Opinion
Civil No. 00-817-RE
January 18, 2001
Tim Wilborn Portland, Oregon Attorney for Plaintiff.
Kristine Olson United States Attorney William W. Youngman Assistant United States Attorney Portland, Oregon 97204-2902. Vikash Chhagan Special Assistant United States Attorney Seattle, Washington Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Linda Castaneda brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is reversed.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI benefits on November 26 and November 15, 1996, respectively. Plaintiff's applications were denied, as were her requests for reconsideration. A hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) was held on October 28, 1998 at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified. On January 21, 1999, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled. On May 16, 2000, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision a final agency decision.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Introduction.
Plaintiff alleges a closed period of disability beginning February 1, 1993 and ending December 31, 1997 based on a combination of impairments including major depression, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), agoraphobia, anxiety, and other psychological impairments. Plaintiff began working again in February 1998 and has persisted with this employment despite continuing problems with her mental health. Tr. 295-301.
Plaintiff was 50 years old at the time of the hearing. She has a limited education, possesses a certificate in data processing, and has past relevant work as a medical records technician and data entry person.
B. Medical Record.
In its brief filed with this court, the Commissioner does not review the relevant medical and testimonial evidence; rather, the Commissioner adopts the ALJ's summary of the evidence contained in his decision. The ALJ's summary of the medical record, upon which the Commissioner relies in this matter, focuses on statements that could be argued not to support plaintiff's claim of disability and neglects to include statements that are consistent with plaintiff's claims. The following summary includes material from the medical record that could be argued to support plaintiff's claim.
Although plaintiff alleges disability beginning in February 1993, she has a history of mental health problems dating back at least to the 1980s. At age 17, plaintiff tried to kill herself by taking a bottle of aspirin, and in 1971 and 1982, plaintiff tried to kill herself and her children by turning on the natural gas in her oven, but both times she turned the gas off before she lost consciousness. See, e.g., Tr. 180, 214, 219.
In March 1987, plaintiff sought help from the Riverside County Department of Mental Health. She reported crying easily; problems with sleeping and eating (15-pound weight loss), and being too depressed to look for work. Tr. 181-82.
In October 1987, plaintiff went to an immediate care facility with complaints of numbness in her extremities and extreme anxiety, and was told to breathe into a paper bag to relieve her symptoms. Tr. 167.
Plaintiff's husband left her in 1989, and thereafter she found out that he had sexually molested all of her children. Tr. 224.
For eight months in 1991, plaintiff had 19 psychotherapy sessions. Tr. 233-34. Her therapist reported that plaintiff was referred for treatment because of numerous absences from work. Tr. 233. Plaintiff was having difficulty getting to work and performing the required work; was showing signs of great stress and anxiety; and was having great difficulty sleeping and eating. Id. Plaintiff's memory was faulty, she had great difficulty concentrating, and she was becoming quite isolated from family and friends. Tr. 234. Her therapist also reported that plaintiff's childhood was extremely abusive (both physically and sexually), with multiple perpetrators. Tr. 233. Plaintiff made minimal progress during therapy despite being well motivated. Id. The therapist opined that plaintiff's stressors (both past and present) were quite overwhelming and that longer treatment was needed. Id.
In June of 1993, plaintiff again sought help from the Riverside County Department of Mental Health for depression and anxiety. Treatment records for June through October of 1993 indicate plaintiff was regularly very depressed, anxious, and not sleeping. Tr. 177-80. During this period, she was going to counseling related to the physical and sexual abuse she had suffered, and her past problems with alcohol dependancy. Id. She had suicidal ideation with a plan. Id. She had been laid off from her job and her home was being foreclosed by HUD. Id. She was having trouble affording the cost of treatment because she had lost her health insurance. Id.
The medical record contains no information for 1994, but plaintiff explained at the hearing that during this period she was so overwhelmed by her psychological symptoms that she isolated herself in her home and was unable to follow through on seeking treatment. Tr. 48-56.
From March through November 1995, plaintiff received counseling through the Iris Plan for her severe depression, prior alcohol dependency issues, abuse issues, and PTSD. Tr. 183-208. From June 1995 through September 1996, plaintiff received treatment through the California Pacific Medical Center for her ongoing depression. Tr. 210-22.
