Opinion
No. 3D17-2780
11-20-2019
Diana Maria CASTELLA, Appellant, v. Pam STEWART, Commissioner of Education, Appellee.
Ana M. Davide, Miami, for appellant. Charles T. Whitelock (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellee.
Ana M. Davide, Miami, for appellant.
Charles T. Whitelock (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and SALTER, and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, J. Diana Maria Castella, the respondent, appeals the Education Practices Commission's ("EPC") Final Order which suspends her Florida Educator's Certificate for three years, followed by two years' probation. We affirm the Final Order in all respects.
The uncontested facts are that in 2015, Ms. Castella was employed by the Miami-Dade County School District as a part-time interventionist teacher at Brownsville Middle School ("BMS"). She held a Florida Educator's Certificate covering elementary education, which was valid through June 30, 2017, and had been a certified teacher in Florida for twenty-five years.
On March 9, 2015, a sixth-grade student at the school, Y.H., informed Ms. Castella around 2:15 p.m., during a late lunch period, that her stepfather comes into her room at night, when her mother is not present, and lays on top of her with his clothes on without touching her in any inappropriate way. Y.H. told Ms. Castella that her mother knew about it but did not believe her. Ms. Castella did not immediately report Y.H.'s accusation on March 9, 2015 to DCF, nor to the Child Abuse Hotline.
At about 2:30 pm when lunch ended, Ms. Castella went to her class, got the class settled, and then went up to Ms. Marilyn Philogene, her senior teacher, and told her what Y.H. had said. Ms. Philogene told her she had to go tell Ms. Sonya Durden, the school counselor. Ms. Castella waited until 3:50 pm at the end of the school day to go tell Ms. Durden, but Ms. Durden was not in her office. Ms. Castella then went home. Although Ms. Castella briefly discussed with other school personnel what Y.H. had told her, she did not immediately report Y.H.'s accusation to DCF or the Child Abuse Hotline that same day.
The next day, when Ms. Castella arrived at school, she went to see Ms. Durden and reported what Y.H. had told her. Mrs. Durden sent Ms. Castella back to her classroom and told her to come back to her office in an hour so they could call DCF. An hour later, Ms. Castella went to Ms. Durden's office. Ms. Durden dialed DCF's phone number, and Ms. Castella made the report telephonically. When Ms. Castella was asked why she did not immediately report what Y.H. had told her, she said there was "nothing sexual to report." DCF then sent a DCF protective child investigator, Ms. Shalonda Sylvester, to the school to begin the investigation. During this investigation, Y.H. for the first time reported the sexual molestation by her stepfather. Ms. Sylvester then terminated the interview and called Miami-Dade County Police to take over the investigation. Thereafter, the investigation by the Miami-Dade County Sexual Crimes Unit led to the arrest and conviction of Y.H.'s stepfather, who is currently serving his prison sentence.
The incident was reported on March 11, 2015, to the Office of Professional Standards for Miami-Dade County Public Schools, which determined there was probable cause to believe that Ms. Castella had violated school board policies. Ms. Castella's part-time employment was terminated effective March 12, 2015 for lack of funding for the I-prep program, and the incident was reported to the EPC for further proceedings.
The Commissioner of Education ("COE") issued an Administrative Complaint on March 16, 2016, seeking a sanction against Ms. Castella's Florida Educator's Certificate and alleging a violation of section 1012.795(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), for knowingly failing to report actual or suspected child abuse. A case was opened at the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") on May 5, 2016 to conduct a formal hearing under section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2016), as Ms. Castella requested. On September 15, 2016, the COE amended the Administrative Complaint without objection. The Amended Administrative Complaint contained the same allegations as to Count 1 and added Counts 2-5. Count 2 alleged that Ms. Castella violated section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2015), because Ms. Castella violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession prescribed by State Board of Education rules. Count 3 alleged a violation of Florida Administrative Code, Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a), for failing to make reasonable efforts to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student's mental health and/or physical health and/or safety.
