Opinion
Rehearing Denied April 5, 1972.
Opinion on pages 1068 to 1093 omitted
HEARING GRANTED
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen. by John Fourt, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for petitioners.
Peter D. Coppelman, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance Senior Citizens Project, San [100 Cal.Rptr. 636] Prancisco, and Blackmon, Isenberg, Moulds & Blicker, Sacramento, by Peter D. Coppleman, San Francisco, for real parties in interest.
REIEDMAN, Acting Presiding Justice.
I
Two recipients of Old Age Security (OAS) and their adult children filed a class action in the Sacramento Superior Court, seeking to enjoin state officials from requiring the adult children to make financial contributions to their parents' support under statutory amendments enacted by the Welfare Reform Act of 1971, Statutes of 1971, chapter 578.
Plaintiff Huntley, son of an OAS recipient, is 60 years old. He alleges that he and his 67-year-old wife have a net monthly income of $656.25 and are attempting to save for their retirement; that the San Joaquin Welfare Department has demanded monthly contributions of $70 from him and $80 from his brother for the support of their mother. Plaintiff Dykstra, son of another OAS recipient, is married and carns $680 per month as a truck driver. The same county welfare department has demanded that he contribute $75 per month to his mother's support. He declares that after paying his family bills, including $180 per month for child support and $145 for rent, he does not have $75 remaining. He states that he sent $10 per month to help his mother, then learned that the county welfare department had subtracted an equal amount from his mother's monthly aid payments.
The superior court issued a temporary restraining order, and the defendants (including Robert C. Carleson, Director of the State Department of Social Welfare) sought a writ of prohibition in this court. This court issued an order to show cause and stayed the superior court proceedings.
Three California statutes are under constitutional attack in the class suit--section 206 of the California Civil Code and sections 12100 and 12101 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
From the 1872 adoption of the Civil Code until 1971, section 206 of theat code declared duties of parental and filial support of 'any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work . . .' The Welfare Reform Act of 1971 amended section 206, expanding the duty of filial support to embrace not merely parents who were 'poor,' but those who are 'in need,' that is, parents who are receiving aid to the aged (OAS).
In its 1872-1971 form Civil Code section 206 provided:
Estate of Preston (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 803, 52 Cal.Rptr. 790 (liability imposed on estate of insane minor for his care in a mental institution); Guardianship of Hicks (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 629, 39 Cal.Rptr. 698 (same).
As amended, section 206 declares: 'It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any person in need who in unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. The promise of an adult child to pay for necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding. A person who is receiving aid to the aged shall be deemed to be a person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work.'
Department of Mental IIygiene v. Kolts (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 154, 55 Cal.Rptr. 437 (liability imposed on spouse of person civilly committed to mental institution); Department of Mental IIygiene v. O'Connor (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 24. 54 Cal.Rptr. 432 (same).
Filial responsibility as a statutory feature of the OAS program did not originate in the Welfare Reform Act of 1971. It has been part of that program since the latter's inception in 1937. One provision of the OAS law, Welfare and Instituions Code section 12100, authorizes a county to maintain a civil action to enforce contributions by a financially able adult child. It descends in unbroken continuity from a demand voiced by the original OAS law of 1937. In 1941 the Legislature adopted the [100 Cal.Rptr. 637] forerunner of present Welfare and Institutions Code section 12101, establishing a relatives' contribution scale which fixed the maximum monthly contributions of the adult child in relation to his income and the number of his dependents. (Stats.1941, ch. 1254, p. 3198.) The 1971 enactments did not amend section 12100, but amended section 12101 by sharply lowering the income point at which the child incurred contribution liability and sharply raising the level of contributions. The amended section appears in the margin.
Former section 2224 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, enacted in 1937, declared: 'If the person receiving aid has within the State a spouse or adult child pecuniarily able to support said person, the board of supervisors shall request the district attorney or other civil legal officer of the county granting such aid to proceed against the kindred in the order of their responsibility to support . . .' (Stats.1937, ch. 369, p. 1094.)
In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204 (liability imposed on parents to reimburse county for supplying minor with court-appointed counsel); In re Shaieb (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 553, 58 Cal.Rptr. 631 (liability imposed on parents for support of minor during hearing of petition of wardship and while minor was ward of the court and was committed to the California Youth Authority); County of Alameda v. Espinoza (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480 (liability imposed on parents of minor made ward of the court and committed to the Alameda County Boys' Camp); In re Dudley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 48 Cal.Rptr. 790 (liability imposed on parent of minor voluntarily committed to state institution as one mentally retarded or deficient); County of Alameda v. Kaiser (1965), 238 Cal.App.2d 815, 48 Cal.Rptr. 343 (liability imposed on parent of emancipated minor treated at a county hospital for physical injuries received in automobile accident).
Welfare and Institutions Code, section 12101, provides:
In support of their position, the majority refer to Penal Code section 270c, enacted in 1909. (Fn. 10.) That section deals with the duty of an adult child to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for an 'indigent' parent, not a parent 'in need' as in Civil Code section 206. This is a fine distinction, but it cannot be ignored. In the Boss case, the Court found it significant, in fact decisive, that Mrs. Boss was 'in need' but not 'poor'.
In their role as real parties in interest, the class-suit plaintiffs contend that these statutes as amended in 1971, deprive them [100 Cal.Rptr. 638] of equal protection of the laws, contrary to article I, sections 11 and 21 of the California Constitution, and contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. They allege that the contribution requirement inflicts grievous and irreparable injury on affected parents and their adult children. They have filed declarations of a number of adult children, some of them elderly, all existing on limited incomes, who have received peremptory contribution demands from county welfare departments. Some of these official communications have included 'suggestions' that the parents leave the OAS rolls. The court fully agrees with the claims of irreparable harm, harshness and economic hardship.
California Constitution, article I, section 11: 'All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.'
In County of San Bernardino v. Simmons (1956), 46 Cal.2d 394, 296 P.2d 329, the Court considered the relative responsibility requirements of the OAS laws and Civil Code section 206 as they then existed. At page 398, the Court said: 'There is nothing in section 206 which suggests an intention to create a liability of the child of poor parents to public agencies which support the parents in accord with their law-imposed duty to pay aid to such parents; the only liability to third persons is in the case of the promise of an adult child expressly referred to in the last sentence of the section.' (Emphasis added.)
Under the relatives' contribution scale emanating from the 1971 California Legislature, an adult child without dependents earning a net monthly income of $351 (after a 25% allowance for taxes and job expenses) must pay $20 to the county which furnishes OAS to his parent. He is permitted to subsist on the remaining $331. A contribution of $25 per month is extracted from a three-member family with a net monthly income of $476. The law promulgated by the 1971 California Legislature permits the three-member family to subsist on the remaining $451. A family of five with a net monthly income of $551 must squeeze out $20 for the parent and exist on the remaining $531.
There is a close correlation between the scale of maximum contributions in the 1971 version of Welfare and Institutions Code section 12101 (fn. 4, ante) and a cost-of-living study issued by the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics estimating a 'lower income' budget for a family of four in West Coast cities based upon spring, 1970 prices. The monthly income left to a family of four under section 12101 hovers in the neighborhood of the 'lower income' family budget estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The budget is austere, making little or no allowance for home ownership, property taxes, college education, automobile liability insurance, contingency and retirement reserves or later inflation.
The Eligibility and Assistance Standards Regulations of the State Department of Social Welfare do not exclude adult children from such liability.
The real parties in interest have also submitted a statement from the Office of Research of the California State Senate estimating that there are in California approximately 750,000 persons who are adult children of the 318,000 elderly citizens receiving OAS assistance.
Affluent adult children have affluent parents or can afford to support their dependent parents. Thus the sharply intensified contribution scale enacted by the 1971 California Legislature strikes most aggressively and harshly at adult children occupying the lower end of the income scale. The enforced shift of subsistence funds from one generation to the other distributes economic desolation between the [100 Cal.Rptr. 639] generations. It galls family relationships. It injects guilt and shame into elderly citizens who have made their contributions to society and have become dependent through life's vicissitudes.
These considerations demonstrate the public significance of the present proceeding, confirm the litigants' need of early decision and justify exercise of the court's original jurisdiction. (Villa v. Hall, 6 Cal.3d 227, 229, 98 Cal.Rptr. 460, 490 P.2d 1148; People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal.3d 480, 492, 96 Cal.Rptr. 553, 487 P.2d 1193.) They do not demonstrate a denial of equal protection evoking the judicial power of invalidation.
II
The members of the court approach their constitutional task with deep concern--convinced of the law's cruel impact upon a selected group of citizens; conscious of the demarcation between legislative power and judicial authority; troubled by decisional ambiguities which, in California, blur that demarcation. The constitutional landscape before us is strewn with semantic sandtraps. Indeed the court finds its members in disagreement stemming from conflicting interpretations of utterances of the California Supreme Court.
When a statute is attacked as discriminatory, the test of validity is substantially the same under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the California Constitution's restriction against special laws. (County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 378, 389, 196 P.2d 773; see also, Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1965) 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321.) Equal protection of the laws permits the state to establish differences in treatment so long as invidious discrimination does not result. (Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 356, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811.) A statute in the field of economics and social welfare may cause some inequality but does not offend equal protection guarantees unless it is arbitrary. (Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers (1959) 358 U.S. 522, 526-527, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480; In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 522, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204.) The Legislature has wide discretion in making statutory classifications. (O'Donnell v. Mullaney (1967) 66 Cal.2d 994, 999, 59 Cal.Rptr. 840, 429 P.2d 160.) Class legislation is not arbitrary if it is based upon some difference or distinction bearing a rational relationship to a conceivably legitimate state purpose. (Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Sail'er Inn v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 16, 95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529; In re Ricky H., supra.) The California Supreme Court has advanced the notion of presumptive validity of legislative classifications. (Whittaker v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 357, 368, 66 Cal.Rptr. 710, 438 P.2d 358; Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 545, 63 Cal.Rptr. 21, 432 P.2d 717.)
In contrast, there are 'suspect classifications' imposing upon selected groups the loss or curtailment of fundamental interests. In the latter case the classification must pass the more rigid constitutional test of a 'compelling state interest.' (See Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600; Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State (1969) 71 Cal.2d 566, 578-579, 79 Cal.Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645.)
In the resolution of equal protection questions, the coverage of a state law is a matter of legislative choice. (Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas (1944) 323 U.S. 32, 35, 65 S.Ct. 9, 89 L.Ed. 25.) Similarly, the California Supreme Court has declared: 'The Legislature is not bound, in order to adopt a constitutionally valid statute, to extend it to all cases which might possibly be reached, but is free to recognize degrees of harm and to confine its regulation to those classes of cases in which the need is deemed to be the most evident.' (Board of Education v. Watson (1966) 63 Cal.2d 829, 833, 48 Cal.Rptr. 481, 484, 409 P.2d 481, 484; see also, In re Ricky H., supra, 2 Cal.3dat [100 Cal.Rptr. 640] pp. 521-522, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204.)
Although the doctrine of judicial abstention is often evoked in adjudicating the validity of economic regulations, it holds sway in the social welfare field as well. In Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, the court rejected an equal protection attack upon a Maryland regulation placing a ceiling on monthly grants to large families under the aid to dependent children program. 'We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure, certainly including the one before us. But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.' (Dandridge v. Williams, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 487, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1162, quoted in Wood v. Public Utilities Com. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 288, 295, fn. 2, 93 Cal.Rptr. 455, 481 P.2d 823.)
