Opinion
No. 13 C.D. 2013
06-03-2013
Thomas Virgil Carr, Petitioner v. Department of Transportation, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
Thomas Virgil Carr (Carr) petitions for review of an order of the Secretary (Secretary) of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (Department) denying him any credit prior to March 12, 2012 toward 13 years of suspensions and revocations of his driving privileges resulting from three drunk driving (DUI) incidents in 1998 and 2000 and his 1999 and 2003 convictions arising out of those incidents. Because Carr's guilty plea in January 2003 to driving while under DUI suspension constitutes an acknowledgment of the suspensions and revocation in effect at that time and the Department failed to give Carr notice that any other form of acknowledgment was required, we hold that Carr is entitled to credit from January 7, 2003 for seven of the 13 years suspension and revocation.
Carr has never held a Pennsylvania driver's license. (Record Item (R. Item) 12, Secretary's Opinion and Order at 1, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 150a; R. Item 6, Hearing Transcript (H.T.), R.R. at 21a, 55a.) In the 1990s and early 2000s, Carr was a Florida resident attending college and graduate school in Pennsylvania and had a Florida driver's license. (R. Item 6, H.T. & Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 35a-37a, 83a, 98a, 103a.)
In September 1993, Carr was arrested in Pennsylvania for DUI and was accepted into an Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition Program. (R. Item 9, Hearing Officer's Proposed Report Finding of Fact (F.F.) ¶4, R.R. at 110a; R. Item 6, H.T. & Department Ex. 1, R.R. at 37a, 57a, 77a.) The Department suspended Carr's driving privilege for 200 days for this violation. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶4, R.R. at 110a; R. Item 6, Department Ex. 1, R.R. at 77a.) Carr's driving privilege was restored from that suspension on July 15, 1994, and that suspension is not at issue here. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶4, R.R. at 110a; R. Item 6, Department Ex. 1, R.R. at 77a.) As a result of the 1993 DUI and suspension, however, the Department in December 1993 created a "non-driver" record of Carr's Pennsylvania driving history, and designated as his "address of record" the Bethlehem, Pennsylvania address that appeared on the court records from the 1993 DUI. (R. Item 12, Secretary's Opinion and Order at 1, R.R. at 150a; R. Item 6, H.T., R.R. at 56a-57a.)
On June 18, 1998 and August 29, 1998, Carr was again arrested for DUI in Pennsylvania. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶¶5, 14, R.R. at 110a, 112a; R. Item 6, Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 77a-78a, 88a, 92a.) At the time of the August 29, 1998 arrest, Carr refused chemical testing, and the Department suspended his driving privilege for one year. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶¶5-6, R.R. at 110a-111a; R. Item 6, Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 77a, 83a, 85a.) On April 15, 1999, Carr was convicted of both 1998 DUI charges. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶¶10, 14, R.R. at 112a; R. Item 6, Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 77a-78a, 88a, 92a.) The court notified the Department of both of these convictions, as required by Section 6323 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 6323. (R. Item 6, Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 88a, 92a.) As a result of these convictions, in May 1999, the Department issued an additional one-year suspension and a five-year revocation as a habitual offender, resulting in a total of seven years of suspension or revocation of Carr's Pennsylvania driving privileges. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶¶11, 15, R.R. at 112a-113a; R. Item 6, Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 77a-78a, 89a, 93a.)
The Department mailed notices advising Carr of each of these suspensions and revocation and instructing that to receive credit toward the suspensions and revocation, he was required to sign and send the Department an enclosed DL-16LC form acknowledging "that my driving privilege is Suspended/Revoked/Disqualified in Pennsylvania." (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶¶7-9, 12-13, 16, R.R. at 111a-113a; R. Item 6, H.T. and Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 43a-47a, 77a-78a, 85a-87a, 89a-91a, 93a-95a.) At the time that it sent these notices, the Department's records showed that Carr had a Florida driver's license, a Winter Springs, Florida address, and a local Allentown, Pennsylvania address. (R. Item 6, H.T. and Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 51a-52a, 83a, 88a, 92a.) The Department, however, did not send these or any other notices to Carr's Florida address or to his current Allentown address; instead, it mailed the notices only to the Bethlehem, Pennsylvania address it had taken from court records approximately five years earlier. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶¶7, 12, 16, R.R. at 111a-113a; R. Item 6, H.T. and Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 45a-47a, 51a-53a, 57a, 85a, 89a, 93a.) There is no evidence that Carr received these notices. (R. Item 6, H.T., R.R. at 23a.) Carr did not sign and return the DL-16LC acknowledgment forms. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶27, R.R. at 115a; R. Item 6, H.T., R.R. at 34a-35a.)
