Opinion
24A-CT-593
08-12-2024
Kenneth Casada, Appellant//Petitioner/Plaintiff v. Anonymous Physician, Anonymous Provider 1, and Anonymous Provider 2, Appellees/Respondents/Defendants
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Michael E. Simmons Hannah K. Brady Hume Smith Geddes Green & Simmons, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Davis S. Strite Rachel Dalton Dearmond O'Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC Louisville, Kentucky
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court The Honorable Thomas A. Cannon, Jr., Judge Trial Court Cause No. 18C05-2201-CT-19
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Michael E. Simmons
Hannah K. Brady
Hume Smith Geddes Green & Simmons, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Davis S. Strite Rachel Dalton Dearmond
O'Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Crone and Tavitas Judges concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] In 2021, Kenneth Casada received medical care from Anonymous Physician, Anonymous Provider 1, and Anonymous Provider 2 (collectively, "Appellees"), and, in January of 2022, submitted a proposed medicalmalpractice claim with the Indiana Department of Insurance ("IDOI") and filed suit in the trial court. A medical-review panel ("MRP") was formed in June of 2022, and Casada filed his submission to the MRP in September. After a series of delays, Appellees made their submission to the MRP in July of 2023. The previous month, Casada had filed a petition for a preliminary determination of law and default judgment ("the Petition"), in which he alleged violations of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act ("the MMA"), namely delays in providing records to the MRP without good cause. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Petition. As restated, Casada contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sanction Appellees, the only appropriate sanction under the circumstances is entry of default judgment against Appellees, and any provisions of the MMA preventing the trial court from entering default judgment against Appellees are unconstitutional. Because we reject Casada's first argument, we need not reach the others and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Beginning in March of 2021, Appellees provided health care to Casada in Muncie. The trial court found the following facts regarding the early procedural history of the case:
1. January 27, 2022, the Plaintiff submits his medical malpractice claim to the [IDOI].
2. January 28, 2022, the Plaintiff files his Complaint for Medical Malpractice against the defendant[]s, Anonymous Physicians, in this cause with the trial Court.
3. March 9, 2022, Robert W. St[r]ohmeyer, Jr. by agreement of the parties, accepted his selection as [MRP] Chair of the [MRP] to be formed.
4. June 16, 2022, the [MRP] is formed by Chairman Str[o]hmeyer, with submission schedule fixed: Plaintiff submission due July 29, 2022; Plaintiff's reply due September 29, 2022; and the [MRP] opinion due by December 13, 2022.Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11.
[¶3] Casada failed to tender his submission by July 29, 2022, and Strohmeyer inquired regarding its status six days later. Casada did not respond, and Strohmeyer inquired again as to the status of Casada's submission on August 22, 2022. Casada stated that he intended to serve his MRP submission that day. On September 6, 2022, Appellees received Casada's MRP submission, and Strohmeyer issued a revised submission schedule. Casada's submission consisted of a narrative and request for the MRP members to review records, which were provided in an electronic format.
[¶4] Appellees' counsel was seemingly out of his office for some time in late 2022 and early 2023, and Strohmeyer wrote to the parties on January 12, 2023, asking for an update as to Appellees' submission. On January 20, 2023, Appellees' counsel wrote to all parties responding to Strohmeyer's inquiry and explaining that, in the process of preparing a responsive submission, it had become apparent that records from Ball Memorial Hospital and Ortho Northeast were inaccessible. Casada responded with another attempt to provide the radiology and medical records electronically. The same day, Appellees' counsel advised Casada and the MRP chair that the new link sent by Casada still had not allowed access to the radiology records but indicated that he intended to get help with accessing the images.
[¶5] On January 24, 2023, Appellees' counsel notified all parties that they would need to request compact disks containing the records from Casada so that it could be obtained and provided to the MRP. In response to this email, Casada's counsel objected to any additional time for Appellees' submission. The same day, Appellees sent an email to Casada's counsel suggesting multiple options for providing the radiology records, including picking up disks from Casada and having copies made, providing directed authorizations or non-party requests to Casada, or any other reasonable manner in which Casada wished to make this imaging available. In an email sent to the parties, Strohmeyer agreed that the MRP members would want to view the radiology records and offered further thoughts on how this could be exchanged:
Understanding that Mr. Casada has objected to the extension, I will keep the extension in place. Also, it appears that the
radiographic images may be of importance, I would ask that the parties determine how they would like the images presented to the [MRP]. Panelists often run into trouble getting the images to load from whatever software is provided with a CD or thumb drive. The CD/thumb drive often has so much software loaded that it is tough to figure out how to get the images to open without detailed instruction. Some folks are now using hosting sites. In any event, if the panelists have a tough time accessing the images, it will delay the [MRP] meeting.
Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 180.
[¶6] On January 25, 2023, Appellees indicated that they were willing to provide copies for the MRP members and all parties, at cost to Appellees, of all radiology records upon Casada advising how he wished to proceed. On January 27, 2023, Casada's counsel informed Appellees' counsel that previously-served discovery requests had gone unanswered. Appellees' counsel apologized for the oversight and provided his mobile telephone number if Casada's counsel needed to contact him. Casada's counsel notified Appellees that he was making certain radiology records available at the front desk of his law firm. On January 31, 2023, Appellees' counsel wrote to Casada that it appeared from previous efforts to produce the radiology records that Casada had secured radiology images from four providers and asked that those be provided to a copy service when he had secured them. On February 22, 2023, a paralegal called Casada's counsel and asked to pick up the disks in question from the copy service; the disks were collected the same day.
