Opinion
15346 Index No. 157608/20 Case No. 2021–01110
02-22-2022
Gretchen CARLSON et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. CHELSEA HOTEL OWNER, LLC, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Leon I. Behar, P.C., New York (Mitchell P. Heaney of counsel), for appellants. Kasowitz Benson Torres, LLP, New York (Jennifer S. Recine of counsel), for respondents.
Leon I. Behar, P.C., New York (Mitchell P. Heaney of counsel), for appellants.
Kasowitz Benson Torres, LLP, New York (Jennifer S. Recine of counsel), for respondents.
Renwick, J.P., Kennedy, Scarpulla, Rodriguez, Higgitt, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lynn R. Kotler, J.), entered on or about March 30, 2021, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants' motion to dismiss the claims for statutory harassment, private nuisance, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs and the motion denied. The complaint states a cause of action for harassment under Administrative Code of City of N.Y. §§ 27–2005(d) and 27–2115(m) ( Jobe v. Chelsea Hotel Owner LLC, 198 A.D.3d 440, 441, 155 N.Y.S.3d 395 [1st Dept. 2021] ). Namely, it sufficiently alleges that defendants failed to provide essential services, including electricity, water, heat, and ventilation, resulting in violations of the Housing Maintenance Code, and that that failure was calculated to and did cause plaintiffs to vacate their apartment ( id. ; see also Administrative Code § 27–2004[a][48]). Moreover, Supreme Court is a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of Administrative Code § 27–2115(m)(2), the provision under which plaintiffs seek relief (id. ). Defendants' contention that plaintiffs' harassment claim under the Administrative Code must be denied because plaintiff failed to plead a specific violation arising from conditions in the apartment to support their claim is without merit (see id. ). The existence or absence of a violation can be determined in discovery (see Administrative Code § 27–2115[h][2][ii]).
Defendants do not oppose the reinstatement of the claims for private nuisance or intentional infliction of emotional distress, opting to litigate those claims on the merits. However, contrary to defendants' contention, punitive damages may be appropriate under both causes of action if the alleged acts are shown to be intentional or malicious ( Jobe, 198 A.D.3d at 440, 155 N.Y.S.3d 395 ). Accordingly, both claims are reinstated, including the demand for punitive damages.