Opinion
No. CV00-0162404
April 28, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The petitioner Earl Capozzi appeals from the October 19, 2000 Decision and Award by the respondent Waterbury Retirement Board ("Board" or "City") in regard to the amount of pension awarded to Capozzi as a retired City of Waterbury employee. The Board awarded Capozzi an annual pension of $46,291.44 and Capozzi appeals claiming entitlement to an annual pension of $48,259.69.
The material facts are not in dispute. Capozzi was an employee of the City of Waterbury continuously for 35 years and a little over 8 months (Appeal, ¶ 2), from February 15, 1965 until October 20, 2000 (Exhibit D-1). Pursuant to Article XVII, Section 2(c) of the 1995-2000 White Collar Contract ("Con-tract"), the 8-plus months of Capozzi's last year of employment is treated as a full year; thus, Capozzi is treated as having worked 36 years. Capozzi is entitled to an additional 2 years pursuant to the Contract's "Golden Hand-shake" provision and an additional 1.92 years (23 months) per the Contract's Article XVII, Section 16 Military Service entitlement. (Exhibits D-1 and D-2). The sum of these numbers is 39.92 years:
Article XVII, Section 2(c) provides:
(c) Effective January 31, 1983, for the purpose of computing the vesting rights of pension benefits (service or disability) prescribed by this Article, the parties specifically agree that, in the computation of these benefits, the 8 months or more of service to the city in the "last" year of employment with the city will constitute one year of service for the purpose of computation of said retirement and/or vesting rights benefits. (See also Section 16 for Military Service credit.)
The city did not initially agree to this analysis but consented to it after oral argument.
Years of Service 36.00
"Golden Hand-shake 2.00
Military Service + 1.92
Sum 39.92
This case presents two issues. The primary issue is whether the fractional share of Capozzi's total service (.92) is included in the pension calculation. Since this is an administrative appeal, the court must answer a slightly different question: Was the Board's decision in awarding Capozzi a service pension without the fractional share unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion. The court answers this question in the negative and finds that the Board properly based its calculation on the 39 full years of service without the inclusion of the additional .92 years.
The second issue in this case is whether the City violated Article XVII, Section 5 and 6 by refusing to include the contractual Top Step Bonus in the pension calculations. We answer this question in the negative as well; the City did not violate said sections. The Board's decision is affirmed.
On October 31, 2000, the petitioner Capozzi filed this administrative appeal, alleging that the Board erroneously awarded him a service pension in an annual amount less than he had claimed. (Appeal, ¶ 1.) The Board filed an answer on December 14, 2000 and return of record on February 22, 2001. On September 4, 2001, the petitioner filed a supplemental return of record.
Section 2709 of the Charter of the City of Waterbury ("Charter") provides: "Any person aggrieved by any decision of said retirement board may, within fifteen days from the date when such decision was rendered, take an appeal to the [Superior Court] for the Judicial District of Waterbury in New Haven County. Notice of such appeal shall be given by leaving a true and attested copy thereof with said retirement board within twelve days before the return date to which such appeal was taken."
On October 19, 2000, the Board rendered its decision in this matter. (Return of Record [ROR], Item 3.) Capozzi subsequently commenced this appeal, dated October 31, 2000, within fifteen days of the Board's decision. On November 1, 2000, the petitioner served notice of the appeal upon the Board within twelve days before the listed return date of November 14, 2000. (Sheriff's return.) The petitioner commenced this appeal in a timely fashion.
This court acts in an appellate capacity and, as such, reviews the record to determine whether the retirement board acted illegally, arbitrarily or in abuse of its discretion. Ferrier v. Pers. Pension Appeals Bd. of the Town of Wallingford, 8 Conn. App. 165, 166-67, 510 A.2d 1385 (1986); see also, Innaimo v. City of Waterbury, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 146439 (August 24, 1999) (D'Addabbo, J.); Battaglia v. Retirement Board of Waterbury, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 123090 (June 5, 1995) (Pellegrino, J.). "An appellate court, in reviewing a decision from a local personnel and pension appeals board, may not adjudicate facts or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the board." CT Page 5537 Ferrier, 8 Conn. App. at 166-67.
