Opinion
No: 2:03-CV-534 PS.
September 29, 2005
ORDER
Before the Court is Cross-Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I of Chicago SouthShore and South Bend Railroad's Cross-Complaint [Doc. 43]. Cross-Defendant Midwest Construction Services, Inc. has adopted the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III of the Cross-Complaint [Doc. 46]. Cross-Plaintiff Chicago SouthShore and South Bend Railroad brought this action against Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Midwest Construction Services, Inc., alleging claims of negligence for a train derailment that allegedly injured Timothy Carr, Plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit. For the reasons discussed below, this Court hereby grants Cross-Defendants Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Midwest Construction Services, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to the negligence claims alleged by Chicago SouthShore and South Bend Railroad.
FACTS
Plaintiff Timothy Carr claims that he was injured in a railroad car derailment on December 20, 2001. ( See Pl.'s Compl. 2.) The alleged cause was a "defective switch, defective track and/or defective track structure. . . ." ( Id.) Carr filed the underlying suit on December 16, 2003 alleging, among other things, FELA liability against his employer, Chicago SouthShore and South Bend Railroad ("Chicago SouthShore"), and common law negligence against Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk Southern") and Midwest Construction Services, Inc. ("Midwest"). ( See id. at 2-5, 8-13.) The theory of liability against Norfolk Southern is that Carr was injured when allegedly a Norfolk Southern train negligently "ran through the switch, track and track structure," ( id. at 12) thereby damaging them, which then led to the derailment that injured Carr, ( see id.) Midwest is liable, according to the complaint, because it failed to maintain and/or repair the railroad switch, track and track structure. ( See id. at 10.)
On June 15, 2004, Chicago SouthShore filed a Cross-Complaint against Norfolk Southern and Midwest. There were several counts contained in the Cross-Complaint, but the two at issue here are Count I, alleging negligence against Norfolk Southern, and Count III, alleging negligence against Midwest. ( See Cross-Compl. 3-5.) Chicago SouthShore alleges common law negligence against Norfolk Southern and Midwest for damage to Chicago SouthShore's railroad cars and for injury to its employee, Carr, both which allegedly resulted from the train derailment on December 20, 2001. ( See id.) In its Motion for Summary Judgment presently before the Court, Norfolk Southern argues that Chicago SouthShore's Cross-Complaint alleging common law negligent damage to property is barred by Indiana's two-year statute of limitations and is therefore untimely. ( See Norfolk Southern's Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 6.) In its Response, Chicago SouthShore concedes that the action for damages sustained to its property is barred by Indiana's statute of limitations because that claim is independent from Carr's original complaint. (See Chicago SouthShore's Resp. 3, n. 1.) The motion is therefore granted without further discussion with respect to that claim.
In addition, Norfolk Southern argues that Chicago SouthShore's claim for damages under a theory of negligence for the personal injury suffered by Carr should be barred under the statute of limitations and because Chicago SouthShore lacks standing and is not the real party in interest to assert a common law negligence claim for the personal injuries of Carr. ( See Norfolk Southern's Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 6-8.) In its Response, Chicago SouthShore argues that its Cross-Complaint simply seeks to recover payments already made to Carr for medical expenses and time off work. ( See Chicago SouthShore's Resp. 2.) Because the Court finds that Chicago SouthShore is not a real party in interest that can bring negligence claims against Norfolk Southern or Midwest and that Chicago SouthShore's negligence claim is identical to its indemnification claim, this Court need not address the parties' statute of limitations or standing arguments.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment StandardSummary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine dispute about a material fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In making this determination, a court construes "all facts and reasonable inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Moser v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2005). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The production of only "a scintilla of evidence" will not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
II. Real Party In Interest
The dispositive issue relating to Norfolk Southern's Motion for Summary Judgment is the question of whether Chicago SouthShore is the real party in interest with the ability to bring claims of negligence against Norfolk Southern and Midwest. The Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure both require that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Ind. R. Trial P. 17(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a). Norfolk Southern argues that Carr is the real party in interest as he is the injured party. Thus, he is the owner of the right to sue for negligence and, in fact, has already done so. Chicago SouthShore presented no argument in its response brief relating to the real party in interest issue. While Chicago SouthShore did argue that it had standing to bring the claim, it is clear under Indiana law that standing, although similar, is not identical to the real party in interest requirement. Town of Georgetown v. Sewell, 786 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003); Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1029 (Ind. 1995). "Both are threshold requirements intended to insure that the party before the court has the substantive right to enforce the claim being asserted." Hosler ex rel. Hosler v. Caterpillar, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). Standing requires only that the party suing have a "personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit" and be "in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue." Id.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that any action be brought by the real party in interest. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a). However, to determine the real party in interest, this Court "must look to the applicable state substantive law." Am. Nat'l Bank Trust Co. of Chicago v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 692 F.2d 455, 459 (7th Cir. 1982).
