amounts be ordered deducted from his child support or activities reimbursement obligations; (2) reversal of the existing transportation schedule with Ms. Centanni being ordered responsible for dropping the child off to him on Fridays, and he being ordered to return her to Ms. Centanni on Mondays; (3) that Ms. Centanni be ordered to provide physical documentation to him of the child's health and academics as it becomes available, and that Ms. Centanni immediately be ordered to provide copies of the child's current health insurance information, birth certificate, and social security card; (4) and other relief related to Ms. Centanni's alleged refusal to foster a healthy and close relationship between the child and Mr. Spradley.
Shortly after the filing of the rule, in May 2013, counsel for Ms, Centanni filed, and was granted, a motion to withdraw as counsel. Thereafter, Ms. Centanni has appeared in proper person, and she confirmed at the hearing on the rule at issue that she was financially unable to pay for legal expenses. Mr. Spradley, who had returned to school at Tulane University for an MBA/JD degree, also represented himself from the filing of the first rule for contempt forward, to date.
ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
After a hearing conducted by the parties in proper person, wherein they each called themselves as witnesses and cross-examined one another, the trial court rendered judgment, refusing to find Ms. Centanni in constructive contempt of the court's August 31, 2010 judgment.
The trial court also ordered that the parties conduct communications regarding the minor child through the "Our Family Wizard" website; st ordered each of them to create accounts on that website within thirty days of the judgment, and ordered Mr, Spradley to bear the initial costs of both parties' accounts for the first year; ordered Mr. Spradley to provide the return transportation of the child following his visitation, or to provide Ms. Centanni $20.00 cash; and further ordered Ms. Centanni to make arrangements to timely receive the child at her house following Mr. Spradley's periods of physical custody. Finally, the judgment ordered Mr. Spradley to pay immediately to Ms, Centanni all amounts of child support he unilaterally deducted for transportation costs prior to the hearing date.
In reasons for judgment, the trial court found that, on numerous occasions, Ms. Centanni violated the August 31, 2010 judgment, by failing to provide transportation to pick up the child from Mr. Spradley, but found those violations were not willful, intentional, and purposefully (as required to find constructive contempt), based on evidence establishing that Ms. Centanni "is unable to bear the financial burden of driving the round trip commute from her home in Prairieviiie to Mr. Spradley's home in Harahan," particularly in light of the fact that Ms. Centanni receives only $200.00 per month in child support, works multiple odd jobs to make ends meet, yet bears the burden of the majority of the minor child's extracurricular expenses. The trial court also noted that this lack of funds on the part of Ms. Centanni prevented her from ruling Mr. Spradley into court when he violated the court's judgment by unilaterally deducting transportation expenses from his child support obligation. Finally, the trial court explained that the order in the judgment for the parties to enroll in and communicate via the "Our Family Wizard" website was done to attempt to resolve the remaining issues before the court and was made considering the best interest of the child, in Sight of the evidence at the hearing and the trial court's first-hand experience with the ongoing history of the parties' animosity and inability to effectively co-parent the child.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
This appeal by Mr. Spradley followed. He raises the following assignments of error:
(1) The trial court erred in finding that respondent-appellee [Ms. Centanni] was not guilty of constructive contempt.The transcript of the hearing and the evidence presented overwhelmingly support the trial court's judgment and negate all of Mr. Spradley's assignments of error, such that we find individualized discussion is not warranted. Our discussion below summarizes and resolves all the issues presented by these assignments.
(2) The trial court erred in modifying the prior judgment without following statutory guidelines.
(3) The trial court erred in faiiing to address each allegation of contempt.
(4) The trial court erred in rendering a judgment that was not precise, definite, and certain.
(5) The trial court erred in failing to allow appellant fair opportunity to present case.
DISCUSSION
The willful disobedience of any lawful judgment constitutes constructive contempt of court. La. C.C.P. art. 224(2). A finding that a person willfully disobeyed a court order in violation of Article 224(2) must be based on a finding that the person violated an order of the court intentionally, knowingly, and purposefully, without justifiable excuse. Carollo v. Carollo, 2013-0010 (La. App., 1 Cir. 5/31/13), 118 So.3d 53, 64. The decision to hold a party in contempt of court for disobeying the court's orders is within the trial court's great discretion, and the court's decision should only be reversed when the appellate court discerns an abuse of that discretion. Buxton v. Buxton, 2010-2182 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/12), 2012 WL 1070012 (unpublished), citing Boudreaux v. Vankerkhove, 2007-2555 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/11/08), 993 So.2d 725, 733.
