Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0139
05-22-2014
ERNIE CAMPOS, A SINGLE MAN, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. JOE A. CAMPOS AND ELEANOR ARBOLIDA, HUSBAND AND WIFE, Defendants/Appellants.
Thompson, Montgomery & DeRose, Globe By Jerry B. DeRose Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Marc C. Cavness, Phoenix Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Gila County
No. CV201300026
The Honorable Robert Duber II, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Thompson, Montgomery & DeRose, Globe
By Jerry B. DeRose
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Marc C. Cavness, Phoenix
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Brammer concurred. KELLY, Presiding Judge:
The Hon. J. William Brammer, Jr., a retired judge of this court, is called back to active duty to serve on this case pursuant to orders of this court and the supreme court.
¶1 Joe Campos and Eleanor Arbolida appeal from the trial court's judgment determining that Ernie Campos is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession of certain real property and that Joe and Eleanor own a remainder interest in the property but have no right to possession or use during Ernie's lifetime. Joe and Eleanor argue they are the owners in fee simple and retain a right of cotenancy with Ernie during his lifetime. We affirm.
The final judgment did not expressly state that a counterclaim filed by Joe and Eleanor was denied, but the parties have stipulated that the judgment "denied all claims and counterclaims not specifically addressed therein." And we agree the judgment necessarily resolved all claims.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's judgment. See Lewis v. Pleasant Country, Ltd., 173 Ariz. 186, 188, 840 P.2d 1051, 1053 (App. 1992). In 2006, Manuel Campos deeded the subject property to his son Ronald. Later that year, Manuel filed an action against Ronald challenging the validity of that conveyance. Pursuant to a settlement agreement in that case, Ronald executed a deed in 2007 "granting life estates" to his brother Ernie and to Manuel. The deed provided, in relevant part, as follows:
Ronald executed two deeds: one in July 2007 and a "corrective" deed in November 2007, redacting certain language. That amendment is not relevant to our analysis and we discuss only the language of the later deed.
I, [Ronald] Campos, . . . hereby convey to:
Manuel Campos, . . . for his lifetime; and to Ernie Campos, . . . for his lifetimea co-tenancy life estate under which each of the above named grantees may, for his lifetime, occupy as a co-tenant with grantor and/or grantor's invitees, the real property . . . .
The life estate granted by this instrument is personal to the grantee, and shall not be assigned, sold, or transferred. It does not relieve the grantee during any occupancy of the obligation to contribute a proportionate share of the utilities, property taxes and insurance upon said premises.
¶3 Manuel died in 2008, and Ronald died in 2011. Ronald's will devised all his property (except listed personal property) to his brother Joe, the appellant here. In 2011, Joe and Eleanor moved onto the property. In 2012, in his capacity as the personal representative of Ronald's estate, Joe transferred the real property to himself (and later to himself and Eleanor) "[s]ubject to the co-tenancy life estate of Ernie Campos . . . to occupy as a co-tenant with Joe A. Campos, his invitees or assigns."
There is conflicting evidence regarding the date of Ronald's death, which occurred in either 2010 or 2011.
¶4 In 2013, Ernie filed this quiet title and ejectment action, alleging Joe and Eleanor's remainder interest in the property was subject to his exclusive right to possession of the property until his death. In response, Joe argued the 2007 deed had "retained for [Ronald], his heirs and successors . . . a co-tenancy right" during Ernie's lifetime. At trial, the court considered the language of the 2007 deed and a transcript from the proceeding during which the parties had agreed to execute the deed as part of their settlement. It determined that, by executing the 2007 deed, Ronald had intended "the three family members, Ron[ald], Manuel and Ernie, would have co-equal rights of possession[,] but it was neither anticipated nor intended" that Ronald could transfer or devise his right to occupy the property during his lifetime. The court concluded that Ernie was entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession of the real property during his lifetime, and that Joe and Eleanor owned the remainder interest. This appeal followed.
Discussion
¶5 Joe and Eleanor argue, as they did below, that the 2007 deed "created co-tenancy life estates in Manuel and Ernie, and retained for [Ronald] and his successors all remaining rights as fee owner, including the right of co-tenancy with the life estate owners." Therefore, they contend they own the property "in fee, burdened only by Ernie's lifetime right of co-tenancy."
