Opinion
731 WDA 2021 J-A08003-22
04-19-2022
RANDY CARLSON v. ROBERT J. WENNER APPEAL OF: RANDY CARLSON, BY AND THROUGH SUSAN CARLSON AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF RANDY CARLSON
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered May 28, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Civil Division at No(s): 326-2017
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM
BENDER, P.J.E.
Appellant, Randy Carlson, by and through Susan Carlson as executrix of the estate of Randy Carlson, appeals from the trial court's May 28, 2021 order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Robert J. Wenner. We affirm.
The record indicates that Mr. Carlson died on April 28, 2021. See Rule 2352 Substitution, 5/11/21, at ¶ 1. On May 11, 2021, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 2355 and 2352(a), Mr. Carlson's counsel gave notice of Mr. Carlson's death and substituted Susan Carlson - the executrix of Mr. Carlson's estate - in his place. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 2355(a) ("If a named party dies after the commencement of an action, the attorney of record for the deceased party shall file a notice of death with the prothonotary. The procedure to substitute the personal representative of the deceased party shall be in accordance with Rule 2352."); Pa.R.Civ.P. 2352(a) ("The successor may become a party to a pending action by filing of record a statement of the material facts on which the right to substitution is based."). For ease of disposition, we use "Mr. Carlson" throughout this writing to refer to Appellant.
On January 8, 2018, Mr. Carlson filed a complaint against Appellee, the police chief for the Oil City Police Department. Complaint, 1/8/18, at ¶ 5. Therein, Mr. Carlson claimed that Appellee detained and falsely attempted to prosecute him without probable cause, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 5. Specifically, Mr. Carlson alleged:
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress….").
6. In or around January 2014, Oil City Police Department Patrolman Robert Culp ("Mr. Culp") began an investigation into the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States Francis B. Pritchard Post 464 Canteen Home Association Incorporated located at 2 Relief Street[, ] Oil City[, ] Pennsylvania 16301-1044.
7. During the course of this investigation[, ] Mr. Culp developed several suspects, including but not limited to James Reisinger. The investigation further revealed that Mr. Reisinger had a contentious and negative history with [Mr.] Carlson.
8. During the course of this investigation, Mr. Culp determined that Mr. Reisinger was under investigation by the U.S. Postal Authority for theft.
9. During the course of this investigation, Mr. Culp determined that Mr. Reisinger was an "interesting character" and denied facts despite being confronted with video evidence to the contrary.
10.On or about January 11, 2015, Mr. Culp decided to arrest [Mr.] Carlson.
11.As of February 17, 2015, Mr. Culp had no evidence to charge [Mr. Carlson] with any crimes, but had enough evidence to arrest Mr. Reisinger.
12. On March 26, 2015, Mr. Culp, at the direction of [Appellee], arrested [Mr.] Carlson and charged him at case number MJ-28301-CR-0000043-2015.
13.At the time of the arrest, [Appellee] knew that [Mr.] Carlson did not commit any criminal acts as related to the charges filed against him at the above[-]identified case number.
14.Prior to [Mr.] Carlson's arrest, [Appellee] and [Mr.] Culp met with Mr. Reisinger, who accused [Mr.] Carlson of the behavior for which [Mr.] Carlson was arrested, including but not limited to [Mr.] Carlson['s] allegedly following Mr. Reisinger "in public."
15.Due to these charges, [Mr.] Carlson was detained in jail until on or about May 11, 2015.
16. On or around April 1, 2015, [Mr. Carlson] litigated an emergency bail reduction hearing.
17.At the hearing, [Appellee] offered testimony of a conversation with Chad Rosen, Esquire.
18.Attorney Rosen was [Mr. Carlson's] previous attorney.
19.[Appellee] offered false evidence that Attorney Rosen feared for his life and his family's life on account of [Mr. Carlson].
20.During his time in jail, [Mr.] Carlson did not have access to his cancer medications, and he missed several cancer treatments.
21.[Mr.] Carlson's condition worsened, and his disease resumed its course against [Mr.] Carlson.
