Opinion
No. 32119.
May 4, 1936.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.
Sixth Amendment to Federal Constitution respecting rights of persons accused of crime has no application to state action, is not a limitation on powers of states, and is confined alone to federal action (Const. U.S. Amend. 6).
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
Statute providing for venue in county in which death happens where mortal stroke or cause of death occurs in another state or country and death happens in Mississippi held not unconstitutional (Code 1930, sec. 1187).
3. CRIMINAL LAW.
Where fatal blow occurred in Tennessee and deceased died in Mississippi, Mississippi court had jurisdiction of murder prosecution, though assault prosecution had been previously instituted in Tennessee, and statute provided that when offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another, jurisdiction shall be in county where prosecution shall be first begun, since statute did not refer to interstate crimes (Code 1930, sec. 1186).
APPEAL from circuit court of Tishomingo county. HON. THOS. H. JOHNSTON, Judge.
C.B. Wright, of Belmont, for appellant.
The statute upon which said indictment was predicated and the state relied upon for conviction is unconstitutional and in violation to the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
I am unable to see and conceive of the idea that the State of Mississippi has jurisdiction of a crime that was committed in the State of Tennessee, which the state admitted when they filed their demurrer to the plea to the jurisdiction of the court.
6th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
It is a well settled rule as laid down in 12 C.J. 1203, section 972, "the established principles of law must be adhered to in all matters affecting jurisdiction and venue and departure from them constitutes a denial of due processes of law."
State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504; Stout v. State, 76 Md. 317.
No crime committed within the territory limits of one sovereign state can be tried in another, for penal laws of every sovereign state are in the strictest sense local, and cannot therefore be enforced by tribunals of any other state.
16 C.J. 185.
The State of Tennessee first acquired jurisdiction of the appellant by having charges filed against him and apprehended on said charges by the authorities in the State of Tennessee. Having the jurisdiction of said appellant, then the courts of the State of Mississippi had no jurisdiction to try said cause.
Adkinson v. State, 96 So. 310. W.D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.
With reference to appellant's contention that the statute violates Article VI of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, such argument may be wholly dismissed with the observation that this amendment has nothing to do with state courts. This amendment was intended exclusively to apply to the powers exercised by the government of the United States, whether by Congress or by the judiciary and not as a limitation upon the powers of the states.
Ellenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 35, 33 L.Ed. 801; Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 52 L.Ed. 582; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164, 50 L.Ed. 421; U.S.C.A. Constitution, Part 2, page 567, Note 2.
Our statute, section 1187, Code of 1930, is but declaratory of the common law on the proposition of venue.
8 R.C.L. 101; Atkinson v. State, 132 Miss. 377, 96 So. 310; Wharton on Homicide (3 Ed.), sec. 555, page 826.
Our statute does not violate the Mississippi Constitution.
Atkinson v. State, 132 Miss. 377, 96 So. 310.
The sovereign state of Mississippi has the right to declare what acts shall be considered criminal here.
State v. Cunningham, 102 Miss. 237, 59 So. 76; Hyatt v. Cockran, 188 U.S. 691, 47 L.Ed. 657.
The State of Mississippi had jurisdiction of the offense, as well as jurisdiction of the defendant, and the circuit court could not be compelled to surrender its prisoner to Tennessee, merely because it might be shown that an affidavit charging crime had been filed with some Tennessee court prior to the time the defendant was arrested in Mississippi.
Under our statute, section 1187, Code of 1930, the circuit court of Tishomingo County had jurisdiction of the offense (the place deceased died) and jurisdiction of the offender (he was in its custody). The statute is constitutional and there is no doubt but that that court was authorized to enter a valid judgment against the prisoner.
Appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted in the circuit court of Tishomingo county for the murder of one Ed Johnson, and sentenced to the penitentiary for life; the jury having returned a verdict of guilty, but disagreeing as to the punishment.
The fatal blow that resulted in Johnson's death occurred in Hardin county, Tenn.; he died the next day in Tishomingo county, in this state. Appellant fled to Tishomingo county, and was there apprehended. Johnson's death was caused by two blows on the head with a cue wielded by appellant. The evidence for the state was ample to sustain the conviction.
We have here, therefore, a crime begun in Tennessee and consummated in Mississippi. Appellant plead to the jurisdiction of the court, in substance, as follows: That the indictment and prosecution in this state were in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; that the crime was committed in Tennessee and no part of it in this state, although Johnson died in this state; and that before appellant was apprehended in this state a prosecution had been instituted against him in Tennessee charging him with assault and battery and intent to kill and murder Johnson, "of which the authorities in Tishomingo County had knowledge."
The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime was committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. The amendment has no application to state action; it is not a limitation of the powers of the states, and it is confined alone to federal action. Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 10 S.Ct. 424, 33 L.Ed. 801; Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 28 S.Ct. 372, 52 L.Ed. 582; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164, 26 S.Ct. 189, 50 L.Ed. 421.
Section 1187, Code 1930, provides, among other things, that: "If the mortal stroke or cause of death occur or be given or administered in another state or country and the death happen in this state, the offender may be indicted and tried in the county in which the death happened." Johnson's death in this state was an essential part of the crime of murder; it was the completion of the crime. Other states have the same character of statute. There is no constitutional provision standing in the way of such a statute. Wharton on Homicide (3 Ed.) sec. 555.
Appellant relies on Atkinson v. State, 132 Miss. 377, 96 So. 310, to sustain the position that the courts in Mississippi were without jurisdiction because prosecution for the offense had been instituted in the state of Tennessee. That decision is not in point. The wound that caused Atkinson's death was inflicted in Leake county, and he died in Hinds county, both in this state. He was indicted and convicted in Hinds county of manslaughter. When he was indicted in Hinds county, prosecution had already been begun in Leake county. The court discussed section 1186 of the Code 1930, which provides that: "When an offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another, or where the acts, effects, means, or agency occur in whole or in part in different counties, the jurisdiction shall be in either county in which said offense was commenced, prosecuted, or consummated, where prosecution shall be first begun." In that case the entire crime was committed in this state from the beginning to consummation, and, furthermore, section 1186, by its plain language, refers alone to intercounty crimes, and not interstate.
The other question argued is not of sufficient merit to call for a discussion.
Affirmed.