Opinion
NO. 14-16-00218-CR
04-18-2017
CHARLES CAMPBELL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 230th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1448297
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Charles Campbell challenges his conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance on the grounds that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
Background
Houston Police Department Sergeant Anthony Turner arrived at an apartment complex located in Harris County, Texas, in response to a weapons-disturbance emergency call. Turner was initially directed to the wrong apartment, but as he drove around the complex, a female, covered in blood and hysterical, approached his patrol vehicle. She directed him to an apartment and told him her assailant was still inside. Turner called an ambulance to help the woman and radioed for back-up. Turner believed that the injured woman had been shot. Two other officers arrived, Officer Cedric Ardoin and Officer Curtis Mayfield. Turner and Ardoin proceeded to the apartment identified by the injured female. Mayfield remained with the injured woman. Approaching the apartment, Turner and Ardoin observed a blood trail on the stairs leading to the apartment door. Turner and Ardoin did not know whether the alleged perpetrator, or more victims, were inside the apartment.
The officers knocked and announced themselves. Appellant answered the door. Although he initially resisted orders to show his hands and step outside, the officers displayed their weapons and "talk[ed] him out of the apartment." Mayfield detained appellant by placing him in the back of a patrol car, in handcuffs, while Turner and Ardoin entered the apartment, following a trail of blood. The officers also detained and handcuffed a female who was inside the apartment.
Turner and Ardoin conducted a protective sweep of the apartment, looking for any others who may have been involved in the disturbance. As the officers cleared one of the bedrooms, they saw, in plain view on top of a dresser, a jar containing a white chalky substance. Next to the jar, they observed some money, a scale, and a receipt bearing what officers later discovered was appellant's name. Turner stated it was "immediately apparent" to him that the white substance in the jar was cocaine; Ardoin believed that the white substance in the jar was crack cocaine. The officers did not seize the cocaine at that moment because they intended to finish their protective sweep of the apartment. Ardoin also saw two guns in plain view in the bedroom closet; again, the officers did not immediately seize the guns because of the ongoing protective sweep.
After the officers cleared and secured the apartment, they determined that appellant was not the injured female's assailant and removed appellant's handcuffs. Although the injured woman had told the officers that her assailant was in the apartment, the officers did not find the assailant at the scene.
Ardoin spoke with appellant, who told him that he had been present in the living room and bedroom of the apartment before the officers arrived. Appellant also volunteered that, for the preceding two months, he was staying in the bedroom where the officers saw suspected cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and money on the dresser. Mayfield entered the apartment and took photographs. He also field-tested the substance in the jar, and it tested positive for cocaine. Ardoin returned to the apartment and took custody of the jar containing the white substance. Appellant claimed the money found on the dresser and asked Ardoin to return it to him. Ardoin gave appellant the money taken from the dresser. According to Ardoin, appellant denied that the cocaine was his. After speaking with the District Attorney's office, Ardoin arrested appellant for possession of a controlled substance.
Before speaking with appellant, Ardoin did not inform appellant that the officers had seen a substance they suspected was cocaine in the bedroom.
The District Attorney charged appellant by indictment for the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance weighing more than four grams and less than 200 grams.
At appellant's trial, Turner, Ardoin, and Mayfield testified to the above sequence of events. In addition, controlled-substance analyst Brook Knapp from the Houston Forensic Science Center verified that the substance contained in the jar taken from the apartment was cocaine. She also testified that the cocaine, including adulterants and dilutants, weighed 27.51 grams.
Appellant testified in his defense. He stated that he was in the living room of the apartment with a woman named Jasmine when he overheard an argument between another male and female. He saw the female, who he identified as "Key," making a phone call and leaving the apartment. He saw the male, who he identified as Taylor Hicks, "grabbing [Key's] stuff and throwing it out the front door." According to appellant, Jasmine went into the bedroom and closed the door. Appellant waited on the couch because he saw police cars coming. When the officers arrived at the door, he opened the door and talked to them. Appellant claimed that he tried to tell the officers that Hicks, the person who had assaulted Key, was gone and that he (appellant) had not done anything. Although appellant recognized the photographs taken from his bedroom, he said he had never seen the jar containing cocaine, scale, or money. Appellant acknowledged that there was a receipt with his name on it on the dresser. He denied that he asked the officers for the money and claimed that Ardoin put it in his pocket.
Appellant testified that he had been in the bedroom a few hours before the police came to the scene, and that Hicks had a brother who also stayed in that room. Appellant acknowledged that, for about two months, he had lived in the apartment and slept in the bedroom where the cocaine was found. He also admitted that the receipt found on the dresser was his. However, he denied that the cocaine was his.
After hearing the evidence described above, the jury convicted appellant of possession of a controlled substance—cocaine—weighing more than four grams and less than 200 grams, including any adulterants and dilutants. After a punishment hearing, the jury assessed appellant's punishment at five years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict, and this appeal timely followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Appellant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that he possessed the cocaine.
A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
Reviewing courts apply a legal-sufficiency standard in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under this standard, we examine all the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360; Criff v. State, 438 S.W.3d 134, 136-37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). This standard applies to both direct and circumstantial evidence. Criff, 438 S.W.3d at 137. Accordingly, we will uphold the jury's verdict unless a rational fact finder must have had a reasonable doubt as to any essential element. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); West v. State, 406 S.W.3d 748, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref'd).
To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must establish that the accused exercised care, control, or management over the contraband and knew the substance was contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Possession may be proven through direct or circumstantial evidence, but the evidence must establish that the accused's connection with the substance was more than merely fortuitous. Id. at 405-06.
If an accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the contraband is discovered, we must examine the record to determine whether there are additional independent facts that "affirmatively link" the defendant to the contraband. Id. at 406. "An affirmative link generates a reasonable inference that the accused knew of the contraband's existence and exercised control over it." Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). A non-exclusive list of relevant factors that help guide our affirmative links analysis include: (1) the accused's presence when the search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the accused's proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the accused was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the accused possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the accused made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the accused attempted to flee; (8) whether the accused made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia was present; (11) whether the accused owned or had the right to possess the place where the contraband was found; (12) whether the place where the contraband was found was enclosed; (13) whether the accused was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Olivarez, 171 S.W.3d at 291). The affirmative-links analysis, however, is qualitative, not quantitative. The number of factors indicating a sufficient affirmative link between the defendant and the contraband is not dispositive. Instead, it is "the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial" that controls our analysis. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162, 166.
With this analytical framework in mind, we consider the evidence linking appellant to the cocaine in this case.
B. Affirmative Links
Our review of the record establishes the following facts viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Appellant was in the apartment when the police arrived. The officers found the jar containing the cocaine in plain view on a dresser in the bedroom. The officers observed drug paraphernalia—a scale with white powder on it—next to the cocaine in the bedroom. Additionally, the officers collected $155 in cash on the dresser next to the cocaine and scale. The officers also discovered two guns in plain view in the bedroom closet. Finally, the officers found a receipt with appellant's name on it next to the cocaine and scale.
Appellant admitted he was staying in the room where the cocaine, scale, money, and guns were found. Appellant acknowledged that he had lived in that room for the preceding two months, although he also testified that Hicks's brother sometimes stayed in the room. According to Officer Ardoin, appellant claimed that the money next to the narcotics was his. Appellant also acknowledged that the receipt found on the dresser was his. Appellant, however, testified that he told Ardoin the money was not his, but Ardoin nonetheless put the money in appellant's pocket while he was handcuffed. Appellant admitted he had been in the room earlier that day, as had at least one other person.
This evidence establishes that appellant was present when the search was conducted; the cocaine was in plain view; appellant easily could have accessed the cocaine; appellant incriminated himself by acknowledging that he had been in the bedroom earlier that day; other drug paraphernalia—as well as two guns—were found in appellant's bedroom; appellant had the right to possess the place where the cocaine was found; the cocaine was in an enclosed space; and appellant claimed that the money found near the cocaine was his. Thus, this evidence supports factors (1), (2), (3), (6), (10), (11), (12), and (13) above. We conclude that the logical force of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, affirmatively links appellant to the cocaine. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 (individual factors not as important as logical force of evidence examined as a whole). Further, the jury, having observed appellant's testimony and demeanor, was entitled to reject appellant's contrary, self-serving testimony that the cocaine did not belong to him or that the money found in the bedroom was not his. See id. at 166.
