Opinion
G060039
03-07-2022
MICHAEL CALANTROPIO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEVCON CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED, Defendant and Respondent.
Corsiglia, McMahon & Allard, Timothy D. McMahon; Law Offices of Russell J. Hanlon and Russell J. Hanlon for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Offices of Michel & Fackler, Michael D. Michel and Kate Morrow for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, No. 1-15-CV-287720, Mary Arand, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Corsiglia, McMahon & Allard, Timothy D. McMahon; Law Offices of Russell J. Hanlon and Russell J. Hanlon for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Michel & Fackler, Michael D. Michel and Kate Morrow for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
GOETHALS, J.
Michael Calantropio appeals from the trial court's entry of judgment after granting summary judgment in favor of Devcon Construction, Incorporated (Devcon), on Calantropio's second amended complaint for negligence and premises liability. Calantropio sued Devcon for workplace injuries he suffered after falling from a ladder he placed on a piece of "cardboard" covering a hole on a jobsite at which Devcon was the general contractor. Devcon hired Calantropio's employer as an independent contractor to perform certain work at the site. The trial court granted Devcon's summary judgment motion under the so-called "Privette rule." (See Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette).)
Under the "Privette rule," the person or entity hiring "an independent contractor[] . . . presumptively delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor's employees." (SeaBright Ins. Co. v. U.S. Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 600 (SeaBright).) In Privette, the Supreme Court concluded that because employers-including employers that are independent contractors-are generally insulated from liability by "the state's workers' compensation system," which "affords compensation [to the injured employee] regardless of fault," "additional recovery from the person who hired the contractor-a nonnegligent party-advances no societal interest that is not already served by the workers' compensation system." (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 692.) As a result, under Privette and its progeny: "A person or entity hiring an independent contractor (a 'hirer')" (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256, 264 (Sandoval)) ordinarily is "not liable to . . . contract workers" for workplace injuries (id. at p. 270).
This doctrine has its limits however. (See e.g., Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 271.) Calantropio contests the trial court's conclusion he failed to establish a triable issue of fact on either of two Privette exceptions. The court identified those exceptions as the "preexisting hazardous condition and retained control exceptions to the Privette rule . . . ."
The retained control exception may apply to "a hirer performing noncontract work [while] the contractor [is] performing contracted work at the same time." (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 280, fn. 8, original italics.) Sandoval cited as an example of retained control liability a "hirer (through another subcontractor) performing bollard hole work at the same time [the] plaintiff contractor performed canopy construction work." (Ibid., citing Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1442-1443 (Tverberg II).) We cannot conclude here, based on the record before us, that Devcon established as a matter of law that it had no retained control liability for site safety. Devcon, through its subcontractors, worked alongside Calantropio and, through one or more of those subcontractors, created and left covered only by a piece of cardboard the hole into which Calantropio's ladder fell.
We also observe that Devcon categorically failed to rebut Calantropio's evidence that he complied with ladder safety protocols. As a result, Devcon failed to establish as a matter of law that Calantropio was solely responsible for his injuries based on ladder safety violations. Devcon thus failed to meet its summary judgment burden to show that no trier of fact could conclude its alleged actions or omissions at the site (including through its subcontractors) contributed to Calantropio's injuries. We therefore reverse the trial court's entry of judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with denial of Devcon's summary judgment motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Devcon served as the general contractor on a construction project known as "San Antonio Station" at a worksite in Mountain View, California. Calantropio presented evidence at summary judgment that the contract between the property owner and Devcon called for Devcon to take all reasonable precautions to ensure the safety of workers at the site. Calantropio's employer, West Coast Architectural Sheet Metal (West Coast), was a subcontractor on the project, hired by Devcon to perform "flashing and sheetmetal work."
On May 2, 2015, Calantropio was working in a section of the project known as the "tank yard." His tasks that day, given to him and a coworker, Dean Hooker, by their West Coast foreman, Patrick Young, included preparing the steel to install sheet metal louvers, as well as the backing for the louvers, at locations in both the east and west ends of the tank yard.
Devcon conducted weekly meetings with the subcontractors at the jobsite to discuss scheduling work that needed to be done. Young confirmed with Devcon's assistant superintendent for the project, John Bono, that it would not be a problem for West Coast to work in the tank yard that day. According to Young, Bono said painters would be working on the west side of the yard, so West Coast employees should work on the east side; Young then instructed Calantropio and Hooker to begin work on the east side.
