Opinion
Supreme Court Nos. S-11390, 11440.
June 14, 2006.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, John Suddock, Judge, Superior Court No. 3KN-00-397 Civil.
William T. Ford, Anchorage, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Jennifer L. Holland, Law Offices of Jennifer L. Holland, Anchorage, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Pamela Dye won an award of $500,000 against Appellant/Cross-Appellee Carter Callahan. Having cohabitated with Carter for several years but never marrying, Pamela successfully sued him to enforce a so-called Marvin agreement under California law that provided for her lifetime support. In the same action, the superior court (1) ordered Carter to reimburse Pamela's daughter for her educational expenses, (2) made offsetting awards of $29,000 to Pamela on an assault claim and to Carter on a conversion claim, and (3) ordered a home that the parties jointly owned partitioned. In this appeal, the parties ask us to review each of the superior court's conclusions.
The superior court's statement of findings and conclusions sets forth the relevant facts and resolves most of the contentions now made by the parties on appeal to this court. We agree with the court's statement and set it out at this point.
The superior court opinion has been edited to conform with the formal standards of this court.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Carter Callahan ("Carter"), is a California real estate developer. In 1983, prior to his third divorce, he began a romantic relationship with Pamela Dye ("Pamela"). Pamela was the divorced mother of two children, Jason and Devon Dye. She worked as a self-employed clinical electrologist. In 1985 or 1986, she moved into Carter's condominium, and soon thereafter into a house he purchased near St. Helena, California, which Pamela and Carter called the "Crystal Rose."
In late 1991, or early 1992, following a domestic violence incident, Pamela moved into a vacation house Carter had purchased in Soldotna, Alaska. Her then thirteen-year-old daughter, Devon, remained at the Crystal Rose with her stepfather, Carter. Pamela would periodically visit Carter, and her children, in California. In 1994, Carter quitclaimed a half interest in the Soldotna house to Pamela.
The relationship ended in the spring of 2000. Carter thereafter filed the instant action for partition of the Soldotna house; he subsequently made claim for bank accounts and chattels allegedly converted by Pamela, and for theft by deception based on Pamela opening an unauthorized telephone account. Pamela counterclaimed for breach of an express or implied contract to provide lifetime support, and for breaches of express promises to share specific assets. In July of 2002, Judge Link ordered Pamela's daughter Devon joined as an indispensable party to a claim of a promise by Carter to pay for her education.
The parties tried the matter to the court in April of 2003. Pamela litigated the issue of her entitlement to damages for domestic violence, without objection from Carter, and without assertion of a statute of limitations defense. The court finds that this unpleaded issue was tried with the consent of the parties. They supplemented their record with a post-trial deposition, and appraisals of the Crystal Rose, and its contents.
At trial, Carter denied any explicit contract for support. He denied ever holding out to be a married couple. According to him, Pamela and her children simply lived with him, no strings attached. When she worked for his businesses, she was contemporaneously compensated. He undertook no financial obligation to her, with the exception that he agreed to educate her children. He quitclaimed her one half of the Soldotna house, not out of obligation, but simply because Pamela pestered him.
Pamela testified that Carter invited her to a French restaurant in 1983, and told her that if she would live with him, he would forever cherish her, notwithstanding that he had already choked her in a moment of pique. He guaranteed she would be secure for life, even if the relationship failed, because he was supremely confident they were right for one another. He would marry her in due course. Throughout their relationship, he reiterated that she would always be taken care of, with a home and a retirement fund.
Pamela further testified the couple commingled finances in joint bank accounts. Her considerable business expertise was at the service of his businesses, without just compensation. This beautiful young woman would never have left the stability of the Victorian home and her lucrative hair removal practice ($70,000 per year) had not she been guaranteed wealth and security. Marriage always seemed just around the corner, but was constantly interrupted by natural catastrophes or business setbacks. Carter gifted her a splendid home, but did not title it to her, because her credit was impaired. She is allegedly entitled to half of Carter's seventy-condominium development, because, inter alia, she expedited matters when a bank's computer crashed, and she aided in the formation of an Alaskan corporation, which now holds the condominiums.