See Torres v. State, 466 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (fact that appellant was present during search weighs slightly in favor of linking appellant to contraband).
In evaluating this factor, we note that the contraband does not have to be in the defendant's view at the time it is seized. See id. Instead, the question is whether the accused would have had occasion to see the contraband. Id. (finding it "notable" that the appellant's wallet was on the living room table where some contraband was found; "jury reasonably could have inferred that appellant had had the opportunity to see the contraband, despite the fact that he was in the bedroom when officers entered the house"). In the present case, a receipt with appellant's name on it was found beside the cocaine, scale, and money on the dresser in the bedroom. From this evidence, as well as the evidence that the cocaine was found in appellant's bedroom, the jury reasonably could have inferred that appellant had the opportunity to see the contraband.
See id. (concluding that because house was small, even though the appellant was in a different room from where the contraband was found, he was in close proximity and easily could have accessed it).
See id. (drug paraphernalia and several guns were discovered in the house); see also Olivarez, 171 S.W.3d at 291-92 (drug paraphernalia found in house).
See Oivarez, 171 S.W.3d at 291 (appellant informed officers he had right to possess house).
See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 165 (appellant's possession of $160, combined with evidence that appellant did not have a job and was sitting near contraband, had some "slight probative value" in connecting appellant to care or custody of contraband).
Though appellant argues that $155 is not a "large amount of cash," the amount of money found in appellant's room is not so small as to prevent the jury from relying upon it as probative evidence linking appellant to the cocaine. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 165 (holding that $160 had slight probative value in linking defendant to possession of contraband).
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a jury rationally could have concluded that appellant exercised care, control, or management over the contraband and knew the substance was contraband. Id. at 164-66; Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405; Torres, 466 S.W.3d at 332-34.
We overrule appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Denial of Motion to Suppress
Appellant asserts in his first issue that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the warrantless search of the apartment.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The trial court is the sole finder of fact and is free to believe or disbelieve any or all of the evidence presented at a suppression hearing. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that depend on credibility and demeanor.
By contrast, we review de novo the court's application of the law to the facts, because resolution of those ultimate questions does not turn on the evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We view the evidence on a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. Whether we infer fact findings or consider express findings, we uphold the trial court's ruling under any applicable theory of law supported by the facts of the case. Alford v. State, 400 S.W.3d 924, 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). With this standard in mind, we turn to the issue presented in this case.
B. Application
The trial court entered its findings on the record at the suppression hearing, finding that the officers entered the apartment and seized the evidence under the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement and the "plain view" doctrine.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of individuals to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Tex. Const. art 1, § 9. Thus, a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). But, a warrant is not required if the State shows that exigent circumstances justify the search. Id.
Appellant did not specify in the trial court whether he sought to suppress the evidence under the Fourth Amendment or the Texas Constitution, although he cites both provisions on appeal. But "article 1, section 9 grants no greater protection in this area than does the Fourth Amendment." Hillsman v. State, 999 S.W.2d 157, 163 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). Thus, we need not undertake a separate state constitutional analysis. Id.
To validate a warrantless search based on exigent circumstances, the State must satisfy a two-step process. Id. First, there must be probable cause to enter or search a specific location. Id. In the context of warrantless searches, probable cause exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a person of reasonable prudence to believe the instrumentality or evidence of a crime will be found. Id. Second, an exigency must exist that requires an immediate entry to a particular place without a warrant. Id. There are three categories of exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless intrusion by police officers: (1) providing aid or assistance to persons whom law-enforcement officers reasonably believe are in need of assistance; (2) protecting police officers from persons whom they reasonably believe to be present, armed, and dangerous; and (3) preventing the destruction of evidence or contraband. Id. If the State does not adequately establish both probable cause and exigent circumstances, then a warrantless entry will not withstand judicial scrutiny. Id.