On July 5, 2000, Carr was again arrested for DUI in Pennsylvania and was also charged with driving while under a DUI related suspension. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶22, R.R. at 114a; R. Item 6, H.T. and Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 21a, 29a, 78a, 98a, 103a.) On January 7, 2003, Carr pleaded guilty to the charge of driving while under a DUI related suspension in violation of Section 1543(b) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543(b), and was sentenced to 90 days imprisonment. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶29, R.R. at 115a; R. Item 6, H.T. and Petitioner's Ex. 7, R.R. at 21a-22a, 29a, 71a-75a.) Carr was also convicted on January 7, 2003 of the 2000 DUI charge and was sentenced to imprisonment and required to complete an alcohol treatment program. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶22, R.R. at 114a; R. Item 6, H.T. and Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 25a, 78a, 98a.) There is no dispute that Carr completed the alcohol treatment program and satisfied all other conditions of his sentences for these offenses. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶25, R.R. at 114a; R. Item 6, H.T. and Petitioner's Exs. 1-3, R.R. at 49a, 67a-70a.)
The court notified the Department of both January 2003 convictions, as required by Section 6323 of the Vehicle Code. (R. Item 6, Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 98a, 103a.) In February 2003, the Department issued an additional one-year suspension and an additional five-year revocation as a habitual offender based on those convictions, resulting in a total of 13 years of suspension or revocation of Carr's Pennsylvania driving privileges. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶23, R.R. at 114a; R. Item 6, Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 78a, 99a, 104a.) Although the 2003 records received by the Department showed that Carr had a Florida driver's license and that his address was in Winter Springs, Florida (R. Item 6, Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 98a, 103a), the Department sent the notices of suspension and revocation and DL-16LC acknowledgment forms only to the Bethlehem, Pennsylvania address it had obtained from 1993 court records nearly ten years earlier. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶24, R.R. at 114a; R. Item 6, H.T. and Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 47a-48a, 52a-53a, 99a, 104a.) Again, there is no evidence that Carr received the notices, and he did not sign and return the DL-16LC acknowledgment forms. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶27, R.R. at 115a; R. Item 6, H.T., R.R. at 23a, 34a-35a.)
In 2008, Carr moved to the State of Washington and was told that he could not obtain a Washington driver's license because of issues in Pennsylvania. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶30, R.R. at 115a; R. Item 6, H.T., R.R. at 23a.) Carr contacted the Department in November 2011, when the 13-year period from his first suspension would have ended, and was sent a letter at his Seattle, Washington address, listing all 13 years of suspensions and advising him that he was required to sign and submit a DL-16LC form. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶34, R.R. at 116a; R. Item 6, H.T., R.R. at 23a; R. Item 3, Restoration Requirements Letter, R.R. at 9a-11a.) In March 2012, Carr completed and signed a DL-16LC form. (R. Item 6 and Department Ex. 2, H.T., R.R. at 23a, 107a.) By letter dated March 31, 2012, the Department advised Carr that it received his acknowledgment form sent on March 12, 2012, and that credit toward his suspensions and revocations began on that date. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶37, R.R. at 116a; R. Item 6, H.T. and Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 49a, 109a.)
