Opinion
05-22-00249-CR
06-30-2023
AARON LEDELL CELESTINE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(B)
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-00005-I
Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CORY L. CARLYLE, JUSTICE
Aaron Celestine challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of manslaughter. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
To determine whether evidence was sufficient to support conviction, we consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict in deciding whether a jury could rationally find the State proved the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). We must defer to the determinations the jury as fact-finder makes, including the weight and credibility to give witness testimony. Id. at 319.
Three people were shot and killed at Aces of Dallas Club on October 25, 2020. Police quickly determined that Cameron Craig shot two of them with a 9mm handgun during a fight, and he later pled guilty to manslaughter. Due to their respective locations, police did not suspect Mr. Craig shot the third victim, Darryl Nellums. The next day, club staff found additional bullet casings upstairs on a club balcony, which police identified as being from a .380-caliber weapon. They and police reviewed video evidence, and determined a second shooter who stood on a balcony caused Mr. Nellums's death. Police determined this was Mr. Celestine, and he later admitted shooting two shots that night, but claimed he shot a 9mm, not a .380. He also claimed he was scared because of Mr. Craig's shooting and the melee, and fired upwards, not down into the crowd.
On appeal, Mr. Celestine claims the evidence demonstrates he fired a 9mm weapon, not a .380, that the detective's failure to get a search warrant for his gun weighed against the verdict, that the failure to subject the balcony casings to fingerprinting or DNA testing demonstrated his innocence, that three others in the club had guns, that toolmark evidence failed to support the State's case, and that it was supposition to believe either of the shots he admitted to firing hit the decedent. For the most part, these claims are more properly described as rejected jury arguments and not appellate sufficiency issues. The State is not required to disprove every defense theory, or even exclude every conceivable alternative to a guilty finding. See Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). That said, we address whether rational jurors could have found Mr. Celestine guilty based on all the evidence.
A person commits manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code § 19.04. A person acts recklessly with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. Id. § 6.03(c).
The State presented circumstantial evidence in this case, including Mr. Celestine's admission that he fired two shots from the balcony in a crowded club, combined with the presence of two .380 shell casings at that location and the presence of a matching-caliber bullet in the decedent's head. Mr. Celestine never contested that he fired in Mr. Nellums's general direction; he contested only the vertical angle of his shots. Video evidence showed the balcony shots were fired at more or less the very time Mr. Nellums went from running, ducking, and hiding to unresponsive and on the floor. The video evidence also gave no indication of any more than two shooters and it only showed shots being fired from the balcony at that moment. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (direct and circumstantial evidence equally probative; circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt).
Mr. Celestine claims he fired into the air because he was scared, alluding to the fight and other shooting being "right up under us." This evidence supports a conclusion that he "either knew the risk, or disregarded the risk, of having a loaded gun." See Taylor v. State, No. 05-17-00658-CR, 2018 WL 3640467, at *10 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Mr. Celestine's claim that he fired upwards while on the balcony and not downwards, such that he claims there was no way his shots could have shot Mr. Nellums falls in the same category of demonstrating a consciously disregarded risk. See Thomas v. State, 699 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) (defendant may not intend the result but his risk disregard may subject him to recklessness liability). This is also a self-serving claim the jury may have rejected, as the State's evidence was that his bullets' trajectory was lower than he claimed. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (fact-finder to resolve conflicts in evidence). And though Mr. Celestine insisted he fired a 9mm upon being told in his interview that the shots that killed Mr. Nellums came from a .380, he never presented a weapon for testing as he said he would. In any event, he was not arrested for months after the shooting and his presenting a 9mm weapon to police at that time would have proven relatively little against the State's case.
This evidence provided jurors a sufficient basis from which to draw the necessary reasonable inferences to support guilt of manslaughter. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19. We overrule Mr. Celestine's issue.
In a cross-issue, the State requests we modify the judgment to reflect that Mr. Celestine pled true to the enhancement paragraph. The record contains Mr. Celestine's true plea to the enhancement paragraph, and therefore we modify the judgment to delete "N/A" after both "1st Enhancement Paragraph:" and "Finding on 1st Enhancement Paragraph:" and replace it with "True" in both places. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(B); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. refd).
We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
We delete "N/A" after both "1st Enhancement Paragraph:" and "Finding on 1st Enhancement Paragraph:" and replace it with "True" in both places.
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.