Count 4 alleged a violation of Rule 6A-10.081(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code, for intentionally exposing a student to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement, and Count 5 alleged a violation of Rule 6A-10.081(3)(f), Florida Administrative Code, for intentionally violating or denying a student's legal rights. The ALJ found that the COE did not prove these two counts by clear and convincing evidence.
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Ms. Castella disputed the allegations, filed her Answer on January 4, 2017, and requested a formal administrative hearing. The parties filed a Joint Prehearing Stipulation on January 6, 2017. In the Stipulation, the COE stated its position that Ms. Castella had a duty under section 39.201(2), Florida Statutes (2015), to immediately report what Y.H. told her to DCF's Abuse Hotline. Ms. Castella contended that she received no training in reporting student abuse or suspected abuse in all her years as a teacher and that no facts of sexual molestation were known by her or anyone until Ms. Sylvester was able to get Y.H. to reveal the information on March 10, 2015.
On January 10, 2017, the formal hearing was held before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") of the DOAH. The COE presented the testimony of four witnesses: Carmen Gutierrez (District Director of the Office of Professional Standards for Miami-Dade County Public Schools), Ebony Dunn (BMS's principal), Ms. Durden, and Terri Chester (the investigator with the Civilian Investigative Unit for Miami-Dade County Public Schools). The COE also presented the testimony of Ms. Philogene, by way of deposition. Exhibits were admitted into evidence. Ms. Castella presented her own live testimony and her deposition testimony, as well as the deposition testimony of Ms. Sylvester and had exhibits admitted into evidence.
The ALJ issued his Recommended Order on March 17, 2017. Based on the findings of fact, the ALJ entered a final order finding that Ms. Castella was in violation of Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Amended Administrative Complaint and that the counts were proven by the COE based on clear and convincing evidence. The ALJ found that Counts 4 and 5 were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. The ALJ recommended that Ms. Castella's license be placed on a one-year probationary status during which time she attend and successfully complete training related to her reporting obligations.
Ms. Castella filed her Exceptions to the Recommended Order on March 29, 2017. She objected to two exhibits of the COE being listed and considered as admitted into evidence. She also objected to two of the COE's exhibits that were not included in the exhibits admitted into evidence. Ms. Castella argued that the factual conclusions were not supported by clear and convincing evidence or competent, substantial evidence and that the ALJ relied upon exhibits that were excluded at the formal hearing.
The COE then filed Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Exceptions, asserting that there was competent, substantial evidence to support all of the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law. On March 31, 2017, the COE also moved to enhance the recommended penalty requesting a suspension of Ms. Castella's Florida Educator's Certificate for three years from the date of the Final Order, followed by two years' probation, and that she be required to complete two courses and pay a $1,000 fine within the first year of probation.
The EPC conducted a hearing on the ALJ's Recommended Order and Ms. Castella's Exceptions on April 26, 2017. The EPC issued an Order on Remand dated May 5, 2017, to the ALJ requesting clarification of certain exhibits on which he relied on in making his findings of fact. The ALJ issued a Supplemental Order Amending the Recommended Order on May 10, 2017, stating that Petitioner's Exhibits 7 and 9 were excluded from those admitted and Respondent's Exhibits D and E are included as exhibits that were admitted. Ms. Castella filed Exceptions to the Supplemental Order on May 11, 2017, and the COE filed a motion to strike these Exceptions.
The EPC conducted another hearing on October 25, 2017, on the Recommended Order and Ms. Castella's Exceptions, as well as the COE's Motion to Enhance the Penalty. Following argument by the parties, the EPC accepted Ms. Castella's exceptions to two findings and rejected the remaining exceptions, finding there was substantial competent evidence to support each factual finding or substantial competent evidence to infer the factual findings. The EPC adopted the remaining Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in the ALJ's Recommended Order.
That same day, the COE argued its Motion to Enhance the Penalty. At the hearing on the motion, each member of the EPC panel confirmed that they read the entire record in the case. The EPC relied upon the ALJ's findings in the Recommended Order as the reasons for enhancing the penalty. The EPC granted the COE's motion to enhance penalty. The Final Order issued on December 1, 2017. Ms. Castella then filed a notice of administrative appeal seeking review of the Final Order pursuant to section 120.68(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2017).
Ms. Castella raises six points on appeal. First, she argues that the EPC erroneously interpreted sections 1012.795(1)(b) and 1006.061, Florida Statutes, by sanctioning her for reporting questionable suspected child abuse within twenty-four hours of being notified of an incident by a student. We disagree.
The EPC has the authority to set aside, modify or remand an agency decision if the agency erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a certain action or if the agency abused its discretion. See § 120.68(7)(d), Fla. Stat. (2015). The standard of review over a question of statutory interpretation is de novo . Sullivan v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 890 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
Ms. Castella claims that the ALJ and the EPC abused their discretion or erroneously interpreted section 1012.795(1)(b). This section provides:
Education Practices Commission; authority to discipline.—
(1) The Education Practices Commission may suspend the educator certificate of any person as defined in s. 1012.01(2) or (3) for up to 5 years, thereby
denying that person the right to teach or otherwise be employed by a district school board or public school in any capacity requiring direct contact with students for that period of time, after which the holder may return to teaching as provided in subsection (4); may revoke the educator certificate of any person, thereby denying that person the right to teach or otherwise be employed by a district school board or public school in any capacity requiring direct contact with students for up to 10 years, with reinstatement subject to the provisions of subsection (4); may revoke permanently the educator certificate of any person thereby denying that person the right to teach or otherwise be employed by a district school board or public school in any capacity requiring direct contact with students, may suspend the educator certificate, ..., or may impose any other penalty provided by law, if the person:
...
(b) Knowingly failed to report actual or suspected child abuse as required in s. 1006.061 or report alleged misconduct by instructional personnel or school administrators which affects the health, safety, or welfare of a student as required in s. 1012.796.
Furthermore, the requirement to report child abuse immediately is specified in section 39.201(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2015). Section 1006.061 provides:
Child abuse, abandonment, and neglect policy. —
Each district school board, charter school, and private school that accepts scholarship students under s. 1002.39 or s. 1002.395 shall:
(1) Post in a prominent place in each school a notice that, pursuant to Chapter 39, all employees and agents of the school district, school board, charter school, or private school have an affirmative duty to report all actual or suspected cases of child abuse, abandonment, or neglect; have immunity from liability if they report such cases in good faith; and have a duty to comply with child protective investigations and all other provisions of law relating to child abuse, abandonment, and neglect. The notice shall also include the statewide toll-free telephone number of the central abuse hotline. Section 39.201(2)(a) provides:
Mandatory reports of child abuse, abandonment, or neglect; mandatory reports of death; central abuse hotline. —
[2](a) Each report of known or suspected child abuse, abandonment or neglect by a parent, legal custodian, caregiver, or other person responsible for the child's welfare as defined in this chapter, except those solely under s. 827.04(3),....shall be made immediately to the department's central abuse hotline.
(emphasis added). Ms. Castella contends that the COE was required to refer to section 39.201(2)(a) in the Amended Administrative Complaint to satisfy the due process notice requirement. Again, we disagree.
Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint charged Ms. Castella with violating section 1012.795(1)(b) because she "knowingly failed to report actual or suspected child abuse as required by Section 1006.061, Florida Statutes." Paragraph 3 of the Amended Administrative Complaint alleged that "[d]espite receiving this notice, Respondent failed to timely notify this case of suspected sexual child abuse to the Department of Children and Families as required by law."
The notice requirement of section 1006.061(1) is posted pursuant to Chapter 39. In addition, Chapter 39 is referenced three times in section 1006.061. Accordingly, we do not accept Ms. Castella's argument on this point. The COE put Ms. Castella on reasonable notice of the conduct which warranted required disciplinary action, thus there was no violation of due process.
Furthermore, the record does not support Ms. Castella's contention that she was unaware that the ALJ and EPC erroneously interpreted the charge to require her to immediately report the child abuse. As indicated, the parties executed a Joint Prehearing Stipulation on January 6, 2017. The parties agreed to the following agreed/uncontested facts:
4. On March 9, 2015, Respondent was informed by Y.H., a sixth-grade student that her stepfather comes into her room and lays on top of her with his clothes on without touching her in an inappropriate way when her mother was not present.
5. On March 9, 2015, Y.H. also informed Respondent that her stepfather pushed her towards a wall, causing her to fall into a chair and then he pulled her by the hair.
7. Respondent (Appellant) did not immediately report the student's accusation on March 9, 2015 to DCF or the Child Abuse Hotline.
In addition, the parties agreed to the COE's request for Official Recognition of section 39.021, Florida Statutes, as well as the four school board policies in petitioner's Exhibits 1-4. Section 39.021 states a teacher is a "mandatory reporter" who is required to report suspected child abuse "immediately." School Board policy #8462 titled "STUDENT ABUSE AND NEGLECT" defined child abuse and outlined the mandatory reporting procedures requiring all district employees, such as Ms. Castella, to "immediately" notify authorities of suspected child abuse. Consequently, the ALJ and the EPC did not err in interpreting the charge requiring suspected child abuse to be reported immediately.
Turning to Ms. Castella's second point on appeal, she claims there was no competent, substantial evidence in the record that Ms. Castella knowingly failed to report suspected child abuse in violation of sections 1012.795(1)(b) and 1006.061, Florida Statutes (2015). The ALJ concluded in his Recommended Order:
9. During Castella's 25 years of teaching, she testified that she never received training concerning suspected child abuse or related reporting requirements. This testimony is rejected. The more persuasive and credible evidence revealed that all school employees at BMS, with no exceptions, received regular training at the beginning of each school year, which includes their reporting duties when child abuse is suspected.
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22. Respondent claims that she did not know the protocol for reporting child abuse. The undersigned rejects this claim as incredible and spurious. Rather, the credible and more persuasive evidence shows that it was common knowledge among the school staff, based on training and posted notices, that an incident of child abuse should be reported immediately.
Ms. Castella essentially was requesting that the EPC reweigh the evidence on this issue. However, when ruling on factual findings in a recommended order, "[t]he agency is not authorized to weigh the evidence presented, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to fit its desired ultimate conclusion." Heifetz v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The agency can only decide whether competent substantial evidence was present to support the presiding officer's findings. Stinson v. Winn, 938 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ; Bay Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Bryan, 679 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
The ALJ rejected Ms. Castella's argument that she never received any child abuse reporting training in the twenty-five years during which she was employed as a teacher and that she never read the school board's policies while she was employed with the Miami-Dade County School Board district. The weight or credibility of a witness's testimony is a factual finding made by the hearing officer. KJS v. Dep't of Child & Fam. Servs., 974 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
As to her third point on appeal, Ms. Castella contends that the EPC erroneously found that she violated Count 2 and section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes, in that she violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession because Count 2 does not constitute a distinct disciplinary violation and is dependent upon a specific violation of the Florida Administrative Code. Section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2015), provides in pertinent part that:
The Education Practices Commission may suspend the educator certificate,...if the person
(j) Has violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession prescribed by the State Board of Education Rules.
Ms. Castella acknowledges that the ALJ's finding of guilt regarding Count 3 constitutes a violation of Count 2. However, Ms. Castella then asks this Court to reweigh the evidence regarding Count 3. Ms. Castella alleges that the finding in paragraph 61 of the Recommended Order that "Respondent's revelation of the matter to the media outlet violated both the spirit and intent of the written admonition she was given" and she "jeopardized the integrity and progress of the investigation by speaking with the media" was based on a violation of a Notice of Investigation she received which she claims does not correspond with a violation of the rules constituting the Principles of Professional Conduct.