"The court's function is limited to the examination of the record to determine whether the ultimate decision was factually and legally supported to ensure that the board did not act illegally, arbitrarily or in abuse of its discretion . . . Without question agency action which is unconstitutional, contrary to law, illegal, or beyond the power granted to the agency is arbitrary, capricious, un-reasonable, or an abuse of discretion." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Downey v. Ret. Bd., 22 Conn. App. 172, 180-81, 576 A.2d 582, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811, 580 A.2d 56 (1990). In order to obtain reversal of an agency's decision, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered "material prejudice as a result of this alleged procedural deficiency." Jutkowitz v. Dept. of Health Services, 220 Conn. 86, 94, 596 A.2d 374 (1991).
FRACTIONAL YEAR ISSUE
After considering Capozzi's application for pension benefits, the Board awarded Capozzi an annual service pension in the amount of $46,291.44. (Appeal, ¶ 4.) The petitioner appeals this pension award, alleging that the Board misapplied the Contract provisions to his pension calculation.
Capozzi argues that the Contract provisions override the City of Waterbury Charter ("Charter") provisions in regard to the amount of his pension. (Appeal, ¶ 6e.) Specifically, Capozzi argues that Article XVII, Section 16 of the Contract, which deals solely with the computation of military service credit, requires that pension benefits be paid in fractional amounts even though the Charter refers to the pension being paid for "each completed year of service."
In response, the retirement board argues that it did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion in setting the plaintiff's years of service at thirty-nine years for purposes of calculating petitioner's pension benefit because it applied standard criteria in rendering its decision. Specifically, the Board asserts that it only calculates pension benefits on whole years as required by the City Charter, not fractional years.
The petitioner's claim raises an issue of statutory interpretation arising out of the relationship between the Charter and Contract provisions. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . ." Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 741, 785 A.2d 197 (2001). Thus, this process requires us to consider all relevant sources of the meaning of the language at issue, without having to cross any threshold or thresholds of ambiguity. Thus, we do not follow the plain meaning rule.
"In performing this task, we begin with a searching examination of the language of the statute, because that is the most important factor to be considered. In doing so, we attempt to determine its range of plausible meanings and, if possible, narrow that range to those that appear most plausible. We do not, however, end with the language." State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577-78 (2003).
We begin our analysis with the text of the Charter. Section 2756 of the City Charter requires that "[a] pension shall be paid to each such regular participant . . . for each completed year of service." (Emphasis added.) Based on this provision the Board calculates the amount of the pension, as opposed to the employee's entitlement to the pension, based upon "completed years of service." According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary the term "completed" means "1: to bring to an end and especially into a completed state 2a: to make whole or perfect b: to mark the end of c: execute, fulfill 3: to carry out successfully." The phrase "completed years of service" suggests, therefore, that the calculation of the pension benefit shall be based only on completed years of service, not fractional years as claimed by the plaintiff.
A similar claim was presented to the United States Court of Claims in Cooper v. United States, 81 F. Sup. 734 (1943). The plaintiff, a United States Court of Claims district judge for the District of Puerto Rico, retired under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 375g, after serving 13 years, 7 months and 11 days. The relevant section provided that after serving 10 years the judge was entitled to a pension based upon his "aggregate years of service." Cooper's pension was based on 13 years of service; he brought suit claiming that his pension should have included the 7 months and 11 days. The Cooper court defined the issue as whether "aggregate years of service means the number of complete[d] years which he had served." Id. at 734. The court upheld Cooper's claim and stated that fractional parts of the year should be included unless the statutory language specifies that the benefit be calculated on the basis of "complete years." In the case at hand, the Charter language is clear and specific. It refers to "each completed year of service."