Judicial declarations of legislative latitude are more than yardsticks for measuring the validity of individual statutes. They describe the tripartite separation of powers which characterizes American government, national and state. They delineate the boundaries of power and authority between the legislative and judicial branches. 'The boundary of legislative power is situated wherever the judiciary locates a constitutional fence.' (Doyle v. Board of Barber Examiners (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 504, 514, 33 Cal.Rptr. 349, 356.) Whether the case involves the reach of regulatory power or the rationality of statutory classification, judges must rigorously abstain from substituting their own moral, social and economic predilections for the Legislature's.
See Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1966) 65 Cal.2d 349, 358-361, 55 Cal.Rptr. 23, 420 P.2d 735; Allied Properties v. Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1959) 53 Cal.2d 141, 146, 346 P.2d 737. We do not overlook the instances in which equal protection has been offended by rank social economic and political conditions left untended through legislative neglect. In those cases the courts have not hesitated to give life and meaning to the equal protection concept by issuing equity decrees addressed directly to the executive branch. (See, e. g., Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (racially segregated schools); Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (disproportionate legislative representation); Gray v. Sanders (1963) 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (same); Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (disparate public school financing). Here, we face not legislative inaction, but legislative action. Here the charge of discrimination is aimed at affirmative legislative choice. Here the intendments favoring legislative classification furnish the governing standard.
The attack upon the relatives' responsibility statutes rests primarily upon two California decisions: Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, and County of San Mateo v. Boss (1971) 3 Cal.3d 962, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654. In Kirchner the Supreme Court found an invalid classification in a statute requiring adult children to contribute to the support of mental hospital patients. The court held, in effect, that the state had assumed the care of state hospital patients through a publicly financed program; that the cost of institutional care cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class of society; that such an assessment violates the equal protection guaranty, (60 Cal.2d at p. 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.) The court cited judicial precedents finding that legislative classifications by family relationship or by wealth was not reasonably related to the objectives of the particular statutes under attack. (60 Cal.2d at p. 721, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.) Finally, the court signified its belief that expansion of state responsibility through social welfare programs [100 Cal.Rptr. 641] calls for reexamination of former concepts under which public officials chose one relative or another for the imposition of state liability. (60 Cal.2d at p. 722, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.)
County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra rejected on equal protection grounds an attempt to collect support money under the pre-1971 version of the OAS contribution law. Referring to its Kirchner opinion, the Boss decision stated: 'We further noted [in Kirchner] that neither family relationship nor presence or absence of wealth were adequate or rational bases for sustaining a classification.' (3 Cal.3d at p. 967, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 297, 479 P.2d at p. 657.)
The Boss opinion held that a preexisting duty of support provided a rational basis for selecting relatives to bear a disproportionate share of the welfare program's cost. (3 Cal.3d at pp. 967-968, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654.) It characterized the OAS laws as 'a valid state function, the expenses of which must be borne by the state'; moreover, it declared that the state 'may not arbitrarily select one class op persons to bear a disproportionately large part of those expenses.' (3 Cal.3d at p. 968, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 298, 479 P.2d at p. 658.) The court rejected a claim that the pre-1971 version of Civil Code section 206 imposed a preexisting duty of support on the defendant Boss. His mother was in need, hence eligible for OAS, but not poor within the purview of section 206; further, at common law a child had no duty to support his parent; hence, in the absence of a preexisting statutory or common law duty, Boss' inclusion in a class selected to bear a disproportionately large share of the welfare program's cost denied him equal protection of the laws. (3 Cal.3d at pp. 968-969, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654.)
The mother was 'in need' because she fulfilled the criteria of OAS eligibility yet, because of the happenstance that she owned a $31,800 home, was not 'poor' within the meaning of Civil Code section 206. Because of that happenstance the defendant Boss had no preexisting duty of support and was able to claim denial of equal protection.
The Boss decision, it should be emphasized, established an individual's constitutional defense to a contribution claim, but did not invalidate the support provisions of the OAS law. Indeed, the court reserved the question of statutory validity, declaring: 'We express no opinion as to whether the duty of support created by Civil Code section 206 provides a sufficient basis for rational classification of those who are required to pay a larger portion of the expense of providing welfare assistance.' (3 Cal.3d at p. 971, fn. 8, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 300, 479 P.2d at p. 660.)
III
Taking their cue from Kirchner and Boss, the real parties in interest contend that the relatives' responsibility law violates equal protection by forcing upon adult children a disproportionate share of the OAS program's cost; that they had no preexisting duty to support their parents prior to October 1, 1971, when the amended law became operative; that in the absence of a preexisting duty there is no rational basis for selecting them to bear OAS costs beyond those borne by the taxpayers generally.
The argument employs the phrase preexisting duty as a fetish, endowing it with a talismanic quality hardly intended by the Supreme Court. As the majority of this court interpret Kirchner and Boss, a finding of preexisting duty is not the sine qua non of a rational basis for the classification. Nor do Kirchner and Boss arrogate to appellate judges a monopolistic power to negate or affirm a rational basis. The question is not whether the judges agree with the Legislature's reasons for the classification, but whether reasonable persons could act as the Legislature did despite the disagreement of other reasonable persons.
One fact is undebatable. Filial responsibility was not newly spawned by the 1971 [100 Cal.Rptr. 642] amendments to the OAS law. Since its inception in 1937 the relatives' responsibility demand of the OAS law has existed independently of Civil Code section 206. (County of San Bernardino v. Simmons (1956) 46 Cal.2d 394, 398-399, 296 P.2d 329.) It has been a consistent and constant feature of the OAS system.