22. On or about June 22, 2015, [Mr.] Carlson successfully petitioned for Habeas relief, which was granted, dismissing 5 of the 7 charges filed against him.
23.On or about November 7, 2016, the Venango County District Attorney [d]ismissed the 2 remaining charges against [Mr.] Carlson.Id. at ¶¶ 6-23. Based on these facts, Mr. Carlson asserted, inter alia, that Appellee "relied upon the knowingly unreliable and under[-]investigation suspect to arrest [Mr.] Carlson, despite knowing at the time that even if the actions described were true, they were not illegal[, ]" and claimed that Appellee's "testimony provided on or about April 1, 2015[, ] was knowingly false, and designed to keep [Mr.] Carlson detained." Id. at ¶¶ 28, 29. As a result, Mr. Carlson claimed that he "suffered injury and damages, including incarceration, which are directly and proximately caused by [Appellee's] actions as described above." Id. at ¶ 31.
On March 3, 2021, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. In his motion, Appellee explained that, in June of 2017, Mr. Carlson had filed a complaint against Mr. Culp in federal court, claiming that Mr. Culp had maliciously prosecuted him and violated his constitutional rights. See Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/3/21, at ¶¶ 1-4. Appellee stated that Mr. Carlson and Mr. Culp ultimately reached a settlement, and that the settlement's terms were memorialized in a Full and Final Release signed by Mr. Carlson. Id. at ¶
6. According to Appellee, the Full and Final Release set forth the following:
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF the total sum of [redacted] paid in hand to Randy Carlson on behalf of Robert Culp, City of Oil City and Selective Insurance Company of America, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and in consideration of other good and valuable consideration, as set forth more fully below, Randy Carlson hereby fully and forever releases, acquits and discharges the said Robert Culp, City of Oil City and Selective Insurance Company of America AND ANY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS, FIRMS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS which are or might be claimed to be liable to the above-named party, his heirs, administrators, executors, successors and assigns from any and all actions, causes of action, claims and demands of whatsoever kind or nature on account of any and all known and unknown losses and damages sustained by the above-named party
as the result of an incident which occurred on or about March 26, 2015[, ] for which losses and damages the above-named party claimed Robert Culp, City of Oil City and Selective Insurance Company of America to be legally liable and on account of which suit was brought at number 1:17-cv-00149 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania it being understood and agreed that the acceptance of said sum is in full accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim and that the payment of said sum is not an admission of liability.
It is expressly understood and agreed that this release and settlement is intended to cover and does cover not only all now known losses and damages but any future losses and damages not now known or anticipated but which may later develop or be discovered, including all the effects and consequences thereof.
***
Randy Carlson hereby declares that he fully understands the terms of this settlement, that the amount stated herein is the sole consideration for this Release and that he voluntarily accepts said sum for the purpose of making a full and final compromise, adjustment and settlement of all claims for losses and damages resulting or to result from said incident.
It is further understood and agreed that this Release constitutes the entire agreement between the parties hereto, the terms of which are contractual and not a mere recital, and that there are no written or oral understandings or agreements, directly or indirectly connected with this Release and settlement that are not incorporated herein.Id. at Exhibit B ("Full and Final Release") at 1-2 (capitalization in original; emphasis added). Appellee claimed that this Full and Final Release releases all parties from any causes of action connected to Mr. Carlson's underlying arrest and prosecution. Id. at 6 (unnumbered pages). Accordingly, Appellee argued that the trial court should grant summary judgment in his favor. Id.
Mr. Carlson subsequently filed a response to Appellee's summary judgment motion. Therein, he contended that his claims against Appellee did not arise from his March 26, 2015 arrest and the filing of criminal charges. See Response to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/26/21, at ¶ 12. Instead, he said that Appellee's "providing knowingly false testimony at the April[] 2015 bail hearing is an independent and intervening event; therefore, Mr. Carlson's detention from the end of his bail reduction hearing until his release in May[] 2015, constitute damages which result directly from [Appellee's] providing knowingly false testimony against Mr. Carlson at his bail reduction hearing." Id.; see also id. at ¶ 14 ("[Appellee's] providing false testimony at the April[] 2015 hearing is an independent and intervening tort which gives rise to a separate cause of action separate and apart from the claims raised in the federal action (which does [not] mention or refer to [Appellee's] provision of false testimony in April[] 2015 at the bail hearing at all)."). Mr. Carlson also noted that the Full and Final Release is not labeled as a 'Full and Final General Release.' See id. at ¶ 19.