Later, Calantropio was approached several times by a painter who said the painters were finished with their work on the west side and wanted to move to the east side. Young approved Calantropio and Hooker's move to the other side of the tank yard.
In preparation for his louver work on the west side of the yard, Calantropio set up a "standard" A-frame ladder that West Coast provided for its employees at the jobsite. He did not realize that he placed the right rear leg of the ladder on "the white cardboard rectangle" that covered or partially covered an opening in the concrete floor surface where Calantropio was working.
The hole had been purpose-built months earlier by another subcontractor that Devcon hired-J.J. Albanese Concrete Construction. The hole was "two feet by two feet at the opening," by one witness's estimate, and about three feet deep. It passed through the concrete slab into a trench or culvert, which was designed to contain any liquid spills or runoff at the location. Photographs which are part of our record show the hole was nearly square in shape and that it abutted the exterior cinder block wall near which Calantropio set up his ladder to install the louvers. The photographs also show a metallic grate next to, but not covering, the hole.
According to Calantropio, he had used "common sense" that day to survey the tank yard for any risks or potential hazards for the work he would be doing. He did not see the hole or the piece of cardboard covering it. Hooker later told a safety inspector that "[c]ardboard" about "one by two feet" in size "probably covered the hole," but "[d]id not cover the hole entirely." Calantropio testified he selected the location to place his ladder after preliminary "test preparation to see if I was in the correct location to perform my work. So this was my prep." He did not at any time move the piece of cardboard on which he placed a leg of his ladder; he "didn't even know there was a cardboard there . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I didn't see it."
Before Calantropio climbed the ladder, he made sure it was on a level surface. He "grabbed it and like pulled it down to see if it was sturdy enough and . . . firm on the ground." He "made sure the-these braces, the ladder braces were extended all the way and fully locked." He confirmed to his satisfaction the ladder was stable: "The first couple steps you kind of-you can feel your weight on the ladder, and it's sturdy enough, you know. It's not moving. So you can go up, continue [up]." He considered himself qualified to use that type of ladder in a construction site setting based on five years of ladder safety training from his union.
Calantropio took five to seven steps up the ladder-about 11 to 13 feet- before he realized that he was going to fall: he "could feel like my equilibrium just start to shift, and I felt my ladder just-abruptly just sink and twist. And then off I came." The ladder sank into the concrete trench hole, twisted, and tipped over. Calantropio fell off the ladder to his left. As he began to fall backwards, he struggled to position his body to land upright on his feet, but his right leg landed first on the concrete and he fell on his back, slamming his head into the concrete.
Hooker was a "couple feet" behind Calantropio when he fell; Calantropio described Hooker as "kneel[ing] into the . . . concrete" by a nearby column. According to Calantropio, Hooker said, "'Look at that hole. That cardboard was covering the hole.'" Calantropio answered, "'[W]hat cardboard? What hole?'" Then Calantropio started screaming and cursing because he was upset.
Devcon's project superintendent, Robert McKenna, Sr., arrived at the accident site before Calantropio was transported away by ambulance. McKenna observed what looked like a piece of "white cardboard" or "white plastic," which he noted "has a name for it," but said he could not recall the name. He described it as "sort of like it's cardboard, it's corrugated, but it's made out of plastic." McKenna was familiar with painters using such material "so you don't get paint . . . on the concrete. You only get it on the-what you're painting. They do that to the edge of walls, stuff like that." He acknowledged that "[c]orrugated plastic" would not "be a proper hole cover."
Calantropio described it in his opposition to summary judgment as simply "a large piece of industrial cardboard."
Calantropio's separate statement of additional disputed material facts submitted in response to summary judgment described the cardboard as "not an acceptable hole cover"; Devcon marked this contention in its reply as "Undisputed."
Calantropio suffered severe injuries. His right foot "snapped" when it hit the ground. He also injured his right knee, lower back, left shoulder, and left hip; he continued to require a cane much of the time to maintain his balance and minimize pain. Calantropio's employer carried an active workers' compensation insurance policy at the time of his injury, and he made a claim on the policy.
Calantropio's lawsuit against Devcon alleged general negligence and premises liability. Devcon eventually moved for summary judgment, and Calantropio filed opposition. The trial court granted the motion after it sustained some of Devcon's objections to the evidence Calantropio submitted. Calantropio now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Calantropio argues the trial court erred in granting Devcon summary judgment. We agree.
