Opinion
Cause Number: 2:05-CV-456 JVB.
August 1, 2008
OPINION AND ORDER
A. Background of the Case
Longtime Mayor Robert Patrick's re-election campaign against George Pabey was riddled with much animosity. State courts invalidated Mayor Pastrick's initial victory because of vote fraud, and another election was staged in which Pabey prevailed. On April 22, 2005, shortly after the change in administration, Plaintiff Blanca Camacho, then an inspector in the City of East Chicago's Health Department, was terminated from her job. Believing that the new leadership retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights, she sued the City, Mayor Pabey, and Director of the Department of Human Resources Fred Vasquez, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In particular, the Plaintiff claims that she was fired for supporting Mayor Pastrick and for associating herself with another high-ranking member of his administration, Councilman Joe DeLaCruz. The Defendants responded to her lawsuit by claiming that they terminated her as part of the city-wide employee layoff aimed at cutting the City's expenses. The case was tried to the Jury, who returned a verdict for the Plaintiff against the City and Fred Vasquez in the amount of $225,000 in compensatory damages and against Fred Vasquez in the amount of $25,000 in punitive damages. The Jury found no liability against Mayor Pabey.
Before the case was submitted to the Jury, the Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 for a directed verdict. Rule 50 allows a court to enter judgment as a matter of law when the motion is first offered or to reserve judgment on the motion until after a jury has returned its verdict. The Court took the second approach, and it will now address the Defendants' motion.
B. Standard under Rule 50
A judgment as a matter of law is granted when "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). "[T]he standard for granting summary judgment `mirrors' the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that `the inquiry under each is the same.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986)). In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of that party. NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994); Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1440 (7th Cir. 1992). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead it must ask whether any reasonable jury could have found that the Plaintiff was terminated for exercising her First Amendment rights. Cf. Appelbaum v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dist., 340 F.3d 573, 578-579 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying the standard in age discrimination lawsuit).
C. Discussion
In their motion, the Defendants City of East Chicago and Vasquez argue three points: (1) there was no probative evidence that any decision maker had knowledge of the Plaintiff's past political affiliation, support for the previous administration, or political activities; (2) there was no probative evidence that any decision maker fired the Plaintiff for her past political affiliation, support for the previous administration, or political activity; and (3) the evidence is uncontroverted that the person who made the decision to terminate the Plaintiff, Dr. Paula Benchik-Abrinko, was completely non-political and had no knowledge of the Plaintiff's politics or political activity. The Plaintiff disagrees with each contention and argues that there was sufficient trial evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise.
The Defendants' contentions boil down to two questions: (1) did the Plaintiff engage in constitutionally protected conduct; and (2) was the conduct a substantial or motivating factor in firing her. See Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346, 357 (7th Cir. 2005) (analyzing First Amendment claims in the context of freedom of speech). As to the second question, the Defendants bear the burden of justifying the Plaintiff's discharge. See id. The Jury found the Plaintiff's exercise of her First Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor in terminating her from employment with the City. Therefore, the Court must determine whether the verdict is reasonable in light of the evidence introduced at trial.
(1) Constitutionally Protected Conduct
The Plaintiff presents two examples of her being engaged in constitutionally protected conduct: her campaigning door-to-door on behalf of Mayor Pastrick and displaying his campaign sign in her front yard; and her association with Councilman Joe DeLaCruz, Mayor Pabey's political opponent. The Defendants insist that there is no evidence showing that anyone knew about the Plaintiff's political activity and that her relationship with DeLaCruz was rumored to be an extramarital affair, not a political association. The Defendants are correct on the first point, but as to the Plaintiff's second contention, a reasonable jury could have believed otherwise.
The Plaintiff only speculated that the Defendants knew of her political activity. She testified that she went house-to-house on behalf of Mayor Pastrick and DeLaCruz but she has presented nothing that would show the Defendants' knowledge of that. In fact, she stated that she has never met Mayor Pabey and never encountered him on the campaign trail. (Tr. 1-40:24-25.) She does claim that on one occasion, Mayor Pabey, while still a candidate, passed her house as she was standing in front yard where a Pastrick sign was displayed. (Tr. 141:2-5), but she does not know if Mayor Pabey saw her (1-66:6-16). In turn, Mayor Pabey testified that he did not know that the Plaintiff campaigned against him until she sued him. (Tr. 2-39:18 — 40:7.) Hence, the Plaintiff has no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that anyone in the City's administration knew of her political campaigning.
However, the Plaintiff has shown that the Defendants knew of her association with DeLaCruz, whom she considered a family friend. Although the Defendants characterize that association as only a rumored adulterous relationship, the jury, having heard the Defendants' reasons for firing the Plaintiff, could have believed that it was not the adultery that the Defendants were troubled by, but the adultery with Mayor Pabey's opponent, and that because of this latter aspect she was fired from her job. That the latter was a possibility is best explained in the context of what motivated the Defendants in firing the Plaintiff. Put differently, if a reasonable jury could believe that an extramarital affair alone and the benefits obtained as a result would not have motivated the Defendants to fire the Plaintiff, then the jury could conclude that the association with the political opponent was the true reason for the discharge.