On May 28, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment. In its order, the trial court determined that the Full and Final Release "is broadly worded to include everyone and anything arising out of the March [26], 2015 incident." Order, 5/28/21, at 4.
On June 24, 2021, Mr. Carlson filed a timely notice of appeal. On June 29, 2021, the trial court issued an order, directing Mr. Carlson to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days after the entry of its order. It warned that any issue not properly included in a timely-filed and served statement would be deemed waived. On July 21, 2021 - 22 days later - Mr. Carlson filed his concise statement. The trial court thereafter issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, relying on the reasoning set forth in its May 28, 2021 order.
Presently, Mr. Carlson submits the following issue for our review:
Whether the Venango County Court of Common Pleas committed reversible error when it granted Appellee['s] [m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment by not applying applicable precedential case law.Mr. Carlson's Brief at 8.
Before delving into the merits of Mr. Carlson's issue, we address the timeliness of his Rule 1925(b) concise statement. As stated supra, the trial court ordered Mr. Carlson to file his concise statement within 21 days after the entry of its order and cautioned that an untimely statement would result in waiver. See Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) ("[I]n determining whether an appellant has waived his issues on appeal based on non-compliance with [Rule] 1925, it is the trial court's order that triggers an appellant's obligation[. T]herefore, we look first to the language of that order.") (citations omitted). Despite the trial court's instruction, Mr. Carlson filed his concise statement 22 days later. Thus, Mr. Carlson's concise statement appears on its face to be untimely.
However, there is no indication on the docket that notice of the trial court's order directing Mr. Carlson to file a Rule 1925(b) statement was given as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 236(b). See Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b) ("The prothonotary shall note in the docket the giving of the notice…."); see also Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) ("The date of entry of an order in a matter subject to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure shall be the day on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the order has been given as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b)."). Accordingly, because the docket does not indicate that notice was given pursuant to Rule 236(b), Mr. Carlson's concise statement is not untimely, and we do not find waiver on this basis. We therefore proceed to the merits of Mr. Carlson's appeal.
At the outset of our review, we acknowledge that:
[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In so doing, the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party, and, thus, may only grant summary judgment where the right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt. On appellate review, then,
an appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion. But the issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to any material fact presents a question of law, and therefore, on that question our standard of review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals.
To the extent that this Court must resolve a question of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the context of the entire record.Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (cleaned up).
Mr. Carlson argues that the Full and Final Release does not release Appellee for his April 1, 2015 actions. See Mr. Carlson's Brief at 12-13. He says that "[w]hile parties was generally defined by the release (which would include Appellee), the claims for which those parties were released was not general at all." Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). In particular, Mr. Carlson asserts that "all persons were released from 'an incident on March 26, 2015[, ] on account of which the federal lawsuit was brought…' by [Mr. Carlson]. However, in this case, the unlawful acts of Appellee occurred on April 1, 2015, and therefore, were not released." Id. (emphasis in original). Additionally, he points out that "nothing about Appellee's (or anyone else's) April 1, 2015 acts were alleged in the federal lawsuit, and therefore, were not released." Id. (citations omitted). Finally, he says that this Court's decision in Harrity v. Med. Coll. of Pa. Hosp., 653 A.2d 5 (Pa. Super. 1994) applies and necessitates the denial of Appellee's summary judgment motion. See id. at 13-15.
This Court has previously explained that,
[w]hen construing the effect and scope of a release, the court, as it does with all other contracts, must try to give effect to the intentions of the parties. Yet, the primary source of the court's understanding of the parties' intent must be the document itself. Thus, what a party now claims to have intended is not as important as the intent that we glean from a reading of the document itself. The parties' intent at the time of signing as embodied in the ordinary
meaning of the words of the document is our primary concern.