Further, as a result of executing a warrantless search under exigent circumstances, officers, in certain instances, may seize evidence of other criminal acts that may not have formed the original basis of probable cause to enter the premises, such as incriminating evidence in plain view. See State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Under the "plain view" doctrine, evidence observed in plain sight lawfully may be seized when law enforcement officials have "a right to be where they are" and it is "immediately apparent" to the officers that the items may be evidence of a crime or contraband. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Keehn, 279 S.W.3d at 335. And, seizing items in plain view does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment's protections because "[i]f an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy." Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 541; see also State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Appellant concedes and we conclude that the officers legally entered the apartment under the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and that the cocaine was in plain view. At the time the officers entered the apartment, they were acting under the reasonable belief that the individual who assaulted Key was inside the apartment. At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that they were unaware whether there were other victims inside the apartment who might be in need of aid. Additionally, they believed that Key's assailant, possibly armed, was inside the apartment and posed a danger to the officers or others. Thus, the initial entry into the apartment was justified under the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Rothstein v. State, 267 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd) (probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into home when officers arrived in response to burglary-in-progress call, no one answered front door, and back door had been kicked in; officers authorized to enter without warrant to determine if burglars still were inside or if there were victims needing assistance). The officers also testified that they saw the jar containing the white, chalky substance in plain view when they entered appellant's bedroom; both Turner and Ardoin testified that they believed the substance in the jar was cocaine. The officers therefore lawfully could have seized the items in plain sight. SeeWalter, 28 S.W.3d at 541.
Appellant urges that the exigent circumstances had expired once the apartment was secured, and, thus, the officers should have obtained a warrant to reenter and seize the evidence. However, several courts of appeals, including this court, have addressed this specific issue and rejected a similar argument on comparable facts. Appellant acknowledges that, in those cases, the courts of appeals have held that when items were in plain view during a valid initial entry, officers may reenter the home later without a warrant to seize or photograph the evidence they saw initially. See Carmen v. State, 358 S.W.3d 285, 294 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd) (once privacy of a residence lawfully has been invaded during an exigency, no requirement to obtain warrant for other officers to enter and complete what officers on the scene properly could have done as long as the search is no more intrusive or expansive than the initial search); Rothstein, 267 S.W.3d at 375-76 (subsequent entry to seize contraband already in plain view during exigent-circumstances search was incidental to valid continuation of initial search); Shoaf v. State, 706 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, pet. ref'd) (picking up, tagging, or preserving items was administrative duty incidental to original entry).
Appellant suggests that "once police officers have observed an item in plain view during an exception to the warrant requirement and they do not immediately seize that item, . . . they [should] be required to obtain a warrant prior to reentering the residence to seize the item." But, appellant cites no authority for his position, and asks us to contravene existing authority, cited above, standing for the opposite proposition. Indeed, "the lawfulness of a search is not determined by the number of times that officers cross the threshold. Rather, it is whether the officers are engaged in objectively reasonable conduct under the circumstances." Johnson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
In this case, there is no evidence that the officers on the scene conducted anything more than a quick search of the apartment to locate any other victims or the perpetrator of the assault. See Rothstein, 267 S.W.3d at 375. Ardoin and Turner saw the cocaine in plain sight in appellant's bedroom; the subsequent entry to photograph the scene and seize the contraband in plain view was incidental to the valid continuation of the initial search. See id.; see also Carmen, 358 S.W.3d at 294; Shoaf, 706 S.W.2d at 175.
In sum, the trial court heard the testimony of Turner and Ardoin and concluded that the deputies did not conduct an unlawful search of the apartment. Based on the record, the trial court reasonably could have determined that the officers' conduct was reasonable under the circumstances and that seizure of the cocaine and related items did not offend the Fourth Amendment. See Rothstein, 267 S.W.3d at 375; see also Johnson, 226 S.W.3d at 445. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress.
We overrule appellant's first issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled both of appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Kevin Jewell
Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Brown and Jewell.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).