II. FACTUAL FINDINGS
a.) CREDIBILITY. Carter is a real estate developer. Pamela testified that she was, at all times, aware of his poor reputation for truth and honor in his business affairs. Carter's former bookkeeper, Paula Belden, testified that he is a liar and a cheat, who follows no rules but his own. Carter testified that he did not hold himself out as married to Pamela; according to him, he routinely identified her as his friend, not his wife. As noted below, the court finds to the contrary. During trial, Carter testified that he established an education account for Devon, under the name "Randall Callahan," and thereafter utilized it to shield large amounts of his personal funds from attachment by creditors during times when his businesses were insolvent. The court finds that Carter is not a credible witness, and generally declines to credit his denial that he made financial commitments to Pamela during their relationship.
The court also finds that Pamela is a less than fully credible witness. She denied that she used threats of suicide in attempts to manipulate Carter, when a note written by her strongly suggests the contrary. At trial she exaggerated her role in the creation of Carter's wealth.
Further, she has demonstrated, in a prior lawsuit, a willingness to testify falsely under oath to attain litigation ends. For six months in 1991, she was a defendant in a debt action against Carter by landscaping and plumbing concerns. After the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed her, she sued them for malicious prosecution in early 1992. She falsely pleaded that Carter was her husband. In a subsequent pleading in support of her application for default, she alleged that her brief tenure as a nominal defendant caused her severe emotional upset with dire physical sequellae, a drug overdose, her inability to work full time for Carter's business, inability to fund her daughter's flute and piano lessons and attendant dire strains on the mother-daughter relationship, the departure from the home of her son, her inability to support him in his college of choice, and the termination of her engagement with Carter.
A fair interpretation of the evidence at the instant trial leads the court to conclude that the above pleading is preposterous, and bespeaks Pamela's willingness to use the courts for personal gains, scantly bounded by a duty of truthfulness.
The court therefore feels constrained to view the testimony of both Pamela and Carter with suspicion. Their accounts were often diametrically opposed. The court is generally reluctant to accept the uncorroborated testimony of either. Instead, the court seeks to gauge the weight of their testimony in light of their points of agreement, any corroborating testimony of witnesses, and inferences derived from their life patterns and circumstances.
b.) OCCURRENCE FINDINGS. By a preponderance of the evidence, the court finds the following facts:
Carter, at the end of his third failed marriage, did not desire a fourth. However, he wanted the comforts of hearth and home, of a devoted woman, and the presence of children. He had amassed considerable wealth, which was available to him in fits and starts, depending on his business fortunes. Beginning in 1983, he wooed Pamela, and she moved in to his new condominium in 1985 or 1986.
Any explicit promises he may have made to her at that time are not reduced to writing, and they are unknowable. However, the court finds that it is more likely than not that such promises were made, either at the outset of the relationship, or as it progressed. This couple mutually understood and agreed that Pamela would have a binding entitlement to some degree of Carter's wealth. The court bases this finding on the following evidence.
When Pamela and Carter met, she was a self-supporting single mother, age 29. Carter, age 50, was 21 years older than she. She resided in a comfortable Victorian home in California, and made a substantial income as a clinical electrologist. In the first few years of her relationship with Carter, she gave up her business, sold her home, and entrusted proceeds to him in the form of a loan.
Carter and Pamela sought the prestige and respectability inherent in a marriage. When his divorce became final in 1985, Pamela began holding herself out as Pamela Dye-Callahan. Carter assented to this fiction. While the couple's closest friends knew the truth, those outside the inner circle were allowed to assume that Pamela and Carter were married. In 1985 Carter, who owned precious stones, had a diamond ring made for Pamela, which she wore on her left ring finger. Thereafter, Pamela contributed her wages working for Carter's business to the joint household expenses.
Pamela's adult daughter Devon Dye testified credibly that Carter at times referred to Pamela as his wife. Devon herself thought for a time that the couple was married, and her teachers so believed. Devon was known as Devon Dye-Callahan. Carter discussed adopting her.
Pamela issued checks for goods and services from a joint checking account bearing both their names. Carter easily could have forbidden this, but did not. He could have insisted that she not use a hyphenated name. Tellingly, when he filled out registration forms for medical treatment, he listed Pamela as his wife, not his significant other. On September 8, 1997, Carter signed an affidavit referring to Pamela as "Pam Callahan," clearly implying that she was his wife. That some of the close friends knew they were not married is not inconsistent with a general holding out to be married.
Carter accepted the role of stepfather of Pamela's two children, Devon and Jason. They were 6 and 12, respectively, when Pamela began cohabiting with Carter in 1985. Carter testified that he promised Pamela and both children that he would either pay for their college educations if they went to college, or give them down payments on houses. These were benefits he had conferred on his own children. He was active in the lives of both children. The children remained with Carter when Pamela moved to Alaska in late 1991. It was he who accompanied Devon to purchase her prom dresses during high school.
Carter established an account under the California Uniform Transfers to Minor's Act, Cal. Probate Code §§ 3900-3925 (hereafter "CUTMA") in Devon's name, when she was seventeen. When she went to college, he deposited sums in that account to pay for her tuition and living expense. This practice continued until Carter's relationship with Pamela definitively ended following domestic violence in 2000. At trial, Carter confirmed that he had promised to pay for Devon's education, and indicated that he only stopped because she broke off contact and did not request further funds.
Pamela thoroughly involved herself in Carter's business ventures. She served as senior vice-president for operations of his company, Raja Development, Inc. Carter, as a real estate developer, had not created a management structure with great depth. He was a deal maker, but lacked administrative expertise. At times, Pamela would fill in for some of his inadequacies, as by assisting in computerization of the enterprise. At other times she would perform more mundane services, for example decorating and staffing model housing units. She performed this work, in part for pay, and in part from a sense that she, as a part of Carter's life, rose with his fortunes.
Carter testified that Pamela was never extensively involved in his business enterprises. Paula Belden, his former bookkeeper, testified that from 1990-92, Carter insisted that Pamela be at his beck and call for business affairs. In 1997, Carter described, in a sworn affidavit, particular involvement in his business, as follows:
On or about November, 1993, Pam Callahan and I first met Douglas and Bruce Tolchin . . . the principals of Tolchin and Tolchin, Inc. As Pam and I became better acquainted with the Tolchin brothers, we discussed and agreed that their company would manage certain assets for RAJA during its bankruptcy reorganization and that they would facilitate RAJA's reorganization efforts.
This assertion is inconsistent with Carter's present testimony that Pamela was merely a gofer. Carter does not dispute that Pamela once signed a $250,000 business loan guarantee as his wife. The fact that Carter allowed Pamela to become deeply involved in his business enterprises, including service as an officer of his main company Raja, is further evidence that their relationship was more than a merely social, no-strings-attached affair.
Pamela, as a non-married cohabitant with only oral assurances as to her financial rights, was intensely conscious of her lack of financial security and her vulnerable dependency on Carter. She repeatedly raised the matter with him. More likely than not, he deflected her with excuses and promises to take steps for her security in the future. He was often under financial distress. He likely intended to make provision for her, and told her she could rely upon his good will. However, he did not wish to encumber specific funds, for this would detract from his ability to weather the economic storms and crises that characterized his financial life. Nonetheless, it is likely the couple jointly intended that Pamela's role in the relationship entitled her to an enforceable right to some degree of lifetime security.
In this regard, Devon credibly testified to imprecise childhood memories that Carter expressly promised Pamela a home and a retirement plan. Jason credibly testified to imprecise childhood memories that Carter said words to the effect that Pamela should not worry about finances, because she would always have a house and be taken care of.
In the early 1990's, Carter met with a financial counselor, Judy Hedin. In a "Feasibility Analysis" dated June 17, 1991, she stated as follows:
In addition to your estate planning documents, we will design and implement a prenuptial agreement prior to your upcoming marriage which will be [sic] accommodate Pamela's needs, and at the same time will minimize transfer taxes payable for your children and other selected beneficiaries.
This document strongly suggests that Carter requested assistance from his financial planner in structuring his financial commitment to Pamela, in an amount bounded by her "needs."
Around that time, the terms of Pamela's relationship with Carter shifted. Following a domestic violence incident in late 1991 or early 1992, Pamela elected to reside in a house Carter had purchased in Soldotna, Alaska, as a fishing retreat. From then onward, Pamela visited Carter in California for Christmas and other vacations, but lived alone in Alaska for most of the year. The couple continued to hold themselves out as married, and continued to have sexual relations.
From Alaska, Pamela performed light administrative services for Carter's business. He paid the bulk of her bills in Alaska, including the mortgage on the house. In 1994, he quitclaimed a half interest in the Soldotna house to her. According to Carter's right hand man, Joe Jackson, Carter spent approximately $260,000 for her support between 1996 and 2003, or an average of $37,000 per year over that seven-year period. The fact that Carter continued to pay Pamela's living expenses even after they separated following a domestic violence incident in 1991, for approximately nine years, strongly suggests that he recognized a binding financial commitment, which survived her move to Alaska.
In addition to a generalized claim for some degree of lifetime support, Pamela makes claims on specific assets. In 1985, the couple noticed a Victorian house under construction on the St. Helena Highway in Napa County, California. Carter purchased it, and they named it the Crystal Rose. He may well have told Pamela words to the effect, "I bought it for you." However, it has not been proven that he expressed actual donative intent in a legal sense. The house was never titled to Pamela, and it cannot be said that clear and convincing evidence controverts record title in Carter's corporation, Raja. Nor is there evidence establishing that Carter likely intended to give Pamela legal title to the antique furniture she located and Carter purchased for $50,000 to furnish the house. At that time, the couple intended to open a bed and breakfast, and the antiques in part supported that plan. Pamela's claim for a half interest in the Crystal Rose is not proven by the clear and convincing evidence necessary to controvert record title under California law.
Pamela also claims that Carter promised her clear title to the Soldotna home once its mortgage was retired. Carter denies this, and seeks partition. Again, Pamela has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that she is entitled to full ownership, in controversion of record title.
Pamela further claims she is entitled to one half of a seventy-unit condominium project in Napa, California, owned by Carter and held in Cashel, an Alaska corporation. She testified that she worked on the project, and assisted administratively when a bank computer deleted a loan application. She also assisted in forming the Alaska corporation Cashel. The court finds that Pamela has failed to establish an explicit agreement entitling her to half the project, and that she has not otherwise established that her rights should be measured by half the value of the project.
On August 9, 1996, when Devon was 17, Carter opened an account in trust for her, pursuant to CUTMA. The nominal purpose of the account was to fund Devon's college education. Carter opened the account as "Randall Callahan," and used it as repository for his personal funds during a time when creditors were hounding him, in order to avoid attachment of his funds. Over time, he deposited approximately $400,000 in the account.
The court finds that Carter had no intent to make a gift of such funds to Devon, but rather utilized the account as a stratagem to defeat creditors. Devon balanced the CUTMA checkbook at Carter's request, and routinely wrote checks to him for his personal expenses. She was fully aware that the money in the account was not exclusively hers, beyond her needs for tuition and living expenses during college.
As noted above, the account was opened on August 9, 1996. Devon turned eighteen on December 3, 1996. Pursuant to CUTMA § 3920, Devon was entitled to the proceeds of the account at that time, unless the time for transfer was delayed pursuant to § 3920.5 For that to occur, Carter would have been required to specify a later age for transfer, no later than age twenty-five. Pamela and Devon offered no evidence that he did so. Therefore, the court must deem that the account ceased to be a CUTMA account on December 3, 1996, Devon's eighteenth birthday. As of that date, $41,764 had been deposited into the account. During her college years, Devon received $33,116 in support payments from the account.
Devon and Pamela make claim for an award to Devon, of Devon's reasonable expenses for the balance of her college career. Carter confirmed that he promised Devon to fund Devon's college education. The court finds that in the context of this family's circumstances, Carter's promise of support for Devon was made to Pamela as well as to Devon, as a portion of the financial support Carter agreed to provide to Pamela. Consideration inheres in the family arrangements between Pamela and Carter.
Devon began college in the fall of 1997. Carter's support continued through the spring of 2000, her junior year. Devon incurred a student loan of $11,640 for her senior year. The court awards $15,000 to Devon to reimburse her for that year, an amount which exceeds any residual amount due Devon from the CUTMA account. The court does not find on the evidence that Carter's promise extended to graduate school for Devon.
In addition to her claims for specific assets, Pamela made claim at trial for damages for four domestic violence incidents.
a). Pamela claimed that in late 1991 or early 1992, Carter either tripped her or shoved her down a stairway at the Crystal Rose. Carter denied this occurred. Pamela claimed this incident capped prior domestic violence, and caused her to move to Alaska.
b). Pamela claimed that during the 1998 Christmas season, Carter became angry when she arrived home later than he wished one afternoon, and that he accelerated his car in reverse towards her in the driveway of the Crystal Rose. Devon and Jason both testified credibly to Carter's explosive rages. Devon witnessed this incident, and confirmed that it was in fact an assault, which left her shaken, and her mother hysterical.
c). Pamela claimed that during the summer of 1999, Carter struck and dragged her in the driveway of the Soldotna, Alaska house. This account was witnessed by neighbor Jane Bredikin, who credibly testified that an assault occurred and that she immediately notified a former police officer living nearby.
d). Pamela claimed that in the spring of 2000, Carter struck the side of her face with a root beer bottle. The account is supported by photographs of facial bruising. Pamela's claim of dental damage is rebutted by Dr. Lockwood's testimony that damage to her crowns could not have been caused by a blow, but was likely caused by their inferior material and the fact that Pamela grinds her teeth.
Three of four of these alleged incidents were corroborated by evidence in addition to Pamela's testimony. The court finds it is more likely than not that Pamela was subjected to domestic violence during her relationship with Carter. She has testified that her principle damage was deep shame and humiliation, and the court finds her credible on this point.
Carter claims that Pamela damaged him by accusing him of wrongfully receiving a senior citizen property tax exemption from the Kenai Peninsula Borough. The borough was tipped off by a poison pen letter, and retracted the exemption. Pamela denies authorship. The letter was sent at a time of heightened conflict between the two, and it is likely that Pamela either sent it, or knew who did, contrary to her denial under oath. However, the letter caused no damage. Carter was not at that time principally residing in the Soldotna house; it fully appears the claim to exemption was a scam. He is not entitled to damages for deprivation of a tax benefit to which he probably was not eligible, and which he could readily have reinstated if the borough erred. Whoever reported the matter was conditionally privileged to do so.
Carter further claims that Pamela converted funds by unauthorized telephonic withdrawal of $7,500 from the CUTMA account; of $9,000 from another of his Wells Fargo accounts; and by conversion of a Lincoln Town Car worth $5,900, and a van worth $2,045. He further alleges that she signed up for telephone service in his name without authorization, incurring charges of $1,378; and that she sold or gave away his $3,000 Weatherby hunting rifle, plus fishing rods with Hardy reels he values at $1,200. Pamela makes excuses for these actions, but does not effectively deny them. She claims she gave the rifle away to a person passing through, whose name she could not recall.
The telephone account claim fails because the telephone company did not hold Carter liable. The court finds that Pamela has wrongly deprived Carter of assets worth approximately $29,000. The court further finds that an appropriate damage award to Pamela for domestic violence is an offsetting $29,000.
Carter's business fortunes waxed and waned over the time period from 1986, when the parties began cohabiting, until 2000, when the relationship definitively ended. In April of 1992, his financial consultant reported his net worth was $15,642,000. By the time of trial, Carter's net worth was approximately $31,000,000.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND LAW REGARDING PAMELA'S NON-MARITAL CONTRACT CLAIM
a). CHOICE OF LAW. Pamela argues that California law governs her contract claims and non-marital co-habitation claims. The Alaska Supreme Court looks to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict Laws § 188 for guidance. See Long v. Holland America Line Westours, Inc., 26 P.3d 430 (Alaska 2001). The relevant Restatement factors overwhelmingly support application of California law. California was the place of the negotiation and adoption of any contract. It is the place where the parties engaged in the majority of the conduct from which any implied in-fact-contract would be inferred. With the exception of the Soldotna house, Carter's assets are located in California. Carter still spends the bulk of his time there, although he now claims Alaska residence. Pamela has resided in Alaska since 1992.
The court has reviewed Alaska and California cases applicable to cohabiting, non-married persons. Both states look to the express or implied intent of the parties in matters of support and property division. Both states require clear and convincing evidence to controvert the express terms of title to real property. It appears that choice of law is largely irrelevant to the outcome of this case.