(2) Substantial or Motivating Factor
The Defendants claimed to the jury that the Plaintiff was fired, not because of any First Amendment conduct, but in an effort to reduce City expenses and, perhaps, because of her rumored affair with DeLaCruz — a personal matter — that netted home improvements for the Plaintiff at the City's expense. Yet, in light of other evidence, a reasonable jury could have disbelieved this explanation.
The Plaintiff presented substantial evidence casting doubt on the truthfulness of the first stated reason. When Mayor Pabey took office, the City employed nine inspectors. At the time the six inspectors were fired, Dr. Benchik-Abrinko was the head of the Health Department and Tony Moore was the supervisor of all the inspectors. The Plaintiff was one of the six persons who lost their jobs at the department, although initially she was on Dr. Benchik-Abrinko's list of employees to be retained at Moore's recommendation, along with Ray Carrillo and Tony Guzman, as one of the best inspectors at the department, (Tr. 1-34:11-19; 1-105:13-106:2; 2-56:21-25; see also 2-107:13-18) Dr. Benchik-Abrinko said that she removed the Plaintiff from the list because she began doubting Moore's recommendation and felt that Teri Barber deserved to stay instead as an employee who was going above and beyond her job expectations. (Tr. 1-105:12-106:2). Dr. Benchik-Abrinko did not substitute the other two employees, although, one of them, Antonio Guzman, was known to sleep on the job (Tr. 2-114:12-115:21). Likewise, Teri Barber often disappeared during the day to visit senior citizens making no report of her activities as required by the Inspection Department. (Tr. 2-63:11-65:8.) Moore told the Plaintiff that she was removed by Dr. Benchik-Abrinko because of her association with DeLaCruz. (Tr. 1-34:11-35:12.) What is more, Diana Garcia-Burns, the Director of the City, admitted that, after the Plaintiff's firing, the City hired Ed Samuels, whose duties were similar to the Plaintiff's. (Tr. 3-188:11-20.) Also, Evelyn Diaz, another inspector and a daughter of Mayor Pabey's political associate, was permitted to transfer to a different city department. (Tr. 2-48:22-25.) In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that the stated reason of cutting expenses was only a pretext for firing the Plaintiff for her association with Mayor Pabey's enemy.
During her testimony, Garcia-Burns described herself as a "Director" but did not further define her title. (Tr. 3-175:15-20.)
Similarly, a reasonable jury could have disbelieved the Defendants' explanation that the Plaintiff was fired for lack of integrity, that is, for tarnishing the department's good name by allegedly having an affair with DeLaCruz and getting house improvements at the City's expense as a result. After all, while Dr. Benchik-Abrinko testified that she recommended the Plaintiff for firing in order to promote integrity in the Health Department, she acknowledged that her subsequent hire was Ed Samuels, a federal felon convicted of ghost pay-rolling. (Tr. 1-125:4-10; 3-56:17-25.) In addition, Ray Carrillo, one of the retained inspectors, had been convicted of election fraud. In fact, if the Defendants were concerned with the Plaintiff's integrity, they could have followed their own procedures and investigated the rumors surrounding her. A jury could conclude that their failure to do that, combined with the above facts, shows the Defendants' indifference toward governmental corruption and fleecing of the taxpayers and betrays their true motive — political retaliation.
Finally, Moore's testimony could have also helped seal the jury's belief that the Plaintiff's firing was politically motivated. He testified that Dr. Benchik-Abrinko told him that the Plaintiff was not to be retained because "of [her] affiliation with a certain politician." (Tr. 2-58:19-59:4.) Add to that City Comptroller Charles Pacurar's directive to Elizabeth Camacho to prepare the list of people to be fired, but not to worry about seniority or who was on it, because "if the Mayor didn't want them, they weren't going to be kept" (Tr. 2-206-23-207:4), and one can understand how a reasonable jury may side with the Plaintiff. Not to mention, Elizabeth Camacho testified that Pacurar, who also was Mayor Pabey's close ally and a leader of his campaign, treated Elizabeth with disdain thinking she was the Plaintiff. When Elizabeth told Pacurar that she was not the Plaintiff, Pacurar's attitude toward Elizabeth changed. (Tr. 2-208:5-210:20.)
The Defendants spend no time discussing Vasquez's individual involvement in firing the Plaintiff. In any case, a verdict against him is justified in light of the above evidence as he was closely tied to Mayor Pabey's campaign and governance and he was the one who told the Plaintiff of her termination — Dr. Benchik-Abrinko testified that, in the end, the Human Resources Department had the final say of who was to be fired. (Tr. 1-111:23-112:16.) The Plaintiff has established the motive for her firing and has identified the actors who might have been glad to see her go. A reasonable jury could have believed that Vasquez acted in concert with Pacurar or Dr. Benchik, or both, to violated the Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The Court, therefore, upholds the jury's verdict against Vasquez.
D. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court denies the Defendant's motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a). Judgment is entered for the Plaintiff against the City and Fred Vasquez in the amount of $225,000 in compensatory damages and against Fred Vasquez in the amount of $25,000 in punitive damages
SO ORDERED