Opinion
No. 1:15-cv-00148-JAM-SKO
07-10-2015
MIKE CASTANEDA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FARMERSVILLE; JEREMY BROGAN; and DOES 1 through 10, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Mike Castaneda ("Plaintiff") filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") (Doc. #19) alleging two causes of action against Defendants City of Farmersville ("the City") and Jeremy Brogan ("Brogan") (collectively "Defendants"). Defendants now move to dismiss (Doc. #20) Plaintiff's claims against the City.
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for July 15, 2015. --------
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the FAC, Plaintiff was a live-in caretaker for an elderly gentleman in Farmersville, California. While loudly dealing with his patient, Plaintiff heard a knock at the door. At the door was Brogan, an officer with the Farmersville Police Department. Brogan asked Plaintiff to step outside and "promptly detained Plaintiff using handcuffs." The handcuffs caused Plaintiff severe pain. Brogan placed Plaintiff in the back of a police vehicle and slammed the door on Plaintiff's foot. As Brogan drove Plaintiff to the Tulare County Jail, Brogan drove erratically in order to cause Plaintiff injuries, which such injuries did result.
Plaintiff requested medical attention for his hands and foot; Brogan ignored him. Plaintiff was held in custody for three days without medical attention before being released without being charged with a crime. Plaintiff alleges that he has been declared permanently disabled as a result of the incident.
The FAC states two causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§1983") against all Defendants based on (1) Excessive Force and (2) Denial of Medical Care.
II. OPINION
Defendants contend the FAC fails to set forth sufficient facts to plausibly plead a cause of action against the City pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). MTD at p. 3.
To create municipal liability under §1983, the constitutional violation must be caused by "a policy, practice, or custom of the entity," Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011), or be the result of an order by a policy-making officer, see Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012). "Although detailed factual allegations are not required under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 8, a claim must set forth sufficient factual content that allows the 'court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Herrera v. City of Sacramento, No. 2:13-CV-00456 JAM-AC, 2013 WL 3992497, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
In his Opposition, Plaintiff points to the following sections of the FAC:
[The City] has failed to adequately train its employee peace officers, including [] Brogan . . . in minimally accepted standards of police conduct . . . including proper use of [force] . . . and obligations to provide medical care . . . . [FAC ¶ 10]Opp. at p. 4. Plaintiff adds that Defendants were also "placed on notice" by the FAC's allegation that Brogan "intentionally and deliberately refused to render or provide any form of reasonable medical care to treat Plaintiff for the injuries he had suffered . . . . [FAC ¶ 27]." Id. Plaintiff argues these allegations adequately put Defendants "on notice for what they must defend." Opp. at pp. 3-4.
Defendant Brogan . . . acting within the course and scope of his duties . . . seized, detained and arrested Plaintiff without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion or any other legal justification . . . . [FAC ¶ 22]
First, the allegations regarding Brogan's conduct surrounding the seizure and detention of Plaintiff (FAC ¶ 22) and his failure to provide medical care (FAC ¶ 27) relate to and properly support Plaintiff's claims against Brogan. However, the City cannot be held liable for Brogan's actions under a respondeat superior theory. See Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2011).
The only allegations in the FAC providing any basis for the City's liability pursuant to Monell are entirely conclusory. FAC 11 10-11. "[T]o sufficiently state a claim under Monell, it is not enough to state that there is a policy and the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to various constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs; there must be facts showing the plausibility of those statements." Herrera, 2013 WL 3992497, at *8. "Although [a] plaintiff may benefit from discovery, the Supreme Court has made it clear that threadbare allegations are insufficient to 'unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.'" Via v. City of Fairfield, 833 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79).
The FAC does not allege any facts supporting Plaintiff's claims that the City failed to adequately train and supervise its officers and properly investigate claims of misconduct. The Court accordingly grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the City in the first and second causes of action. Because it is not clear to the Court that Plaintiff can allege no set of facts to support such claims, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend.
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the City WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must file his new complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this order. Defendants must file their responsive pleading within twenty (20) days thereafter.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 10, 2015
/s/_________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE