Opinion
NO. 02-17-00146-CR
04-19-2018
CHRISTOPHER TROY CARTWRIGHT APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1430011D MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
A jury found appellant Christopher Troy Cartwright guilty of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, and the trial court, after finding the enhancement paragraph true, sentenced Cartwright to 18 years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. In Cartwright's sole issue, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding two witnesses whom he needed to establish his duress defense. We affirm.
Evidence
Corporal Dalton Rosenbaum of the Arlington Police Department testified that on September 23, 2015, while he was working as a patrol officer, he saw a motorcycle parked in a residential front yard. According to Corporal Rosenbaum, parking a motorcycle in that manner violated a city ordinance. Corporal Rosenbaum did not recall that particular resident owning a motorcycle, but he did recall that the police had recently recovered stolen motorcycles at that residence. Thinking the motorcycle might be stolen, he decided to wait until the vehicle's rider drove it off so that he could run its registration.
Eventually, someone drove the motorcycle directly toward Corporal Rosenbaum's stake-out. Corporal Rosenbaum unsuccessfully tried to overtake the motorcycle to get its license plate number and run its registration. As Corporal Rosenbaum pursued the motorcycle, he saw it make a left-hand turn while signaling perhaps only ten feet from the intersection instead of the required one hundred feet to which Corporal Rosenbaum testified. At that point, Corporal Rosenbaum decided to make a traffic stop and turned on his overhead lights. The motorcyclist responded by walking his motorcycle onto a sidewalk behind two parked cars, which made Corporal Rosenbaum suspicious because normally drivers did not pull over onto a sidewalk. In fact, as Corporal Rosenbaum asserted, pulling the motorcycle onto the sidewalk was another traffic violation.
As Corporal Rosenbaum got out of his patrol car, he tried to see the motorcycle's license plate so that he could notify dispatch, but what he saw was an obstructed temporary paper tag. Again according to Corporal Rosenbaum, having an obstructed license plate was yet another traffic violation.
At trial, the State did not cite or point to the particular ordinances or statutes that Cartwright allegedly violated, but Cartwright did not complain at trial, nor does he on appeal, about the absence of specific references.
As Corporal Rosenbaum approached the motorcycle on foot, the motorcyclist asked what he had done, but before Corporal Rosenbaum could answer, the motorcyclist revved his engine and rapidly took off back onto the roadway. Corporal Rosenbaum returned to his patrol car and pursued the motorcycle with both his siren and his overhead lights on.
In residential neighborhoods where the speed limit was 30 miles per hour, the chase reached speeds in excess of 60 and 70 miles per hour. On Park Row, where the speed limit was 40 miles per hour, Corporal Rosenbaum reached a top speed of about 102 miles per hour.
As the two approached the point where East Park Row turns into West Marshall Drive, Corporal Rosenbaum saw sparks flying and suspected that the motorcycle had crashed. Entering the crash area, Corporal Rosenbaum saw a raised-curb median that the motorcycle had apparently hit. The motorcycle had slid through the Highway 161 frontage-road intersection and come to a stop beneath the Highway 161 overpass. The rider himself was gone.
After looking around the area, Corporal Rosenbaum eventually spotted the motorcyclist on a grassy embankment and ordered him at gunpoint to stop; the motorcyclist, protesting that he was in pain, surrendered, and Corporal Rosenbaum arrested him. When Corporal Rosenbaum asked the motorcyclist why he had run, the motorcyclist answered that he had a warrant. When asked for his identity, the motorcyclist gave a false name and birthdate. Because the motorcyclist had suffered significant road-rash abrasions, he was sent to a hospital, and it was there that Corporal Rosenbaum first learned that the motorcyclist's true name was Christopher Cartwright.
The motorcycle turned out not to be stolen. But the part about Cartwright's having an outstanding warrant turned out to be true.
Excluded Evidence
At trial, Cartwright wanted to present the testimony of two witnesses, Anita and James Bristow. They would have testified that on June 20, 2015, about three months before Cartwright tried to outrun Corporal Rosenbaum, the Arlington Police Department executed a search warrant for Cartwright at their residence in such a forceful and violent manner that they believed that if the police ever found Cartwright, they would kill him. Both Anita and James Bristow would have also testified that they then told Cartwright that the police intended to kill him if they ever caught up with him.
Argument
Cartwright contends that he acted out of duress when he fled Corporal Rosenbaum. He maintains that he needed the excluded evidence to show why he feared for his life.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We may not reverse a trial court's decision unless it falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 83.
The first step in admitting evidence is to determine whether that evidence is relevant to a consequential fact. Tex. R. Evid. 401; Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 83. While the evidentiary rules favor admitting all logically relevant evidence, the trial court still must make the threshold relevance decision, and we will not disturb that decision unless it is clearly wrong. Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 83.
Under the penal code, "[i]t is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.05(a) (West 2011). To be relevant to a duress defense, the evidence must show a present threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm. Anguish v. State, 991 S.W.2d 883, 886-87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd); Smith v. State, 949 S.W.2d 333, 336-37 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref'd); Kessler v. State, 850 S.W.2d 217, 220-22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, no pet.). A trial court may properly exclude evidence of a threat that an accused contends compelled his criminal conduct if it determines that the threat was not imminent. Kessler, 850 S.W.2d at 222.
Discussion
The proffered evidence did not show an "imminent" threat, as caselaw has interpreted that concept. See Anguish, 991 S.W.2d at 886-87 (holding that threat made four days earlier was not imminent); Smith, 949 S.W.2d at 336-37 (holding that threats made nearly four months earlier were not imminent); Kessler, 850 S.W.2d at 220-22 (holding that various threats, including one made earlier in the evening, were not imminent). Assuming any threats were made, they were made in June, about three months before the offense, and were therefore too remote. Moreover, when Cartwright initially sped off from Corporal Rosenbaum, there was no evidence that Corporal Rosenbaum had done anything that might be construed as threatening, nor did any evidence connect him with the earlier allegedly aggressive search of the Bristows' home. Finally, when arrested and asked why he had run, Cartwright himself did not give fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm as his explanation, citing only his outstanding warrant. On these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Cartwright's proffered testimony. See Kessler, 850 S.W.2d at 222. We overrule Cartwright's sole issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Cartwright's sole issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
ELIZABETH KERR
JUSTICE PANEL: GABRIEL, KERR, and BIRDWELL, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) DELIVERED: April 19, 2018