Opinion
Case No. 5:18-cv-00423-TES-CHW
03-17-2020
MARIO RANDLE CARTER, JR, Plaintiff, v. BUTTS COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.
Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment, one filed by Sheriff Gary Long, Captain Vette Weaver, and Captain Hanson ("County Defendants"), (Doc. 38), and one filed by Melinda Burdette, LPN, and Southern Correctional Medicine ("Medical Defendants"), (Doc. 42). Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact left to be tried as to any of the constitutional claims brought by Plaintiff Mario Randle Carter, Jr., against the above defendants, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' respective motions for summary judgment be GRANTED.
Plaintiff's claims against Butts County Jail were dismissed at the screening stage, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e). (Docs. 10, 21).
In the event that this Recommendation is adopted, the only remaining claim in this action will be an excessive force claim brought against Defendant Deputy Brad Young. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Young "brutally beat[]" Plaintiff while Plaintiff was handcuffed, causing serious injuries, including facial fractures. (Doc. 1, p. 7). Upon screening Plaintiff's claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e), it was found that Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Young were sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim. (Doc. 10, pp. 5-6) (citing Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008)). In this Court's Order for Service, however, Defendant Young was mistakenly omitted from the list of defendants upon which service was to be perfected. (Id., p. 16). As a result of that omission, Defendant Young was subsequently, and inadvertently, dismissed. (Doc. 21). Therefore, to correct that error, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Young be reinstated as a defendant in this action, that service be made on Defendant Young, and that Defendant Young file an Answer, or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Defendant Young is reminded of the duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses, and of the possible imposition of expenses for failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mario Randle Carter, Jr., a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, raising claims related to incidents in which he was "brutally beaten," first by correctional officers and then by three federal inmates, while he was a pretrial detainee at Butts County Jail. (Doc. 1, p. 7). The facts as alleged by Plaintiff are as follows.
Plaintiff alleged that he was beaten by both Defendant Young and Sergeant Nunn (Doc. 1, p. 7), but Plaintiff has only sued Defendant Young, not Nunn. (Id., p. 6). Plaintiff stated that, since the incident, Nunn has treated him "kindly," allowing Plaintiff to transfer cells and "to contact [his] loved ones." (Id., p. 9).
On April 11, 2018, Plaintiff was "brutally beaten on two occasions" by "multiple Butts Co[unty] officer[s]" while he was in handcuffs at Butts County Jail. (Id.). As a result of the beatings, he "suffered multiple injuries including facial fractures and other physical injuries." (Id.).
On April 13, Plaintiff made "verbal complaints" to nurses and correctional officers about "pain in [his] face, nose, back, jaw, hip, ribs, and head." (Id.). He also submitted approximately 12 sick calls between April 23 and October 9, 2018, "complaining about [the] nature and source of [his] injuries," but did not receive medical treatment from "April 22-June." (Id., pp. 7, 9). Plaintiff claims that x-rays and CT scans were ordered by a "female [medical] provider" on May 10 and either May 19 or 20, 2018. (Doc. 16, p. 8). The provider explained, however, that the board at Southern Correctional Medicine "could decide not to provide [him] with the exams." (Id.). The tests were ultimately denied by "the med board," causing Plaintiff "to suffer unnecessarily." (Id.). Plaintiff contends that, had the tests been administered, his "facial fractures would have been detected and [he] would have received the proper care." (Id.). In addition, when he refused to take "the wrong medication" on May 29, 2018, nurse Melinda Burdette "locked [him] down" without a hearing. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Plaintiff contends that he complained to Long, Hanson, and Weaver about his injuries on several occasions before he received treatment. (Id., p. 5).