In July 1995, Kevin K. Nguyen, M.D. of the California Pacific Medical Center reported that plaintiff was in an episode of major depression, with moderate to severe impairment in daily functioning, and started her on anti-depressant medication. Tr. 222. In September 1995, plaintiff's mental health practitioner at the Iris Center, Sally Wong, M.A., certified that she was unemployable for the next six months due to severe depression, and stated that her condition should be reviewed again at the end of the six month period. Tr. 183. In April 1996, Michael Levinson, M.D. of the California Pacific Medical Center certified her as unemployable for the next six months due to severe depression and anxiety, and again stated that her condition should be reviewed at the end of the six month period. Tr. 209.
In September 1996, plaintiff sought help from the Pacific Northwest Clinic Research Center for her depression, severe insomnia, PTSD, and anxiety attacks. Tr. 270-71. She reported to Scott Losk, Ph.D., the clinical psychologist who evaluated her, that she took anti-depressant medication between October 1995 and July 1996, but had to discontinue use because of the cost. Tr. 270. Dr. Losk reported that plaintiff would be a good candidate for a Sertraline PTSD research trial. Tr. 271.
In December 1996, plaintiff received a comprehensive psychological examination from Ann B. Clarkson, Ph.D. Tr. 223-32. Dr. Clarkson extensively reviewed plaintiff's background, presenting problems, and daily activities. Tr. 223-28. Dr. Clarkson administered a number of tests to plaintiff, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Dr. Clarkson found plaintiff's MMPI profile to be valid, and also found that it was very elevated, with five major scales in the 99th percentile and one major scale in the 98th percentile. Tr. 230. Dr. Clarkson reported that profiles elevated at this level indicate an individual who is severely emotionally distressed and unable to fulfill usual daily responsibilities. Id. Dr. Clarkson rated plaintiff's Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) at 45, which is indicative of a disabling level of impairment. Tr. 231. Dr. Clarkson reported that plaintiff's reaction to stress is to withdraw physically and that, under extreme stress, she may temporarily lose contact with reality. Id. She diagnosed plaintiff with chronic PTSD, as well as severe recurrent and chronic major depression. Id. Dr. Clarkson opined that vocational rehabilitation would not be appropriate for plaintiff until after her emotional distress had been relieved to the point that she could begin to handle daily responsibilities on a regular basis. Tr. 232.
In January 1997, Lori Whittaker, a counseling intern at the YWCA, reported on three counseling sessions she had had with plaintiff. Tr. 235-36. She reported that plaintiff exhibited vegetative symptoms of clinical depression and needed medication. Tr. 235. Plaintiff reported to Ms. Whittaker that she intended to pursue getting medication, but could not afford it on her own, and also that she could not afford to continue her counseling. Id. Ms. Whittaker also reported that plaintiff lacked a network of friends to provide support to her and that she appeared to be functioning at an extremely low level with regards to work-related activities. Id. She opined that with financial, medical and psychological support, plaintiff could possibly resume working and supporting herself. Id.
In January through March 1997, as part of the Sertraline study, Dr. Losk reported that plaintiff was minimally improved and still had a marked level of PTSD and lacked motivation to leave her home very much (plaintiff may have been getting the placebo in the study). Tr. 250-53.
In March 1997, Dick Wimmers, Ph.D. reviewed plaintiff's medical records on behalf of the Department of Disability Services. Based on his review of the records, Dr. Wimmers opined that plaintiff had slight limitations in daily living activities; moderate limitations in social functioning; often has deficiencies in concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner in work settings or elsewhere; and has one or two episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work settings. Tr. 244.
In September 1997, Lloyd Caplan, M.D. reported the results of a complete psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff that he performed at the request of the Disability Evaluation Division of the Department of Social Services. Tr. 273-75. Plaintiff reported PTSD, anxiety, depression, sleep disorder and panic attacks. Tr. 273. The depression was almost constant, and was such that plaintiff felt like crying all the time. When she did cry, she was often not able to stop. Tr. 273. Dr. Caplan reported a GAF of 50, and diagnosed plaintiff with major depression and PTSD with agoraphobia. Tr. 275.
He concluded that plaintiff cannot relate and interact with supervisors and coworkers. She can understand and remember detailed and uncomplicated job instructions but it is doubtful she could carry them out. She cannot deal with the public. She cannot maintain concentration and attention. She cannot withstand the stress and pressures associated with day-to-day work activity.
Id.
