Opinion
8:22-cv-02013-DOC-JDE
03-23-2023
JESUS CASILLAS v. NISSAN RTH AMERICA, INC.
Present: The Honorable David O. Carter, Judge
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Before the Court is Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.'s (“Defendant” or “Nissan”) Motion to Remand (“Motion”) (Dkt. 24). Because this action was originally filed in this Court, the Court construes Defendant's Motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Having reviewed the parties' briefs and arguments, and for reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and DISMISSES this action WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. Background
This action arises out of Plaintiff Jesus Casillas' (“Plaintiff”) purchase of a new 2021 Nisan Frontier, VIN No.: 1N6ED0EA6MN707251 (“Subject Vehicle”) on or about April 12, 2021. Plaintiff filed this action on November 2, 2022, alleging three causes of action under the California Song-Beverly Act. See Complaint (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on December 21, 2022 (“FAC”) (Dkt. 11). Nissan filed its Answer to Plaintiff's FAC on January 21, 2023 (Dkt. 14). The parties appeared before the Court for a Scheduling Conference on February 21, 2023. At the Scheduling Conference, the Court requested simultaneous briefing addressing the Court's jurisdiction (Dkt. 21).
The parties filed their briefs on March 7, 2023. Pl.'s Br. (Dkt. 23); Def.'s Motion (Dkt. 24).
II. Legal Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A federal court cannot assume subject-matter jurisdiction to reach the merits of a case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). A district court properly exercises jurisdiction over cases that present a federal question or where there is diversity of citizenship among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
Moreover, “it is well settled that the jurisdictional amount is established from the face of the pleadings, at the time a complaint is filed.” Maine Community Health Options v. Albertsons Companies, Inc., 993 F.3d 720, 723 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Alcaraz v. Steadfast Ins. Co., No. 222CV00842ABJEMX, 2022 WL 1102123, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022). The amount in controversy is an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant's liability. See Lewis v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2000). “[I]n cases brought in the federal court ... [i]t must appear to a legal certainty that the [plaintiff's] claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.” Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90 (1938)).
Even where neither party has challenged the district court's jurisdiction, a district court may raise sua sponte the issue of whether the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A., 264 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2001); O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is well settled that the court must dismiss sua sponte at any time its lack of jurisdiction appears by any means.”).
III. Discussion
It is undisputed that the parties are citizens of different states. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff only raises claims under state law, namely the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff nonetheless asserts that subject matter jurisdiction exists because based on actual damages, incidental damages, a civil penalty of two times actual damages, and attorneys' fees. By aggregating all these sums, Plaintiff concludes that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The Court disagrees.
Actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act are the “amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer,” less the reduction in value “directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C). To determine the amount directly attributable to the buyer's use of the vehicle, the manufacturer multiplies the price of the vehicle the buyer paid or will pay by a fraction-the denominator is 120,000, and the numerator is the number of miles the buyer drove the car before the first relevant repair. Id. This calculation provides the actual damages that Plaintiff suffered.
Here, Plaintiff contends that the approximate value of the Subject Vehicle is $36,931.20, with a Cash Price of $30,500.00. Pl.'s Br. at 5. Plaintiff further states that the first repair occurred at 16,029 miles. Id.; FAC ¶ 6. Accordingly, he estimates a mileage offset of 16,029 miles taking into account the 17 miles on the odometer at the time of purchase. Applying the formula under the Song-Beverly Act, Plaintiff estimates an offset amount of only $4,074.03-which, subtracted from the paid and payable amount, yields an “actual damages” amount of $32,857.17. Pl.'s Br. at 5.
Plaintiff nonetheless argues that, because he is “also requesting civil penalties of up to twice their actual damages amount of ($32,857.17)” under the Act, “this would bring the total damages amount to $98,571.51.” Br. at 5. Adding Plaintiff's claims for “attorneys' fees or incidental and consequential damages in the amount of $5,000.00,” Plaintiff estimates that the amount of controversy is approximately $110,793.60. FAC ¶ 18.
The Song-Beverly Act does not provide for punitive damages but “[c]ourts have held that the civil penalty under [Song-Beverly] is akin to punitive damages, because both have the dual effect of punishment and deterrence for defendants.” Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 243 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (citations omitted). The amount recoverable under the Song-Beverly Act is up to two times the amount of actual damages Plaintiff suffered. Brady, 243 F.Supp. at 1009. “If the amount of actual damages is speculative, however, an attempt to determine the civil penalty is equally uncertain.” Chavez v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. CV 19-06003-ODW-GJSX, 2020 WL 468909, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2020) (citing Edwards, 2016 WL 6583585, at *4).
A civil penalty is applicable only if a court determines that a defendant's failure to comply with the Act is willful. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1794(c). “The civil penalty under California Civil Code § 1794(c) cannot simply be assumed.” Castillo v. FCA USA, LLC, 2019 WL 6607006, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (remanding where the defendant provided no specific argument or evidence for including a civil penalty in the amount in controversy). Rather, the party asserting jurisdiction “must make some effort to justify the assumption.” Zawaideh v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2018 WL 1805103, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018), at *2; Herko v. FCA US, LLC, 2019 WL 5587140, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2019) (similar); Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., No. 16-cv-05852 BRO (PLAx), 2016 WL 6583585, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016); Chavez, 2020 WL 468909, at *2 (remanding where the defendant did not explain why a penalty applying to willful conduct would be awarded in the case); Eberle v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, No. 2:18-CV-06650-VAP (PLAx), 2018 WL 4674598, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2018) (similar). see also Sanchez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 218CV08023RGKSKX, 2018 WL 6787354, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2018) (remanding where civil penalties were “too speculative for inclusion in the amount-in-controversy”); Chajon v. Ford Motor Co., No. 218CV10533RGKRAOX, 2019 WL 994019, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019).
Here, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to support a civil penalty award. Although Plaintiff cites a number of cases awarding civil penalties, he does not explain how those jury verdicts are similar to this case. Accordingly, the Court finds the amount too speculative to include when calculating the amount-in-controversy. See Lopez v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. 219CV07577RGKMRW, 2019 WL 4450427, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2019) (excluding punitive damages where party asserting jurisdiction offered no evidence to support the imposition such an award); Davani v. e-Zassi, LLC, 2018 WL 1471895, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (concluding that punitive damages could not establish the amount in controversy where no evidentiary support for the imposition of punitive damages was offered); Eberle, 2018 WL 4674598, at *2 (collecting cases).
As to attorneys' fees, district courts within the Ninth Circuit are split with respect to including prospective attorneys' fees in the amount in controversy. See Chajon, 2019 WL 994019, at *2. Because “attorneys' fees are in the control of the client and counsel[] and may be avoided or accrue over years depending on legal strategy,” the Court agrees that they are “too speculative for inclusion into amount in controversy.” Id.; see D'Amico v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 20-2985-CJC (JCX), 2020 WL 2614610, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2020); Mullin v. FCA US, LLC, 2020 WL 2509081, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2020); Castillo, 2019 WL 6607006, at *2; Sanchez, 2018 WL 6787354, at *1; MIC Philberts Invs. v. Am. Cas. Co of Reading, Pa., 2012 WL 2118239, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012). Accordingly, the Court excludes attorneys' fees from its calculation of the amount in controversy.
Because Plaintiff fails to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
IV. Disposition
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion (Dkt. 11) and DISMISSES this action WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.
MINUTES FORM 11
Initials of Deputy Clerk: kdu
CIVIL-GEN