[¶7] On March 6, 2023, Strohmeyer requested a status update from the parties. Appellees' counsel wrote that he believed they now had the necessary records, thanked Casada's counsel for their cooperation in providing them, and indicated that he would be trying to complete these responses prior to a trial in another matter in March and April. Casada again objected to any extension of time.
[¶8] Strohmeyer wrote on June 20, 2023, regarding the status of Appellees' submission. Appellees' counsel responded the next day that they were working with their clients to finalize the response submission and that he anticipated having it completed within fifteen days. Appellees finally served their submission of evidence to the MRP upon the MRP chair and all counsel electronically on July 28, 2023. Also on July 28, Appellees mailed to Casada's counsel a flash drive containing all imaging and delivered to the MRP chair all copies of Appellees' submission with flash drives containing the radiology images.
[¶9] Meanwhile, on June 21, 2023, Casada had filed the Petition. The hearing on the Petition, which the trial court delayed twice due to court congestion, ultimately took place on February 5, 2024. On February 21, 2024, the trial court denied the Petition.
Discussion and Decision
[¶10] Although the trial court issued a written order, it does not reveal the reasoning behind the denial of Casada's petition for default judgment. Where there are no specific findings, a general-judgment standard applies, and we may affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence adduced at trial. In re Marriage of Duckworth, 989 N.E.2d 352, 353 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). Moreover, "a trial court judgment may be affirmed if sustainable on any basis in the record, even though not on a theory used by the trial court." Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Ind. 1994). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom and will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. In re Marriage of Duckworth, 989 N.E.2d at 354.
[¶11] Casada contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for entry of default judgment against Appellees as a sanction for their failure to abide by the requirements of the MMA. Casada acknowledges that the MMA does not allow a trial court to enter default judgment in a medical-malpractice case before it has been before the MRP but argues that those MMA provisions are unconstitutional. Appellees argue that the trial court correctly declined to sanction them for MMA violations, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment on the merits, and the challenged portions of the MMA are not, in fact, unconstitutional.
[¶12] We must first decide if the trial court abused its discretion in declining to impose sanctions on Appellees. Indiana Code section 34-18-10-14 governs sanctions for failure to act as required by the MMA's MRP chapter and provides that a "party, attorney, or panelist who fails to act as required by this chapter without good cause shown is subject to mandate or appropriate sanctions upon application to the court designated in the proposed complaint as having jurisdiction."
Whether a plaintiff should be sanctioned for his failure to submit evidence to the [MRP] in a timely manner is a question of law and fact that may be preliminarily determined by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion after a hearing. Galindo v. Christensen, 569 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991). In other words, decisions as to whether to dismiss a proposed complaint under the [MMA] are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Beemer v. Elskens, 677 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at 1120.Mooney v. Anonymous M.D. 4, 991 N.E.2d 565, 575-76 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. In exercising discretion as to what sanctions should be imposed when a party fails to comply with the MMA, the trial court should consider whether the breach of duty was intentional or contumacious and whether prejudice resulted. Id. at 576 (citing Rivers v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 654 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995)).
[¶13] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining Casada's invitation to sanction Appellees. As an initial matter, Casada is seemingly attempting to attribute every delay to some act or omission of Appellees. This, however, ignores evidence of the role Casada played in those delays, such as evidence that his MRP submission was made over one month after the date set by Strohmeyer and that much of the later delay occurred after he had failed to provide readable radiology records to Appellees. The trial court was entitled to take Casada's acts and omissions into account.
[¶14] Moreover, Casada points to nothing in the record suggesting that any delays were intentional or the result of contumacious behavior. Casada characterizes the record as demonstrating "a blanket and universal disregard of multiple deadlines mandated (and explicitly emphasized) by statutes and trial rules, or set by the [MRP] Chair, and even self-imposed promises and assurances, all without an offered excuse or explanation." Appellant's Br. p. 30. Suffice it to say that the record does not necessarily support this characterization, i.e., there is ample evidence that many, if not most, delays were, in fact, explained. Appellees' counsel was apparently not in his office for a while in late 2022 and early 2023, a situation known to Strohmeyer and, therefore, to Casada as well. The record also contains several communications regarding Appellees' attempts to obtain readable radiology records, all of which were sent to Casada's counsel. Appellees' counsel was also preparing for a jury trial court that occurred in early 2023, which was offered as a cause of at least some delay. None of these explanations strikes us as clearly unreasonable. The trial court was entitled to credit Appellees' counsel's assertions that delays were the result of the complexity of the case, genuine difficulties in obtaining readable radiology records, scheduling conflicts with other cases on which he was working, time away from the office, etc., and apparently did so.
[¶15] Finally, Casada has not even alleged that the delays caused him any prejudice. As a general rule, "[a]n error is harmless if it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Bonnes v. Feldner, 642 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ind. 1994). As Casada points out, in the context of cases where noncompliance with the MMA is alleged, it is not absolutely necessary to establish prejudice. See, e.g., Reck v. Knight, M.D., et al., 993 N.E.2d 627 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) ("Prejudice, rather, is merely one factor that the trial court can consider when ruling on a motion to dismiss a proposed complaint."), trans. denied. That said, while a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely required, that does not make the absence of even an allegation of prejudice any less conspicuous. As we stated in Reck, prejudice is one factor we may consider, and, in our view, Casada's failure to allege any prejudice, much less establish any, undercuts his claim of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. In the end, Casada's arguments amount to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Mooney, 991 N.E.2d at 575; In re Marriage of Duckworth, 989 N.E.2d at 354.
Because we have concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining Casada's invitation to sanction Appellees, we need not address Casada's arguments that (1) the only appropriate sanction in cases such as this is entry of default judgment against Appellees and, (2) to the extent that the MMA prevents the trial court from imposing that sanction, it is unconstitutional.
[¶16] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.