On June 5, 2018, Plaintiff was "brutally beaten in [his] cell" by three federal inmates housed at the jail. (Id., p. 7). His "already fractured ocular bone" was "shattered" in the attack, leaving him "at high risk for a severed optic nerve and permanent loss of [his] left eye." (Id.). Plaintiff claims that the attack ultimately "left [him] blind in [his] left eye." (Id.). According to Plaintiff, he was told by Captain Weaver that surveillance cameras captured the incident. (Doc. 16, p. 5). Plaintiff claims that "if an officer was in the bottom tower or a staff member would have been available to monitor the dorm activity" the attack would not have happened. (Id.). The attack, according to Plaintiff, was "a direct consequence" of Sheriff Long's policy of understaffing the facility. (Id.). Following the attack, Sheriff Long hired "a great number" of correctional officers, which suggests that "[h]e knew his facility was extremely understaffed." (Doc. 20, p. 5).
Plaintiff was taken to the emergency room for treatment on June 6, 2018. (Doc. 1, p. 10). According to Plaintiff, medical reports revealed "lamina propecia fracture, possible severed optic nerve, depressed fracture of lamina papyracea, opacification of left ethmoid air cells, periorbital swelling, age indeterminate facture of the papyracea, facial fracture, [and] head trauma." (Id.). From June 6 to July 2, 2018, while "locked down 24/7" under the alleged pretense of "medical observation," Plaintiff was prohibited from enjoying privileges such as use of the television, visitation and phone calls, access to the law library, and recreation. (Id., pp. 9-10). Plaintiff contends that the lockdown was intended to punish him. (Id., p. 9).
On screening Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the following claims were permitted to proceed against Defendants: (1) deliberate indifference to medical needs claims against Defendants Burdette, Long, Hanson, and Weaver; (2) due process claims against Defendants Burdette and Weaver; (3) deliberate indifference to medical needs claims against Southern Correctional Medicine; and (4) a failure to protect claim against Defendant Long. (Doc. 21). In relief for the alleged constitutional violations, Plaintiff requests an injunction and compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14).
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "An issue of fact is 'material' if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party; however, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the position will be insufficient." Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting City of Delray Beach v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1527, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996)).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and of citing "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," that support summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). In resolving motions for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014), which requires the Court to believe the evidence provided by the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmovant's favor, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. "Inferences based on speculation," however, "will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1219 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation omitted). "A party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings. Rather, its responses, either by affidavits or otherwise as provided by the rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990).
III. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO MEDICAL NEEDS
Defendants Burdette, Long, Hanson, Weaver, and Southern Correctional Medicine have satisfied their burden of showing that they did not act deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's claims are properly addressed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, which applies only to the confinement conditions of convicted persons. See Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009); Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985). "Nonetheless, Plaintiff['s] claims are subject to the same scrutiny as if they had been brought as deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth Amendment." Mann, 588 F.3d at 1306. To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, Plaintiff must show: (1) he had an objectively serious medical need; (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that need; and (3) the official's deliberate indifference and Plaintiff's injury were causally related. See Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1121 (11th Cir. 2019).
A. Serious Medical Need
Plaintiff has shown that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had serious medical needs during the relevant time period.
To establish that a medical need is sufficiently serious, the plaintiff must show that the need is either "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Taylor v. Hughes, 920 F.3d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Three incidents are pertinent to the medical-need inquiry in Plaintiff's case. First, Plaintiff alleges that, on April 11, 2018, he sustained "facial fractures" and "pain in [his] face, nose, back, jaw, hip, ribs, and head" following the "brutal[] beat[ing]" he received at the hands of "multiple Butts Co[unty] officer[s]." (Doc. 1, p. 7). Second, on April 27, 2018, Plaintiff reported that he fell in his dorm twice, hitting his head on the table and then the toilet, due to disorientation. (Docs. 42-3, ¶ 11; 42-4, p. 25; 48, ¶ 19). Finally, on June 5, 2018, Plaintiff was attacked by three federal inmates. (Doc. 1, p. 7). Following the latter incident, Plaintiff presented to medical staff with swelling of his left eye and face, a bite injury on his left cheek, scratches to his face, and complaints of dizziness and nausea. (Docs. 42-3, ¶ 21; 42-4, p. 43). The next day, Plaintiff was taken to the emergency department of an outside hospital, where medical staff found a depressed fracture of Plaintiff's left lamina papyracea, partial opacification of the left ethmoid air cells, and left periorbital soft tissue swelling. (Doc. 42-4, p. 108).
Defendants do not challenge the severity of the injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained as a result of the latter two incidents. See (Docs. 38-1, pp. 10-11; 42-1, pp. 10-13). Instead, Defendants argue that there is no evidence that Plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the April 11 incident. However, because there is more than a "scintilla" of evidence showing that Plaintiff suffered the injuries he alleges resulted from the April 11 incident, Defendants have not shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony that he sustained a broken bone in his face, damage to the right side of his jaw, bruising to his ribs, back pain, and a broken nose during the April 11 altercation, together with supporting evidence in the record, is sufficient to create a genuine issue as to the seriousness of his medical needs at that time. (Doc. 40, pp. 6-7); see Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019) ("self-serving statements based on personal knowledge or observation can defeat summary judgment" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018))). The record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, shows that he consistently complained to and was treated by medical staff for the alleged injuries. On April 23, 2019, for example, Plaintiff complained of a broken nose and "a hole in his face," as well as pain related to a sciatic nerve that he claimed was "blew out" as a result of the "tasing and beating" the officers had inflicted upon him. (Doc. 42-4, p. 27). Plaintiff also presented to medical staff on April 30 with dark circles under his eyes, a swollen nose, and pain in his ribs and legs. (Id., p. 31). Nurse Sumner noted at that time that Plaintiff had claimed that those injuries "came from altercation [with] staff on admit to jail." (Id.). Plaintiff was also evaluated by Dr. Wrobel on May 2, 2018, who assessed Plaintiff with chronic jaw pain related to the titanium metal plate implanted in a prior facial surgery and prescribed Plaintiff with a 14-day regimen of ibuprofen. (Docs. 42-3, ¶ 12; 42-4, pp. 18-19). Further, in a May 14 medical request, Plaintiff complained that, although ibuprofen had helped with his swelling and rib pain, he was "still experiencing ex[]cruciating pain in [his] face under [his] right eye" and jaw. (Doc. 42-4, p. 34). Following that request, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Dieu and then Nurse Singleton. (Id., pp. 30, 68). On May 21, 2018, Plaintiff was treated by Nurse Practitioner Rowell-Crane, who diagnosed Plaintiff with temporomandibular joint (TMJ) syndrome, swelling and tenderness in his right maxillary area, and teeth clinching, and ordered a CT scan of Plaintiff's facial bones and pain medication. (Id., p. 17).
Whether the injuries in fact resulted from the April 11 altercation with officers is an issue of fact that is appropriately resolved by a jury.
The above-cited evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, shows that there is a genuine issue as to whether Plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of the altercation with officers on April 11, 2018. The evidence also shows that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff's injuries, considered as a whole, and persistent pain constituted serious medical needs. See Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1222 (11th Cir. 2016) ("[A] reasonable jury could find that Melton's severe pain and suffering constituted a serious medical need."). Accordingly, there are genuine issues of material fact remaining as to whether Plaintiff had serious medical needs during the relevant time period.
B. Deliberate Indifference
Although Plaintiff has shown that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff had serious medical needs, Plaintiff has not made the same showing regarding Defendants Burdette, Long, Hanson, Weaver, and Southern Correctional Medicine's alleged deliberate indifference to those needs. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when she has (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2) and disregards that risk (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence. See id. at 1223. Conduct that amounts to more than mere negligence includes grossly inadequate care, a decision to take an easier but less efficacious course of treatment, and medical care that is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all. Id. (citing Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011)).
