Nos. 05-08-00155-CR, 05-08-00156-CR
Opinion issued June 12, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-66883-PU, F06-66884-PU.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, LANG, and SMITH.
The Honorable Bea Ann Smith, Justice, Court of Appeals, Third District of Texas at Austin, Retired, sitting by assignment.
Opinion By Justice FITZGERALD.
Silvestre Castillanos appeals his convictions for unlawful possession of 400 grams or more of heroin with intent to deliver and for unlawful possession of less than one gram of cocaine. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized in a search of his vehicle. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, appellant pleaded guilty before the court in each case without an agreement as to punishment. The trial court found appellant guilty in both cases and sentenced him to fifteen years' imprisonment and a $500 fine for possession of heroin with intent to deliver and to 180 days' confinement in state jail and a $500 fine for possession of cocaine. Appellant brings three issues on appeal, asserting the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2006 a drug-enforcement task force consisting of officers with various law-enforcement departments received word from a confidential informant that the informant had arranged to purchase a kilogram of heroin from appellant. The officers, working undercover, set up surveillance in the parking lot where the informant and appellant were to meet. At the appointed time, appellant entered the parking lot and raised the hood of his vehicle, and the informant soon drove into the parking lot and stopped beside appellant's vehicle. The officers saw appellant get out of his vehicle and get into the informant's vehicle. A few minutes later, appellant got back into his vehicle and drove away. The informant told the officers that appellant had gone to get the heroin and would return with it, and the officers told the informant to go home. The officers followed appellant to a known drug house. The officers could not stop and watch appellant without being observed, so a team of undercover officers drove by regularly and reported what they saw. None of them saw appellant go into the drug house or saw anyone hand appellant a package of drugs. However, appellant eventually drove away from the drug house followed by the undercover officers. The informant then called the officers and told them appellant had called and said he was on his way to the parking lot with the drugs. When appellant entered Interstate 20, the undercover officers directed two uniformed officers, Dallas Police Officers Miguel Almeida and Roderick Valentine to perform a traffic stop of a pickup truck. Officers Almeida and Valentine noticed that the rear bumper of the truck was hanging down in an unsafe manner, and Officer Almeida testified that "sparks would come off the truck . . . when the vehicle would go over a bump." The officers stopped the truck and asked appellant for his driver's license and insurance. The officers concluded that he was driving while his license was suspended, and they arrested appellant and placed him in the squad car. The officers then searched the vehicle and found a kilogram of heroin concealed beneath the spare tire in the bed of the pickup, and they found about one-tenth gram of cocaine in the passenger compartment. The arrest report for appellant stated that he was stopped for "driving on the freeway with a vehicle that did not have a rear bumper." Appellant moved to suppress the heroin and cocaine found in the warrantless search of his vehicle on the ground that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic stop. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State asserted the traffic stop of appellant was supported both by his defective bumper and because the officers had reasonable suspicion that appellant was in possession of heroin. The trial court concluded that either rationale supported the traffic stop and overruled the motion to suppress. Appellant then entered pleas of guilty to the offenses without agreements on punishment. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his first issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, and we review de novo the trial court's application of law to facts not turning on credibility and demeanor. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We do not engage in our own factual review; instead, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review the record to determine whether the trial court's ruling is supported by the record and is correct under some theory of law applicable to the case. St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725. "A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005). "Any peace officer may arrest without warrant a person found committing a violation" of the transportation code's "Rules of the Road." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999). A police officer may stop a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. Garza v. State, 261 S.W.3d 361, 367 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref'd). "`Reasonable suspicion' exists if the officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity." Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). The State is not required to prove that a violation actually occurred, only that the officer reasonably believed a violation was in progress. See id. An officer's reasonable suspicion of an alleged traffic violation cannot be based on a mistaken understanding of traffic laws. Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd); Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). An officer's honest but mistaken understanding of the traffic law that prompted a stop is not an exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement. Fowler, 266 S.W.3d at 504; Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 716. Section 547.004(a)(1) of the transportation code provides, "A person commits an offense that is a misdemeanor if the person operates or moves . . . a vehicle that: (1) is unsafe so as to endanger a person. . . ." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.004(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Here, the testimony about the condition of the rear bumper was conflicting. The arrest reported stated there was no rear bumper. Officer Valentine testified the vehicle had a rear bumper, but it "was hanging off the vehicle in an unsafe manner . . . [and] might have bounced off the ground." He also testified he did not recall seeing "sparks flying from the ground." Officer Almeida testified there was "something wrong with the bumper, like it was kind of like dragging kind of." On cross-examination, he testified, "Specifically, I don't remember what was wrong with it, but I remember-I believe that it was hanging down. Anytime the truck would hit a bump, you could see the bumper hanging. And sparks would come off the truck . . . whenever the bumper hit." Almeida stated he saw sparks flying from the bumper more than once. Testimony from the undercover officers about the bumper was also conflicting. Sergeant Ronald Bardin testified "the bumper was hanging down," but although he followed the vehicle farther than Valentine and Almeida, he never saw the bumper hit the ground or sparks fly from it. Officer William Bishop testified appellant's vehicle was in poor condition, but he did not recall anything about the bumper, and he did not observe sparks. Sergeant Bob Powell testified he could not remember whether the vehicle had a bumper, and he did not recall seeing any sparks. Courts have upheld traffic stops under section 547.004 for cars driven with dangerously defective equipment. In United States v. Magana, 544 F. Supp. 2d 560 (W.D. Tex. 2008), the court upheld a traffic stop where the officer believed the vehicle's wheel was wobbling, indicating it had a bent rim. Id. at 565. In State v. Kloecker, 939 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.), the officer stopped the defendant for driving a car with a tireless metal rim; the court of appeals held the officer lawfully stopped the defendant for violating section 547.004 and reversed the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion to suppress. Id. at 209. Without citing section 547.004, a court held an officer lawfully stopped a defendant who was driving with a flat tire at over forty miles per hour in the rain. Sweeney v. State, 6 S.W.3d 670, 671 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). In this case, the evidence in the record shows the bumper was dangling off the pickup to the point that it would strike the ground when the truck hit a bump. Just as officers in the cases cited above could lawfully stop a driver whose vehicle had a wobbly wheel, a flat tire, or no tire, so the officers in this case could reasonably believe that a vehicle being driven in that condition on an interstate highway was unsafe and could pose a danger to appellant or the other motorists. We hold the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress. We overrule appellant's first issue. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his second and third issues, appellant asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. When a defendant enters a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea of guilty, the State has no obligation to prove the defendant's guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988); Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). A plea of guilty also waives a defendant's right to have the evidence reviewed for factual sufficiency. McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). Thus, the appellate standards of review for evidentiary sufficiency that apply when a defendant pleads not guilty do not apply when a defendant pleads guilty. McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330; O'Brien v. State, 154 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Instead, we apply the procedural safeguards of article 1.15 of the code of criminal procedure, which provides that when a defendant pleads guilty before the trial court, "it shall be necessary for the state to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant . . . and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon 2005). A defendant's judicial confession is sufficient evidence to support a defendant's guilty plea. Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (op. on reh'g). In each of these cases, appellant signed two confessions, one which tracked the language of the indictment and the other which stated, "I admit and judicially confess that I committed" each offense "on 6-8-06 exactly as alleged in the charging instrument. I affirm that my plea and judicial confession are freely and voluntarily made, and not influenced by any consideration of fear, persuasion, or delusive hope of pardon or parole." Appellant's confessions provide sufficient evidence showing his guilt to support his pleas of guilty under article 1.15. See Jones v. State, 857 S.W.2d 108, 110-11 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no pet.). We overrule appellant's second and third issues. We affirm the trial court's judgments.