California has the most significant relationship to the transactions that establish the rights and obligations of Pamela and Carter. Alaska has the more significant relation to an alleged domestic violence assault occurring at Soldotna, and Alaska law applies to that. All other domestic violence incidents occurred in California, and California law applies to them. There is no relevant distinction in the legal principles either state applies to such alleged assaults.
b.) APPLICABLE CALIFORNIA LAW. The leading California case setting forth the rights of non-married cohabitants is Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). There, Plaintiff, Michelle Marvin, alleged that actor Lee Marvin expressly promised to share equally his earnings. As here, Michelle testified she had given up a lucrative career to devote herself full time to Lee Marvin. The California Supreme Court held that the courts should uphold non-meretricious express contracts between non-marital partners. Absent an express contract, courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to ascertain the existence of any implied contract or other enforceable "tacit understanding" between the parties.
Subsequently, in Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (Cal.App. 1997), a female cohabitant, Flo, testified that her partner Skip promised to take care of her for life in return for domestic services, but he died before he could take concrete steps to do so. The trial court granted summary judgment against Flo. The appellate court gave significance to the fact that Skip in fact supported Flo, that he established a conservatorship for her handicapped daughters, that he designated her his beneficiary on his retirement plan, and that she retired from her job at his insistence. Further, the couple purchased new furniture, and opened a joint bank account. They did not hold out to be married. The court held that a generalized promise of support is not too uncertain to enforce, and that the quantum of damage may be resolved in the light of extrinsic evidence, including the payments made and the standard of living provided during Skip's lifetime. However, the court held that proof of a Marvin agreement contrary to record title must be by clear and convincing evidence.
In Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal App. 1998), the court discussed the significance of the fact a couple had held themselves out to be married. The court held this is a factor to be considered in determining the existence of an implied-in-fact contract, but is not itself dispositive of the matter. The court further discussed the fact that Claire Maglica's hard work and brilliant ideas materially contributed to Anthony Maglica's business, which became worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The court held that such contributions may be compensable in quantum meruit, but do not themselves establish an entitlement to a share of the assets created. However, neither is that possibility excluded. The court cited factors enumerated in Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Cal.App. 1986), as bearing on the topic. Those factors included direct testimony of an agreement, holding out as husband and wife, adoption by the woman and her children of the man's surname, the pooling of finances, and the provision of bookkeeping and other commercial services. Such factors can, held the Maglica court, permissibly lead a trier of fact to the conclusion that the parties intended to share assets.
Guided by Maglica, this court concludes that Pamela has not proven an entitlement to a share of Carter's wealth based on any services she provided that contributed to that wealth. The thrust of Pamela's testimony was that she provided services because she felt a commonality with Carter in his business activities, and wanted him to do well. While her contributions were not insignificant, they were in no sense key or critical to the success of his deals. She mostly described activities that could have been performed by low to mid-level employees, or a design consultant, for a modest salary or fee. She was not a genuine creator of Carter's wealth. Were she to be awarded an equity share in his wealth, she would be fabulously overcompensated for her relatively modest actual contributions.
Nor has Pamela proven a quantum meruit claim with satisfactory precision. She in effect argues that she was under-compensated for her time and efforts, but there is no adequate paper trail or testimonial evidence of the hours she worked and the activities she engaged in. Similarly, while there is evidence of express agreements by Carter to provide for Pamela to some extent, the terms of the express agreement are not proven, in part because the court cannot trust the unsupported testimony of either party.
Under California case law, Pamela's situation is most appropriately addressed by the law applicable to implied-in-fact agreements or "tacit understandings." Byrne, supra, stands for the proposition that such a contract can be inferred from an express but indefinite promise of lifetime security, support in fact, legal provision for a child (there a conservatorship), a joint bank account, and the refurnishing of a household emblematic of a domestic partnership. All those factors, and more, are present in the instant case. Similarly, the Alderson, supra, factors are here present: testimony of some agreement, a holding out to be married, adoption of the man's name, some pooling of finances, and the provision by the woman of commercial services in favor of the family as an entity.
At least twelve factors, considered collectively, quite strongly support a finding that the parties implicitly agreed that Pamela's lifetime needs would be met to a reasonable extent.