The court will adopt an interpretation that is most reasonable and probable bearing in mind the objects which the parties intended to accomplish through the agreement…. There is no requirement that all of the parties to be discharged from liability are specifically named within a release if the terms of the release clearly extend to other parties. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that when the terms of a release discharge all claims and parties, the release is applicable to all tortfeasors despite the fact that they were not specifically named and did not contribute toward the settlement.Ford Motor Co. v. Buseman, 954 A.2d 580, 583 (Pa. Super. 2008) (cleaned up).
Here, as mentioned supra, the Full and Final Release applies, in relevant part, to
any and all actions, causes of action, claims and demands of whatsoever kind or nature on account of any and all known and unknown losses and damages sustained by the above-named party as the result of an incident which occurred on or about March 26, 2015 for which losses and damages the above-named party claimed Robert Culp, City of Oil City and Selective Insurance Company of America to be legally liable and on account of which suit was brought at number 1:17-cv-00149 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania….Full and Final Release at 1.
Looking at the language of the Full and Final Release, it is apparent that it bars causes of action for losses and damages Mr. Carlson sustained as a result of his March 26, 2015 arrest for which he claimed Mr. Culp, the City of Oil City, and Selective Insurance Company of America were legally liable and on account of which he brought suit in federal court. In the federal action against Mr. Culp, Mr. Carlson claimed that due to the charges brought by Mr. Culp on March 26, 2015 (and not because of any false testimony given by Appellee), he "was detained in jail until on or about May 11, 2015." See Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/3/21, at Exhibit A ("Federal Complaint") at ¶ 14; see also id. at ¶ 22 ("[Mr.] Carlson has suffered injury and damages, including incarceration, which are directly and proximately caused by [Mr. Culp]."). In the present action, Mr. Carlson sues Appellee for this same loss. See Complaint at ¶ 29 ("[Appellee's] actions as described above violate the 4th Amendment and thus 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because [Appellee's] actions were objectively unreasonable in that the testimony provided on or about April 1, 2015 was knowingly false, and designed to keep [Mr. Carlson] detained."); id. at ¶ 31 ("[Mr.] Carlson has suffered injury and damages, including incarceration, which are directly and proximately caused by [Appellee's] actions as described above."); see also Mr. Carlson's Brief at 9 ("[Mr. Carlson] was arrested on March 26, 2015. On April 1, 2015, Appellee lied to a [j]udge during [Mr. Carlson's] bail hearing, which … led directly to [Mr. Carlson's] not being released on bail that day. Due to [Appellee's] false statement, Mr. Carlson was jailed for more than an additional month, from April 1, 2015 through May 11, 2015.") (citations omitted). However, per the allegations advanced by Mr. Carlson in his federal complaint, his incarceration through May 11, 2015 occurred as a result of the March 26, 2015 arrest. Thus, his present suit against Appellee falls within the scope of the Full and Final Release, which bars actions for losses and damages sustained as a result of Mr. Carlson's March 26, 2015 arrest.
Harrity does not compel us to reach a different conclusion. In Harrity, the plaintiff fell at a hotel on June 22, 1986, fracturing her wrist, and subsequently initiated an action in federal court against the hotel for her injuries. Harrity, 653 A.2d at 6. In addition, the plaintiff later brought separate medical malpractice actions in state court against the doctors who treated her fractured wrist, claiming, among other things, that they improperly set her fracture and negligently performed surgery, leading her to suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and undergo further surgeries. Id. With respect to the lawsuit against the hotel, the plaintiff ultimately executed a release, releasing the hotel "and any other person or corporation from all actions or claims arising out of an accident which occurred June 22, 1986 'and for which suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania at Civil Action No. 88-4913, Sarah T. Harrity v. Claridge at Park Place, Inc….'" Id. at 6-7 (emphasis omitted). Based on this release, the trial court in the medical malpractice actions granted summary judgment in favor of the medical malpractice defendstyledants. Id. at 7. The plaintiff appealed. Id.
On appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court improperly entered summary judgment in favor of the medical malpractice defendants. Initially, we determined that the trial judge, in granting summary judgment, had improperly overruled decisions rendered by other judges on her court in these same cases. See id. at 7-9. Notwithstanding, we opined that the trial judge nevertheless erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the medical malpractice defendants, explaining, in pertinent part, that:
Herein, [the plaintiff] released persons and entities from claims, actions, et cetera "arising out of an accident which occurred June 22, 1986 and for which suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania at Civil Action No. 88-4913, styled: Sarah T. Harrity vs. Claridge at Park Place, Inc…." (emphasis added). Thus, the release, on its face, applies only to causes of action, et cetera for which suit was brought in the [hotel] action. In other words, the release applies only to that action. This is extremely clear limiting language.
A copy of the complaint in the [hotel] action … indicates that [the hotel] action was not brought for the malpractice of [the medical malpractice defendants]. In the [hotel] action, [the plaintiff] sought recovery solely for the negligence of [the hotel] in maintaining its hotel lobby and for the injuries directly connected to the fall. No mention in the complaint is made of any of [the medical malpractice defendants'] actions in connection with the treatment of these injuries, [the plaintiff's] resultant four surgeries, or [the plaintiff's] carpal tunnel syndrome. Thus, suit was not brought in the [hotel] action for the malpractice at issue in these two actions, and the release does not apply here.
***
[The medical malpractice defendants] posit that the release applies to them, although they are not named in it. However, that is not the issue in this case. The issue is whether the language in question renders the release applicable only to the [hotel] action. The issue is not who or what is released. The issue is from what are they released. [The plaintiff] did not release every entity from liability for any tort that was committed on her in the past, present, and future. She released entities from liability arising from the June 22, 1986 accident "and for which" [she] brought suit against [the h]otel in the federal action named. [The plaintiff] did not bring suit in the [hotel] action against [the medical malpractice defendants] for their malpractice.Id. at 11.
Therefore, in sum, the release in Harrity released persons and entities from claims arising out of the accident "and for which suit was brought" in the hotel action. Because the plaintiff in Harrity did not make claims about her medical treatment, resulting four surgeries, and carpal tunnel syndrome in the hotel action, we concluded that the release was not intended to apply to the medical malpractice actions.
See Porterfield v. Trustees of Hosp. of Univ. of Pa., 657 A.2d 1293, 1295-96 (Pa. Super. 1995) (interpreting Harrity in a similar manner); see also Brown v. Herman, 665 A.2d 504, 507 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1995) (noting that "the release in Harrity applied only to certain claims for which causes of action were brought against a certain defendant in the underlying suit").
In contrast, in the case sub judice, Mr. Carlson released persons and entities from claims for any and all known and unknown losses and damages sustained by him as the result of his March 26, 2015 arrest for which he claimed Mr. Culp, the City of Oil City and Selective Insurance Company of America to be liable and on account of which he brought the federal suit against Mr. Culp. As discussed supra, in the federal action, Mr. Carlson brought suit against Mr. Culp for his allegedly improper arrest and detention through May 11, 2015. His claim against Appellee in the present action likewise relates to his allegedly improper arrest and detention through May 11, 2015. Thus, Mr. Carlson is suing Appellee for the same harm that he had previously attributed to Mr. Culp in the federal action. Accord Brown, 665 A.2d at 509 ("[B]ecause [the] appellants identified impotence as an element of injury in their products liability action, the settlement in that action represents compensation for impotence. The release therefore includes impotence and [the] appellants may not now claim otherwise in order to pursue a second satisfaction for the same injury."). Accordingly, we construe the Full and Final Release as releasing Appellee in this action, and Harrity does not compel us to reach a different result.
Accord Mr. Carlson's Brief in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/25/21, at 3 (recognizing that the Full and Final Release "has qualifying and limiting language which allows [Mr. Carlson] to pursue any and all claims against any and all persons for any and all damages that are not the '…result of an incident which occurred on or about March 26, 2015 … on account of which suit was brought at number 1:17-cv-00149 in the United States Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania'") (unnumbered pages; citation omitted).
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered.