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rejecting a proposed construction because it "seeks to incorporate context that is expressly included in the claim's language"
Summary of this case from 0912139 B.C. Ltd. v. Rampion USA Inc.Opinion
CASE NO. C15-0624JLR
06-06-2016
CAAS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Plaintiff, v. ENVISION TELEPHONY, INC., Defendant.
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the court in order to construe terms in United States Patent No. 8,433,915 ("the Patent"), entitled "Selective Security Masking Within Recorded Speech" (the "Invention"), which covers a system of identifying and securing personal information disclosed in electronic communications. (Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶ 5, Ex. A ("Patent") at 1:1-2.) Plaintiff CAAS Technologies, LLC, owns the Patent and alleges that Defendant Envision Telephony, Inc., infringes claim 1 of the Patent through its Click2Coach software. (See Compl.) Envision denies infringing and counterclaims for declaratory judgments of non-infringement and invalidity. (See Ans. & CCs (Dkt. # 8).) The court has considered the parties' briefing and supporting materials and heard oral argument from the parties at a Markman hearing held on May 19, 2016. This order memorializes the court's construction of the disputed terms of the Patent.
II. BACKGROUND
CAAS owns the Patent and alleges that Envision induced infringement or committed contributory infringement of claim 1. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-11.) The Patent discloses a method for monitoring telephonic conversations, detecting when a caller is providing personal information, and rendering that personal information unintelligible on the corresponding recording. (See generally Patent.) The independent claims of the Patent—claims 1, 8, 10, and 14—describe correlating various types of input to determine whether the caller is providing personal information and rendering that information unintelligible. (Id. at 20:49-22:24.)
The language of claim 1 is:
A method comprising:(Patent at 20:49-63.)
identifying an activity performed in an area of a user interface during a voice recording of a verbal interaction comprising a speech signal, wherein the activity comprises motion of a pointing device associated with the area;
evaluating the motion of the pointing device by correlating the activity with at least a part of the speech signal that corresponds with special information and determining a correlation value for the special information;
applying a threshold to the correlation value and rendering the special information unintelligible when the correlation value satisfies the threshold; and
analyzing the voice recording to provide feedback to a business based on the interaction.
As an example, a caller might place a telephone call to a customer service representative to set up an account. During the call, the customer may provide personal information, such as a birthdate or social security number, as part of the account setup process. The Invention monitors the activity on the representative's computer screen to determine if and when the caller is likely providing personal information. When the likelihood reaches a certain threshold, the Invention renders the corresponding portion of the call unintelligible on the recording. Claim 1 relates only to analyzing motion from a "pointing device," such as a mouse or a stylus, to help determine when the caller is providing personal information. (Id. at 20:53.)
CAAS asserts that Envision indirectly infringes claim 1 of the Patent by providing its Click2Coach software to companies operating call centers. (Jt. Prehearing Stmt. (Dkt. # 25) ¶ g, Ex. 2 ("Infr. Alleg.") at 3.) Click2Coach can allegedly monitor and record mcoming voice calls and the corresponding activity on the call agent's desktop software. (Id. at 4-5.) When the call agent moves her pointing device within a data field related to the caller's credit card validation code, Click2Coach allegedly pauses the recording of the conversation. (Id. at 5-7.) Finally, Click2Coach allegedly provides Envision's customers with metrics regarding customer interactions, which is also an element of claim 1. (Id. at 8.) CAAS alleges that this functionality infringes on claim 1 of the Patent.
Each party has submitted an opening brief, a response brief, and supplemental briefing following the hearing on May 19, 2016. (CAAS Op. Br. (Dkt. # 27); Envision Op. Br. (Dkt. # 26) at 8; CAAS Resp. Br. (Dkt. # 30); Envision Resp. Br. (Dkt. # 31); CAAS Supp. Br. (Dkt. # 35); Envision Supp. Br. (Dkt. # 36).) Seven disputed terms from claim 1 are now before the court for construction.
The parties initially presented 10 disputed terms to the court (Jt. Prehearing Stmt. ¶ 1, Ex. 1 ("Jt. Claim Chart") at 1-8), but they have since agreed on the following constructions: (1) a "pointing device" is an "input device that controls the placement of a cursor or pointer on a computer screen"; (2) "special information" is "personal, private, confidential and/or sensitive information within a speech signal, depending on the context of a verbal interaction"; and (3) "unintelligible" means "impossible to understand."
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
The court has the sole responsibility for construing patent claims. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). The court construes claims as a matter of law, though the court may make subsidiary factual findings regarding extrinsic evidence. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 831, 836-38, 840-42 (2015). In practice, executing the Markman mandate means following rules that rank the importance of various sources of evidence of the "true" meaning of claim terms.
The Federal Circuit summarized its view of the claim construction rules in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Although the case focused on the role of dictionaries in claim construction, it also provided an overview of the claim construction process. Intrinsic evidence, which includes the patent and its prosecution // // // // history, is the primary source from which to derive a claim's meaning. Id. at 1314. The court's task is to determine the "ordinary and customary meaning" of the terms of a claim in the eyes of a person of ordinary skill in the art on the filing date of the patent. Id. at 1313 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). In its review of intrinsic evidence, the court should begin with the language of both the asserted claim and other claims in the patent. Id. at 1314; see also Biagro W. Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("It is elementary that claim construction begins with, and remains focused on, the language of the claims."); Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[C]laim construction analysis must begin and remain centered on the claim language itself.").
A patent is composed of three parts: (1) a "written description," which consists of an often lengthy exposition of the background of the invention, at least one embodiment of the invention, and other written material that assists in understanding how to practice the invention; (2) (in most cases) a set of drawings that illustrates portions of the written description; and (3) the claims, which delimit the scope of the invention. General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Together, these three components make up the patent's "specification." Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 35 U.S.C. § 112. However, although 35 U.S.C. § 112 includes the claims as part of the specification, many courts and practitioners use the term "specification" to refer to all portions of a patent except the claims. In most instances, the context will reveal what portion of the specification is at issue.
The court must read claim language, however, in light of the remainder of the patent's specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 ("[T]he specification necessarily informs the proper construction of the claims."). The specification acts as a "concordance" for claim terms, and is thus the best source beyond claim language for understanding claim terms. Id. at 1315. The inventor is free to use the specification to define claim terms as she wishes, and the court must defer to the inventor's definitions. Id. at 1316 ("[T]he inventor's lexicography governs."). The court should "rely heavily" on the specification in interpreting claim terms. Id. at 1317. The court should not, however, commit the "cardinal sin" of claim construction—impermissibly reading limitations from the specification into the claims. Id. at 1320 (citing SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Although a court should limit the meaning of a claim where the "specification makes clear at various points that the claimed invention is narrower than the claim language might imply," the court must not read particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification into the claims unless the specification requires it. Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Additionally, although drawings illustrating the invention may be used in construing claims, "the mere fact that the patent drawings depict a particular embodiment of the patent does not operate to limit the claims to that specific configuration." Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
More recently, the Federal Circuit has emphasized the importance of reading the claims in the context of the specification and prosecution history. Laryngeal Mask Co. v. Ambu, 618 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.") Although the patent's prosecution history is also intrinsic evidence, it is "less useful for claim construction purposes" than the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Because the prosecution history documents an invention's evolution from application to the issuance of the patent, it usually "lacks the clarity of the specification." Id. The prosecution history is useful, however, in determining when an inventor has expressly disavowed certain interpretations of her claim language. Id. Specifically, a patentee may limit the meaning of a claim term by making a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution. Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A patentee could do so, for example, by clearly characterizing the invention in a way to try to overcome rejections based on prior art. Id. The doctrine of prosecution disclaimer "protects the public's reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution" by "precluding patentees from recapturing through claim interpretation specific meanings [clearly and unmistakably] disclaimed during prosecution." Id. (citations omitted).
The prosecution history exists independently of the patent. It consists of the inventor's application to the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and all correspondence between the PTO and the inventor documenting the invention's progress from patent application to issued patent. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
Finally, the court can consider extrinsic evidence, "including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). For a variety of reasons, extrinsic evidence is usually "less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history" as a source for claim interpretation. Id. at 1318. The court thus need not admit extrinsic evidence, but may do so in its discretion. Id. at 1319.
With this general framework in mind, the court turns to the disputed claim terms.
B. Disputed Terms
The parties ask the court to construe the following seven terms: (1) "motion of a pointing device"; (2) "evaluating the motion of a pointing device"; (3) "correlating"; (4) "correlation value"; (5) "determining a correlation value tor the special information"; (6) "applying a threshold to the correlation value"; and (7) "rendering the special information unintelligible." The court first construes, one-by-one, those terms for which construction is appropriate and then explains why the remaining terms do not warrant construction.
1. Disputed Term One: "motion of a pointing device"
The term "motion of a pointing device" appears in claim 1 of the Patent. (Patent at 20:53; see also id. at 20:55 ("motion of the pointing device").) The parties offer the following competing constructions.
CAAS's Proposed Construction: "input corresponding to control of the placement of a cursor or pointer on a computer screen." (CAAS Op. Br. at 6.)
Envision's Proposed Construction: "movement of a pointing device between areas on a user interface screen." (Envision Op. Br. at 8.)
CAAS's proposed construction would encompass periodic input controlling the cursor or pointer, whereas Envision's proposed construction seeks to limit this term to continuous movement or input. (See CAAS Op. Br. at 8-9.) For the reasons explained below, the court agrees with CAAS that the term encompasses periodic input, but the court alters CAAS's proposed construction to provide greater clarity.
Envision first argues that a plain reading of the claim language demonstrates that movement is required. (Envision Op. Br. at 8.) If the court adopts CAAS's construction, Envision argues, it would be "as if the word 'motion' does not even exist in the claim." (Envision Resp. Br. at 2.) This characterization is inaccurate. CAAS's proposed construction does not read out the word "motion," but rather impliedly posits that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand "motion" in the context of the Patent to contemplate both continuous movement between points and periodic input corresponding to the placement of the cursor or other position indicator on a computer screen. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 ("[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention . . . ."). The court agrees that "motion" could be naturally read to capture either or both of those manifestations.
Indeed, some of the extrinsic evidence to which Envision cites favors CAAS's position. (See Envision Op. Br. at 10.) Envision refers the court to the Second College Edition of the American Heritage Dictionary, which defines "motion" as "[t]he action or process of changing position." (See id. (citing Lowe Decl. (Dkt. # 29) ¶ 4, Ex. C at 816).) Envision draws the conclusion that "motion" is a "dynamic concept focused on change, and not mere static position." (Id.) However, nothing in the American Heritage Dictionary's definition of "motion" requires that "motion" refer to a continuous—as opposed to a periodic—"changing [of] position." (Lowe Decl. Ex. C at 816.)
The intrinsic evidence supports the court's conclusion that CAAS's proposed construction is more accurate. The specifications describe two principal embodiments for determining when the caller is providing special information: a trajectory embodiment, // // which evaluates the vector on which the cursor travels (see, e.g., Patent at 12:9-35), and a minimum/maximum embodiment, which evaluates the placement of the cursor (see, e.g., id. at 11:60-12:8). The minimum/maximum embodiment contemplates provision of periodic input as a method of controlling the cursor placement. Envision acknowledges that its proposed construction would preclude claim 1 from covering the minimum/maximum embodiment but contends that Federal Circuit caselaw supports its position. (Envision Resp. Br. at 3-4 (citing August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) ("There is no requirement that a claim construction encompass each and every embodiment disclosed in the patent specification.").)
For instance, the Invention gets progressively more confident that the caller is providing or about to provide special information as the mouse moves the cursor toward the data entry box for the caller's social security number. (See Patent at 12:9-35.)
For instance, the Invention immediately realizes that the caller is providing or about to provide special information when a stylus moves the cursor into the data entry box for the caller's social security number. (See Patent at 11:60-12:8.)
The "language of the claim" governs where it conflicts with an embodiment disclosed in the patent, especially where the language is supported by intrinsic evidence. TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also August Tech., 655 F.3d at 1285. However, as the court concluded above, the language of the claim does not conflict with the embodiment encompassing periodic positional input. Just as it constitutes "motion of a pointing device" when a user slides her pointer across the computer screen by operating a mouse, it constitutes "motion of a pointing device" when a user alters the location of her pointer by pressing on a different part of the screen with a stylus. These are merely two different methods of conveying motion to a computer screen.
The parties' agreed definition of "pointing device"—an "input device that controls the placement of a cursor or pointer on a computer screen"—clearly covers both a mouse and a stylus. See supra n.2.
The principle against importing limitations from the specification into the claims further guides the court in this context. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) ("Even when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using 'words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.'"). Here, the specification describes multiple embodiments, and Envision would have the court limit the meaning of "motion" based on only the trajectory embodiment. (Envision Op. Br. at 9; Envision Resp. Br. at 4.) Because the intrinsic evidence does not demonstrate "a clear intention to limit the claim scope" in this fashion, the court declines to do so. Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906.
Envision's argument would have greater force if the Patent's other claims captured the periodic input embodiment described in the specifications. See August Tech., 655 F.3d at 1285 (concluding that where "other unasserted claims in the patent cover the excluded embodiments," it is "especially true" that the claim language need not be contorted to cover those embodiments). The specification makes clear that the minimum/maximum embodiment can be used in conjunction with a pointing device. (Patent at 11:6-11 ("FIG. 7 illustrates . . . correlating activity in a user interface with special information according to embodiments of the invention. . . . Activity includes, but is not limited to, moving a pointing device into a field of a user interface that corresponds with special information.").) However, as Envision acknowledges, "[t]he three other independent claims 8, 10 and 14 do not evaluate the motion of a pointing device." (Envision Supp. Br. at 5.) In other words, the Patent's other claims fail to capture the embodiment that uses the minimum/maximum technique on a pointing device, which the court has concluded comports with the language of claim 1. As such, the court will not construe claim 1 to omit this embodiment.
