Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 143732
RAYE, J.Defendant Oroville Union High School District (District) hired plaintiff Robert F. Cann as a high school teacher. Cann, who had been issued a specialized teaching credential, held a full-time position for the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 school years. At the beginning of the 2006-2007 school year, the District was informed that Cann had failed to complete certification requirements and his preliminary full-time credential would expire September 1, 2006. In response, the District reduced Cann’s teaching assignment.
Following the completion of his credential requirements, Cann demanded a return to full-time status and thereafter filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order requiring the District to recognize his right to a full-time position and salary and awarding back pay. The trial court denied the petition. Cann appeals, arguing the court erred in upholding the District’s actions regarding his classification and salary. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District hired Cann as a 1.0 FTE (full-time equivalent) probationary teacher for the 2004-2005 school year. Cann held a preliminary designated subject vocational education teaching credential allowing him to teach full time in only the subject areas of computer assisted manufacturing, drafting occupations, and computer applications.
Cann held a 1.0 FTE position during the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 school years. Cann reported for duty on August 14, 2006, the first day of paid service of his third complete, consecutive school year. The District gave Cann a split assignment: an 0.40 FTE at one school and an 0.60 FTE at another school, which together equaled a 1.0 FTE assignment.
In August 2006 the District personnel office was informed by the Butte County Office of Education that Cann had not completed the “Level I” requirements, causing his preliminary full-time credential to expire on September 1, 2006. The Level I requirements were necessary to keep Cann’s credential valid and in good standing.
On August 14, 2006, Cann met with several District officials, including personnel director Deana Fallen. The District officials informed Cann that he could not continue to teach with an invalid credential. Cann chose to apply for a part-time credential that allowed him to teach no more than an 0.60 FTE assignment.
Fallen sent Cann a memorandum directing him to continue in a full-time (1.0 FTE) capacity until September 1, 2006. On September 1, 2006, 19 days into the 2006-2007 school year, the District removed Cann from his 0.40 FTE assignment and reduced his teaching load to 0.60 FTE.
On March 12, 2007, Cann completed the Level I requirements necessary to reinstate his full-time credential. The parties dispute when the District became aware of the change in Cann’s credential status. Cann continued to teach in the 0.60 FTE capacity for the 2007-2008 school year.
Though not critical to the outcome of this appeal, the District asserts it was not provided a copy of Cann’s full-time credential until it was served with his writ petition.
On December 5, 2007, Cann’s counsel contacted the District, asserting Cann’s right to full-time status. In June 2008 Cann filed a petition for writ of mandate. Cann’s remaining 0.60 FTE position was abolished by a reduction in force (RIF) in the spring of 2009.
The trial court, in denying the petition, noted that Cann knew or should have known he had not completed the Level I credential requirements when he returned for the 2006-2007 school year. Since Cann failed to properly maintain his full-time credential, the District was prohibited by Education Code sections 44830 and 45034 from allowing him to continue in a full-time position and paying him a full-time salary.
All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.
The court further found that because Cann’s full-time credential was reinstated in the middle of the school year, he was not entitled to a full-time position upon reinstatement of his full-time credential. In addition, the District was not obligated to create a full-time teaching assignment for Cann. The court determined Cann’s part-time assignment was not a de facto layoff, but the result of his failure to maintain his full-time credential in good standing. Following entry of judgment, Cann filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
In reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a writ of mandate under the abuse of discretion standard (Ohton v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 749, 766), we determine whether the findings and judgment of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence (Stryker v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 324, 329). On issues of law, we review the court’s determinations de novo. (Abbate v. County of Santa Clara (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1231, 1239.)
There is no dispute that Cann was ineligible for full-time employment during the 2006-2007 school year. Section 44830, subdivision (a) states, in part: “The governing board of a school district shall employ for positions requiring certification qualifications, only persons who possess the qualifications therefor prescribed by law.” In addition, “No order for a warrant... shall be drawn in favor of any person employed in a position requiring certification qualifications, unless such person is at the time the holder of a proper certification document in full force for the full time for which the requisition or warrant... is drawn....” (§ 45034.)
Consonant with the foregoing language, the trial court found Cann “failed to properly maintain his full-time credential as of September 1, 2006 and thus the District was prohibited by law pursuant to Education Code section 44830 from allowing him to continue in a full-time position, and by Education Code section 45034 from paying him a full-time salary.”
During oral argument, the trial court ascertained that the course work required would take a semester to complete and could not be completed before September 1, 2006.
It is also undisputed that his ineligibility was a product of his own failure to complete course work necessary to comply with Level I credentialing requirements. However, the question raised by the appeal concerns the effect of the subsequent reinstatement of Cann’s credential and his renewed eligibility for a full-time teaching assignment. Cann is correct in observing that this question is not resolved by simple reference to sections 44830 and 45034.
According to Cann, his failure to complete course work merely rendered his full-time credential “unusable” as of September 1, 2006. But the mere fact his credential was temporarily unusable does not negate his right to resume a full-time assignment immediately upon reinstatement of his full-time credential. In support, Cann relies on Shields v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 955 (Shields).
In Shields, a permanent tenured teacher’s teaching credential was suspended for 10 years as part of a settlement. Under the terms of the settlement, the teacher’s credential would be completely restored after the suspension period. (Shields, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at pp. 957-958.) The District informed the teacher of its intention to terminate his employment due to the suspension and underlying allegations of misconduct. The District also told the teacher that he was not entitled to a hearing under section 44934 et seq. because he no longer possessed a valid credential. (Shields, at p. 958.)
The trial court granted the teacher’s petition for writ of mandate and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court concluded: “Nowhere in the comprehensive statutory scheme pertaining to school district employees is permanency, with its attendant rights and duties, affected by a suspended credential.” (Shields, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 962.) Accordingly, section 44934 et seq. required that the District hold a hearing prior to termination.
In making this assessment, the court noted that during the suspension period the teacher could not provide any service to the District requiring a valid credential and could not be paid during the period of his suspension. (§§ 44330, 44355, 45034.) The court concluded, “While an individual whose credentials are suspended cannot perform the duties of a classroom teacher during the period of suspension, that individual is still a permanent employee. The fact Shields was required to temporarily surrender his teaching credential during its suspension did not result in the relinquishment of his permanency or employment status.” (Shields, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 959-960.)
Cann argues his situation is akin to that of the teacher in Shields: “In both cases, a tenured teacher held a credential which was temporarily unusable. Subsequently the... [D]istrict attempted to eliminate or reduce the teacher’s position without according him any due process. Accordingly, since under Shields a tenured teacher has the right to resume employment once his or her credential is valid again, ... Cann must have had the right to resume his full 1.0 FTE teaching load once his Full-Time Credential was valid again. Since Cann’s credential was revalidated as of March 12, 2007, he was entitled to resume a full-time teaching assignment.”
The facts and legal principles set forth in Shields bear little resemblance to the present case. In Shields, the district moved to terminate a tenured teacher whose credential had been temporarily suspended. Here, the District modified Cann’s teaching load as required by section 44830. The District did not claim Cann was not a permanent employee, nor did it terminate Cann’s employment. Moreover, Shields did not hold that when a tenured teacher’s credential becomes valid that teacher must be returned to a full-time assignment. That issue was not before the court.
Thus, Shields offers little support for Cann’s argument that once he obtained permanent status “[b]y law, he was entitled to tenure in a full-time, 1.0 FTE assignment, and was entitled by law to resume that assignment once he had completed the Level I requirements needed to reactivate his credential.”
Teacher tenure is governed by section 44929.21, which states, in part: “(b) Every employee of a school district of any type or class having an average daily attendance of 250 or more who, after having been employed by the district for two complete consecutive school years in a position or positions requiring certification qualifications, is reelected for the next succeeding school year to a position requiring certification qualifications shall, at the commencement of the succeeding school year be classified as and become a permanent employee of the district.”
The District does not dispute that Cann became tenured at the beginning of the 2007-2008 school year. However, the District disagrees with Cann’s assertion that his tenure mandates his assignment as a full-time employee.
Under section 44929.21, subdivision (b), Cann became permanent, or tenured, at the beginning of the 2006-2007 school year. However, 19 days into that academic year, Cann became ineligible to teach full time and the District reduced his teaching assignment accordingly. Nothing in section 44929.21 mandates that the District, once Cann’s full-time credential was restored, immediately return him to full-time status.
As the trial court observed, “Petitioner’s current part-time assignment is the result of his failure to maintain his full-time credential in good standing and his subsequent receipt of a part-time credential and acceptance of a part-time position.” Caught in a predicament of his own making, Cann was not entitled to a full-time position upon reinstatement of his full-time credential in the middle of the school year, nor was the District obligated to create a full-time teaching assignment for him.
Under Cann’s reasoning, the District must at all times be prepared to immediately reinstate a tenured teacher who has completed the requirements to reinstate a lapsed credential. This places an undue burden on the District, which can never know with certainty when, or even if, a tenured teacher will reinstate a lapsed credential. The District must cover the teaching duties the teacher cannot meet without the proper credential and then rehire the teacher whenever the requirements are met. It makes no sense to impose such a burden, which is due solely to the teacher’s failure to comply with the credential requirements.
II
Cann also faults the trial court’s findings that his part-time assignment did not constitute a de facto layoff and Cann was not entitled to a layoff hearing. Cann argues that if the District “wishes to dismiss a tenured teacher, eliminate particular kinds of services, or reduce the teaching load of a teacher, it must comply with specific provisions of the Education Code.”
Cann cites a December 14, 2007, letter from the District’s counsel, stating: “There is not sufficient student enrollment/interest to offer additional sections in these designated subjects at this time.” Cann reads this statement as an admission by the District that it was not restoring Cann to his full-time position because of a lack of student enrollment, in essence a layoff.
An RIF of teachers is governed by Education Code sections 44949 and 44955. Section 44955 outlines the two grounds for an RIF: reduction in average daily attendance, or a Board of Education-ordered reduction in services. A teacher must receive notice of a preliminary RIF and may request a hearing under the Administrative Adjudication Act. (Educ. Code, § 44949, subd. (a), (b); Gov. Code, § 11500 et seq.)
When the District offered Cann the only teaching assignment authorized by his part-time credential, it was not based on a reduction in attendance, but on an effort to comply with section 44830. Nor does the letter Cann cites from the District, explaining there was not sufficient enrollment, support his assertion that he was laid off. After Cann completed the requirements to reinstate his full-time credential, the District provided an explanation as to why he would not be teaching full time in the middle of the academic year. We agree with the trial court’s assessment that the District did not subject Cann to a de facto layoff.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The District shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
We concur: SIMS, Acting P. J., NICHOLSON, J.