In February 1998, plaintiff started work. In June 1998, she started participating in another medication study. By July 1998, she was still having a marked level of depression, with passive suicidal ideation. She was persisting at work, refusing to give up despite severe symptoms. Tr. 296-301.
C. Plaintiff's Testimony.
Plaintiff testified that she has an 11th grade education and did not obtain a GED. Tr. 43-44. She has worked since February 1998 doing data entry for the State of Oreogn Tax Division. Tr. 45.
Plaintiff testified that in 1994, she attempted to work, but didn't know what she was doing on the job and was crying all the time at work. Tr. 46. When she found she could not work anymore, she returned to her house in Palm Springs until it was repossessed by HUD. Tr. 46-47. During that time, she rarely left her house and cried much of the time. She got a temporary job that was supposed to last two weeks, but lost it in two days because she could not make it in to work. Her sleep was so severely disrupted that she did not fall asleep until dawn and thus could not make it to a morning job. Tr. 47. At this time, plaintiff testified that she also was not eating very well, and would go about three days before forcing herself to eat. Tr. 50. The length of time between meals was sometime due to her running out of food and not being able to work up the courage to go to the store. Tr. 51.
In 1995, when her first application for benefits was denied, plaintiff was crying regularly and wrongly understood that she had no appeal rights. Tr. 48-49. At that time, she was incapable of balancing her own checkbook, could not do any reading, and could not deal with financial matters. Tr. 49.
Plaintiff has a past problem with alcohol, but has been sober since 1993. Tr. 49.
In 1995, when she was living with her son in San Francisco, plaintiff got a job working a graveyard shift, thinking this would be workable with her disrupted sleep pattern. Tr. 51. However, when she went to the bus stop to go to work, she just stood there letting buses pass her without knowing why. Id. She then sat at the bus stop in the rain and cold and cried, and then finally walked back to her son's house. She felt ashamed and did not know how to explain that she had not gone to work. Id.
Plaintiff testified that she isolates herself in her house. She stays inside and does not do anything, with her mind continuing to think and know that she needs to do something but not knowing what to do. Tr. 52.
Plaintiff testified that during her period of disability, she lost interest in the former hobbies of sewing and drawing. Prior to losing her home, she had deteriorated to the point where she left the house in a terrible mess; she testified to being ashamed of how she left the house, but stated that she was overwhelmed and could not clean or do anything in anticipation of leaving. Tr. 53. When she was packing to leave, she would become overwhelmed, take the boxes she had packed, and throw them in the trash. Id. These boxes contained, among other things, items she had been given by her mother and grandmother, and she had a lot of guilt about throwing them away. Id. Plaintiff left her furniture in the house. She had to push herself to do anything, and struggled with words constantly going through her head about her being worthless. Tr. 54.
By the time of the hearing, plaintiff testified that her condition was better, although she still has some severe difficulties, such as difficulties functioning on the job. Tr. 55.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must affirm the Secretary's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Secretary's conclusions." Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986).
The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, plaintiff must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Secretary has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502, 416.920. In the first step, the Secretary determines whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." If so, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
In step two, the Secretary determines whether the claimant has a "medically severe impairment or combination of impairments." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If not, the claimant is not disabled.
In step three, the Secretary determines whether the impairment meets or equals "one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Id.; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, the claimant is conclusively presumed disabled; if not, the Secretary proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141.
In step four, the Secretary determines whether the claimant can still perform "past relevant work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant can work, she is not disabled. If she cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Secretary.
In step five, the Secretary must establish that the claimant can perform other work. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (f), 416.920(e) (f). If the Secretary meets this burden and proves that the claimant is able to perform other jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566, 416.966.
THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
The ALJ found that plaintiff:
(1) Has the following severe, medically determinable impairments: major depression and post traumatic stress disorder, in remission with medication treatment;
(2) Does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to, one listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Appendix 1, Subpart P;
(3) Has an underlying medically determinable psychological impairment that could possibly cause the pain or other symptoms alleged, but plaintiff's allegations with regard to the severity and functional consequences of her symptoms are not credible;
(4) Has the residual functional capacity to perform work activity at any exertional level;
(5) Is subject to a moderate restriction of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace seldom resulting in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner, and one or two episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings; and
(6) Has impairments that do not preclude performance of her past relevant work as a data entry person.
PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATIONS OF ERROR
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in:
(1) Improperly rejecting the opinion of Lloyd M. Caplan, M.D.;
(2) Improperly ignoring the disability opinion of Ann B. Clarkson, Ph.D.;
(3) Improperly ignoring the disability assessment of Lori Whittaker;
(4) Improperly ignoring the disability assessment of Michael Levinson, M.D.;
(5) Improperly ignoring the opinion of Dick Wimmers, Ph.D. (the DDS doctor); and
(6) Improperly rejecting plaintiff's testimony.
DISCUSSION
A. Opinion of Lloyd M. Caplan, M.D.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Dr. Caplan, an examining psychiatrist hired by the Social Security Administration to evaluate plaintiff. The ALJ rejected Dr. Caplan's conclusions, which are summarized at page 6 above, as "not being supported by the clinical findings in his report." Tr. 17, 20.
The ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ must do more than simply state that "objective factors point toward an adverse conclusion" or "medical opinions are not supported by sufficient objective findings." Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ must "provide detailed, reasoned, and legitimate rationales for disregarding the physicians' findings." Id.
I agree with plaintiff that the ALJ erred in not providing clear and convincing reasons for rejection of the opinion of Dr. Caplan. Dr. Caplan's report indicates that he performed a complete psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff upon which he based his conclusions about plaintiff's functional limitations. Tr. 273-75. The ALJ's rejection of Dr. Caplan's conclusions because they are "not . . . supported by the clinical findings in his report," without more, does not provide a legally sufficient basis to reject Dr. Caplan's uncontradicted conclusions that were based upon his complete psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff. Because the ALJ failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion of Dr. Caplan, that opinion is credited as a matter of law. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 834.
B. Opinion of Ann B. Clarkson, Ph.D.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in ignoring the opinion of Dr. Clarkson, who did a comprehensive psychological examination of plaintiff, the results of which are summarized at page 5 above. The ALJ recited in his opinion are very brief, and one-sided, summary of Dr. Clarkson's opinion, and gave no reasons for not considering Dr. Clarkson's conclusions that, for example, plaintiff suffers from severe emotional distress and has inability to fulfill usual daily responsibilities. Indeed, the ALJ appears to have concluded that Dr. Clarkson's opinion supports a conclusion that plaintiff had the ability to work.
With respect to plaintiff's impairments as found by Dr. Clarkson, the ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting her uncontradicted opinions as plaintiff's examining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The ALJ must provide detailed, reasoned, and legitimate rationales for disregarding the doctor's findings. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d at 421-22.
I agree with plaintiff that the ALJ erred in not considering plaintiff's impairments as found and reported on by Dr. Clarkson. Because the ALJ failed to provide adequate reasons for not considering the opinion of Dr. Clarkson, that opinion as to plaintiff's impairments is credited as a matter of law. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 834.
C. Disability Assessment of Lori Whittaker.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in ignoring the opinion of Lori Whittaker, a counseling intern at the YWCA, whose report is summarized on page 5 above. Plaintiff argues that even though Ms. Whittaker's report is not entitled to the same weight as the opinion of a doctor, her report is probative evidence that must be considered, citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) ("We consider all evidence in your case record when we make a determination."). Again, with respect to Ms. Whittaker, the ALJ gave in his opinion a very brief, and one-sided, summary of her report, and gave no reasons for not considering Ms. Whittaker's conclusions that support plaintiff's claim of disability.
The ALJ must give legitimate reasons for rejecting the statements of even nonprofessional lay witnesses. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, the ALJ provided no reasons at all. I agree that the ALJ erred in not properly considering the report of Ms. Whittaker, and that her report should be credited.
D. Disability Assessment of Michael Levinson, M.D.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly ignored the opinion of Michael Levinson, M.D. (see summary on page 4 above) that plaintiff was unemployable. The ALJ does not mention Dr. Levinson's report in his opinion.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician if it is conclusory and unsupported by clinical findings, citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the ALJ does not even mention Dr. Levinson's report, much less characterize it as conclusory and unsupported by clinical findings. My review of Dr. Levinson's report indicates that it is "conclusory" because of the nature of the form that was used, and that it is supported by the outpatient department progress notes from the California Pacific Medical Center that appear at Tr. 210-22.
The ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of a treating physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The ALJ did not do so here, and I agree with plaintiff that the ALJ erred in not considering the opinion of Dr. Levinson. Because the ALJ failed to consider or mention Dr. Levinson's opinion, that opinion is credited as a matter of law. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 834.
E. Opinion of Dick Wimmers, Ph.D.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly ignored the findings of Dr. Wimmers upon his review of plaintiff's medical record for the state agency. Dr. Wimmers conclusions are summarized at page 6 above, and the ALJ's summary of Dr. Wimmers' file review appears at Tr. 17-18. In his opinion, the ALJ gave no reason for rejecting those of Dr. Wimmers' conclusions that support plaintiff's disability claim (indeed, the ALJ does not even mention those of Dr. Wimmers' conclusions that support plaintiff's disability claim). Plaintiff argues that failing to consider Dr. Wimmers' conclusions was error, citing Social Security Ruling 96-6p (which requires that such evidence to be treated as expert opinion evidence of nonexamining sources).
I agree with plaintiff that it was error for the ALJ to fail to give legitimate reasons for rejecting or even mentioning those of Dr. Wimmers' conclusions that supported plaintiff's disability claim. Dr. Wimmers' report should be credited.
F. Plaintiff's Testimony.
The ALJ determined that plaintiff's testimony with regard to the severity and functional consequences of her symptoms was not credible. Tr. 19. Plaintiff argues that this was error, citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996). In Smolen, the Ninth Circuit said that the ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant's symptom testimony if there is no affirmative evidence of malingering and the claimant has established a condition that is capable of producing some degree of symptom. Smolen at 1281-82.
In this case, there is no evidence of malingering and the record supports that plaintiff's impairments could cause some degree of the symptoms alleged. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's reasons for rejecting plaintiff's testimony are not clear and convincing. I agree.
I disagree with the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's testimony is "inconsistent with the medical record." Tr. 19. I find unconvincing the ALJ's conclusion that if plaintiff's treatment has been sporadic, this is clear and convincing evidence that her testimony of her symptoms is to be discounted. As noted by plaintiff, the nature and severity of plaintiff's symptoms, together with her precarious financial situation, could well be responsible for plaintiff being unable to obtain more frequent and consistent treatment. I find plaintiff's reasoning as fully supported in the record as any conclusion by the ALJ that plaintiff has been noncompliant with treatment because her impairments are not substantial.
Further, the ALJ relies upon plaintiff's ability to perform some activities of daily living in support of his conclusion that her testimony is not credible. However, it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff's ability to perform some activities of daily living within the confines of her home means that she is able to perform and sustain work-related activities outside her home. In fact, evidence in the medical record from her treating and examining physicians belies this conclusion.
Resolution of conflicts in the testimony and credibility is the function of the ALJ.
Russell v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1988). However, in this case, much of the medical testimony supporting plaintiff's claim of disability was either ignored or improperly rejected by the ALJ. When plaintiff's testimony is evaluated in light of the medical record as a whole, I find it was error for the ALJ to reject her testimony. The reasons given by the ALJ for rejection of the testimony were not clear and convincing.
G. Remand/Award of Benefits.
If the opinions in the medical record and plaintiff's testimony had been properly credited, I conclude that there was no substantial evidence to support the ALJ's denial of benefits. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The final question before the court is whether the case should be remanded for further administrative proceedings, as requested by the Commissioner. The decision whether to remand a case or award benefits outright is left to the discretion of the court. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 1998). Courts "generally award benefits when no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings or when the record has been fully developed and there is not sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion." Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989). Remand is appropriate where additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects; however, where remand would only delay the receipt of benefits, judgment for the claimant is appropriate. Id.
In this case, I conclude that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting or ignoring the opinions of plaintiff's examining and treating physicians, plaintiff's counselor, and the psychiatrist who reviewed her records on behalf of the agency. Further, the ALJ's reasons for rejecting plaintiff's testimony were also insufficient when viewed in conjunction with a proper review of the medical record as a whole. Reversal for the payment of benefits is appropriate where there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find plaintiff disabled if the evidence were credited. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1292. The administrative record here is fully developed, and there are no material outstanding issues. If the opinions in the medical record and plaintiff's testimony had been properly credited, there was no substantial evidence to support the ALJ's denial of benefits. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). A remand for payment of benefits is appropriate in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Commissioner's decision is REVERSED; the case is remanded for the payment of benefits for a closed period of disability beginning February 1, 1993 and ending December 31, 1997; and plaintiff's prior application is to be reopened if necessary to support the benefit award.
IT IS SO ORDERED.