Thus the present case diverges from Kirchner in a fundamental respect. In Kirchner the state had fully assumed financial responsibility for maintaining mental institutions regardless of the patients' dependency and their children's financial ability. In contrast, the filial responsibility feature of the OAS law supplies a standing limitation on the scope and coverage of the program. By requiring contributions from financially able children, the filial responsibility provisions have withheld partial or full public support from the parents of these children. Ever since its inception, the OAS law has essayed only partial coverage of the state's needy aged. It has never essayed a program fully financed by the public fisc.
Thus the 1971 amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 12101 does not impose upon one group of citizens partial cost of a program fully undertaken by the general taxpayers. In the Boss case, supra, the Supreme Court declared arguendo: 'Since the extension of aid under the provisions of the Old Age Security Law is for broad social purposes and for promoting the public health and welfare, it is a valid state function, the expenses of which must be borne by the state.' (3 Cal.3d at p. 968, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 298, 479 P.2d at p. 658.) As a description of historical fact, the quoted statement is contradicted by the consistent legislative policy of refraining from assumption of the program's full cost. As a constitutional imperative it clashes with the principle that the Legislature is free to recognize 'degrees of harm' and to confine its program to the area of sharpest need. (In re Ricky H., supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 521-522, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204; Board of Education v. Watson, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 833, 48 Cal.Rptr. 481, 409 P.2d 481.) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves the coverage of the state law to legislative choice. (Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas, supra, 323 U.S. at p. 35, 65 S.Ct. 9, 89 L.Ed. 25.) No greater compulsion springs from the comparable provisions of the California Constitution.
IV
Recognition that the OAS law has consistently called for a mixture of public and private financing does not repulse the constitutional challenge. The fact remains that the Legislature has selected the offspring of OAS recipients to bear costs not borne by others. Although the 1971 amendments increased their burden, the selection itself antedated the 1071 amendments. The real focus of inquiry is the continued viability of the private financing imposed upon financially able offspring since 1937.
In Boss the defendant escaped the exaction on the ground that he had no preexisting duty to support his mother, because of the happenstance that she was needy but not poor. (See fn. 9, ante.) Other parents might be both needy and poor, thus depriving their adult offspring of the defense available to Mr. Boss. When the litigation transcends the idiosyncrasies of an individual case and calls for judicial review of legislative choice, the verbal signals of the Boss case lose much of their potency. The core constitutional problem is whether the relatives' responsibility law represents an arbitrary selection or one which bears a rational relation to a conceivably legitimate state purpose.
Adult children's liability to reimburse the counties for OAS assistance to their parents springs from Welfare and Institutions Code sections 12100-12101, not from Civil Code section 206. (County of San Bernardino v. Simmons, 46 Cal.2d at p. 398, 296 P.2d 329.) The latter, nevertheless, is an important factor in seeking a rational basis for sections 12100-12101. Prior to its 1971 amendment, section 206 expressed dual [100 Cal.Rptr. 643] principles of parental obligation and filial obligation toward poor persons. The 1971 amendment expanded these obligations to embrace the needy, that, is, those on the OAS rolls.
Before the advent of the OAS law and quite independently of it, it was recognized that section 206 aimed to relieve the public treasury of the support of persons having financially able parents or children. (Duffy v. Yordi (1906) 149 Cal. 140, 142, 84 P. 838; Radich v. Kruly (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 683, 686, 38 Cal.Rptr. 340; Britton v. Steinberg (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 358, 360, 24 Cal.Rptr. 831; Woolams v. Woolams (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 1, 6, 251 P.2d 392; see also, Ten Broek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 Stan.L.Rev. 257, 283-286 (1964).) Dependency, not a synthetic distinction between poverty and need, is the wellspring of the policy expressed in section 206. In descrying a rational basis for the selection made by the OAS law, the change in the nomenclature in section 206 is not particularly significant.
The policy expressed in section 206 did not flow from the common law but originated in the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. (County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 971, fn. 8, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654; Ten Broek, op.cit., 16 Stan.L.Rev. at pp. 283-312.) That it originated with the British Parliament rather than the British common law courts is relatively unimportant. The statutory policy was transported across the Atlantic to the American colonies, found its way into the statutes of 42 states and was incorporated in the Field Codes of New York and California (Ten Broek, op.cit., 16 Stan.L.Rev. 291-312; Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 Cal.L.Rev. 175 (1955); Comment, 12 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 605, 608, fn. 15 (1965).) The principle of filial support embodied in the Elizabethan law doubtless had antecedents in natural law notions and in traditional moral and religious attitudes. (Ten Broek, op.cit., 16 Stan.L.Rev. at p. 283; Schorr, Filial Responsibility in the Modern American Family, pp. 1-2 (U.S.Dept. of HEW (1960). ) However dim these antecedents, the statutory concept represents a solid, discernible tradition, an expression of public policy extending through the past four centuries of Anglo-American social history.
Viewing its origins in the stratified society of Elizabethan England, reasonable persons might regard section 206 as the embodiment of an obsolescent, undesirable social attitude, inimical to the goals of an open society. Conceivably, it stigmatizes dependency rooted in circumstances beyond the individual's control. The real parties in interest consider it odious. These are policy arguments, not constitutional vices. The California Legislature does not share the disdain felt by some, because it has chosen to expand the concept, not abolish it.
Two other California statutes express substantially the same policy of state-enforced filial support. Penal Code, section 270c, enacted in 1909, imposes a misdemeanor penalty on an adult child who, having the ability to provide his parent with necessities, fails to do so. In 1955 California enacted its own version of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. That act includes Civil Code section 242, which declares in part: 'Every man shall support . . . his parent when in need.' Comparable provisions have been adopted by most of the American states. (See Colby, The 1954 Uniform and Model Acts: A Summary and Analysis, 41 Am.Bar Assn.J. 39, 41 (1955). )
Section 206, then, is a local manifestation of a centuries-old, widely established public policy of enforced filial support. The very existence of this traditional policy furnishes a rational basis for the legislative classification made by the OAS law. In establishing the OAS program, the Legislature was at liberty to hold down the public cost. As recognized by California case law, section 206 was itself an effort to reduce the public cost of dependency. By assuming the burden of supporting [100 Cal.Rptr. 644] needy parents through the OAS program, the state undertook an in loco parentis role. Section 206 had traditionally permitted a dependent parent to sue his children for support. To conserve the expense of the OAS program, the relatives' responsibility law utilized a similar device, in effect subrogating the government to the tradition-supported claim of the parent whose needs it had met.
