Opinion
Civil No. 03-2216 (PAM/RLE).
September 2, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on several Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion and grants Defendants' Motions.
BACKGROUND
This personal injury action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on October 25, 1999, at the intersection of Minnesota Highway 21 and Lavender Drive in Faribault, Minnesota. Two vehicles were involved in the accident: an automobile driven by Defendant Donald Michael Rohan and a United Parcel Service ("UPS") van driven by Defendant Daniel Joseph Von Ruden. Plaintiff Thomas Cahalan was a passenger in the automobile. Prior to the collision, the van was southbound on Highway 21 and the automobile was northbound in the left turn lane.
As the automobile approached the intersection, Donald Ludwig was driving a semitractor trailer in the southbound left turn lane. Ludwig intended to make a left turn across the northbound lanes when Rohan's automobile entered the northbound left turn lane. Ludwig stopped in the intersection, facing the automobile. He had initially stopped about seven to eight feet into the intersection crossing lanes, but reversed when he determined that he would not be able to make his turn because of where the automobile was located.
Rohan maintains that he stopped in the median lane and looked for traffic but had an obstructed view of oncoming traffic because of how Ludwig's semi was positioned. He claims that he then crept into the intersection to see oncoming traffic. As Rohan proceeded to make a left turn onto Lavender Drive, he pulled into the path of the UPS van driven by Von Ruden. Von Ruden was in the left, southbound lane when he saw the automobile pull out from in front of the semi. Von Ruden moved to the right lane and applied the brakes in an attempt to avoid the automobile. Unfortunately, the van struck the passenger side of the automobile, severely injuring Cahalan.
Before the collision occurred, Ludwig saw the UPS van approaching in his rearview mirror. He also witnessed Rohan momentarily stop in the left turn lane and then slowly accelerate into the crossing lanes. When Ludwig saw Rohan proceeding into the intersection, he motioned to Rohan to stop. However, Rohan and Cahalan failed to see Ludwig's motions. Ludwig never saw Rohan look for oncoming traffic or down the road beyond the semi to see if traffic was clear. Ludwig then heard screeching tires and the sound of impact.
When the collision occurred, both Cahalan and Rohan were New Jersey residents employed by the New Jersey law firm of McCarter English. They were in Faribault on an assignment to administer a portion of a nationwide class action settlement involving their client, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife"). To disseminate information to its policyholders about the settlement, MetLife hired Rust Consulting. In turn, Rust Consulting hired telephone operators to answer questions by policyholders through a toll-free number. Calahan and Rohan were in Faribault to instruct and supervise the telephone operators to ensure correct information was disseminated. Their only assigned duties were to train and supervise the telephone operators, and had no work responsibility outside of the Rust Consulting facility. They were scheduled to remain in Faribault to complete the MetLife project until the following Friday.
Cahalan commenced this action alleging that the Defendants' negligence caused the collision and therefore his injuries. Specifically, he alleges that Von Ruden and UPS are liable under the theories of direct and vicarious liability. He further alleges that Rohan was either negligent or grossly negligent in turning into the crossing lanes without seeing whether oncoming traffic was approaching.
Cahalan now seeks to strike Rohan's affirmative defense that his claims against Rohan are barred by a workers' compensation act. He also seeks summary judgment that Rohan was negligent as a matter of law. Rohan seeks dismissal, contending that the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act ("NJWCA") bars the claims against him. Defendants Daniel Von Ruden and UPS also seek summary judgment, arguing that Cahalan fails as a matter of law to show that Von Ruden was negligent.
Rohan submits that Cahalan's Motion was untimely and should be stricken. Cahalan noticed the hearing date for June 30, 2004, and served his motion papers on May 27, 2004, thirty-four days before the hearing. Local Rule 7.1(b)(1) requires a moving party to file and serve its dispositive motion papers at least forty-five days before a hearing date. Local Rule 7.1(b)(1). The Court recognizes that the summary judgment motion filed by Cahalan was untimely. Nevertheless, the Court also recognizes that Rohan was not so prejudiced to warrant striking the moving papers. Striking the Motion is a more draconian measure than is warranted.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, only disputes of facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Id. The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Kiemele v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 93 F.3d 472, 474 (8th Cir. 1996). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings — it must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
B. Defendant Rohan
Rohan argues that the NJWCA bars Cahalan from seeking relief against Rohan. Cahalan seemingly concedes that New Jersey law applies, but argues that the NJWCA does not preclude his action against Rohan because Cahalan was not acting in direct performance of his duties when the accident occurred.