1. At the inception, there was a substantial disparity of age and wealth. Pamela moved dramatically from a position of financial independence, to one of complete dependence. It is circumstantially plausible that a single mother of two would not do so without assurances to some reasonable extent.
2. The relationship was of significant duration, from 1983 to 2000.
3. The couple generally presented as married, including a wedding ring.
4. The couple had one or more joint accounts, and joint utility debt.
5. There is evidence of express promises of security for Pamela, including written reference in a formal financial planning document to imminent marriage accompanied by a prenuptial provision for Pamela's needs.
6. There were significant, under-compensated contributions by Pamela to Carter's business.
7. Pamela was conferred executive status with that business.
8. There was a significant undertaking of joint liability by the execution of a guarantee.
9. Pamela and Carter behaved as a family unit rather than as social roommates. Carter adopted the role of stepfather, and raised Pamela's children.
10. Carter made provisions for the education of the children.
11. Carter continued to significantly support Pamela even after she moved to Alaska and the relationship was under stress.
12. Carter's transfer of a one-half interest in the Soldotna property to Pamela in 1994 is inconsistent with his assertion he had no financial obligation to her. Assuming Carter paid off the mortgage, Pamela could realize at most $100,000 upon sale. It is highly unlikely either party considered this to be a reasonable total provision for Pamela in the light of all the circumstances.
The court finds from that the reasonable value of the mutually understood implied-in-fact agreement to provide financially for Pamela is $500,000, plus the Soldotna proceeds. That sum represents the present value of the parties' implied-in-fact-contract for support, inclusive of any claims for pre-judgment interest thereon.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Carter's complaint for partition of the Soldotna home is granted. The parties shall market the home and equally divide the net proceeds. Carter is awarded any remaining furnishings provided by him from model homes. Carter's claim for fraud and misrepresentation is denied. Carter's claims for conversion of chattels and bank accounts are granted, but the damages are offset by damages awarded to Pamela for domestic violence. Pamela's claims for an enhanced interest in the Soldotna home; for a half interest in the Crystal Rose and its furnishings; and for a half interest in the Golden Gate condominiums, are denied. The court awards her $500,000, in addition to the Soldotna proceeds, representing the present value of the parties' implied-in-fact contract of support, inclusive of any claim for prejudgment interest thereon. Devon is awarded $15,000 for educational support. While Pamela and Carter have each prevailed on some claims and lost on others, Pamela and Devon are on balance the prevailing parties in this litigation, and are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 82.
The parties make the following arguments to this court on appeal. Our response to each follows the statement of each argument.
I. CARTER'S ARGUMENTS
A. "The Superior Court Erred in Finding That an Implied in Fact Contract for Lifetime Support Existed Between the Parties and in its Award of $500,000 for Palimony Based upon Such Contract."Response: The superior court's discussion on this point is found in Part III of its opinion. We agree with that discussion and accordingly conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Pamela $500,000.
B. "The Superior Court Erred and Abused its Discretion in Awarding $15,000 of Educational Expenses to Devon Dye."Response: In Part II.b of its opinion, the superior court concluded that the implied support agreement between Carter and Pamela encompassed a promise to pay Devon's educational expenses. We find no fault in that conclusion or in the superior court's award of $15,000 to Devon on that promise. $15,000 is reasonable given that Devon incurred some $11,640 in student loans to pay for her final year of college.
C. "The Superior Court Erred and Abused its Discretion in its Award of $29,000 in Damages for Domestic Violence."Response: "The determination by a trial court sitting as a finder of fact as to the proper amount to be awarded as compensatory damages is not to be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous." Compensatory damages may do more than simply pay a plaintiff back for money lost. Such damages may also compensate for noneconomic losses. Here, the superior court found that Callahan repeatedly assaulted Dye and that his actions caused her deep shame and humiliation. While the court did not explain why $29,000 was the appropriate number, it needed only to make a reasonable estimation grounded upon the evidence. $29,000 is a reasonable estimation of Pamela's damages.
Pluid v. B.K., 948 P.2d 981, 983 (Alaska 1997).
See Walker v. Alaska Road Comm'n, 388 P.2d 406, 408 (Alaska 1964) (allowing damages for pain, suffering, and inconvenience).
See Pluid, 948 P.2d at 983.
