Opinion
No. 04-17-00086-CR
01-03-2018
Alex CASIAS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 38th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas
Trial Court No. 14-09-11574-CR
The Honorable Camile G. Dubose, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice AFFIRMED
In 2014, Alex Casias was charged with Assault-Family Violence-Impede Breath. On June 24, 2015, after pleading nolo contendere to the charge, Casias was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. His sentence was then suspended, and he was placed on community supervision for two years. On February 1, 2017, a revocation hearing was held during which Casias pled true to having violated the terms of his community supervision. His community supervision was then revoked, and he was sentenced to nine years of imprisonment. Casias appeals, arguing that his plea of true was involuntary. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
At the beginning of the revocation hearing, both Casias and the State waived their opening statements. The State then read the fifteen allegations against Casias as alleged in the State's motion to revoke Casias's community supervision. Casias was asked if he understood the allegations. He responded in the affirmative. He was then asked by the trial judge how he pled to those allegations. Casias responded, "True."
Casias's probation officer, Juan Villasana, then took the witness stand and testified that the terms and conditions of Casias's community supervision required him not to engage in criminal activity and not to associate or affiliate with any known gang members or members of a criminal organization. The State introduced an exhibit in evidence, showing that on August 26, 2016, Casias pled nolo contendere to having made a terroristic threat and was sentenced to forty days of confinement in jail and a fine of $2,000.
Casias then testified on his own behalf. His attorney asked him whether he understood the allegations made by the State in its motion to revoke his community supervision. Casias replied that he did understand. Casias then agreed with his counsel that he had pled true to all of the allegations. Casias's counsel asked him to go through each allegation so that Casias would have "an opportunity to explain to the Judge the circumstances surrounding those pleas of true." His counsel questioned Casias about each allegation and had Casias explain the circumstances surrounding them and the reasons why he had not complied with the terms and conditions of his community supervision. At the end of the hearing, the trial judge revoked Casias's community supervision. Casias now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review an order revoking community supervision for abuse of discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). "In determining questions regarding sufficiency of the evidence in probation revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. "[A]n order revoking probation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence; in other words, that greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of his probation." Id. (quoting Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Casias argues that his plea of true was not voluntary because he was not admonished properly:
At no time during the hearing was [Casias] advised as to the range of punishment he was facing should his probation be revoked or should he enter pleas of true to any of the alleged violations. At no time did [Casias] ever acknowledge his understanding of the revocation proceedings or any understanding of the range of punishment he was facing. At no time did [Casias] ever acknowledge that he could be sent to prison rather than merely being discharged from his probation. At no time did [Casias] acknowledge that he had been served with a copy of the State's motion to revoke or that he reviewed the allegations in the State's motion with defense counsel. [Casias] was also never advised of the effect of testifying and admitting to any of the alleged probation violations.
A plea of "true" to having violated a term or condition of community supervision must be voluntarily made. See LeBlanc v. State, 768 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1995, no pet.); Jenkins v. State, No. 05-14-00195-CR, 2015 WL 3522813, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2015, no pet.) (not designated for publication). And, generally, a plea of "true" is sufficient, standing alone, to support the revocation of community supervision, thus relieving the State of its evidentiary burden. See, e.g., Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see also Rusk v. State, 440 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (explaining that this general rule may not apply when the alleged violation is that the defendant failed to pay fees required by the terms and conditions of community supervision). Although the State has no evidentiary burden when the defendant pleads true, "it is by far the safer practice [by the trial court] to always hear evidence regardless of the plea." Mitchell v. State, 482 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). In this case, after Casias pled true, the State proceeded to put on evidence that Casias violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision, and Casias then testified on his own behalf.
Casias complains on appeal that he was not given admonishments before he pled "true" to having violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision, arguing that the "revocation hearing record is devoid of any inquiry by the trial judge regarding whether or not [his] pleas of true were of his own free will and not induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises." Admonishments like the ones referred to by Casias are statutorily required before a trial judge can accept a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere in a felony case. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (West Supp. 2017). However, these mandatory, statutory admonitions do not apply to a plea of "true" entered, as here, in a community supervision revocation proceeding. Harris v. State, 505 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Rylander v. State, 970 S.W.2d 174, 174 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.); Lanum v. State, 952 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.); Lindsey v. State, 902 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.); see also Gutierrez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 304, 309-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Thus, the revocation hearing record being devoid of admonishments does not support Casias's argument that his plea of true was involuntary. See Slater v. State, No. 04-04-00299-CR, 2004 WL 3044444, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that because admonishments required by article 26.13 do not apply to probation revocation proceedings, the defendant's plea of true was not rendered involuntary by the absence of such admonitions). And, Casias has not pointed to anything in the record to show that his plea was involuntary. Instead, the record reflects that Casias understood the allegations made against him and pled true to those allegations. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Karen Angelini, Justice Do not publish