Carr timely requested a hearing on the Department's credit determination, asserting that his January 7, 2003 guilty plea to driving while under a DUI suspension satisfied the requirement of Section 1541(a) of the Vehicle Code that he submit "an acknowledgment of suspension or revocation" to the Department, and that he should therefore receive credit from that date. (R. Item 3, R.R. at 2a-11a.) An administrative hearing was held, at which Carr and a Department representative testified and the Department's records concerning Carr and court records of his 2003 guilty plea were introduced in evidence. On August 31, 2012, the hearing officer issued a Proposed Report recommending affirmance of the determination that credit toward all of Carr's suspensions and revocations began March 12, 2012 and that his Pennsylvania driving privileges were therefore not eligible for restoration until March 12, 2025. (R. Item 9, R.R. at 110a-124a.) Carr timely filed exceptions to the Proposed Report, again arguing that his guilty plea to driving while under a DUI suspension constituted an acknowledgment of suspension or revocation, and asserting that he did not receive notice that he was required to submit a particular form of acknowledgment because the Department sent those notifications only to an out-of-date address. (R. Item 10, R.R. at 125a-149a.)
On December 11, 2012, the Secretary denied Carr's exceptions and adopted the hearing officer's Proposed Report. The Secretary held that Carr was not entitled to any credit from the date of his guilty plea on the grounds that Section 1541(a) of the Vehicle Code prohibits credit toward a suspension "unless and until a license is surrendered or an acknowledgement is submitted in response to a suspension notice" and that a "judicial acknowledgement" cannot satisfy Section 1541(a)'s requirement of an acknowledgment. (R. Item 12, Secretary's Opinion and Order at 3, R.R. at 152a.) The Secretary did not find that Carr's guilty plea to driving while under suspension was substantively inadequate to satisfy the purpose of Section 1541(a)'s acknowledgment requirement. Rather, the only detriment found by the Secretary from granting credit from the date of such a guilty plea was the administrative concern that it would require the Department to examine court records and transcripts to determine whether the driver acknowledged his suspension. (Id.)
With respect to the Department's sending of notices in 1998, 1999 and 2003 to an address based on 1993 court records, the Secretary agreed that Carr, as a non-Pennsylvania driver, had no obligation to notify the Department of changes in his address. (R. Item 12, Secretary's Opinion and Order at 2-3, R.R. at 151a-152a.) The Secretary concluded, however, that the Department did not err in using the 1993 address, instead of the addresses in the later records at issue, holding that "the potential consequences of" using a later address "may be significant" and "may become confusing, inconsistent with the driver's intentions, and inaccurate and therefore, become problematic in more cases than not." (Id.)
On January 7, 2013, Carr timely filed the instant petition for review appealing the Secretary's decision to this Court. Carr argues that the Secretary erred in denying credit toward his suspensions and revocation because his 2003 plea of guilty to driving while under a DUI suspension or revocation constitutes an acknowledgment of suspension or revocation under Section 1541(a) of the Vehicle Code. We agree.
This Court's review of the Secretary's decision concerning credit toward suspensions and revocations of driving privileges is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether an error of law has been committed or whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Martin v. Department of Transportation, 6 A.3d 589, 593 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Because the issue here, the construction of a statute, is a question of law, the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Whalen v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 613 Pa. 64, 67, 32 A.3d 677, 679 (2011). --------
Section 1541 of the Vehicle Code prescribes when credit may be given toward a suspension or revocation of operating privileges, and provides in relevant part:
(a) Commencement of period.-- ... No credit toward the revocation, suspension or disqualification shall be earned until the driver's license is surrendered to the department, a court or a district attorney, as the case may be. A nonresident licensed driver or an unlicensed individual, including a driver whose license has expired, shall submit an acknowledgment of suspension or revocation to the department in lieu of a driver's license, except for the suspension of the operating privilege of an unlicensed individual under 16 years of age, in which case the suspension shall commence automatically upon the individual's 16th birthday for the specified period if an acknowledgment is received any time prior to the individual's 16th birthday. If a licensed driver is not in possession of his driver's license, no credit toward the disqualification, revocation or suspension shall be earned until a sworn affidavit or a form prescribed by the department is surrendered to the department swearing that the driver is not in possession of his driver's license. Such credit shall be rescinded if it is later determined that the driver was untruthful in the affidavit. Credit shall also be revoked if a person surrenders a duplicate license and it is later determined that the person was still in possession of an earlier issued, unexpired license. ...75 Pa. C.S. § 1541(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the statutory requirement with which a non-Pennsylvania driver, such as Carr, must comply for credit toward a suspension or revocation is to "submit an acknowledgment of suspension or revocation to the department."
Section 1541 of the Vehicle Code does not mandate any particular form of acknowledgment for nonresident drivers. The only requirement of a particular type of statement applies solely to Pennsylvania licensed drivers who do not have their license in their possession and therefore cannot comply with the requirement that they surrender it. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1541(a) (requiring that a driver "not in possession of his driver's license" surrender to the Department "a sworn affidavit or a form prescribed by the department ... swearing that the driver is not in possession of his driver's license"); 75 Pa. C.S. § 102 (defining "driver's license" as a license issued under the Vehicle Code). Because Section 1541 does not set forth any limitation on the type of acknowledgment of suspension or revocation that nonresident drivers must provide and does not contain any language that the acknowledgment must be in response to a notice, the Secretary's conclusions that Section 1541(a) requires an acknowledgment be "submitted in response to a suspension notice" and that "judicial acknowledgement" cannot be sufficient (R. Item 12, Secretary's Opinion and Order at 3, R.R. at 152a) impose additional requirements beyond the statute and are in error.
The question before us, thus, is whether a guilty plea is an "acknowledgment," and if so, whether Carr's guilty plea here acknowledged the DUI suspension or revocation. The Vehicle Code does not define what constitutes an "acknowledgment." See 75 Pa. C.S. § 102. Nor has the Department defined this term by regulations. The regulations that the Department has promulgated with respect to credit toward suspension or revocation address only the surrender and cancellation of Pennsylvania driver's licenses and permits, not nonresident driver acknowledgments of suspension or revocation. 67 Pa. Code §§ 89.1-89.4, 93.4. What constitutes a sufficient "acknowledgment" under Section 1541(a) must therefore be determined by the ordinary meaning of the term. Section 1903(a) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. C. S. § 1903(a) (undefined, nontechnical "[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage"); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Empfield, 526 Pa. 220, 224-25, 585 A.2d 442, 444 (1991); St. Ignatius Nursing Home v. Department of Public Welfare, 918 A.2d 838, 845 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (dictionary definition is appropriate source of ordinary meaning of term).
A plea of guilty constitutes an "acknowledgment" under the ordinary meaning of that term. The term "acknowledgment" includes an admission or confession. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 23 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining "acknowledge" as "[t]o own, avow or admit; to confess; to recognize one's acts and assume responsibility therefor" and defining "acknowledgment" as "[a]dmission or affirmation of obligation or responsibility"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 17 (2002) (defining "acknowledgment" as "the act of acknowledging" and defining "acknowledge" as a synonym of "admit" and "confess"). It is well established that a guilty plea is an admission of all of the elements of the underlying charge. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 578 Pa. 587, 609, 854 A.2d 489, 502 (2004); Commonwealth v. Hines, 496 Pa. 555, 559, 437 A.2d 1180, 1182 (1981).
Carr's 2003 guilty plea was to a charge of driving while his operating privilege was suspended or revoked for a DUI related offense, in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543(b). (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶29, R.R. at 115a; R. Item 6, Petitioner's Ex. 7, R.R. at 72a-73a.) The elements of that offense include not only that the defendant's driving privileges were suspended or revoked, but that they were suspended or revoked for a DUI related offense and that the defendant had actual notice or knowledge of the suspension or revocation and that it was DUI related. Commonwealth v. Zimmick, 539 Pa. 548, 554-57, 653 A.2d 1217, 1220-22 (1995); Commonwealth v. Kane, 460 Pa. 582, 584-86, 333 A.2d 925, 926-27 (1975); Commonwealth v. Vetrini, 734 A.2d 404, 406-08 (Pa. Super. 1999); Commonwealth v. Nuno, 559 A.2d 949, 950 (Pa. Super. 1989). Because a guilty plea is an admission of all of the elements of the offense and notice of suspension or revocation is an element of a violation of Section 1543(b), Carr's guilty plea constitutes an "acknowledgment of suspension or revocation" sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 1541(a).