In fact, the petitioner does not challenge the meaning of "completed years of service" as set forth in the Charter. Instead, petitioner argues that the Contract language overrides such Charter language. Article XVII, Section 3 of the Contract provides that, "the parties further agree that the Charter provisions relating to pension benefits . . . as prescribed by Chapter 27 of the said Charter of the City of Waterbury, will remain in full force and effect and will remain unaffected by the provisions of this Article XVII unless any sections hereof specifically detail and prescribe a pension benefit . . . which is contrary to a charter provision." Petitioner argues that Article XVII Section 16 of the Contract, the military service provision, "specifically detail[s] and prescribe[s] a pension benefit" and contradicts the Charter provision that requires pension benefits to be paid "for each completed year of service."
Section 16 provides, "[T]he parties have agreed on a formula for crediting military service time as "years of service" with the City for the purpose of an employee's entitlement to service pension or vesting rights benefit . . . For purposes of this section one "year of service" (for purposes of computing years of employment with the City for a service pension or vesting rights benefits as aforesaid) shall be equal to twelve complete months of military service. An employee may purchase no more than five years of "years of service" credit for the time spent by the employee in the military service. Also an employee may purchase all, or a portion, of his military service credit up to five years of credit as aforesaid." (Emphasis supplied.)
The first sentence of Section 16 states that military service shall be credited "for the purpose of an employee's entitlement to service pension." This language must be compared with the relevant language of Section 2756 of the Charter: "A pension shall be paid . . . for each completed year of service." This comparison suggests that the City has properly distinguished between "entitlement to service pension" and "pension amount paid." Although Section 16 does provide that military service credits are to be calculated by using months of military service, military service credits are part of the calculation utilized for determining an applicant's "entitlement" to service pension. The actual payable amount of the total pension is based on "completed years of service" as specified in the Charter. That is, military service is utilized to determine an employee's length of service with the city and therefore his entitlement to a pension, while the amount of the actual pension is calculated by reference to completed years of service.
Finally, there is no evidence that the Retirement Board deviated from the procedure that was applied in previous cases. The Board's decision in awarding Capozzi a service pension without the fractional share was not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion. Downey, 22 Conn. App. at 180-81.
TOP STEP BONUS ISSUE
This case presents a secondary issue: Did the City violate Article XVII, Section 5 and 6 by refusing to include the contractual Top Step Bonus in the pension calculations?
The petitioner argues that according to Article VI Section 2 of the Contract, and a memorandum issued by the Comptroller's office, the Board was required to include the Top Step Bonus in his pension calculations. Specifically, the petitioner argues that his rate card indicates that he reached Step 41-8 as of July 1, 1998. Article IV states "the Top Step Bonus shall be paid on the increment date beginning one year after the employee reaches Step 8." A 7% pension contribution deduction was deducted from his gross weekly pay of January 8, 2000, including the Top Step Bonus. Thus, he continues, "it is clear that the Top Step Bonus . . . must be included . . . in Mr. Capozzi's gross pay for the year 2000." (Petitioner's September 25, 2001 Memorandum of Law at 9-10.)
The Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration answered this "Top Step Bonus" issue on January 22, 2003 in the Matter of City of Waterbury and Waterbury City Employees Association. The discussion and award of such decision follows:
The contract language is quite clear as to what is to be included in the definition of regular annual pay for purposes of calculating pension benefits. If the parties wanted to include the Top Step Bonus in the calculations, it would have done so by including it in the definition. It is obvious that it was not included and no mistake was made. Since the Top Step Bonus is not included in the calculations, there should not be any deduction from it for purposes of contributing to the pension plan. It certainly was not the intent of the parties to deduct seven (7%) of the Top Step Bonus from an employee and have no benefit go to the employee . . . The City did not violate Article XVII, Sections 5 and 6, by refusing to include the contractual Top Step Bonus in pension calculations. To this extent the grievance is denied. However, the City shall cease and desist from deducting a percentage of the Top Step Bonus from an employee for contributions to the pension plan. The City shall refund any such past deductions to any affected employee.
The court believes that the decision by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration fully resolves the issue in this case. Accordingly, the court finds that the top step bonus is not to be included in the calculation of regular annual pay for the purpose of computing plaintiff's pension benefit.
For the foregoing reasons, the respondents' October 19, 2000 Decision and Award to petitioner of an annual pension in the amount of $46,291.44 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
HOLZBERG, J.