We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion for refusing to find Ms. Centanni in contempt of court. While the trial court noted that Ms. Centanni, indeed, failed to pick up the child as ordered, on numerous occasions, the trial court heard the testimony of Ms. Centanni at the hearing, during which she admitted having failed to provide transportation, but explained that she could not afford to put the gas in her car required to make the trip. She also testified that during this time, she was receiving less than the full amount of child support ordered, because Mr. Spradley made the unilateral decision to withhold certain amounts from child support to "compensate" for his having to transport the child home. The transcript reveals that this was not the first time the transportation issue had been before the court, and that the trial court, at a previous hearing, suggested to Mr. Spradley that he should offer to pay Ms. Centanni twenty dollars cash to facilitate her ability to comply with her transportation obligations. Apparently, based on this testimony, the trial court concluded that Ms. Centanni's failure to pick up the child as ordered was not "intentional, knowing, purposeful, or without justifiable excuse," but rather, she was constrained from doing so based on dire financial circumstances. (The record contains testimony by Ms. Centanni that she is a single mother, has three other children, works three jobs to make ends meet, and still falls short.) Based on the record before us, we cannot say the trial court abused its great discretion and, therefore, affirm the judgment insofar as it finds Ms. Centanni was not in constructive contempt of the trial court's judgment.
We also find no merit to Mr. Spradley's assertions on appeal that the trial court failed to follow guidelines, address each allegation of contempt, and failed to allow appellant a fair opportunity to present his case. As noted earlier, both parties appeared at the hearing without counsel, and each represented him/her self. This rendered the taking of testimony peculiar, in that the party/witness must essentially offer a soliloquy, rather than ask and answer his/her own questions. Additionally, the long-standing animosity between the parties and their inability to effectively communicate with one another is very evident from the record, and our review reveals that the trial court did an excellent job of equally guiding and advising both parties in putting on their case as effectively as possible under the circumstances. Our review reveals that the trial court did so carefully, patiently, and without any showing of partiality or bias. There is no evidence that either party was hindered or prohibited from presenting all relevant testimony and evidence. Rather, again, the record reflects that the trial court went exceedingly far in guiding and allowing both parties to place before the court and into evidence whatever relevant information they had to present. These assignments of error have no merit; the trial court did not abuse its great discretion in modifying the judgment as it saw fit to address and remedy the parties' problems regarding transportation and communication, considering the best interests of the child, i.e., in accordance with law. Both issues were properly placed before the trial court, and its actions in resolving them simply do not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Mr. Spradley's argument that the trial court modified child support without following guidelines (i.e., finding a material change in circumstances to warrant such modification) is misplaced. The trial court did not modify child support; it merely added an obligation on the part of Mr. Spradley to pick up and return the child when exercising his visitation, or to compensate Ms. Centanni with twenty dollars if he was unable to perform that obligation. That does not amount to a change in child support that requires a showing of a material change in circumstances.
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We also find no merit to Mr. Spradley's assertions that the trial court erred in not considering every aspect of the rule for contempt. As noted earlier, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Ms. Centanni free of contempt. All of the other allegations made by Mr. Spradley in his rule concern the parties' inability to effectively communicate and Ms. Centanni's refusal to share and exchange information and other important documents regarding the child's heath and school activities. These assertions were addressed by the trial court's ordering the parties to enrol! in "Our Family Wizard" website, noting that it was a means for the parties to submit the necessary information via their accounts on that website, without the need for direct communication, which in the past has been wrought with animosity and ineffectiveness. Again, we cannot say the trial court abused its vast discretion in resolving those issues by this means.
Finally, we find no merit to Mr. Spradley's contention that the judgment rendered by the trial court is not "precise, definite, and certain." This assignment is based on the fact that the judgment does not detail how long Mr. Spradley must either relieve Ms. Centanni of her obligation of contributing to transporting the child or pay her twenty dollars so that she could afford to do it herself. Mr. Spradley contends that since this (the trial court's order) was an "impermanent" condition, the judgment is not "precise, definite, and certain" because it does not address when that provision is "no longer applicable." However, our review of the judgment does not reveal that the provision is an "impermanent" condition, thus, it was unnecessary that the judgment provide when such obligation would no longer be applicable. Indeed, a reading of the judgment renders quite clearly that this provision places a dear and ongoing obligation on Mr. Spradley to either transport the child both ways, or to pay Ms. Centanni twenty dollars if she is to participate in picking up the child, There is nothing vague, uncertain, or indefinite about that order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Spradley has failed to show that the triai court abused its great discretion in resolving the issues raised in his rule for contempt. Having found no abuse of discretion, we affirm that judgment Ail costs of this appeal are assessed to Mr. Spradley.