A real party in interest, however, "is the person who is the true owner of the right sought to be enforced." Hammes, 659 N.E.2d at 1030. "He or she is the person who is entitled to the fruits of the action." Id.; Otto v. Pelis, 640 N.E.2d 712, 714 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994). "To acquire real party in interest status, a person must have a present and substantial interest in the relief being sought[.]" Otto, 640 N.E.2d at 714. If a party's injuries are only derivative, that party is not a real party in interest and thus "cannot maintain an action in his [or her] own name." Weissman v. Weener, 12 F.3d 84, 86 (7th Cir. 1993).
Here, Carr is the directly injured party. As such, he is the real party in interest. Chicago SouthShore attempts to distinguish its negligence claim from Carr's claim by arguing that it only seeks recoupment from Norfolk Southern for payments already made to Carr. It contends: "The fact that Chicago SouthShore paid these monies is a direct result Norfolk Southern's negligence [sic]." (Chicago SouthShore's Resp. at 7.) But this statement does not provide sufficient grounds for Chicago SouthShore to bring a negligence claim against Norfolk Southern and Midwest, particularly when Carr, the party who owns the primary right to sue for negligence and is therefore the real party in interest, has already brought his negligence claim in this case. Chicago SouthShore's negligence claims against Norfolk Southern and Midwest therefore must fail.
III. Indemnity Claim
Moreover, Chicago SouthShore's negligence claim is unnecessary for recouping money already paid because it has presented cross-claims for indemnity against Norfolk Southern and Midwest. ( See Cross-Compl. Counts II IV.) If Norfolk Southern and Midwest are found to be liable for Carr's injuries, Chicago SouthShore could be entitled to recoup the money it has already expended to cover the cost of those injuries from them (or even Carr, for that matter) through an indemnity (which Chicago SouthShore has already filed), recoupment, or contribution cause of action. But Chicago SouthShore may not sue for Carr's personal injuries, which is a different cause of action than a right to recover through indemnity, recoupment or contribution. Cf. Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the railroad's "right to recoup [amount paid in SSB benefits] does not arise out of the same occurrence that gave rise to [plaintiff's] earlier suit [alleging personal injury tort damages under FELA].")
It is true that, to win its indemnity claim, Chicago SouthShore will have to show that Norfolk Southern's and Midwest's negligence caused Plaintiff Carr's injuries. See, e.g., Gaines v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 23 F.3d 1170, 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding third-party defendant in a FELA action not negligent in a contribution claim); McClish v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, 266 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Ind. 1967) (dismissing third-party indemnity complaint after reviewing Indiana indemnity law based on negligence principles); Sears, Roebuck Co., Inc. v. Boyd, 562 N.E.2d 458, 461 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990) (discussing negligence in a cross-claim for indemnification). However, a separate negligence claim is simply superfluous.
CONCLUSION
As Chicago SouthShore is not the real party in interest with respect to Plaintiff Carr's injuries, Norfolk Southern's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 43] is GRANTED. As Midwest filed a Motion for Summary Judgment that adopted Norfolk Southern's reasoning, its Motion [Doc. 46] is GRANTED as well. The Court REAFFIRMS the trial schedule for the remaining counts.