Opinion
1:99-cv-951
February 22, 2001
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court on defendant's Rule 56(b) motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.
I. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment A. Background
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility ("IMAX"). Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his complaint. On May 23, 1998, defendant Richard Carlisle, a resident unit officer at IMAX, intentionally pushed a tray of hot food items through plaintiff's food slot striking plaintiff in the face and chest. Complaint, ¶¶ 15-17. When plaintiff went to the cell door and placed his arm in the food slot "to gain the sergeant's attention," defendant violently pulled plaintiff's right arm through the slot in an attempt to break plaintiff's arm. Id.at ¶¶ 18-19. Plaintiff did not resist or struggle with defendant, even though he experienced agonizing pain. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. Plaintiff suffered injuries including a ligament strain to the right shoulder, scrapes, bruises and loss of use of his right arm for several weeks.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages from defendant for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal constitution and Art. 1, § 16 of the Michigan constitution, and for assault and battery.
B. Standard
Defendant requests judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b), claiming there are no genuine issues of material fact. In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 478-79 (6th Cir. 1995), the court described the standard for deciding such a motion as follows:
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1993) The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct 2548, 2552-53, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); LaPointe, 8 F.3d at 378. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2512Id.at 478-79. "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000)
C. Discussion
Section 1983 confers a private federal right of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 45 n. 3; 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2926 n. 3 (1984); Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, "to state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the `Constitution and laws' of the United States, and (2) plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this federal right `under color of law.'" Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 360, 361-362 (6th Cir. 1988).
1. Eighth Amendment claims
Plaintiff claims that defendants' attack and mistreatment violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment The Supreme Court has held that "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5; 112 S.Ct. 995, 998 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319; 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986)); see also Moore v Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1993). In analyzing plaintiff's claim, the Court must examine whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6. Courts evaluate the injury suffered, "the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat `reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,' and `any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'" Id.at 7, quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 1085.
Courts must give deference to actions prison guards take to maintain prison discipline, as long as those actions are taken pursuant to a considered choice and not in bad faith or for no legitimate purpose. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-22, 106 S.Ct. at 1084-85. "[Not every] malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000. Consequently, where the use of some force is required to restore order, it does not violate the Eighth Amendment unless "prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm" or the force used is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind" Id.at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. at 1000 (citations omitted).
Here, plaintiff essentially asks the court to find the use of force against him repugnant because it was unprovoked. The affidavits and other evidence before the court demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to plaintiff's claims against defendant.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, defendant has filed an affidavit in which he denies pushing the food tray into plaintiff's cell; rather, defendant states that plaintiff pushed the food tray back at him with the mid-section of his body Affidavit of Richard Carlisle at ¶¶ 9-12, attached to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as exhibit A. Defendant thought that plaintiff had a cup of feces or urine in hand to throw at him, but plaintiff apparently dropped the cup when defendant pushed the food tray back into the food slot. Id.at ¶ 12. Then, plaintiff stuck his arm out of the food slot in an attempt to assault defendant. Id.at ¶ 13. Corrections officer Bradley Baublitz, who is not a party to this suit, stated in his affidavit that plaintiff "rushed" the food slot, knocking the tray and food towards defendant. Affidavit of Bradley Baublitz at ¶ 7, attached to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as exhibit B. Baublitz further states that defendant "secured" plaintiff's right arm to prevent plaintiff from assaulting defendant. Id.at ¶ 8. Defendant also submitted copies of plaintiff's health records, which indicate that plaintiff's reported shoulder problems began as early as April 22, 1998, one month before defendant allegedly injured his shoulder Health Records, attached to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as exhibit C.
Plaintiff responded with a counter-affidavit in which he denies that he rushed the food slot. Affidavit of Antonio F. Carson, Sr., attached to plaintiff's Response. On the contrary, plaintiff states that defendant "forcefully shoved" the food tray into his cell, causing the hot food items to burn him, and then pulled plaintiff's arm through the food slot. Id.In addition, plaintiff submitted a copy of a health care request dated May 23, 1998, in which he reports burns to his stomach after defendant assault him with a food tray. Exhibit A attached to plaintiff's Response.
Furthermore, the court notes that a hearing officer did not sustain defendant's charges against plaintiff for the major misconduct of threatening behavior on May 23, 1998. Major Misconduct Hearing Records, attached to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as exhibit D. The hearing officer found that the staff statements were too inconsistent to support defendant's allegation that plaintiff tried to throw an unknown substance at him. Id.The hearing officer also noted that the debris was scattered inside the cell rather than outside the cell (as would seem reasonable if the tray had been pushed out of the cell towards the defendant), and that there was no log entry that plaintiff tried to throw any substance at defendant. Id.These findings support plaintiff's claim that he did not provoke defendant.