D. "The Superior Court Erred and Abused its Discretion in Ordering That the Soldotna Residence Be Partitioned Equally Between the Parties Without Providing a Date for the Separation of the Parties' Interests."Response: Carter's argument here is that the court improperly failed to give him credits for the rental value of the Soldotna residence and the mortgage payments he made after the partition action was filed and before the court's decision. The superior court specifically reserved judgment on these issues until a proceeding to follow this appeal. Therefore, this point is not properly before this court at this time.
E. "The Superior Court Erred and Abused its Discretion in its Award of Attorney's Fees and in its Failure to Award Attorney's Fees to Carter Callahan."Response: Carter argues that Pamela is not entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party in this case because the superior court's $500,000 award to her is erroneous. Because we affirm the superior court's award to Pamela on her contract claim, Carter's argument against the award of attorney's fees is rendered moot.
II. PAMELA'S ARGUMENTS
A. "The Court Should Have Awarded Pamela More than $500,000 as the Value of the Implied-in-fact Contract."Response: Part III of the superior court's opinion adequately answers this argument.
B. "The Court Erred in its Valuation of Pamela's Damages for the Domestic Violence Perpetrated by Carter."Response: For the reasons we set forth in Part I.C, supra, we will not disturb the superior court's award of damages on Pamela's domestic violence claim.
C. "The Court Erred in Failing To Award Devon the Full Value of the California Uniform Transfer to Minors Act (CUTMA) Account."Response: Pamela contends that Devon is entitled to recover the total amount of money deposited into the CUTMA account by Carter in addition to the $15,000 under the implied contract.
The California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act is a means by which trust-like transfers can be made to minors without the expense and formality associated with the creation of an actual trust. Once a transfer is made, it is irrevocable. The transferor may name him or herself "custodian," though, and manage the transferred funds for the benefit of the designated minor. The custodian is permitted to either pay the designated funds to the minor outright or expend them for the minor's benefit. The custodianship is typically terminated on the minor's eighteenth birthday. At that point, the custodian must transfer the funds to the minor directly and CUTMA's applicability ends.
4 Witkin, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW, Personal Property § 113, at 104 (9th ed. 1987).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 3911(b) (West 2005).
Witkin, supra note 5, § 116, at 107 (transferor may be custodian); CAL. PROB. CODE § 3914 (custodian to manage custodial property for minor's benefit).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 3920(a); Witkin, supra note 5, § 124, at 115. But see CAL. PROB. CODE § 3920(b) (transfer can be delayed in specified circumstances not applicable here).
The superior court found that Carter transferred nearly $400,000 to an account initially set up to hold CUTMA funds earmarked for Devon. However, it determined that Carter deposited only $41,764 in the account by Devon's eighteenth birthday. Under California Probate Code § 3920 Devon's eighteenth birthday marked the end of the CUTMA rules' applicability to Carter's transfers into the account. It also marked the date on which Devon became entitled to the custodial funds. At that point the court also determined that Carter spent $33,116 of the custodial funds on Devon's education. This is a proper use of the money under California Probate Code § 3914 because it was for Devon's benefit. Therefore, Devon's entitlement to the CUTMA money transferred to her is limited to the difference between $41,764 and $33,116: $8,648.
Id.
Pamela argues that because Carter deposited more than $400,000 into an account initially opened for Devon's benefit in accordance with CUTMA, Devon is entitled to that entire sum. She bases her argument on the fact that transfers made under CUTMA become immediately vested in the minor. However, as set forth above, CUTMA applies only to transfers made to persons under the age of eighteen. Therefore, Devon only has a claim to the money transferred by Callahan to the account before her eighteenth birthday. Pamela cites no authority to support her argument to the contrary.
The superior court's $15,000 award to Devon covered Carter's liability for $8,648 in CUTMA funds. The court labeled its $15,000 award an amount "which exceeds any residual amount due Devon from the CUTMA account." The liabilities are technically separate; one is based on a breach of contract and the other is based on CUTMA's provisions. However, there is no question that Carter satisfied his contractual obligation to pay for Devon's first three years of college with CUTMA monies. Therefore, it is appropriate to allow the money due under the contract to account for that owed under CUTMA.
For these reasons, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.