Opinion
C. A. 8:21-cv-02963-JFA-JDA
10-28-2021
Robert Lee Carter, Jr., Petitioner, v. Florence County Detention Center, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
Robert Lee Carter, Jr. (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is a detainee at the Florence County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Judge. For the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner commenced this action by filing a hand-written document that the Court construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. [Doc. 1] Petitioner then filed a petition on the standard court form. [Doc. 1-2.] The Court construes both documents together as the Petition filed in this matter. The Court has carefully reviewed the Petition and the state court records concerning Petitioner's underlying criminal conviction.
The Court takes judicial notice of Petitioner's state court records. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Petitioner makes the following allegations in his Petition. Petitioner is presently confined on various charges pending against him in the Florence County Court of General Sessions. [Id. at 1.] Petitioner contends that, with regard to his pending charges in the state court, an investigator made a false statement to obtain an arrest warrant and gave false testimony to the grand jury so that the solicitor could obtain an indictment. [Id. at 5.] Petitioner asserts a No. of grounds for habeas relief as follows. First, Petitioner contends investigators have presented false evidence and statements in violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. at 6.] Second, Petitioner contends he was denied counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment during a photo identification. [Id. at 7.] Third, Petitioner contends his attorney has a conflict of interest and has engaged in ineffective assistance. [Id.] Fourth, Petitioner contends he has been denied a fast and speedy trial. [Id. at 8.] Fifth, Petitioner contends the investigating officers and the prosecutor have engaged in official misconduct. [Id. at 9.] Sixth, Petitioner contends that his public defender provided ineffective assistance of counsel. [Id. at 10.] For his relief, Petitioner asks to be immediately released from detention at the Detention Center. [Id. at 8.]
Specifically, Petitioner has been charged with armed robbery, attempted murder, and conspiracy at No. 2019A2120200928, 2019A2120200928, and 2019GS2101497A. See State v. Carter, Florence County Twelfth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Florence/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by No. 2019A2120200928, 2019A2120200928, and 2019GS2101497A) (last visited Oct. 28, 2021).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se petition filed in this case. The review is conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Petitioner filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This statute authorizes the Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, is frivolous or malicious, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012). Pursuant to this rule, a district court is “authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994).
Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
As noted, Petitioner is a pretrial detainee at a local detention center facility, and he seeks release from his current detention on his pending charges. Ordinarily, federal habeas corpus relief for a state prisoner is only available post-conviction. However, pretrial petitions for habeas corpus may be “‘properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.'” United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987)). Nevertheless, “an attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution” is not attainable through federal habeas corpus. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226. As such, this action should be dismissed based on the Younger abstention doctrine because granting Petitioner's requested relief would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin his pending state court proceedings. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with those proceedings and decline to hear this matter.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Petitioner is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings, and he asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations and to require his immediate release from detention on the pending state charges against him; thus, the first element is satisfied. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-2981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012) (noting the first prong of the abstention test was satisfied where the petitioner alleged that “he is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012). The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as Petitioner can raise his constitutional claims in the state court. Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-2981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012) (“The federal court should abstain from considering a speedy trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012)
A ruling in Petitioner's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Petitioner can raise his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should dismiss this case without prejudice on abstention grounds pursuant to Younger. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits”).
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file an answer or return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).