In a footnote, Cahalan informed the Court that he plans to select coverage under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act ("MWCA") if the Court holds that the NJWCA law bars his action against Rohan. Because Cahalan has not yet opted for coverage under the MWCA, the Court offers no opinion as to whether the MWCA likewise bars a claim against Rohan.
The NJWCA generally provides the exclusive remedy for employees injured during the course of employment. Sloan v. Luyando, 701 A.2d 1275, 1279 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1997). It defines employment as follows:
Cahalan does not allege that Rohan acted intentionally. Thus, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-8, which provides that an employee may maintain an action against a coworker for an intentional act, does not apply to the instant case.
Employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer's place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer; provided, however, when the employee is required by the employer to be away from the employer's place of employment, the employee shall be deemed to be in the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct performance of duties assigned or directed by the employer; but the employment of employee paid travel time by an employer for time spent traveling to and from a job site or of any employee who utilizes an employer authorized vehicle shall commence and terminate with the time spent traveling to and from a job site or the authorized operation of a vehicle on business authorized by the employer.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-36. Thus, the NJWCA generally does not apply when injuries occur in areas outside of the employer's control, as when the employee is going to and coming from the workplace. Zelasko v. Refrigerated Food Express, 608 A.2d 231, 234 (N.J. 1992).
However, two exceptions to the general rule exist. First, the "special mission" exception applies when the employer requires the employee to be away from the workplace and the employee is engaged in the direct performance of employment duties. Id. Ehrgott v. Jones, 506 A.2d 40 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1986) exemplifies how New Jersey courts apply the "special mission" exception. In Ehrgott, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision while en route to an airport to travel to a convention. As in this case, the plaintiff commenced a negligence action against the coworker who was driving the automobile. The court dismissed the suit, holding that the NJWCA provided exclusive recourse. It found that the plaintiff was away from the employer's premises and that the travel to and from the conference was so integral to attending the meeting that it constituted a part of the overall special mission. Id. at 397.
An injury that occurs during a commute from a distant work site is covered by the NJWCA. See Nemchick v. Thatcher Glass Mfg. Co., 495 A.2d 1372 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1985). InNemchick, an employee was injured while driving home after completing an all-night emergency assignment to an offsite location. The court concluded that the employee was required by his employer to be away from his place of employment and was engaged in the direct performance of duties when the accident occurred. In doing so, the court rejected the notion that the employee had completed the direct performance of duties before traveling, and held that the journey to and from the remote work site was in the direct performance of the employee's assigned duties. Id. at 1374-75.
In contrast, New Jersey courts have rejected the applicability of the NJWCA where the employees were traveling for reasons unrelated to work. See, e.g., Jumpp v. City of Ventnor, 796 A.2d 945 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 2002) (plaintiff was not performing duties when he deviated from his assigned route to pick up his personal mail at the post office, where he was injured); Walsh v. Ultimate Corp., 555 A.2d 731 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1989) (employee was not covered by the NJWCA when he was assigned to work in Australia but was not engaged in the direct performance of duties when he took a day trip for sightseeing); Mangigian v. Franz Warner Assoc., Inc., 501 A.2d 179 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1985) (employee, who was required to conduct a remote site survey, was not engaged in the direct performance of her duties when she left her hotel for food); Ward v. Davidowitz, 468 A.2d 250 (N.J.Super. App. Div. 1983) (NJWCA did not apply to employee who was injured in an automobile accident while on a lunch break because the employee was not on an assigned duty).
Second, the "travel time" exception allows portal-to-portal coverage for employees who are engaged in the performance of assigned duties away from the place of employment and either are paid for travel time to and from a distant job site, or use an employer-authorized vehicle for travel to and from a distant job site. Zelasko, 608 A.2d at 234. Both Ohio Casualty Group v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 517 A.2d 166, 170 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1986) and Chisholm-Cohen v. County of Ocean, 555 A.2d 713, 715-16 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1989) demonstrate that use of an employer-authorized vehicle alone is insufficient to fall within the ambit of the NJWCA. Rather, the "travel time" exception applies only when the employee is on business authorized by the employer when the accident occurs.Chisholm-Cohen, 555 A.2d at 715-16; Ohio Cas. Group, 517 A.2d at 170.