1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper when there are no triable issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar))
"A defendant who moves for summary judgment bears the initial burden to show the action has no merit-that is, 'one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to [that] cause of action.' [Citation.] Once the defendant meets this initial burden of production, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact." (Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1283, 1292-1293, italics added (Grotheer).)
This shift in the burden of production arises in a workplace injury lawsuit when the defendant moving for summary judgment provides a factual foundation for the Privette doctrine to apply. (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 644 (Alvarez).) The shift occurs because of the Privette presumption that hirers are not liable for such injuries. (Id. at p. 642, citing SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 600.) The requisite factual showing is simply that the defendant hired the plaintiffs employer to perform work "and that plaintiff was injured while working at the site." (Alvarez, at p. 644.) Devcon established these predicates in its summary judgment moving papers, neither of which Calantropio disputes.
Once established, "[a] presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence 'operates to eliminate the existence of a triable issue of fact where no contrary evidence is offered.'" (Alvarez, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 645.) In other words, if a defendant moving for summary judgment "provided sufficient evidence to trigger the Privette presumption and plaintiff d[oes] not raise a triable issue of fact," the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. (Id. at p. 646.) The plaintiff s burden is to set forth "specific facts" showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling de novo. (Grotheer, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1293.)
All further statutory references are to this code.
2. Privette Exceptions in the Context of Summary Judgment
A plaintiff rebuts a defendant's reliance on Privette at summary judgment by showing the doctrine may not apply under the facts of the case. As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, "the Privette doctrine has its limits." (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 271; see, e.g., Kinsman v. Unocal Corp (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 664 (Kinsman); Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 202 (Hooker).) "Sometimes a hirer intends to delegate its responsibilities to the contractor in principle but, by withholding critical safety information, fails to effectively delegate its responsibilities in practice; or a hirer delegates its responsibilities only partially by retaining control of certain activities directly related to the contracted work. When such situations arise, the Privette doctrine gives way to exceptions." (Sandoval, at p. 271.) "In Kinsman, we articulated the rule that a landowner-hirer owes a duty to a contract worker if the hirer fails to disclose to the contractor a concealed premises hazard. [Citation.] And in Hooker, we articulated the rule that a hirer owes a duty to a contract worker if the hirer retains control over any part of the work and actually exercises that control so as to affirmatively contribute to the worker's injury." (Ibid.)
To defeat summary judgment, an injured employee need only show a Privette exception may apply. When the party moving for summary judgment has carried its initial burden, causing a shift in the burden of production, the opposing party then bears the burden to present evidence that "make[s] a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact." (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) "A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question." (Id. at p. 851.) "No more is called for." (Ibid.)
This minimal burden is appropriate because, while the burden of production may shift back and forth, "from commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) That burden of persuasion is tied to the standard of proof at trial (id. at p. 851), which here, as in civil cases generally, is a preponderance of evidence (see id. at p. 861). Thus, a defendant moving for summary judgment under that standard "must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact not to find any underlying material fact more likely than not-otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact." (Aguilar, at p. 851, original italics.)
Once a plaintiff opposing summary judgment invokes a Privette exception, the relevant underlying material facts are those bearing on the exception. In other words, the plaintiff opposing summary judgment under the Privette doctrine must present evidence on which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the circumstances establishing the exception exist. In contrast, for the defendant to obtain summary judgment, the record must show that no reasonable jury could make underlying factual findings consistent with the Privette exception on which the plaintiff relies.
3. Retained Control Exception
Calantropio argues the trial court erred in concluding he failed to present evidence to make a prima facie case supporting the retained control exception to Privette. We agree.
"In Hooker," as reaffirmed in Sandoval, the high court "recognized that hirers do not always fully delegate control to their contractors" and therefore, in some "'retained control' situations, notwithstanding Privette's presumption to the contrary, the hirer must owe a duty of care to the contract workers." (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 274.) It is the plaintiff's burden "in such cases [to] establish not only that the hirer retained control over the contracted work, but also that the hirer actually exercised that retained control in a manner that affirmatively contributed to the contract worker's injury." (Ibid.)
Sandoval arose when a contractor's worker was severely burned by an "arc flash" from a powerful electrical circuit in a large switchgear room on the hirer's property. The hirer (Qualcomm) powered down the circuits that it identified and hired a contractor (TransPower) to inspect and, at a pre-inspection safety meeting, "did not authorize TransPower to inspect (or expose) any other circuits at th[e] time." (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 266.) In fact, after powering down its circuits, Qualcomm's plant manager "reminded [the contractor] and his team that some circuits in the switchgear [room] would remain live." (Ibid.) The plant manager further confirmed with the contractor "which circuits were now dead (the 'safe zone') and which were still live (the 'no-safe zone')." (Id.at p. 267.)