The affidavits and other evidence before the court present a genuine issue of fact with respect to the incidents that occurred on May 23, 1998. Plaintiff has presented evidence which, if believed by a jury, would establish that defendant intentionally pushed a tray of hot food on plaintiff and then, without provocation, violently pulled plaintiff's arm through the food slot. This conduct would constitute "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
2. Qualified immunity
Next, defendant contends he is entitled to judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. In certain circumstances, government employees have at least qualified immunity from individual liability for damages resulting from their performance of discretionary functions. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818; 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 263 (6th Cir. 1997); Wysinger v. City of Benton Harbor, 968 F. Supp. 349, 353 (W.D.Mich. 1997). Whether an official is protected by qualified immunity turns on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were "clearly established" at the time it was taken, not on the subjective good faith of the defendant. Harlow, 457 U.S.at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (1982); Barrett, 130 F.3d at 263-264; Wysinger, 968 F. Supp. at 353.
Under this objective legal reasonableness standard, individual claims of immunity are analyzed on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis to determine whether the plaintiff's federal or constitutional rights were so clearly established when the alleged misconduct was committed that any official in the defendant's position would understand that what one is doing violates those rights. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640; 107 S.Ct 3034, 3039 (1987); Cope v. Heltsley, 128 F.3d 452, 458-459 (6th Cir. 1997). The official will be immune "if officers of reasonable competence could disagree" on whether the conduct violated the plaintiff's rights. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341; 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096(1986); Chappel v. Montgomery County Fire Protection District No. 1, 131 F.3d 564, 580 (6th Cir. 1997).
The issue of qualified immunity is essentially a legal question to be decided by the court. Chappel, 131 F.3d 564 at 573; Rought v Porter, 965 F. Supp. 989, 992 (W.D.Mich. 1996). The district court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1154 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1996). If genuine issues of material fact exist as to an issue on which the question of immunity turns, summary judgment is improper. See Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 426 (6th Cir. 1988) See also Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1996); Buckner v. Kilgore, 36 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Sixth Circuit noted in Dickerson, "[s]ummary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine factual dispute relating to whether the defendants committed acts that allegedly violated clearly established rights." Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1158.
"The first step in a qualified immunity analysis is whether, based on the applicable law, a constitutional violation occurred." Dickerson, 101 F.3d 1151 at 1157; see also Wysinger, 968 F. Supp at 353. As set forth above, there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude a determination that a constitutional violation did not occur. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish an entitlement to judgment in the first step of the analysis.
The second step of the qualified immunity analysis is "whether [the constitutional violation] involved `clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1158; see also Wysinger 968 F. Supp. at 353 ("[W]hether the defendant officials should have known their actions were in violation of that constitutional right.") At the second step, there are several ways an official might establish the defense:
First, qualified immunity will be sustained if the parameters of the federal right at issue were not sufficiently clear at the time the defendant acted. Second, if the interest asserted by the plaintiff was clearly protected by federal law, but it was not clear whether an exception permitted the defendant's acts, the defendant is entitled to immunity. Third, the defendant is entitled to immunity i[f] she can show that "it was objectively reasonable for [her] to believe that [her] acts did not violate those rights,' even if the parameters of the plaintiff's rights were clearly established.
Barrett, 130 F.3d at 263 n. 29 (internal citations omitted).
As noted above, there is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether defendant violated clearly established rights. The same factual dispute which precludes summary judgment on liability in the first instance precludes summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity. Until the disputed facts are determined the court cannot evaluate the objective legal reasonableness of defendant's actions. At this point, it can only be said that defendant's actions do not satisfy the objective legal reasonableness test if one construes the disputed facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff.
II. Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings
Finally, plaintiff has filed a one page document entitled, "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) Affidavit/ Objection/Petition/Motion for Judgment on the pleadings." Plaintiff's motion references his letter to the court dated August 1, 2000, in which he states that prison employees confiscated his legal papers on June 29, 2000. Consequently, plaintiff seeks judgment on the pleadings, in part, because he does not have access to his legal files.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings:
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside of the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). "The obvious purpose of Rule 12(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to save time and expenses in cases wherein the ultimate facts are not in dispute." Ulen Contracting Corporation v. Tri-County Electric Cooperative, 1 F.R.D. 284, 285 (W.D.Mich. 1940). See also Zimmer v. Manitowic Shipbuilding, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (E.D.Wis. 1985) (the purpose of Rule 12(c) is "to promote the conservation of time and resources in cases where the ultimate issues of fact are not in dispute").
The court has determined that a genuine issue of material fact exists that precludes granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. Because the ultimate facts of this case are in dispute, plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).
There is no basis to grant plaintiff's Rule 12(c) motion on the ground that prison officials confiscated plaintiff's legal files during the pendency of the suit. Such an action, if it happened, does not render plaintiff's case any more or less meritorious than it was before the confiscation occurred.
Conclusion
Accordingly, defendant's Rule 56(b) motion for summary judgment (docket no. 17) and plaintiff's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings (docket no. 27) should be denied. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.ORDER
In accordance with the Opinion filed this date,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Rule 56(b) motion for summary judgment (docket no. 17) and plaintiff's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings (docket no. 27) are DENIED.