Based on a review of New Jersey case law, the Court finds that both the "special mission" and "travel time" exceptions apply to the instant case. It is undisputed that McCarter English required Cahalan's attendance at Rust Consulting as part of the administration of a nationwide class action settlement. Cahalan sustained injuries while in a company-authorized vehicle traveling from Rust Consulting. The travel on Highway 21 was part of the overall mission to ensure that telephone operators properly disseminated settlement information, and Cahalan was on Highway 21 at the time of the collision only because he had been directed to oversee the dissemination. The Court therefore concludes that Cahalan's negligence action against Rohan is barred by the NJWCA. Consequently, the Court need not address the issue of whether Rohan was negligent as a matter of law.
C. Defendants Von Ruden and UPS
Defendants Von Ruden and UPS seek summary judgment on Cahalan's negligence claim. Negligence is "a departure from a standard of conduct required by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." Teska v. Potlach Corp., 184 F. Supp.2d 913, 925 (D. Minn. 2002) (Erickson, Magistrate J.) (quoting Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Minn. 1981)). To prevail on a negligence claim under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff; (2) there was a breach of that duty; (3) the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the harm to the plaintiff; and (4) damage. Gylten v. Swalboski, 246 F.3d 1139, 1141 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The simple occasion of an accident does not itself support an inference of negligence. Lenz v. Johnson, 122 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Minn. 1963).
Cahalan attempts to impose a higher duty on Von Ruden because Von Ruden is a UPS driver. UPS instructs its drivers that all accidents are avoidable and that having a right-of-way is never an excuse for a collision. UPS also advises that a defensive driver should never be surprised by the unpredictable. Cahalan argues that a reasonable UPS driver with training and experience comparable to Von Ruden would have been able to avoid the accident either by slowing down or by not changing lanes once the automobile was visible. Cahalan cannot rely on the standards set forth by UPS to establish a prima facie case of negligence. Minnesota law imposes one standard of car on all drivers: ordinary negligence. The law does not recognize a standard of care beyond a reasonable and prudent ordinary person standard — even for professional drivers. See Blatz v. Allina Health Sys., 622 N.W.2d 376, 384-85 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001) (declining to hold ambulance drivers to a standard of care beyond that of the ordinary driver). Thus, Von Ruden owed the standard of care that a reasonable man would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. Id. at 384.
The Court finds the record devoid of any evidence that Von Ruden acted unreasonably. Von Ruden was traveling at or below the speed limit while traveling southbound on Highway 21, and was decreasing his speed as he approached the intersection. Von Ruden had no obligation to slow, stop, or yield at the intersection. Indeed, he had a legal right to assume that no vehicle would turn left in front of him. See Oldendorf v. Eide, 110 N.W.2d 310, 312 (Minn. 1961) (driver had right to assume that drivers would comply with traffic regulations and stop before entering an intersection).
Von Ruden saw Rohan's automobile move into the southbound lane moments before impact. When the automobile appeared, Von Ruden instantaneously looked into his side mirror to ensure he could maneuver into the right lane and simultaneously applied the brakes. He made a split-second decision that a lane change would both make an accident less likely and make his vehicle more visible to driver of the automobile. When the automobile proceeded into the intersection, Von Ruden applied the brakes, leaving skid marks for approximately sixty-two feet before impact. Ludwig testified that Von Ruden "did everything he could to prevent" the collision. (Johnson Aff. Ex. B at 25 (Ludwig Dep.).) In addition, undisputed expert opinion concluded that Von Ruden reacted promptly and appropriately. (Lundgren Aff. Ex. A at 4.)
Cahalan attempts to avoid summary judgment by presenting several hypotheses regarding the collision. For example, Cahalan argues that Ludwig opined that the severity of the accident may have been reduced had Von Ruden stayed in the left lane. Although Ludwig speculated that the accident may have been less serious, he also testified that Von Ruden "did exactly what he should have been taught and trained to do." (Johnson Aff. Ex. B at 41-42.) Undisputed expert opinion also concluded that the lane change was appropriate. (Lundgren Aff. Ex. A at 4.) Cahalan provides no evidence to establish that the lane change was negligent. Likewise, his assertions that Von Ruden should have further reduced his speed as he approached the intersection and should have braked more quickly upon seeing the automobile are purely speculative and lack support in the record. Based on a review of the entire record, the Court finds that the facts are undisputed and the evidence is so clear that no reasonable jury could find Von Ruden negligent. See Hamilton v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 114, 355 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984) (citation omitted) (summary judgment should be granted in a negligence case only if the facts are undisputed and the evidence is so clear that it will leave no room for honest differences of opinion among reasonable people).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff Thomas Cahalan's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 23) is DENIED;
2. Defendant Donald Rohan's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 17) is GRANTED;
3. Defendants Daniel Von Ruden's and United Parcel Service's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 24) is GRANTED; and
4. The Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.