The Department does not cite any authority holding or suggesting that a guilty plea is not an "acknowledgment," and does not dispute that a plea of guilty to violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543(b) admits a DUI suspension or revocation of driving privileges. Nor does the Department argue that its DL-16LC acknowledgment form provides any additional or more detailed admission of the suspensions or revocations beyond that provided by a guilty plea to driving under a DUI suspension or revocation. Rather, the Department argues that Carr's guilty plea cannot be sufficient for credit because Section 1541(a) requires that the driver "submit an acknowledgment of suspension or revocation to the department," 75 Pa. C.S. § 1541(a) (emphasis added), and Carr's guilty plea was not made directly to the Department. (Respondent's Br. at 10-16.)
The legislature did not provide in Section 1541(a) that a nonresident driver must communicate directly with the Department, only that he must "submit" the acknowledgment "to the department." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1541(a). It is clear from the purpose and language of the statute that what is required is that the driver submit an acknowledgment in a fashion that provides the Department with a record that the driver has notice of the suspension or revocation. "[T]he purpose behind the acknowledgement requirement of section 1541 ... is to ensure that the driver has notice of the suspension." Smith v. Department of Transportation, 740 A.2d 284, 286 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). The requirement of an acknowledgment is "in lieu of a driver's license," and Section 1541 permits surrender of a driver's license not only to the Department, but also to "a court or a district attorney." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1541(a). Surrender to a court or district attorney is sufficient under Section 1541(a) because courts and district attorneys are statutorily obligated to forward surrendered driver's licenses to the Department, thus ensuring that the Department receives the documentation of the driver's awareness of his suspension. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1540(a).
In the case of a guilty plea to a violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543(b), the court is similarly required by law to transmit a record of the conviction. 75 Pa. C.S. § 6323(1). Because notification of the Department is required by law, such a plea of guilty effectively ensures that the Department receives proof of the nonresident driver's awareness of his suspension or revocation. Carr's guilty plea therefore fulfills Section 1541(a)'s requirement the driver "submit an acknowledgment of suspension or revocation to the department in lieu of a driver's license." Indeed, it is undisputed here that the Department received documentation that Carr had notice as a result of his guilty plea. The Department's records showed that it received the required notification that Carr was convicted of driving under a DUI suspension in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543(b), which, as discussed above, necessarily established his notice of suspension or revocation. (R. Item 6, H.T. and Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 44a, 48a, 78a, 103a-105a.)
Contrary to the concern expressed in the Secretary's decision, this does not require the Department to "comb through court records or review transcripts in unrelated criminal cases not in its possession to determine if a driver acknowledged his suspension." (R. Item 12, Secretary's Opinion and Order at 3, R.R. at 152a.) The record that is transmitted to the Department under Section 6323 of the Vehicle Code and is placed by the Department in the nonresident's driving record shows the offense of which the driver was convicted. (See, e.g., R. Item 6, Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 88a, 92a, 98a, 103a.) Because a violation of Section 1543(b) requires that the driver have actual notice of the DUI suspension or revocation, the Department's record of such a conviction is sufficient, on its face, to establish the driver's notice of the suspension, without any examination of transcripts and other records.
Moreover, the Department here failed to give Carr any notice that a particular form of acknowledgment or method of submission was required to obtain credit toward the suspensions and revocations. While the Department sent notices in 1998, 1999 and 2003, advising Carr to complete and send the Department a DL-16LC form, it disregarded the court records it received showing his current address and sent those notices only to a five-to-ten year old address that it had no reasonable basis to believe was accurate. The Department used that out-of-date address only because it had unilaterally designated that address, which it took from 1993 court records, as Carr's "address of record." (R. Item 12, Secretary's Opinion and Order at 1, R.R. at 150a; R. Item 6, H.T., R.R. at 56a-57a.)
As the Secretary admits (R. Item 12, Secretary's Opinion and Order at 1, R.R. at 151a), Carr, as a non-Pennsylvania driver with Florida license, had no obligation to update his address with the Department. McCrea v. Department of Transportation, 783 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (requirements of Vehicle Code that drivers notify the Department of their new address when they move "apply to holders of issued Pennsylvania licenses, not non-resident holders of licenses from other states") (emphasis omitted). Where a driver has no obligation to notify the Department of address changes, the Department cannot ignore the address in the court records on which a suspension based and use an old address, simply because it is listed in the Department's records. Brozena v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 802 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); McCrea, 783 A.2d at 384. Redenbach v. Department of Transportation, 817 A.2d 1230 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), relied on by the Secretary, is not to the contrary. In Redenbach, unlike Brozena, McCrea, and this case, the driver did not have an out-of-state driver's license, and the Department did not ignore an out-of-state driver's license address. 817 A.2d at 1232, 1235. Moreover, the evidence in Redenbach as to when the driver resided at particular addresses was conflicting, and it was not clear that the address to which the notices were sent was a wrong address at the time that they were sent. 817 A.2d at 1233.