¶6 We apply rules of contract interpretation to the interpretation of deeds, and our primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the parties. Scalia v. Green, 229 Ariz. 100, ¶ 19, 271 P.3d 479, 483 (App. 2011); see also Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 148, 153, 854 P.2d 1134, 1139 (1993) (primary purpose to determine and enforce intent of parties at time contract made). To determine intent, we look first to the plain meaning of the words in the context of the deed as a whole. See Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 222 Ariz. 588, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1045, 1050 (App. 2009). However, we also may consider extrinsic evidence of intent if the deed is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation suggested by the proponent of that evidence. See Long v. City of Glendale, 208 Ariz. 319, ¶¶ 27-28, 93 P.3d 519, 528 (App. 2004); see also Taylor, 175 Ariz. at 154, 854 P.2d at 1140 (court need not find ambiguity before considering extrinsic evidence of intent).
¶7 We review the interpretation of a contract de novo. Grosvenor, 222 Ariz. 588, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d at 1050. And whether a contract is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation is a question of law. Id. However, determining the contracting parties' intent may require factual findings. Chopin v. Chopin, 224 Ariz. 425, ¶ 7, 232 P.3d 99, 102 (App. 2010) (intent of contracting parties "question of fact left to the fact finder"); see also In re Estate of Lamparella, 210 Ariz. 246, ¶ 21, 109 P.3d 959, 963 (App. 2005) (determining contracting parties' intent from extrinsic evidence "may require fact finding"); cf. In re Estate of Pouser, 193 Ariz. 574, ¶ 11, 975 P.2d 704, 709 (1999) (testator's intent better determined as question of fact if will reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations). In this case, we review the trial court's interpretation of the deed de novo, but acknowledge that its conclusion was based, at least in part, on a factual finding of the parties' intent as expressed to the court during settlement proceedings. We defer to that determination unless it is clearly erroneous. John C. Lincoln Hosp. & Health Corp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 208 Ariz. 532, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 530, 535 (App. 2004).
¶8 The record supports the trial court's determination that Ronald intended to preserve for himself an inalienable right to possess the property during his life and a remainder in fee after the expiration of Manuel's and Ernie's life estates. During the settlement proceedings, the parties agreed that Manuel and Ernie would have the right to "live in the house as co-tenants with Ron[ald]." Manuel's counsel described the life estates by stating: "They own it; Manuel his life estate and Ernie has his life estate and Ron[ald] then when they pass away." Ronald's counsel clarified Ronald would retain a "present interest and remainder interest," and described the present interest as "the right to live there while his dad and brother are still alive." Manuel's counsel then added, "When Ernie and Manuel die and [sic] property will be Ron[ald]'s, but he still has his interest only. Ron[ald] does that so he can live there." Both parties agreed those statements accurately summarized the intended agreement.
¶9 The parties' articulation of the intended agreement is consistent with the trial court's interpretation of Ronald's interest: a right to live in the house during his life and a remainder interest when both Ernie and Manuel have died. And their descriptions are inconsistent with Joe and Eleanor's argument that Ronald had intended to retain his fee interest, rather than dividing it into present and remainder interests. The parties expressly contemplated a separate remainder interest effective upon Ernie's and Manuel's deaths, implying Ronald's present and remainder interests were or could be separated by intervening interests. See 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estates § 417 (2014) (life estate and remainder merge into fee simple unless intervening life estates or contrary to intent). Therefore, the court did not err by finding "it was neither anticipated nor intended" that Ronald would have the authority to transfer his right to occupy the property with Manuel and Ernie during their lifetimes. John C. Lincoln, 208 Ariz. 532, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d at 535.
¶10 As the trial court noted, the 2007 deed stated Manuel and Ernie had the right to "occupy [the property] as a co-tenant with grantor and/or grantor's invitees." It made no mention of co-tenancy with Ronald's successors or devisees. Based on the deed's language and the court's finding regarding the parties' intent—which is consistent with the deed's language—the court did not err by concluding Ernie is entitled to exclusive possession during his lifetime, subject to the conditions set forth in the judgment. Scalia, 229 Ariz. 100, ¶ 19, 271 P.3d at 483.
Joe and Eleanor argue the judgment "eliminates the limitation of the corrective deed that Ernie's co-tenancy is for his personal use only, converting a personal right to an alienable life estate." To the extent we understand this argument, it reiterates their objection to the form of judgment below, in which they argued the judgment should include the deed language providing that Ernie's life estate is personal, cannot be transferred, and does not relieve him of any obligation to contribute to expenses. Because the final judgment includes that language, we do not address their argument further.
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Disposition
¶11 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Ernie requests his attorney fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1103(B). In our discretion, we grant the request upon his compliance with Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.