Nevertheless, the contractor had one of its employees "remove the bolted-on back protective panel" on the tall cabinet that enclosed a live circuit. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 267.) The contractor "well knew . . . the GF-5 circuit was still live," but "told no one that he was exposing a live circuit"; he later explained he did so "to take photographs for purposes of an unrelated previous inspection." (Ibid.) By this point, Qualcomm had turned the inspection over to the contractor. When another contractor team member, Martin Sandoval, who was not wearing an arc flash suit, attempted to inspect and ascertain the size of the now-exposed electrical circuit with his metal tape measure, he was electrocuted. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed a jury verdict in favor of Sandoval finding "the hirer liable under a retained control theory of liability." (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 265.) The intermediate court rejected Qualcomm's argument that it was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict "because it did not affirmatively contribute to [the worker's] injuries." (Id. at p. 269.) The Supreme Court granted review "to resolve whether a hirer of an independent contractor may be liable to a contractor's employee based only on the hirer's failure to undertake certain safety measures to protect the contractor's employees." (Ibid.) The Supreme Court determined the answer to that question is "no" when there is no evidence of retained control by the hirer and remanded the case to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Qualcomm. (Id. at pp. 265, 284.)
But the high court did so with an important caveat contained in footnote 8: "As we determined above, Qualcomm ceased performing the power-down process and turned over control of the worksite well before Sandoval's injury. This case does not present, and thus we do not address, the issue of a hirer performing noncontract work and the contractor performing contracted work at the same time." (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 280, fn. 8.) The court cited Tverberg II as an example of a situation when a hirer may indeed be liable if it, even "through another subcontractor," performs ongoing "hole work" at the site where the plaintiff is also working (ibid.), assuming the hirer's or its subcontractor's work causes or contributes to the plaintiff's injuries.
In Tverberg II, the general contractor (Fillner) on a project to expand a commercial fuel facility hired one subcontractor to erect a canopy over some fuel-pumping units and another to install protective bollards to prevent vehicles from colliding with the fuel dispensers. (Tverberg II, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1442.) The canopy subcontractor in turn hired Jeffrey Tverberg to do that work. On Tverberg's first day, he noticed eight large holes-each one four feet long by four feet wide-that the other subcontractor dug to pour concrete footings for the bollards. Tverberg asked Fillner's '"lead man"' to cover the holes with large metal plates that were onsite, but the lead demurred for lack of "the necessary equipment to do so that day"; Fillner's lead instead had his crew flatten dirt that had been piled around the holes. (Id. at p. 1443.) "Tverberg removed three or four stakes that marked the edges of some of the bollard holes." (Ibid.)
The next day, the lead failed to act on Tverberg's renewed request to cover the holes; Tverberg decided to begin his canopy work anyway. As he "walked from his truck toward the canopy [area], he fell into a bollard hole and was injured." (Tverberg II, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1443.) The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the general contractor on Tverberg's negligence claim. (Id. at pp. 1442-1443.) The appellate court explained that, at a minimum, a jury could conclude that "by ordering these holes to be created and requiring Tverberg to conduct unrelated work near them, Fillner's conduct may have constituted a negligent exercise of its retained control in a manner that could have made an affirmative contribution to Tverberg's injury." (Id. at p. 1448.)
Similarly, in Strouse v. Webcor Construction, L.P. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 703 (Strouse), the general contractor (Webcor) tasked with rehabilitating the UC-Berkeley football stadium "created and constructed 50 expansion joints that were placed throughout the structure." (Id. at p. 707.) Webcor placed and maintained plywood covers over the expansion joints (ibid.), but one gave way when a subcontractor's worker walked across it while carrying a large section of pipe on his shoulder (id. at p. 709). The worker suffered knee, hip, and other injuries when his leg "went down into the joint." (Ibid.) The Strouse court found no prejudicial error in the wording of a negligence instruction because "the evidence strongly supports the inference that the jury found Webcor to have affirmatively contributed to Strouse's injury." (Id. at p. 716.)