The legislative choice was neither arbitrary nor unique. Quite aside from the law's artificial contrivances, social custom produces a two-way flow of financial support between the generations, its rise and ebb responding to shifting states of dependency. To conserve the public treasury, organized society transforms this custom into a duty, enforced by legal sanctions, criminal as well as civil. The state stimulates by appropriate sanctions the flow of financial assistance from parent to dependent child. Sanctions which assure the reverse flow from adult offspring to dependent parent represent the reverse of the selfsame policy. (See fn. 9, ante.) That one tradition traces its lineage through the common law, the other through an act of Parliament, is hardly crucial. Publicly enforced filial responsibility is no more unique, no more arbitrary, than publicly enforced parental responsibility. When the state extended support to dependent parents through the OAS program, the relatives' responsibility provisions did no more than embrace an existing principle and add the government to those who might utilize it.
See Schorr, op. cit., pp. 5-8; Shanas and Streib, Social Structure and the Family, pp. 80-81 (1965); Streib Intergenerational Relations: Perspectives of the Two Generations on the Older Parent, Journal of Marriage and the Family, vol. 27, pp. 469-476 (1965).
See Civil Code, sections 196, 205-206, 241-254; Penal Code, section 270; Welfare and Institutions Code, section 11350.
As we view the matter, the 1971 expansion of section 206 to embrace the offspring of persons described as needy was no more than a legislative attempt to meet the constitutional problem described in County of San Mateo v. Boss. After October 1, 1971, the offspring of a needy (but not poor) parent would no longer be able to plead lack of a preexisting duty. The Legislature could reasonably decide that dependency, expressed as need rather than poverty, would provide the impetus for state-enforced filial responsibility. 'The concept may be right or wrong. At least it corresponds to an intelligible belief, and one widely prevalent today among honest men and women. [Citation.] With that our function ends.' (Liggett Co. v. Lee (1933) 288 U.S. 517, 586, 53 S.Ct. 481, 504, 77 L.Ed. 929, dissent of Cardozo, J.)
V
As an intermediate appellate court, we must respect and deal with the Supreme Court's statement in County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d at page 967, 92 Cal.Rptr. at page 297, 479 P.2d at page 657: 'We further noted [in the Kirchner case] that neither family relationship nor presence or absence of wealth were adequate or rational bases for sustaining a classification.' We do not interpret this declaration as a pronouncement of an inelectable principle of constitutional adjudication. In Kirchner (60 Cal.2d at p. 721, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720) the court had described a series of federal and California Supreme Court decisions, all finding economic status and kinship devoid of substantial relation to a particular statutory objective. These invalidations of unrelated statutes do not support the generalization that economic condition and kinship never at any time or under any circumstances furnish a rational basis for any legislative classification whatever.
Interpreted as a generalization of law, the Boss declaration simply doesn't stand up. A wide miscellany of laws impose obligations and sanctions arising from economic status, kinship or both. In footnotes 9 and 12, ante, we enumerated a series of [100 Cal.Rptr. 645] California statutes imposing special burdens arising out of dependency and family relationship. Our inheritance laws are rife with distinctions based on kinship and degrees of kinship. A California statute permits a county to seek reimbursement from a parent for the cost of legal services furnished a minor in juvenile court proceedings. The Supreme Court sustained the statute against equal protection attack in a decision rendered after Kirchner but before Boss. (In re Ricky H., supra, 2 Cal.3d 513, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204.) Viewed liberally, the Boss declaration would nullify the same statute. Viewed literally, the Boss declaration beclouds all laws distributing benefits and burdens by the measures of kinship and economic dependency.
We have adverted to the fundamental doctrine--really an expression of the separation of powers principle--which requires judicial abstention when the legislative branch chooses between competing social interests. To say that equal protection annuls all distinctions based on economic need, all those based on family ties, collides head-on with that principle. The courts should not move by degrees from laissez-faire touching whiskey prices into readiness to veto controversial social welfare policies. There are two levels--no more--for testing statutory classifications. (Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17, 95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529.) In the area of civil liberties and civil rights, the courts are alert to detect 'suspect classifications.' Beyond that, any attempt to verbalize gradations of judicial suspicion only opens a series of entry points for judicial supervention. (Compare majority and dissenting opinions, Wood v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 4 Cal.3d 288, 93 Cal.Rptr. 455, 481 P.2d 823.) We must not enmesh principled constitutional judgments in webs of subjectivity.
See Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control and Allied Properties v. Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control, both cited in footnote 8, supra.
At this point we indulge in a dual paraphrase. In his work, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1970), Professor Alexander Bickel has an analytical chapter on constitutional decisions which he entitles 'The Web of Subjectivity.' In the course of that chapter (p. 81), he quotes Professor Herbert Wechsler's exhortations to 'principled decision.' Elsewhere, Wechsler has said: 'A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and in their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.' (See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 19 (1959), reprinted in Wechsler, Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law (1961).)
For the reasons stated, we interpret the Boss declaration not as a generalization of law but as a summarization, attempting no more than a description of the particular judicial precedents enumerated in the Kirchner case. We therefore decline to apply it as though it were a proposition of law. We hold that Civil Code section 206 and Welfare and Institutions Code sections 12100 and 12101 have a rational relation to a legitimate public objective and do not transgress the equal protection guaranty.
The laws in question being valid, the Superior Court of Sacramento County lacked jurisdiction to restrain petitioner from administering them. (Code Civ.Proc., § 526.) Let a writ of prohibition issue, restraining that court from enforcing its restraining order in Civil Action Number 216141.
JANES, J., concurs.
TAYLOR, Associate Justice (dissenting).
Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
I dissent. I believe that the rules prescribed in County of San Bernardino v. Simmons (1956) 46 Cal.2d 394, 296 P.2d 329; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, and County of San Mateo v. Boss (1971) 3 Cal.3d 962, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654, all unanimous decisions of [100 Cal.Rptr. 646] the California Supreme Court, are sufficiently broad and controlling that this court is obliged, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to hold that Welfare and Institutions Code sections 12100 and 12101, as amended in 1971, are constitutionally invalid as applied to adult children of OAS recipients.
An enumeration of the rules announced or reapplied in County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, shows that the Supreme Court has held:
1. The old age security law is 'a valid state function, the expenses of which must be borne by the state.' (County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 968, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 298, 479 P.2d at p. 658.)
2. 'The effect of imposition of liability under sections 12100 and 12101 is to charge the adult children of recipients of aid to the aged with a disproportionate share of the costs of providing for such aid. Therefore, the imposition of liability under those sections is constitutional only to the extent that there is a rational basis supporting the classification thereby established.' (Id. at p. 969, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 298, 479 P.2d at p. 658.)
3. '[N]either family relationship nor presence or absence of wealth [are] adequate or rational bases for sustaining a classification.' (Id. at p. 967, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 297, 479 P.2d at p. 657.)
4. A preexisting duty of support provides a rational basis for the imposition of liability under sections 12100 and 12101. 'Since the state discharges that duty of support to the extent it provides welfare assistance, it may reasonably seek reimbursement from those whose duty it discharges.' (Id. at pp. 968-969, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 297, 479 P.2d at p. 657.)
5. 'At common law there was no liability on a child to support parents, . . .' (Id. at p. 971, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 299, 479 P.2d at p. 659.)
6. The imposition of liability under sections 12100 and 12101 is a denial of equal protection 'at least where the adult child owes the recipient . . . no duty of support under Civil Code section 206, . . .' (Id. at p. 971, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 299, 479 P.2d at p. 659.)
These rulings narrow the purview of this court's inquiry to the single issue of whether or not Civil Code section 206, as amended in 1971, now provides a 'preexisting duty of support' furnishing a rational basis for the classification established by sections 12100 and 12101.
I
When the Supreme Court concluded that a preexisting duty of support could provide a rational basis for sustaining the classification of sections 12100 and 12101, it meant a legal duty existing prior to the classification, which, in this case, would have been a duty requiring an adult child to support his parents. The preexisting duty must be a duty of support owed by an adult child to his parents which the state discharges by providing aid. It is helpful to note that in the Boss case the Supreme Court approved a line of decisions, decided since Kirchner, imposing liability for the cost of public institutional care 'upon the estate of the recipient of welfare, 1 upon the recipient's spouse, 2 and, where the recipient was a minor, upon his parents, 3 . . . as constitutional. In [100 Cal.Rptr. 647] each of these cases, it was found that the person upon whom liability was imposed owed a preexisting duty of support to the recipient of the public assistance. Since the state discharges that duty of support to the extent it provides welfare assistance, it may reasonably seek reimbursement from those whose duty it discharges. Such a preexisting duty of support provides a rational ground for classification of those who must bear a disproportionate amount of the costs of the welfare program.
'In the case at bench we deal with provisions of the Old Age Security Law rather than with the particular statute involved in the Kirchner case which purported to impose liability upon specified relatives for the care and maintenance of patients in state hospitals. [Citation.] Nevertheless, we think, the principles enunciated in Kirchner clearly apply to the instant case.' (3 Cal.3d at pp. 967-968, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 297, 479 P.2d at p. 657.)
The amendments of sections 12100 and 12101, and Civil Code section 206, here involved, all were part of the 1971 Welfare Reform Act. It is manifest that a duty created by the same statute and at the same time as the classification, cannot 'preexist' and thereby breathe constitutional validity into a statute which, as applied to adult children of OAS recipients, already has been held unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 971, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654.) If there existed no valid duty of an adult child to support a parent 'in need' under the classification made by sections 12100 and 12101 before 1971, as the Boss case held, none came into existence when sections 12100 and 12101 and Civil Code section 206 were simultaneously amended in 1971. 4 I agree with the majority of the court when they say: 'The core constitutional problem is whether the relatives' responsibility law represents an arbitrary selection or one which bears a rational relation to a conceivably legitimate state purpose.' I disagree with the majority in that the Boss case was held sections 12100 and 12101 a denial of equal protection when applied to adult children of OAS recipients where there is no preexisting duty of support, and merely expanding those two sections by amending a third does not change that holding.