Nevertheless, as the COE contends, the "conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student's mental health and/or physical health and/or safety" in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(2)(a) did not result from the Notice of Investigation but rather by Ms. Castella's publication of Y.H.'s child abuse when Ms. Castella spoke to the news media. Both Ms. Philogene and Principal Dunn testified that they observed the news interview on television where Ms. Castella named the school and that she claimed she was terminated because she reported the sexual abuse of Y.H. The students in Y.H.'s class recognized Ms. Castella on the news and knew the student Ms. Castella was speaking about was a student at their school. Thus, the record supports the EPC correctly found that Ms. Castella violated Count 2 and section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes, in that she violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida.
With regard to Ms. Castella's fourth point on appeal, she claims that there was no substantial competent evidence that she failed to make reasonable effort to protect Y.H. from conditions harmful to learning and/or to Y.H.'s mental health and/or safety by her actions in not timely contacting DCF on March 9, 2015 as alleged in Count 3 and the Amended Administrative Complaint. The EPC rejected Ms. Castella's exception to paragraph 57 when it determined that the ALJ's inference was supported by clear and convincing evidence. She claims that she assured the DCF investigator that Y.H.'s mother would be present that day so that the stepfather could not molest Y.H. However, Ms. Castella testified in her deposition that Y.H. had informed her that she told her mother the stepfather was coming into her room at night and laying on top of her, but her mother did not believe her. In addition, Y.H. had also informed Ms. Castella about the physical abuse, which the DCF investigator believed should have been reported immediately to DCF as a criminal offense.
The ALJ concluded as a matter of law that Ms. Castella's failure to report the sexual and physical abuse was a serious breach of her legal, moral, and ethical duties which jeopardized the physical and emotional safety and well-being of a young female student and exposed the female student to additional physical, health, and safety concerns. In paragraph 57 of the Recommended Order, the ALJ found "[i]n this case, the physical and emotional safety and well-being of a young female student was jeopardized by Respondent's failure to immediately notify the appropriate authorities of what she learned on March 9, 2015." As the COE correctly contends, section 90.301(3), Florida Statutes, provides that nothing in the Evidence Code shall prevent the drawing of an inference that is appropriate. Whiteaker ex rel. Parker v. Gilreath, 734 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The EPC found that it was an inference based on competent, substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the ALJ's inference regarding this issue was supported by evidence that Ms. Castella failed to immediately report the child abuse.
For her fifth point on appeal, Ms. Castella claims the EPC erred in increasing the recommended penalty without conducting a thorough review of the record and without citing to the record in the Final Order to justify the action. We disagree, as the EPC properly exercised its discretion in imposing the enhanced penalty, and complied with the statutory requirements in doing so.
Section 120.57(1)(l) , Florida Statutes, states that the "agency may accept the recommended penalty in a recommended order but may not reduce or increase it without a review of the complete record and without stating with particularity its reasons therefor in the order, by citing to the record in justifying the action." Furthermore, in Criminal Justice Standards v. Bradley, 596 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. 1992), the Florida Supreme Court stated, "[I]t is the primary function of professional disciplinary boards to determine the appropriate punishment for the misconduct of professionals it regulates." The Florida Supreme Court went on to hold, "[a]s long as the statute under which a professional agency operates provides guidelines for imposing penalties, the agency complies with Section 120.57, and the increased penalty falls within the guidelines established by its statute, a professional board or agency has the discretion to increase the recommended penalty." Bradley, 596 So. 2d at 663, see also Fla. Real Estate Comm'n v. Webb, 367 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 1978) ; Mendez v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 943 So. 2d 909, 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ; Weiss v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 677 So. 2d 98, 99-100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) ; Clark v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 463 So. 2d 328, 333-334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
The transcript of the EPC hearing held on October 25, 2017, reflects that each member of the Commission confirmed that they each read the entire record in this case. Ms. Castella's counsel agreed twice that the panel members reviewed the record. In its Final Order, the EPC states it is imposing the enhanced penalty based on the reasons set forth in the COE's motion to enhance and based on the argument of counsel made before the EPC at the hearing. The Final Order attaches and incorporates as an exhibit the COE's motion to enhance penalty. That motion specifically and expressly cited three separate factual bases to support an increase in the penalty. The EPC's adoption of these bases and its incorporation of the COE's motion into its Final Order satisfied the requirements of section 120.57(1)(l) . In Phillips v. Board of Dentistry, Department of Health, 884 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), Dr. Phillips similarly challenged an agency's final order that enhanced the penalty imposed, contending that the final order failed to satisfy the requirements of section 120.57(1)(l) . In rejecting that claim, the Fourth District held:
Here the Board did not merely refer to the record in its final order; rather the Board expressly adopted the exceptions filed by the Department of Health to the recommended order and incorporated them into its final order. Because these exceptions became a part of the order, to which they were attached as an exhibit, the failure of the order itself to duplicate the language of the exceptions does not affect this court's ability to review the Board's decision.