1. Medical Defendants
Beginning with the Medical Defendants, Plaintiff has failed to set forth specific facts to show there are genuine issues for trial as to the deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Burdette and Southern Correctional Medicine.
a. Nurse Burdette
In the complaint, Plaintiff contended that he "made verbal complaints to nurses" from April 13 onwards about the injuries he suffered from the altercation with the officers on April 11. (Doc. 1, p. 7). On screening Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, that allegation was liberally construed against Nurse Burdette because Plaintiff had alleged that he had been treated by her on May 29, 2018. (Doc. 10, pp. 10-11). At summary judgment, Plaintiff can no longer rest upon his allegations. See Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990). Instead, he must, by affidavit or otherwise, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
Plaintiff has made no specific allegations that Nurse Burdette either had subjective knowledge of his injuries or disregarded his injuries prior to May 29, 2018, or that Nurse Burdette was deliberately indifferent to his injuries at the May 29 assessment. In fact, it is undisputed that Plaintiff saw Nurse Burdette that day regarding treatment for a painful stomach and constipation lasting several days, not for his other injuries. (Docs. 40, p. 19; 42-2, ¶ 18). At that time, Plaintiff refused the medication Nurse Burdette had recommended to treat his digestive issues. (Doc. 42-4, p. 51). Plaintiff was, however, successfully placed under medical observation to record the frequency of his bowel movements. (Doc. 42-2, ¶¶ 19-20). Neither action suggests a disregard for Plaintiff's serious medical needs. There is also no evidence that Plaintiff attempted to discuss his other injuries with Nurse Burdette or that his injuries would have been obvious to her at that time. Of course, by May 29, Plaintiff had been assessed by and received treatment from numerous medical professionals, including physician Dr. Wrobel and Nurse Practitioner Rowell-Crane. See (Docs. 42-3, ¶ 12; 42-4, pp. 17-19).
Because Plaintiff has not set forth specific facts that show Nurse Burdette acted deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs either before, at, or after the May 29 assessment, a reasonable jury could not find that Nurse Burdette was deliberately indifferent. Accordingly, Nurse Burdette should be granted summary judgment in her favor as to that claim.
b. Southern Correctional Medicine
Southern Correctional Medicine is also entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim. Southern Correctional, as a private corporation in contract with Butts County, is treated in the same manner as the county for § 1983 liability purposes. See Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997). To hold Southern Correctional liable, Plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing (1) that his constitutional rights were violated, and (2) that the violation occurred as the direct result of Southern Correctional's policies or customs. See id. (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
Plaintiff's allegation against Southern Correctional is based on the alleged denial of a CT scan ordered by a "female provider" in the jail medical department sometime in May 2018. (Doc. 16, p. 8). It is uncontested that Nurse Practitioner Rowell-Crane ordered a CT scan on May 21, 2018. (Doc. 42-3, ¶ 16). In his amended complaint, Plaintiff contended that the provider "explained that the board [at Southern Correctional Medicine] could decide not to provide [him] with the exams." (Doc. 16, p. 8). Plaintiff further alleged that "[t]he med board denied [him] the exams," thereby causing him "to suffer unnecessarily" with his facial fractures. (Id., pp. 8-9). Plaintiff eventually received a CT scan and x-rays to assess the injuries resulting from the June 5 attack by three federal inmates. (Doc. 42-4, pp. 142-46).
The undisputed evidence shows that the appropriate officials at Southern Correctional Medicine did not receive a request in May 2018 for Plaintiff to receive a CT scan, despite Rowell-Crane's order for a scan. According to Southern Correctional's policies and procedures, "requests for patients to undergo CT [s]cans [are] sent to [the] main office for review by the Chief Medical Officer or Dr. Peter Wrobel, who then make the determination whether a CT scan is necessary and either approve or deny the request based upon their medical assessment of the patient's condition and whether such test is warranted." (Doc. 42-2, ¶ 30). Defendant concedes that Rowell-Crane's CT-scan order "was never sent to SCM's Chief Medical Officer for review," due to a "clerical oversight," thus it "was never even evaluated for medical necessity" by officials. (Doc. 42-1, p. 18). Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant's explanation for the failure to provide him with a CT scan at that time. Instead, Plaintiff rests on his bald allegation that "[t]he med board denied [him] the exams." (Doc. 16, p. 8). Again, at summary judgment, Plaintiff must do more than simply assert that a factual issue exists; he must instead, by affidavit or otherwise, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff's allegation, without more, suggests, at most, merely negligence on the part of a non-party to this litigation, which is insufficient to overcome summary judgment. Accordingly, Southern Correctional Medicine should be granted summary judgment in its favor.
2. County Defendants
Plaintiff has also failed to meet his burden at summary judgment of showing that the County Defendants, all officers with the Butts County Sheriff's Office, were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
"[W]hen a lay person is accused of deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must 'present[] evidence that h[is] situation was so obviously dire that [a lay person] must have known that a medical professional had grossly misjudged [the plaintiff's] condition.'" Kuhne v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 618 F. App'x 498, 507 (11th Cir. 2015) (first and last alteration in original) (quoting Townsend v. Jefferson Cty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2010)). Furthermore, when the plaintiff has received treatment from medical professionals, correctional officers are entitled to rely on the medical judgments made by those medical professionals. See Williams v. Limestone Cty., 198 F. App'x 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2006); cf. Keith v. DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1050 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he law does not require that Sheriff Brown ignore the determination and recommendation of [mental health] staff. A sheriff cannot be held liable for failing to segregate mental health inmates [who] trained medical personnel have concluded do not present a risk of harm to themselves or others.").
Plaintiff contends that he contacted Defendants Long, Hanson, and Weaver at various times between April and August 2018 regarding the medical treatment he was receiving at Butts County jail. (Docs. 1, p. 5; 40, pp. 12-14). Even if Plaintiff had complained to the County Defendants as alleged, the record shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that he was assessed and treated by numerous medical professionals throughout that time period. The County Defendants, as lay persons, were entitled to rely on the medical judgments of those medical professionals in determining whether Plaintiff was receiving the appropriate care. See Williams, 198 F. App'x at 897. In addition, nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff's condition was "so obviously dire" that officers would have been alerted to a gross misjudgment of his injuries by Plaintiff's medical providers. See Kuhne, 618 F. App'x at 507. Plaintiff may have believed a different course of treatment was necessary, but "a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison's medical staff and the inmate as to the latter's" treatment is insufficient to support a claim of deliberate indifference. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991). Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that the County Defendants, as non-medical personnel, were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs; accordingly, summary judgment should be granted in their favor.
In sum, Plaintiff has not adequately shown at summary judgment that there is a genuine dispute as to whether either set of defendants acted deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted in Defendants' favor as to Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims.
IV. DUE PROCESS
Plaintiff's due process claims concern two separate incidents of medical segregation: (1) a May 29, 2018 medical segregation ordered by Nurse Burdette, and (2) a June 6, 2018 medical segregation following the attack by federal inmates housed at the jail. Liberally construed, the former incident applies to both Defendants Burdette and Weaver; whereas the latter incident applies only to Defendant Weaver. Because the claim regarding the May 29 incident was not exhausted, that claim should be dismissed. Further, Plaintiff has failed to present specific facts showing that Defendant Weaver violated his right to due process. Accordingly, Weaver should be granted summary judgment as to that claim.
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was "locked down 24/7" and left without access to certain privileges from June 6 to July 2, 2018, under the guise of "med[ical] observation," but failed to identify the party or parties responsible for segregating him at that time. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Plaintiff did, however, claim that he contacted Captain Weaver about his lack of privileges, (id., p. 8), and it was that allegation that permitted his claim against Weaver regarding the June 6 segregation to proceed for further factual development, (Doc. 10, p. 12).
A. May 29 , 2018 Medical Segregation
"[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter in abatement and not generally an adjudication on the merits." Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (11th Cir. 2008). Therefore, an exhaustion defense "is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment; instead, it should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for summary judgment." Id. (quotation omitted). Viewed in light of the appropriate standards, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his due process claims against Defendants Burdette and Weaver before filing the instant complaint; therefore, those claims should be dismissed.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, provides: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). "To exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must properly take each step within the administrative process." Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). This requires prisoners to file a timely appeal of a denied grievance, if such an appeal is available. See id.
The PLRA defines "prisoner" as "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(h). "Pretrial detainees are 'prisoners' for purposes of the PLRA because they are in custody while 'accused of . . . violations of criminal law.'" Kalinowski v. Bond, 358 F.3d 978, 979 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(h) and 1915A(c), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)).
To determine whether the plaintiff failed to exhaust, courts in the Eleventh Circuit follow the two-step process mandated by Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008). Under Turner's first step, the court must look to the factual allegations in the defendant's motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff's response, and if they conflict, the court takes the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. Id. at 1082. "If, in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed." Id. If the complaint is not subject to dismissal based on the plaintiff's version of the facts, the court must proceed to the second step, where it must make specific findings of fact in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion. Id. At the second step, it is the defendant's burden to prove that the plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. Id.
Plaintiff's due process claim is subject to dismissal at step two of Turner. Plaintiff submitted a grievance regarding the "medical lockdown" into which he claims he was forced following his refusal to accept medication. (Doc. 42-5, p. 48). Plaintiff specifically complained that Nurse Burdette "kept [him] away from family, law library and medical care" during his time in segregation. (Id.). Once the grievance was denied, Plaintiff was required to take the next step in the administrative process: appeal. The Butts County Sheriff's Office's grievance procedure requires detainees to submit a written appeal of a denied grievance to jail officials within two days of the denial. (Id., p. 216). If the detainee fails to do so, "the grievance shall be considered administratively closed." (Id.). There is no evidence, and Plaintiff does not contend, that he appealed the denial of his grievance. Accordingly, Plaintiff's due process claims against Defendants Burdette and Weaver regarding the May 29 segregation should be dismissed for failure to exhaust. See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1378.
B. June 6 Medical Segregation
Plaintiff has not established that there is a genuine issue of material fact remaining as to the due process claim against Defendant Weaver.
Due process requires that "a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). The government may, of course, "detain him to ensure his presence at trial and may subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution." Id. at 536-37. "The determination of whether a condition of pretrial detention amounts to punishment turns on whether the condition is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is incident to some legitimate government purpose." Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004). If the condition is "arbitrary or purposeless," then the court "may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment." Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
Upon review of the record at summary judgment, no reasonable jury could find that the June 6 medical segregation was imposed for the purpose of punishment. The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff was held under medical observation from June 6 to July 2, 2018. (Docs. 38-2, p. 104; 40, pp. 10-11; 48, ¶ 48). The day before his segregation began, Plaintiff had suffered a "brutal[] beat[ing]" at the hands of three inmates, resulting in significant injuries, including a depressed fracture of the left lamina papyracea, periorbital swelling, and damage from a bite to his left cheek. (Doc. 48, ¶¶ 43-45). Plaintiff was assessed by numerous medical professionals following the attack and received significant treatment for his injuries, including a CT scan, x-rays, and pain medication. (Docs. 42-4, pp. 138-46; 42-5, p. 27; 48, ¶¶ 48-49, 56). An ophthalmologist, reviewing Plaintiff's case, expressed concern as to a possible severed optic nerve, an injury which could cause vision loss. (Doc. 38-3, p. 142). Dr. Dieu, in her affidavit, contended that "[d]ue to the serious nature of Mr. Carter's fracture to his left orbital lamina papyracea and potential injury to his left optic nerve, he was placed in medical housing for observation and monitoring of his conditions until . . . his fracture had healed to the point he was safe to be discharged." (Doc. 42-3, ¶ 24). On July 2, 2018, Plaintiff signed "an unofficial waiver" releasing him from medical segregation. (Docs. 38-2, p. 161; 48, ¶ 59).
Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that his medical segregation was intended to punish him is insufficient to support his claim against Defendant Weaver at this stage of the litigation. Based on the above evidence, no reasonable jury could find that his confinement in a medical unit was imposed for a purpose other than for medical observation following a "brutal" attack on his person by other inmates. That Plaintiff was allegedly denied certain privileges during his time in segregation does not change that conclusion, since Plaintiff admits that he enjoyed certain privileges for two days in June, see (Doc. 48, ¶ 55), and he has provided no evidence that a request for privileges at that time was denied. Nor has Plaintiff provided an explanation as to why he did not exercise his apparent right to waive medical treatment prior to July 2. In addition, Plaintiff has failed to establish that any action on Defendant Weaver's part, apart from the alleged receipt of a letter at an unspecified time and of uncertain content, see (Doc. 1, p. 8), caused or continued to cause his confinement in medical housing. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[S]ection 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation."); Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1168 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing causation in the § 1983 context). Therefore, because the approximately month-long medical segregation was neither "arbitrary [n]or purposeless" but imposed for legitimate medical reasons, there is no genuine issue of fact remaining as to the due process claim against Defendant Weaver. Defendant Weaver is, accordingly, entitled to summary judgment in his favor.
V. FAILURE TO PROTECT
Plaintiff has not met his burden at summary judgment of showing that Defendant Long failed to protect him, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, from the attack by three federal inmates housed at Butts County jail on June 5, 2018.
"[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. . . . It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into [a] constitutional liability." Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994)). To establish that a jail official unlawfully failed to prevent inmate-on-inmate violence, "a plaintiff must 'produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.'" Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003)). "To be deliberately indifferent a prison official must know of and disregard 'an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'" Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1319-20 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
On screening, Plaintiff was permitted to proceed with his failure-to-protect claim against Sheriff Long based on the contention that Long had a policy of understaffing the facility and that Long had "hired a great number of guards to run the jail" after the June 5 incident. (Doc. 21, pp. 6-8). Those allegations were sufficient to overcome dismissal at the screening stage of the litigation; however, as previously stated, at summary judgment, Plaintiff "may not rest upon the mere allegations . . . in [his] pleadings." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff has provided no evidence to support his contentions. In fact, Plaintiff admitted during his deposition that he had no knowledge of the staffing levels at Butts County jail.
Q. Okay. One of your claims is that there are -- that the jail is inadequately staffed. Do you know how many jail officers are in the jail?(Doc. 40, p. 15). Plaintiff then admitted his allegations were based on inferences he had drawn from the delay in the response from officials following the attack.
A. I have no idea now. Back then, you know, I didn't know either, and I asked -- and I -- I wrote the court asking for the -- the SOP for staffing here.
I know it was inadequately staffed the day -- the day that I was assaulted . . . because no officer responded to my issue. You know, no -- and it was visibly on camera. They were either watching me be assaulted, or they just did not care about me being assaulted. Or they didn't have the personnel to send down here to -- to intervene in me being assaulted, but it was on camera. Captain Weaver told me that they saw on camera where he was hitting me; she told me that.(Id.). Plaintiff's inferences, without more, are based on mere speculation as to the circumstances at the time of the attack, and are thus insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1219 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Inferences based on speculation . . . will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.").
In addition, there is no evidence that Defendant Long subjectively knew of a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that he had never had any problems with his attackers prior to June 5, 2018; that, although fighting did occur in the jail, Plaintiff knew of only one previous incident involving the three federal inmates; and that he had never been physically assaulted by an inmate at the jail prior to the June 5 incident. (Doc. 40, pp. 8-9). Although Plaintiff claimed that Captain Weaver had told him "that they saw on camera where [the inmates were] hitting [him]," Plaintiff did not similarly testify that Defendant Long observed the incident. (Id., p. 15). In light of the complete lack of evidence to show that Defendant Long knew of a risk of harm to Plaintiff either prior to or at the time of the attack, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Long unlawfully failed to protect him from the assault.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' respective motions for summary judgment (Docs. 38, 42) be GRANTED and that judgment be entered in their favor as to all claims except the due process claim against Defendants Weaver and Burdette concerning the May 29 medical segregation. As for that claim, it is RECOMMENDED that it be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 17th day of March, 2020.
s/ Charles H. Weigle
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge