Opinion
03-CV-5480 (JG).
October 29, 2004
ROBERT CASTRO, DIN: 00-A-7129, Lincoln Correctional Facility, New York, New York, Petitioner Pro Se.
ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney General, State of New York, New York, By: Luke Martland, Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner Robert Castro seeks habeas corpus relief from a criminal sale of a controlled substance conviction entered after a jury trial in state court. I held oral argument on October 29, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
On November 7, 1999, Castro was arrested pursuant to a "buy and bust" operation in Corona, Queens. Two undercover officers took part in an operation in which they drove to a corner in the area and made contact with Castro. The officers testified that Castro came over to them and offered them cocaine. He gave the first officer one bag of cocaine. The officer subsequently walked ten to fifteen feet away, telling Castro that his partner would pay for it. He radioed the team to inform them of his buy and watched as Castro handed the remaining undercover officer another bag. Castro asked for $20 and was given $20 in pre-recorded buy money. He took the money and gave the officer his beeper number, offering to make sales on the same corner in the future.
Once this sale was complete, the second officer rejoined his partner, who then radioed the team with a description of Castro. Detective Sinclair arrested Castro based on the description he had received in the call. The pre-recorded buy money was found in Castro's pocket. Detective Sinclair testified at trial and had noted in his paperwork that Castro showed no signs of intoxication at the time of the arrest.
Castro was charged with two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
A. Trial
Jury selection began on November 2, 2000. At trial the undercover officers and Detective Sinclair testified to the events described above. Castro testified at the trial as well. His version of the events leading up to his arrest was very different. Castro testified that he had a substance abuse problem. On the night of his arrest he had consumed at least ten beers and had also purchased and used cocaine. He was riding home on his bicycle (after purchasing three bags of cocaine in a park for $60) when he was called over by the second of the undercover officers. He approached the officer, and once there, the officer "begged" Castro for drugs and held on to Castro's bicycle until Castro sold the officer a bag. Castro explained that he had purchased the cocaine for his personal use but the officer was insistent. Castro then sold him the cocaine, after which he was arrested by Detective Sinclair. Castro testified that he had no intention of selling cocaine that evening. He also testified that he did not see the first officer referred to by the government. (Trial Tr. 467-74.)
Based on this testimony, Castro offered the affirmative defense of entrapment. To establish entrapment under New York Law, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he was actively induced or encouraged to commit the alleged crime by a public official, and that (b) the inducement or encouragement created a substantial risk that the defendant would commit such crime when he was not otherwise disposed to commit it. N.Y. Penal L. § 40.05.
On November 13, 2000, the jury was charged with the two counts as well as the entrapment defense. (Trial Tr. 615-17.) That same day the jury found Castro guilty of one charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. On December 6, 2000, he was sentenced to a four and one-half to nine-year term of imprisonment. Castro appealed the judgment to the Appellate Division, Second Department, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because he was entrapped by the undercover officer into selling cocaine.
On November 25, 2002, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment holding that:
The question of whether a defendant is predisposed to commit an offense or was induced to commit the offense is a question of fact for the jury. Here, the jury could have reasonably relied on the police testimony which established that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. . . . Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses. Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record. Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence.People v. Castro, 750 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (2d Dep't 2002). Castro requested leave to appeal on this ground, which was denied on March 17, 2003. People v. Castro, 99 N.Y.2d 626 (2003).
In the instant petition, filed on October 8, 2003, Castro asserts the same claim, i.e. that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the presentation of his entrapment affirmative defense.
The petition raises the ground of "weight of the evidence." Whereas such a claim may be grounds for relief in state court, it is not a cognizable ground for federal habeas corpus relief. I construe this aspect of the petition as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
DISCUSSION
A. The Standard of ReviewThe Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") has narrowed the scope of federal habeas review of state convictions where the state court has adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the AEDPA standard, which applies to habeas petitions filed after AEDPA's enactment in 1996, the reviewing court may grant habeas relief only if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "clearly established Federal law" to mean "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); see also Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
Habeas relief is also warranted where the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). That subsection is not relevant here.
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law if a state court "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [a] prisoner's case." Id. "In other words, a federal court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a `governing legal principle' to `a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003)).
However, there is "force" to the argument "that if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand then the rationale cannot be clearly established at the time of the state-court decision"; "[§] 2254(d)(1) would be undermined if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the guise of extensions to existing law." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2150-51 (2004). The Supreme Court has concluded, however, that while "the difference between applying a rule and extending it is not always clear," "[c]ertain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt." Id. at 2151.
Under the "unreasonable application" standard set forth in Williams, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 93 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (per curiam) ("Where . . . the state court's application of governing federal law is challenged, it must be shown to be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable."); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (same). Interpreting Williams, the Second Circuit has added that although "[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required . . . the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence." Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 93 (citing Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)).
The Supreme Court has explained that the specificity with which the rule of law at issue is defined may affect whether the state court's determination was "unreasonable":
[T]he range of reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule. If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow. Applications of the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules are more general, and their meaning must emerge in application over the course of time. Applying a general standard to a specific case can demand a substantial element of judgment. As a result, evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case by case determinations.Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. at 2149.
This standard of review applies whenever the state court has adjudicated the federal claim on the merits, regardless of whether it has alluded to federal law in its decision. As the Second Circuit stated in Sellan v. Kuhlman:
For the purposes of AEDPA deference, a state court "adjudicate[s]" a state prisoner's federal claim on the merits when it (1) disposes of the claim "on the merits," and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment. When a state court does so, a federal habeas court must defer in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to the state court's decision on the federal claim — even if the state court does not explicitly refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law.261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001).
B. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim
A petitioner arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt bears a "very heavy burden." See Ponnapula v. Spitzer, 297 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted); Einaugler v. Supreme Court, 109 F.3d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). A state criminal conviction will be upheld if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Ponnapula, 297 F.3d at 179 ("[W]e review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief only if no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence adduced at trial.").
In making this assessment, the court may not "disturb the jury's findings with respect to the witnesses' credibility," United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1989), "make credibility judgments about the testimony presented at petitioner's trial or . . . weigh conflicting testimony." Fagon v. Bara, 717 F. Supp. 976, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing United States v. Zabare, 871 F.2d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 1989)). Under this "rigorous standard," a "federal habeas court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.'" Wheel v. Robinson, 34 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).
Castro argues that the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the undercover officers testified to the following: one of them nodded his head to call Castro over, after which Castro walked over to them, offered to sell them "twenties," which they testified was a street term for narcotics, and an exchange was made. (Trial Tr. 255-58, 308-09.) Although, as set forth above, Castro contradicted their testimony, I presume, as required by the above standard, that the jury fully credited the testimony of the officers and did not credit Castro's testimony. As stated above, I cannot disturb the jury's findings with respect to the witnesses' credibility," Roman, 870 F.2d at 71, "make credibility judgments about the testimony presented at petitioner's trial or . . . weigh conflicting testimony." Fagon, 717 F. Supp. at 979 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, I find the Appellate Division's finding, that "the jury could have reasonably relied on the police testimony which established that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime" and that, therefore, "the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence" was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied. As Castro has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, no certificate of appealability shall issue.So Ordered.