Id. at 8, see also Allen v. Sch. Bd. of Dade Cty., 571 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). We hold that the Final Order in the instant case complied with section 120.57(1)(l) .
Finally, with respect to Ms. Castella's last point on appeal, she contends she was denied due process of law because 1) the COE's closing argument to enhance the sentence improperly attacked Ms. Castella and her theory of defense, 2) injected allegations of abuse that were not charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and 3) the EPC's misapprehension of the available penalties denied Ms. Castella due process of law.
First, regarding the COE's closing argument to enhance the sentence improperly attacked Ms. Castella and her theory of defense, Ms. Castella's counsel made no objection to the comments or the motion to enhance. The ALJ found Ms. Castella's testimony was not credible and rejected her explanation that she did not receive any training on reporting suspected child abuse. Absent a contemporaneous objection, appellate courts will not review alleged inappropriate comments made by counsel unless the comments constitute fundamental error. Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2001). And this is not a case involving fundamental error. Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998). Second, as previously noted, the parties entered into a joint stipulation admitting in the "STATEMENT OF AGREED/UNCONTESTED FACTS" the reported sexual abuse, physical abuse, and that Ms. Castella did not immediately report the abuse to DCF. Third, Ms. Castella claims that the comment made at the hearing by one EPC panel member demonstrates that suspension or revocation was the only sanction known available to the entire panel. This is inaccurate.
In his Recommended Order, the ALJ recommended only probation, so the panel was aware that probation was an available sanction. Further, as argued in the COE's motion to enhance, the ALJ cited the penalty range from probation to revocation for Ms. Castella's violation of Count 3, but the ALJ did not cite the range for the violation of Counts 1 and 2. The motion to enhance stated in paragraph 15 that the violation of Count 1 permitted a penalty range from probation to suspension and that the COE was requesting a penalty within that range. The EPC has the discretion to apply penalties when multiple categories of violations are noted. See 6B-11.007(2)(p), Fla. Admin. Code.
A review of the transcript of the October 25, 2017 hearing indicates that the comment made by one of the panel members, Ms. Rose, was that she stated that per their guidelines, the penalty ranged from suspension to revocation and she questioned whether probation was within their guideline purview. Another panel member, Dr. Bland had questions and sought to clarify the ALJ's recommendation. Dr. Bland misunderstood and thought the COE was seeking additional sanctions, but his question was answered when the other members explained to him that the enhancement being sought was still within permissible guidelines. Thus, the panel members were all in agreement and there was no confusion regarding the enhancement the COE was seeking. The COE cited cases supporting its position that enhancing the ALJ's recommended penalty was permitted, and the COE was explaining to the EPC panel members what the options were. Ms. Castella's counsel did not object. The imposed penalty was within the guidelines range for the violations, and there was no error on this point, either.
In sum, we find no error in the EPC's Final Order, and thus affirm it in all respects.
Affirmed.