Opinion
December 2, 1940.
January 6, 1941.
Negligence — Degree of care — Telegraph companies — Wires suspended over public highways.
1. In maintaining its wires, the care to be exercised by a telegraph company should be commensurate with the peril inherent in the situation. [104-5]
2. Where a telegraph company had constructive notice that its wire sagged over a public road in such way as to interfere with lawful highway travel, failure to remove it was a breach of duty to such travelers. [105]
Argued December 2, 1940.
Before SCHAFFER, C. J., MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN and PATTERSON, JJ.
Appeals, Nos. 270, 265-269, Jan. T., 1940, from judgments of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1939, Nos. 56-61, affirming judgment of C. P. Potter Co., Dec. T., 1937, No. 4, in cases of William Campbell v. Western Union Telegraph Co.; John J. Breen v. Same; Raymond M. Solis v. Same; Charles C. Proctor v. Same; Harry L. Woodcock v. Same, and James Dustin v. Same. Judgments affirmed.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before LEWIS, P. J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court, reported in 139 Pa. Super. 553.
Verdicts and judgments for plaintiffs. Defendant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the judgments of the court below. Appeals were allowed to the Supreme Court.
Errors assigned, among others, related to the dismissal by the Superior Court of various assignments of error.
George H. Hafer, with him Arthur H. Hull, of Snyder, Hull, Leiby Metzger, Berger Sinon and Francis R. Stark, General Solicitor, for appellant.
Paul Cauffiel, for appellees.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court from which these appeals come: 139 Pa. Super. 553, 12 A.2d 816.
Appellant complains that its motions for binding instructions and judgment n. o. v. were refused; the charge is not complained of. In the argument in this Court appellant contends that the Superior Court "applied the test of extraordinary care, required of companies maintaining wires carrying a dangerous current, to a telegraph company whose wires do not carry such current and to whom the logic of the rule relating to carriers of dangerous currents is inapplicable." We do not so understand the decision. The principle applied was simply that "the care to be exercised . . . should be commensurate with the peril inherent in the situation." Whether that measure of care was exercised may vary with the circumstances.
There was sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury of constructive notice that the wire sagged over the public road in such way as to interfere with lawful highway travel; failure to remove it was a breach of duty to such travelers.
The judgments are affirmed.