Tverberg II and Strouse are similar in that, unlike the specialty contractor in Sandoval, the plaintiff in each was not working for a subcontractor hired to confront the exact risk that caused their injuries. In Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th 256, the evidence showed the contractor determined he was "'in charge,' 'knew what [he was] doing,' and didn't 'need' a monitor" (id. at p. 281) in performing his contracted task "to inspect and verify the amperage capacity of Qualcomm's existing switchgear equipment" (id. at p. 265). In contrast, in Tverberg II, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th 1439, while Tverberg knew about the bollard holes, they were "unrelated" to his contracted work (id. at p. 1448) yet lurked "in the area in which [he] was expected to erect the canopy" (id. at p. 1447). The same was true of the subcontractor carrying materials over the expansion joint to perform his job in Strouse. (Strouse, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 709.)
The court in Tverberg II explained that "[w]hile the passive permitting of an unsafe condition to occur is not an affirmative contribution, the act of directing that it occur is active participation." (Tverberg II, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448.) The court therefore reversed summary judgment and endorsed the plaintiff's contention that the general contractor's "affirmative contribution is satisfied by its direction of another subcontractor to dig the bollard holes in the first place." (Id. at p. 1447.) Tverberg II relied on Supreme Court precedent in Hooker for the proposition that "[i]n order for a worker to recover on a retained control theory, the hirer must engage in some [form of] active participation." (Tverberg II, at p. 1446.)
In Sandoval the Supreme Court observed that "Hooker's application has produced significant confusion" (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 274). Footnote 8 in Sandoval precludes any thought that the court intended to cast doubt on Tverberg II. (Id. at p. 280.) The trial court here did not have the benefit of the Sandoval decision, which postdated the trial court's ruling, including the trial court's finding that "Devcon did not create the hole where Plaintiff's accident occurred." To the contrary, as Sandoval noted by reference to Tverberg II in footnote 8, a hirer's active participation at the worksite may be shown by the hirer performing-"through another subcontractor"- work at the site contributing to the plaintiff's injuries. (Sandoval, at p. 280, fn. 8.)
Thus, pursuant to Tverberg II and Sandoval, a general contractor's creation of a hazard at the worksite "may . . . constitute[] a negligent exercise of its retained control in a manner that could" (Tverberg II, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th 1439, italics added), depending on the facts of the case, "ma[ke] an affirmative contribution to [the plaintiff's] injury" (id. at p. 1448). If the trier of fact might reasonably find an affirmative contribution to the worker's injury, summary judgment is inappropriate. (Id. at p. 1447.) The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Huerta v. City of Santa Ana (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 41, 47.)
Here, Calantropio asserted in his opposition to Devcon's motion for summary judgment that Devcon, through its subcontractor "Albanese," created the hole into which his ladder fell. In its reply, Devcon argued that the cited testimony of the subcontractor's foreman did not explicitly state that the subcontractor created the trench for Devcon, but we find that to be a reasonable inference in light of the size and location of the trench. Moreover, in its reply to Calantropio's response to its separate statement, Devcon did not specifically dispute Calantropio's claim that the trench's "open floor hole" that caused Calantropio's fall "was created by Devcon due to its failure to properly cover the hole."
In any event, based on the reasonable inference that Devcon caused the creation of a hole at the worksite through a subcontractor (as in Tverberg II), a further reasonable inference based on Tverberg II and Strouse is that worksite holes present an unsafe condition. "[D]irecting that it occur" (i.e., creation of the hole) is evidence of retained control that may be sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude the defendant "made an affirmative contribution" to a worker's injury caused by the hole. (Tverberg II, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448.) This is particularly true where Devcon failed to dispute Calantropio's evidence that he "took appropriate steps" in using his ladder "to make sure [it] was on solid ground." Indeed, Devcon introduced evidence in its moving papers that Calantropio was "qualified to use an A-frame ladder in a construction site setting" based on "five years of ladder safety training." As a result, the trier of fact could reasonably infer Calantropio was not solely responsible for his injuries. Because Calantropio presented prima facie evidence supporting an inference Devcon bore some liability for his injuries based on the retained control exception to the Privette doctrine, summary judgment must be reversed.
Calantropio also contends the trial court erred in concluding he failed to meet his prima facie burden to present evidence of another Privette exception, namely that a dangerous property condition existed that he or his employer could not reasonably have discovered. This challenge becomes moot in light of our conclusion the summary judgment ruling must be reversed. Devcon did not move for summary adjudication of Calantropio's claims; it made a global motion for summary judgment. Because that motion must be denied, we do not review or engage in summary adjudication of other issues, which Devcon did not request. (See § 437c, subd. (f)(2) ["A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court. Calantropio is entitled to his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. MARKS, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.