II
I respectfully disagree with the majority's ruling that sections 12100 and 12101, as amended in 1071, do not violate the California equal protection clauses. To reach this result they conclude that family relationship and the presence or absence of wealth are an adequate basis for sustaining the classification in question, This conclusion directly contradicts the holding in Kirchner, which was reapplied by Boss in an OAS context, 'that neither family relationship [100 Cal.Rptr. 648] nor presence or absence of wealth were adequate or rational bases for sustaining a classification.' (County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 967, 92 Cal.Rptr. at p. 297, 479 P.2d at p. 657.) The majority of the court also conclude that 'a finding of preexisting duty is not the sine qua non of a rational basis for the classification.' This conclusion also is inconsistent with the holding of the Boss case. (3 Cal.3d at pp. 968, 971, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654.) However graciously, vigorously or convincingly an inferior court may be able to demonstrate the erroneousness of a Supreme Court ruling, that ruling is the law of the state and must be followed. In Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 323, 369 P.2d 937, 939, the Supreme Court phrased the responsibility of courts inferior to it in these words: 'Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of stare decisis makes no sense. The decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed by all the state courts of California . . . Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court. [Citations.]' (See also Miller v. Superior Court (1968) 69 Cal.2d 14, 69 Cal.Rptr. 583, 442 P.2d 663.) In 6 Witkin, California Procedure (2d ed. 1971) section 664, page 4578, the author states the rule in this manner: 'A decision of the highest reviewing court in a state is considered absolutely binding on a trial court or lower appellate court. Hence a Supreme Court decision must be followed by trial judges, courts of appeal and Appellate Departments of the superior court. 'It is not for us to inquire what the law ought to be when the Supreme Court has emphatically informed us what the law is. . . .' [Citations.]' (Emphasis added.) The question before this court is not whether the judges agree with the Legislature's reasons for the classification, and it is not, as a majority of the court believe, whether reasonable persons could act as the Legislature did despite the disagreement of other reasonable persons, but whether this court must apply rules of law enunciated by the Supreme Court.
III
The conclusion of the majority of the court that sections 12100 and 12101 are constitutionally valid is not only improper by reason of its failure to conform to the doctrine of stare decisis, it is also incorrect.
This court had occasion to interpret Civil Code section 206 in Gluckman v. Gaines (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 52, 71 Cal.Rptr. 795, where we said at page 54, 71 Cal.Rptr. at page 797: 'It is to be noted that the obligation imposed by section 206 is upon the children collectively. Although the California Supreme Court in an early case held that where a parent was being supported by certain of her children and there was no threat of a withdrawal of that support, the parent was not entitled to maintain an action against another child for contribution (Duffy v. Yordi, supra, 149 Cal. 140, 84 P. 838), section 206 has more recently been construed to require several children to support the parent in proportion to their abilities to do so respectively. (Britton v. Steinberg, supra, 208 Cal.App.2d 358, 24 Cal.Rptr. 831.) Other jurisdictions have stated the same rule. (See Hansis v. Brougham (1960) 10 Wis.2d 629, 103 N.W.2d 679; Mallatt v. Luihn, supra [206 Or. 678], 294 P.2d at p. 882; Lister v. Sheridan (1962) 33 Misc.2d 650, 226 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234.) Obviously, abilities cannot be measured or an equitable judgment made without a comparison of the net resources respectively of each child to be charged. It is equally obvious that the extent of the liability of the children (individually or collectively) cannot be fixed equitably without weighing the extent of ability against the extent of the parent's needs. A further factor must be taken into consideration. To what extent does [100 Cal.Rptr. 649] the parent have a call morally upon his child--by past treatment and not just by consanguinity? Where an actual abandonment of the child by the parent has occurred, the Legislature by the enactment of Civil Code section 206.5 in 1955 (Stats. 1955, ch. 613, p. 1102) has provided means by which a child can cause all filial support liability to be wiped out. In cases both before and after the enactment of that section the factor of abandonment has been considered. (Duffy v. Yordi, supra, 149 Cal. p. 141, 84 P. 838; Britton v. Steinberg, supra, 208 Cal.App.2d p. 359, 24 Cal.Rptr. 831.) Ill treatment, not amounting to abandonment, while not an absolute defense to a section 206 action may be such 'as to warrant only minimum consideration from a child or anyone else. . . . A child, neglected or abused during minority, may by marriage or otherwise, attain a status of power and wealth. Love, respect, loyalty, devotion and the natural and inevitable desire of a child to recompense a parent for the love, service, support and sacrifice usually lavished by a parent upon a child, cannot be legislated not should the law force a child to make recompense for an assumed standard of upbringing, when a trial court finds on credible evidence that it never existed.' (Radich v. Kruly (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 683, 687, 38 Cal.Rptr. 340, 343.)
'This summary of the law has served its purpose if it has pointed out the many factors which a trial court must consider and weigh in determining whether, or to what extent, a child owes an obligation to support a parent. In making that determination the trial court possesses a wide discretion. (Woolams v. Woolams (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 1, 251 P.2d 392.)'
From this analysis of Civil Code section 206, quoted from Gluckman v. Gaines, supra, it is apparent that the duty of parental support imposed upon a child is indeed a delicate and complex duty which requires weighing and considering many factors. The nature of this duty, which stems from the Elizabethan Pool Law (43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2 (1961)), was not changed by the 1971 amendments to Civil Code section 206. 5 The relatives' contribution scale, with the scanty standards provided by section 12101, cannot be intruded into this area of delicately balanced filial duty and still conform to the requirements of article I, section 11, of the California Constitution that: 'All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation', nor to section [100 Cal.Rptr. 650] 21 which provides, in part, 'nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.' The criteria for establishing a duty under Civil Code section 206 are sufficiently variable and discretionary in nature that the duty cannot be molded into the general relatives' contribution scale promulgated in section 12101. In County of San Bernardino v. Simmons (1956) 46 Cal.2d 394, 396, 296 P.2d 329, 330, the Court said: 'This statute [Civ.Code, § 206] authorizes a 'general action addressed to the equitable powers of the court' by the poor person against the relative. (Tuller v. Superior Court (1932), 215 Cal. 352, 355, 10 P.2d 43.)' (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, the last paragraph of section 12101, as amended, provides that 'Notwithstanding any other provision of this code to the contrary, the provisions of this section and the regulations of the department adopted pursuant thereto shall be the basis for determining the extent of liability of an adult child to contribute to the support of, or defray the cost of any medical care or hospital care and other services rendered to a recipient pursuant to any provision of this code if he is a recipient of aid under this chapter at the time such medical care or hospital care or other services are rendered.' By the terms of this paragraph, an adult child can be held liable for the cost of care provided to his parent in a state hospital for the insane. The imposition of such liability conflicts with the mandate of the Kirchner case where the Supreme Court held that it was a denial of equal protection to impose on adult children the obligation to reimburse the state for the cost of care furnished to their parents in state hospitals for the insane. 6
Under the rulings of the Simmons, Kirchner and Boss cases, I would hold, and I believe this court is constrained to hold, that the imposition of liability on the adult children of OAS recipients under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 12100 and 12101 violates sections 11 and 21 of article I of the California Constitution.
'It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. The promise of an adult child to pay for necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding.'
12101. The ability of an adult child to contribute to the support of a parent shall be determined in accordance with this section.
The director may establish a relatives' contribution scale setting forth the amount an adult child shall be required to contribute toward the support of a parent in receipt of aid under this chapter provided that the schedule established shall not exceed the amounts in the schedule specified in this section. Regulations of the department shall prescribe the criteria, methods of investigation and test check procedures relating to the determination of the maximum amount any adult child may by held liable to contribute toward the support of a parent to the end that the required contribution does not impose an undue hardship upon the adult child and administrative time and effort are not expended on nonproductive investigative activities.
For purposes of this chapter, income of an adult child is defined as the sum of the income constituting the separate property of the adult child, the income (excluding earnings) which is community property subject to the direction and control of the adult child, and the earnings of the adult child but not of his or her spouse.
In computing net income, a flat 25-percent allowance shall be permitted for the cost of personal income taxes, disability insurance taxes and social security taxes, expenses necessary to produce the income, including the cost of transportation to and from work, meals eaten at work, and union dues, and the cost of tools, equipment and uniforms.
A responsible relative who is self-employed shall also be allowed to deduct the expenses necessary for obtaining the income.
The department, in establishing criteria and regulations for the administration of this section, shall provide for consideration of contributions made in kind.
Relatives' Contribution Scale
A. Net monthly income B. Number of persons dependent upon income
1 2 3 4 5 6 or more C. Maximum required monthly contributions $350 or under $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 351"375 20 0 0 0 0 0 376"400 25 0 0 0 0 0 401"425 30 20 0 0 0 0 426"450 40 30 20 0 0 0 451"475 40 30 20 0 0 0 476"500 45 35 25 0 0 0 501"525 50 40 30 20 0 0 526"550 55 45 35 25 0 0 551"575 60 50 40 30 20 0 576"600 65 55 45 35 25 0 601"625 70 60 50 40 30 20 626"650 75 65 55 45 35 25 651"675 80 70 60 50 40 30 676"700 85 75 65 55 45 35 701"725 90 80 70 60 50 40 726"750 95 85 75 65 55 45 751"775 100 90 80 70 60 50 776"800 105 95 85 75 65 55 801"825 110 100 90 80 70 60 826"850 115 105 95 85 75 65 851"875 120 110 100 90 80 70 876"900 125 115 105 95 85 75 901"925 130 120 110 100 90 80 926"950 135 125 115 105 95 85 951"975 140 130 120 110 100 90 976"1,000 145 135 125 115 105 95 1,001"1,025 150 140 130 120 110 100 1,026"1,050 155 145 135 125 115 105 1,051"1,075 160 150 140 130 120 110 1,076"1,100 165 155 145 135 125 115 1,101"1,125 170 160 150 140 130 120 1,126"1,150 175 165 155 145 135 125The maximum required monthly contribution of responsible relatives in one is over one thousand one hundred fifty dollars ($1,150) shall be the amount computed by entering the column of maximum required monthly contribution appropriate to number of persons dependent upon income as shown in the relatives' contribution scale for a net monthly income of one thousand one hundred twenty-six dollars ($1,126) to one thousand one hundred fifty dollars ($1,150) and then adding to the required monthly contribution thus ascertained an additional sum of five dollars ($5) contribution for each and every bracket of twenty-five dollars ($25) net income over and above one thousand one hundred fifty dollars ($1,150), the same as if the relatives' contribution scale were extended by brackets of twenty-five dollars ($25) net income in column A with corresponding step-by-step increases of five dollars ($5) monthly contribution in each column under B and C.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this code to the contrary, the provisions of this section and the regulations of the department adopted pursuant thereto shall be the basis for determining the extent of liability of an adult child to contribute to the support of, or defray the cost of any medical care or hospital care and other services rendered to a recipient pursuant to any provision of this code if he is a recipient of aid under this chapter at the time such medical care or hospital care or other services are rendered.
California Constitution, article I, section 21: 'No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.'
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment: 'No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
The majority also cite Civil Code section 242, which merely begs the question before this court. It provides: 'Every man shall support his with, and his child; and his parent when in need. The duty imposed by this section shall be subject to the provisions of Section[s] . . . 206 of the Civil Code.'
The 1971 amendments to Civil Code section 206 added no provisions which are inconsistent with the interpretations given that section by the Simmons and Gluckman cases. The 1971 amendments changed the recipient of the benefits conferred by section 206 from a 'poor person' t a 'person in need' and defined a 'person in need', but they made no change in section 206 affecting the liability of adult children to third persons or to public agencies. The language supporting the Simmons edict that 'the only liability to third persons is in the case of the promise of an adult child' remained unchanged and intact. It is well settled that 'Parts of an amended statute not affected by the amendment will be given the same construction that they received before the amendment.' (Brailsford v. Blue (1962) 57 Cal.2d 335, 339, 19 Cal.Rptr. 485, 487, 369 P.2d 13, 15.) In such circumstances the Legislature is presumed to have adopted the prior judicial interpretation of language unchanged by the amendment. (People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 355, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33; Summers v. Freeman (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 828, 832, 276 P.2d 131.)
In summary, there is nothing in the new wording of section 206 that changes the old wording so as to negate the Simmons and Gluckman interpretations; they apply equally well to the 1971 wording.