Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority

Full title: OSCAR CAMACHO, Plaintiff v. PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

Date published: Dec 22, 2004

Civil 01-1681 (JAG) (JA) (D.P.R. Dec. 22, 2004)

Opinion

Civil 01-1681 (JAG) (JA).

December 22, 2004

OPINION AND ORDER

JUSTO ARENAS, Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the court on motion to dismiss filed by defendant Puerto Rico Ports Authority's (hereinafter "PRPA") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 59.) Plaintiff Oscar Camacho (hereinafter "Camacho") filed a response in opposition to PRPA's motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 64.) The PRPA then filed a reply to Camacho's opposition. (Docket No. 67.) After considering the arguments of the parties and for the reasons set forth below, PRPA's motion to dismiss will be GRANTED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Camacho brought the present action pursuant to, inter alia, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Camacho's principal allegation is that the PRPA discriminatorily terminated his harbor pilot license on account of his age. The PRPA has denied liability claiming that its decision to revoke Camacho's license was based on Puerto Rico law, specifically 23 P.R. Laws Ann. § 2406 which provides that "[e]very license shall automatically expire on the date in which the pilot reaches seventy (70) years of age." The PRPA has also maintained throughout the proceedings that as the agency that regulates and licenses harbor pilots it does not qualify as Camacho's employer for purposes of the ADEA.

In an opinion and order issued on March 26, 2003, I granted in part and denied in part PRPA's motion for summary judgment.Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth., 254 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.P.R. 2003). I specifically found that the PRPA was Camacho's employer for purposes of the ADEA inasmuch as the level of control exercised by that agency over the daily functions of harbor pilots resulted in a de facto employer/employee relationship under common law agency principles. Id. at 227. Additionally, I ruled that the harbor pilot's mandatory license expiration under Puerto Rico law was the equivalent of a mandatory retirement plan prohibited by the ADEA. Id. at 229. Finally, I denied PRPA's motion for summary judgment concluding that there was a factual controversy regarding the issue of whether the mandatory license expiration could be upheld as a bona fide occupational qualification. Id. at 230.

Subsequently, the PRPA sought a certification of immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Agreeing with the PRPA that my determination as to employer status was a controlling issue of law as to which there were grounds for substantial disagreement, and finding that resolution by the court of appeals would greatly benefit the final disposition of the case, I granted the request for certification. Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth., 267 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175-76 (D.P.R. 2003). The PRPA then filed its petition requesting permission to appeal which the court of appeals granted on August 14, 2003. (See court of appeals docket No. 03-8012.)

In a published opinion issued on May 21, 2004, the First Circuit reversed my determination on the issue of the PRPA's status as Camacho's employer. Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth., 369 F.3d 570 (1^st Cir. 2004). The court of appeals held that under the circumstances of this case, no de facto employment relationship existed. Id. at 572. Consequently, the court of appeals ruled that Camacho's ADEA claim cannot be maintained.Id. at 578 ("Because the lower court erred in holding that the Authority is a de facto employer of the harbor pilots, Camacho's ADEA claim necessarily founders.").

Following the court of appeals' decision, the PRPA filed the present motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 59.) In it, the PRPA contends that because the First Circuit held that the agency cannot be considered Camacho's employer for ADEA purposes, the latter's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Camacho filed a response in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 64.) He claims that the court still has federal jurisdiction over the case by virtue of a global jurisdictional allegation set forth in the amended complaint which reads as follows: ". . . and such other laws as are promulgated by the Unite States relative to discrimination relative to work and labor practices. . . ." (Amended Complaint, Docket No. 5, at 2, ¶ 7.) According to Camacho, a statute relevant to the claims asserted against the PRPA was found during discovery giving this court federal question jurisdiction over his claims. Camacho argues that the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq., which imposes the obligation not to discriminate by reason of age in programs or activities receiving federal funds, is a further jurisdictional basis for his claims, thus precluding dismissal. Finally, it is Camacho's position that fairness and judicial economy dictate that the court retain jurisdiction over his state-law claims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a litigant to move for dismissal of an action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under the rule is not appropriate "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (footnote omitted). In ruling upon a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true all the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.Perry v. New England Bus. Serv., Inc., 347 F.3d 343, 344 (1^st Cir. 2003) (citing Beddall v. State St. Bank Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 16 (1^st Cir. 1998)). The complaint should only be dismissed if it appears that, under the facts alleged, the plaintiff cannot recover under any viable theory. Campagna v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 334 F.3d 150, 154 (1^st Cir. 2003) (citing Nethersole v. Bulger, 287 F.3d 15, 18 (1^st Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, plaintiff must present "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory."Romero-Barceló v. Hernández-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 28 n. 2 (1^st Cir. 1996) (quoting Gooley v. Mobile Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1^st Cir. 1988)). Even though all inferences must be construed in favor of the plaintiff, the court need not give weight to "bald assertions, periphrastic circumlocutions, unsubstantiated conclusions, [and] outright vituperation. . . ." Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1^st Cir. 1997) (quotingCorrea-Martínez v. Arrillaga-Beléndez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1^st Cir. 1990)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The First Circuit's opinion holding that there can be no employment relationship between harbor pilots and the PRPA, undoubtedly precludes Camacho's ADEA claim. Consequently, he must persuade the court that there is another basis for federal jurisdiction for his complaint to survive. He attempts to do so by relying on the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq. (hereinafter "ADA") which prohibits age discrimination by entities receiving federal financial assistance. According to Camacho, although the complaint does not specifically plead a cause of action under the ADA, the same is assertedly covered by the catch all jurisdictional allegation stated in the amended complaint. Said allegation reads as follows: "This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this law suit [sic] by virtue of . . . and such other laws as are promulgated by the United States relative to discrimination relative to discrimination relative to work and labor practices. . . ." (Docket No. 5, at 2, ¶ 7.) Nevertheless, even if the court were to accept Camacho's contention that his amended complaint has properly alleged a claim under the ADA,¹ such cause of action cannot be maintained for the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, thus depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction.² I explain.

