Opinion
2001-01835
Submitted November 2, 2001.
November 26, 2001.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff wife appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Ponterio, J.), dated August 30, 2000, which denied her motion, in effect, for reargument and, sua sponte, enjoined her from intitiating any action or making any motions for claims arising from the matrimonial action without permission of the appropriate administrative judge.
Jennifer Cangro, Staten Island, N.Y., appellant pro se.
Lifshutz, Polland Hoffman, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Elliot R. Polland of counsel), for respondent.
Before: GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, J.P., WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, ANITA R. FLORIO, THOMAS A. ADAMS, JJ.
ORDERED that the plaintiff's notice of appeal from so much of the order as, sua sponte, enjoined her from initiating any action or making any motions is treated as an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted (see, CPLR 5701[c]); and it is further,
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order as denied the motion, in effect, for reargument is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see, CPLR 2221; Ramilo v. 32-78 80 Steinway St. Realty, 256 A.D.2d 505; Rivera v. Cambridge Mut. Ins. Co., 136 A.D.2d 688); and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly enjoined the plaintiff from initiating any action or making any motions based on claims arising from the matrimonial action without the prior permission of the appropriate administrative judge (see, Mancini v. Mancini, 269 A.D.2d 366; Berson v. Berson, 265 A.D.2d 439, 440; Matter of Shreve v. Shreve, 229 A.D.2d 1005).
KRAUSMAN, J.P., FRIEDMANN, FLORIO and ADAMS, JJ., concur.