Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 03-1349
November 25, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is General Motor's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, (56)(c) Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 5). The motion was set for hearing on October 29, 2003, without oral argument. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
BACKGROUND
Two African American plaintiff's, Tyrone Causey and Deborah Griffin, filed a complaint against defendants, Sewell Cadillac Chevrolet ("Sewell") and General Motors, Inc. ("GM"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff's claim that an unidentified person who worked at Sewell made a racial comment in the plaintiff's' presence while Mr. Causey attempted to have his Chevrolet Corvette serviced at Sewell under a GM warranty. Some dispute existed between Mr. Causey and another service person regarding whether the vehicle needed repair. Mr. Causey alleges that the unidentified person made racial comments, told the plaintiff's to leave, yelled to the security guard to escort the plaintiff's off of the property, and told plaintiff's never to return to Sewell again. Eventually, a GM dealership on the West Bank fixed the problem under the GM warranty to Mr. Causey's satisfaction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A 12(b)(6) motion should be granted if it appears beyond doubt from the pleadings that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Id. If the court considers materials outside of the pleadings, the court may treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260 (4th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Causey's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ClaimThe activities protected by section 1981 are "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 2003). To establish a § 1981 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he or she is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant had an intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1997).
In the present case, plaintiff asserts that he fulfills all of the requirements of section 1981. Plaintiff specifically urges that a claim exists against GM because GM is integrally involved in the day-to-day operations of Sewell as well as Sewell's handling of customer warranty claims. Plaintiff cites several cases for support. However, the cited cases are easily distinguished from the case at hand.
For example, plaintiff cites State of New York v. Ford Motor Co., 74 N.Y.2d 495(1989). In State of New York, the court held that the manufacturer's imposition of a $100 deductible for repairs covered by the extended warranty violated section 198 a(b) of General Business Law. Id. at 503. State of New York discussed a manufacturer's express warranties and the New York "Lemon Law." Id. 499-502.
Moreover, plaintiff cites Chrysler Corp. v. Lee Janssen Motor Co., 619 N.W.2d 78 (Neb.Ct.App. 2000). The court in Lee Janssen held that a manufacturer had good cause to terminate dealership's franchise agreement because the dealership submitted incorrect warranty repair information, altered warranty documents, and repeatedly obtained customer rebate money for sales in violation of program rules. Id. at 90.
The facts and legal arguments of both State of New York and Lee Janssen are totally unrelated to the present case. The only similarity to the present case is that both of the aforementioned cases deal with manufacturers; this is hardly enough to justify a factual comparison.
The plaintiff also cites Rose Equip., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 535 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1995) (holding that good cause existed to terminate a dealers franchise because, among other things, the dealer refused to do warranty work). Like State of New York and Lee Janssen, Rose is easily distinguishable from the present case.
On the other hand, defendant argues that plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a claim against GM upon which relief can be granted because plaintiff has not alleged any discriminatory act by GM. Instead, all alleged discriminatory acts were committed by Sewell. Essentially, defendant is arguing that the second part of the Bellows test is missing; because GM and Sewell are separate, no "intent to discriminate" can be shown by GM. GM has attached to its motion contractual documents between Sewell and GM in an effort to reflect the distinct corporate status of each entity. The defendant argues that the attached documents indicate that Sewell and GM are separate legal entities. GM allows Sewell the right to buy, sell, and service GM's Chevrolet and Cadillac cars, but GM does not own any interest in the stock of Sewell.
In cases involving claims under section 1981, courts have held that defendants in civil rights actions must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. For example, officers, directors, and employees of a corporation can be personally liable when they have been "personally involved in the discrimination" by having "directly participated" in the alleged discriminatory acts. A-Khazaraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir. 1986).
"[M]erely alleging that the individual defendants were somehow responsible for implementing and allowing discriminatory practices does not suffice" for purposes of section 1981. Richard v. Bell Atl. Corp., 946 F. Supp. 54, 74 (D.C. 1996).
For support, defendant relies on Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles. 915 F. Supp.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990). In Watson, the plaintiff's, black guests at a private party at the Akron Aerie Local 555, a constituent of the Fraternal Order of Eagles ("Local 555"), were told that blacks were not welcome and were asked to leave. Id. at 238-39. Plaintiff's brought claims under section 1981 against Local 555 and its parent, the International Fraternal Order of Eagles Grand Aerie ("Grand Aerie"). Id. When addressing the liability of the parent organization, the court noted that while doctrines of vicarious liability have been applied on occasion in section 1981 cases, the plaintiff's introduced no evidence showing that the parent organization engaged in discrimination on the basis of race or refused to make a contract with them. Id. at 244.
Specifically, the court explained that plaintiff did not introduce evidence to show that the parent organization owned or operated the Local or that it owned or operated the bar or banquet hall where the alleged discrimination took place. Id. Moreover, all membership and guest policies were left up to the Locals. Id. Thus, the relationship was too remote to make the parent organization liable for Local 555's allegedly discriminatory acts. Id. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff's had no cause of action against the parent organization under section 1981. Id.
See also Wayne v. Dallas Morning News, 78 F. Supp.2d 571, 578-80 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that a parent company may not be liable under section 1981 for the acts of its subsidiary when the parent is not interrelated).
Likewise, in the present case, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that GM owns or operates Sewell. Moreover, plaintiff has not shown that GM is integrally involved in the day-to-day operations of Sewell. Although plaintiff notes that GM has the authority to select the Executive Manager of Sewell, the Court finds that this factor alone is not enough to show that the two companies — are interrelated. Instead, the two companies are separate legal entities, and the plaintiff has neither alleged nor introduced evidence demonstrating that GM engaged in the alleged discrimination. Thus, this Court finds that like the parent organization in Watson, GM's relationship is too remote to make it liable for Sewell's allegedly discriminatory acts. Therefore;
IT IS ORDERED that General Motor's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, (56)(c) Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.