1 Apparently, the PRPA has admitted in its answers to a request for admissions that it is the recipient of federal funds. (See Docket No. 64, Ex. I.)

2 Additionally, it is questionable at best that Congress intended to create a private right of action for monetary damages with the enactment of the ADA. See Tyrrell v. City of Scranton, 134 F. Supp. 2d 373, 383 (M.D. Pa. 2001).

Section 303 of the ADA provides in pertinent part that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 6102. However, there is a requirement that a plaintiff exhaust the administrative remedies set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 6104 ³ and 45 C.F.R. 90.50 before bringing an action under the ADA. Curto v. Smith, 248 F. Supp. 2d 132, 145 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). The court in Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (E.D. Pa. 1990), enumerated the requirements laid out in 42 U.S.C. § 6104 and 45 C.F.R. § 90.50. It was stated that administrative remedies are exhausted if:

3 "No action . . . shall be brought . . . if administrative remedies have not been exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e)(2)(B).

180 days have elapsed since the complainant filed a complaint before the relevant federal funding agency and the agency has made no finding, or if, whatever the interval, the agency has found in favor of the complainant. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(f); 45 C.F.R. § 90.50(a). Moreover, before filing the action in federal court, the complainant must give thirty days' notice by registered mail to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, the head of the granting agency, and the grant recipient. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 90.50(b)(3)(iii). This notice must state the alleged violation of the ADA, the relief requested, the court in which the action shall be brought, and whether attorney's fees will be demanded if the plaintiff prevails. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 90.50(b)(3)(iv).

Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F. Supp. at 1221.

Since neither Camacho's amended complaint nor his memorandum of law mention whether administrative remedies were exhausted in this case, it follows that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the ADA. See Belcher v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 48 F. Supp. 2d 729, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1999). Without the ADA, there is no other federal statute or constitutional provision under which Camacho could ground his federal jurisdiction argument. Therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the present case. See Simmons v. Middle Tenn. State Univ., No. 95-6111, 1997 WL 400105, at *3 (6^th Cir. July 11, 1997) (unpublished); see also Curto v. Smith, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 145. The only question remaining for resolution is whether the court will assert jurisdiction over Camacho's state-law claims.

B. State-Law Claims

Camacho's final attempt to avoid dismissal comes in the form of a request to the court to exercise its discretion and retain supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law causes of action. In his memorandum in opposition to the PRPA's motion to dismiss, Camacho argues that judicial economy and fairness must be taken into account in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over his state-law claims. He further contends that dismissal of state-law claims is not warranted inter alia because: the case has been before the court for almost five years; discovery is complete; the PRPA unreasonably delayed the case by failing to comply with its discovery obligations; and given Camacho's age, the delay and prejudice that will be caused by having to litigate these matters in state court will prevent a fair and rapid adjudication of the issues.

It is well-settled law that "[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1367, `[a] district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction' if `the district court has dismissed all claims under which it has original jurisdiction." González-De-Blasini v. Family Dep't, 377 F.3d 81, 89 (1^st Cir. 2004); see also Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd., 375 F.3d 99, 104-05 (1^st Cir. 2004). "Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs., 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). "[I]n the usual case in which all federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Rodríguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1^st Cir. 1995) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988)). This is such a case. Therefore, having dismissed all federal claims before trial, the court will not retain jurisdiction over Camacho's supplemental state-law causes of action.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, PRPA's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the case is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk will enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED.