Opinion
No. CV05 4003399S
October 27, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT
On April 1, 2005, the plaintiff, Takiyah Campbell, filed a one-count complaint against the defendants, Francis Rosa and Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. (Coca-Cola). This action arises out of injuries allegedly sustained by Campbell as a result of a motor vehicle accident on July 8, 2003, between her and Rosa. At the time of the accident, Rosa was operating a motor vehicle owned by Coca-Cola and was an agent or employee of Coca-Cola. In count one Campbell alleges negligence against Rosa and Coca-Cola.
On August 19, 2005, Campbell filed a request for leave to amend her complaint and attached and amended complaint that added a claim for property damage resulting from the motor vehicle accident. On August 22, 2005, Rosa and Coca-Cola filed an objection to Campbell's request. On August 26, 2005, Campbell filed a reply to Rosa and Coca-Cola's objection. Rosa and Coca-Cola then filed a sur-reply to the objection on August 29, 2005.
DISCUSSION
Practice Book § 10-60 permits a party to "amend his or her pleadings or other parts of the record or proceedings at any time . . . (3) [b]y filing a request for leave to file such amendment, with the amendment appended." "While our courts have been liberal in permitting amendments . . . this liberality has limitations. Amendments should be made seasonably. Factors to be considered in passing on a motion to amend are the length of the delay, fairness to the opposing parties and the negligence, if any, of the party offering the amendment. The motion to amend is addressed to the trial court's discretion which may be exercised to restrain the amendment of pleadings so far as necessary to prevent unreasonable delay of the trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 849, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). "[W]hile an amendment that corrects a minor defect relates back to the date of the CT Page 13355-aq original complaint, one stating a separate cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Palazzo v. Delrose, 91 Conn.App. 222, 226, 880 A.2d 169 (2005).
In the present case, Campbell requests leave to amend her complaint to add a property damage claim arising from the same motor vehicle action as the personal injuries claim. Campbell alleges in her amended complaint that she incurred property damages to her motor vehicle, and, therefore, the claim relates back to the original cause of action. Rosa and Coca-Cola object to Campbell's request for leave to amend her complaint because they maintain that the action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in General Statutes § 52-584.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has "recognized that our relation back doctrine is akin to rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part: (c) RELATION BACK OF AMENDMENTS. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading . . . The policy behind rule 15(c) is that a party, once notified of litigation based upon a particular transaction or occurrence, has been provided with all the notice that statutes of limitations are intended to afford." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 547, 590 A.2d 914 (1991).
"An amended complaint, if permitted, relates back to and is treated as filed at the time of the original complaint unless it alleges a new cause of action . . . A cause of action must arise from a single group of facts . . . To relate back to the institution of the action the amendment must arise from a single group of facts . . . A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief . . . A right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff, and an invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which establish the existence of that right and that delict constitute the cause of action . . . An amendment may properly expand or amplify what had originally been alleged in support of the cause of action . . . A change in the allegations of liability, therefore, does not necessarily amount to the introduction of a new cause of action . . . Where an entirely new and different factual situation is presented, however, a new and different cause of action is stated." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jonap v. Silver, 1 Conn.App. 550, 555-56, 474 A.2d 800 (1984). CT Page 13355-ar
"The case of Mccray v. Stimpson, [Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 0191271 (February 20, 1986, Berdon, J.) ( 1 CSCR 177)], held that property damage is merely an additional injury and does not constitute a new cause of action . . . [T]he Mccray court stated that `it has always been the law of this state, as stated by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, that personal injuries and property damage arising out of the same negligent act, constitute but one cause of action.' In McCray, it was ruled that the statute of limitations had not run as to the property damage amendment, since it arose out of the same allegedly negligent act(s) upon which the personal injury action was initially premised." (Citation omitted.) Durand v. TMC Manufacturing, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 91 0396077 (June 20, 1994, Mulcahy, J.) ( 11 Conn. L. Rptr. 641). In addition to Durand and McCray, several Superior Court cases have permitted the plaintiff's requests to amend the complaint to add a property damage claim arising out of the same motor vehicle accident where previously only personal injuries were alleged. See Williams v. Miclette, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 96 0136221 (November 10, 1999, Gill, J.) ( 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 166); Linger v. Derusha, Superior Court, judicial district at Hartford, Docket No. CV 93 0524104 (March 13, 1995, Corradino, J.).
In support of their objection to the amended complaint, the defendants cite to DiPiro v. Chapin, 24 Conn.Sup. 174, 188 A.2d 504 (1963). DiPiro, relying on Falis v. Dawson, 22 Conn.Sup. 472, 474, 175 A.2d 191 (1961), granted a defendant's motion to strike to prohibit the plaintiff from using a substituted complaint to add a claim for property damages four and a half years after the accident occurred. In Linger, Judge Corradino, discussed the DiPiro decision and stated that "[i]n any event, I do not agree with Falis. It refers to an article in [the American Law Reports] and adopts what the article says is clearly the minority position. It still appears to be the minority position . . . DiPiro merely cites Falis. Also, both of these cases appear at odds with the old Connecticut case of Seger v. Barkhamstead, 22 Conn. 290, 295, which appears to accept the majority view that a single act causing simultaneous injury to the person and property of an individual constitute a single cause of action." Linger v. Derusha, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 93 0524104.
In the present case, the amended complaint seeks to add a claim for property damage arising out of the same set of facts as the original complaint, that is, the motor vehicle accident seeking monetary damages as a result of the personal injuries. The plaintiff is not adding a new cause of action. Since the property damage claim arose from the same set of facts, the amended complaint relates back to the original date of the CT Page 13355-as complaint and should not be barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the defendants have not argued in their objection that they have or will suffer any prejudice if the court permits the plaintiff to amend her complaint.
"Technical reasons and reasons of fairness do not offer any grounds for the court to ignore the liberal policy as to amendments so that the amendment to the complaint is permitted." Linger v. Derusha, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 93 0524104. Accordingly, the statute of limitations has not run because the amendment relates back to the original filing of the complaint and this court allows the plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint. CT Page 13355-at