The Secretary, in his decision, justified the Department's failure to send notices to the addresses on Carr's contemporaneous court records on the grounds that using a more current address without a formal driver change of address might possibly be "confusing, inconsistent with the driver's intentions, and inaccurate." (R. Item 12, Secretary's Opinion and Order at 3, R.R. at 152a.) That concern is unsupported and not a valid basis for the Department to disregard current address information where, as here, the Department's "address of record" was created by the Department from the same type of record and with no notice to the driver that he has any official address on file. Where the driver has no obligation to update his address and no notice that he has a different address in the Department's records than the address he currently reports, no inference can be drawn from failure to request an address change that the older address is accurate. Indeed, the Department did not even provide Carr a reasonable opportunity to correct his address. The change of address that the Department requires before it will send notices to the driver's current address is not on a form filled out by the driver, and that form did not provide the opportunity to request a change of address at the time of Carr's 1999 convictions. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶39, R.R. at 116a; R. Item 6, H.T. and Department Ex. 2, R.R. at 54a, 58a-59a, 88a, 92a, 98a, 103a.)
The fact that Carr's guilty plea is "an acknowledgment of suspension or revocation" under Section 1541(a) of the Vehicle Code, however, does not mean that he is entitled to credit from January 7, 2003 for all of the suspensions and revocations at issue here. At the time of his guilty plea, the only suspensions and revocations that Carr was under were the 1998 one-year suspension for refusal of chemical testing and the one-year suspension and five-year habitual offender revocation for his 1999 convictions. The remaining six years of suspension and revocation were not imposed by the Department until February 2003, after his guilty plea. (R. Item 9, F.F. ¶23, R.R. at 114a; R. Item 6, Department Exs. 1 and 2, R.R. at 78a, 99a, 104a.)
Under Section 1541(a) of the Vehicle Code, an acknowledgment of suspension or revocation must be made after the suspension or revocation is issued. See Hruska v. Department of Transportation, 27 A.3d 269, 272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (surrender of driver's license to Department, even if it had been received, could not satisfy Section 1541(a)'s requirements for credit because driver's license had not yet been suspended); Martin v. Department of Transportation, 6 A.3d 589, 594 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (pre-suspension surrender of driver's license to police officer could not satisfy Section 1541(a)'s requirements for credit toward later suspension). Carr's January 7, 2003 guilty plea cannot acknowledge the one-year suspension and five-year habitual offender revocation that were not in existence at the time and therefore cannot entitle him to credit with respect to those six years of suspension and revocation.
Accordingly, Carr is entitled to credit with respect to the first seven years of his suspensions and revocations from January 7, 2003 and that period of suspension and revocation ended January 7, 2010. With respect to the six years of suspension and revocation of driving privileges imposed by the Department in February 2003, Carr did not acknowledge that suspension and revocation until he submitted his DL-16LC form on March 12, 2012, resulting in a restoration eligibility date of March 12, 2018.
Because the Secretary erred in adopting the Proposed Report of the hearing officer and in holding that Carr was not entitled to credit from January 7, 2003 for the seven years of his suspensions and revocation that pre-dated his guilty plea, we reverse and remand with directions to grant Carr credit toward his 1998 and 1999 suspensions and revocation beginning on January 7, 2003 and modify Carr's restoration eligibility date to March 12, 2018.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of June, 2013, the order of December 11, 2012 of the Secretary of Transportation in the above-captioned matter is REVERSED. This matter is REMANDED to the Department of Transportation (Department), and the Department is directed to grant Petitioner credit toward his 1998 and 1999 suspensions and revocation beginning on January 7, 2003, and modify Petitioner's restoration eligibility date to March 12, 2018, in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge