Opinion
A23-1908
06-04-2024
Dale Channing Casebolt, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Clearwater County District Court File No. 15-CR-10-134
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
MICHELLE A. LARKIN JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 2010, a jury found appellant Dale Channing Casebolt guilty of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Casebolt moved for a new trial. The district court denied his motion, entered judgment of conviction, and sentenced him to serve 187 months in prison.
2. Casebolt appealed (A11-0291), and we stayed the appeal so he could seek postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied Casebolt's petition for relief after an evidentiary hearing, and Casebolt appealed that denial (A12-1645). We dissolved the prior stay and consolidated the two appeals. In 2013, we affirmed the denial of Casebolt's motion for a new trial and postconviction petition, and the supreme court denied Casebolt's petition for review. State v. Casebolt, Nos. A11-0291, A12-1645, 2013 WL 1092196 (Minn.App. Mar. 18, 2013), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2013).
3. In June 2023, Casebolt filed a second postconviction petition, and in September 2023, the postconviction court filed an order summarily denying the petition as untimely.
4. On September 18, 2023, Casebolt filed a third postconviction petition, asserting that (1) the complaint failed to allege "a public offense," (2) there was "a fatal variance between the evidence and the allegations of the complaint," (3) there was an erroneous "forced construction" of a statute and/or an error in the amended charges, and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. In his petition, Casebolt primarily argued that the state's dismissal of another count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct before jury deliberations meant that "jeopardy had attached."
5. Casebolt's third petition for postconviction relief included an affidavit from his daughter, MC. In her affidavit, MC claimed that the victim, BD, did not wear certain garments on the day of the offenses, that she and BD were "always playing in [her] room or downstairs in the living room," and that "[n]othing was going on" between Casebolt and BD. MC claimed that "the reason why it took [her] so long to come forward [was] because [she] was very young[,] and [she] didn't understand or process what was going on with the situation."
6. On October 16, 2023, the postconviction court denied Casebolt's third petition as untimely. The court reasoned that Casebolt's petition was statutorily time-barred and that Casebolt had not asserted an exception to the time bar. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2022) (containing postconviction time bar and exceptions). Casebolt appeals from the October 2023 order.
The postconviction court considered Casebolt's postconviction petition to be his fourth. It appears that the postconviction court may have deemed a prior motion to compel discovery to be a postconviction petition.
7. Casebolt contends that the postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily denying his postconviction petition as untimely. He asserts that two time-bar exceptions apply: the newly-discovered-evidence and interests-of-justice exceptions.
8. Under Minnesota's postconviction statute, a person convicted of a crime may seek relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction "violated the person's rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state." Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2022). "We review the summary denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if the district court erred in its application of law or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Greer v. State, 2 N.W.3d 323, 326 (Minn. 2024).
9. A postconviction petition is untimely if filed "more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal." Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1)-(2). Here, Casebolt's petition was untimely because this court disposed of his direct appeal and the supreme court denied review in 2013.
10. There are exceptions to the two-year time-bar. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (listing five exceptions). For example, the time-bar does not apply if newly discovered evidence clearly and convincingly establishes the petitioner's innocence or if the petition is not frivolous and the interests of justice warrant review. Id.; Moua v. State, 778 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 2010). A petition invoking an exception "must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises." Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). The date that a claim arises is "determined by when a petitioner knew or should have known the claim existed." Greer, 2 N.W.3d at 327. "[I]f the petitioner does not invoke any of the exceptions, we need not consider them." Griffin v. State, 941 N.W.2d 404, 410 (Minn. 2020).
11. Although Casebolt's brief to this court addresses two exceptions to the statutory time-bar, he did not raise those exceptions in his third postconviction proceeding. We therefore do not consider them. See Jones v. State, 671 N.W.2d 743, 746 n.4 (Minn. 2003) (declining to consider arguments raised in brief that were not made to the postconviction court); see also Brocks v. State, 883 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2016) (stating that to satisfy an exception to the time bar, the petitioner must "invoke an exception in the petition"). And although Casebolt attached MC's affidavit to his petition, he did not cite the affidavit as a basis to apply the newly-discovered-evidence exception to the statutory time bar. Instead, the references to MC's affidavit in Casebolt's petition regarded his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Moreover, Casebolt did not show that MC's statements were not cumulative to evidence presented at trial. See Henderson v. State, 906 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Minn. 2018) (stating that newly-discovered- evidence exception requires a petitioner to show that the evidence is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial).
12. On this record, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Casebolt's third petition for postconviction relief was time-barred.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The postconviction court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.