Finally, Envision contends that the prosecution history supports its argument that claim 1 requires continuous rather than periodic motion. (Envision Op. Br. at 9-10.) During the prosecution of the Patent, the inventor authorized the Examiner to incorporate from dependent claims into an independent claim the following terms: "evaluating motion of the pointing device" and "wherein the activity comprises motion of a pointing device." (Envision Op. Br. at 9-10; see also Lowe Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B at ECF 39.) That independent claim eventually became claim 1 in the Patent. (Envision Op. Br. at 10; see also Lowe Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B at ECF 39.) Envision argues that "'motion of a pointing device' is thus a necessary condition for the patentability of the claim" and "[t]o read out the word 'motion' from this limitation would be to undo one of the main requirements made by the Examiner." (Envision Resp. Br. at 3.)
Envision is correct but to no end. This argument rests on the same flawed premise as several of its other arguments—that "motion" necessarily requires continuous movement. As the court has concluded, in the context of the Patent, "motion" does not require continuous movement. Thus, although the prosecution history can help determine when an inventor has expressly disavowed certain interpretations of her claim language, no such "clear and unmistakable" disavowal happened here. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317; Computer Docking, 519 F.3d at 1374-75.
The foregoing analysis leads the court to conclude that claim 1 encompasses periodic movement of the pointing device. However, CAAS's proposed construction is nonetheless flawed because it fails to clarify that the relevant input must come from a pointing device. (See Envision Resp. at 2-3 ("CAAS's construction would read on any input, such as electromagnetic signals (e.g., generated by a mouse, pointer, or keyboard) or even human keystrokes or hand motions, which corresponds to screen pointer placement.").) Accordingly, the court adopts much of CAAS's proposed construction but adds language to make clear that the "input" must be made by a "pointing device." The court construes "motion of a pointing device" to mean "input that comes from a pointing device and controls the placement of a cursor or pointer on a computer screen."
Because the parties have agreed to a definition of "pointing device," it is unproblematic to include that phrase in both the term being construed and the court's construction of that term. Indeed, including the phrase in the construction keeps the emphasis on the court's construction of "motion," which comprises the core of the dispute.
2. Disputed Term Four: "correlation value"
The term "correlation value" appears in claims 1, 8, 10, and 14 of the Patent. (Patent at 20:58-61, 21:21-23, 21:46-48, 22:20-24.) The parties offer the following competing constructions.
CAAS's Proposed Construction: "an amount of correlation." (CAAS Op. Br. at 11.)
Envision's Proposed Construction: "a numerical value assigned to the likelihood that special information is being added as part of a voice recording or speech signal based on the movement of a pointing device between predetermined areas on a user interface screen." (Envision Op. Br. at 13.)
Envision seeks to import several pieces of context specific to claim 1 into the construction of "correlation value," whereas CAAS seeks a more straightforward construction. The court agrees with CAAS that it is inappropriate to construe the term by incorporating its context but alters CAAS's proposed construction to provide greater specificity.
Envision's proposed construction "is redundant given the surrounding words of the claim—that is, the surrounding claim language already specifies" what the correlation value is "assigned to" and what it is "based on." Symantec Corp. v. Acronis, Inc., No. C-11-5310 EMC, 2013 WL 752472, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013); (Envision Op. Br. at 13). In claim 1, the "correlation value" (Patent at 20:58) is "determin[ed]" (id. at 20:57) by "correlating the activity" (id. at 20:55-56), which "comprises motion of a pointing device associated with the area" (id. at 20:52-54), "with at least a part of the speech signal that corresponds with special information" (id. at 20:56-57). In other words, besides its first three words, Envision's proposed construction is redundant with the claim language that surrounds the term itself. See Toshiba, 2005 WL 6218785, at *11. Furthermore, Envision's proposed construction is inconsistent with claims 8, 10, and 14, which use the term "correlation value" but do not calculate the correlation value based on the motion of a pointing device. (See, e.g., Patent at 21:15-18.) Accordingly, the court declines to adopt Envision's proposed construction.
See also Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[T]he context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms."); Atser Research Techs., Inc. v. Raba-Kistner Consultants Inc., No. SA-07-CA-93-H, 2009 WL 691118, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2009) ("The Defendants arrive at their construction first by including the surrounding words of the claim. Such inclusion is redundant and unnecessary."); Toshiba Corp. v. Lexar Media, Inc., No. C 03-0167 MJJ, 2005 WL 6218785, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2005) ("The remaining dispute here lies in whether the construction should explain from where and to where the signal is outputted . . . . Toshiba argues that Lexar's focus on defining the means for outputting a collective verify signal is redundant because surrounding claim language explains what generates the signal and what receives it. Lexar contends that including such language would be beneficial to the jury to understand exactly what the collective verify signal does. . . . [T]he Court declines to incorporate from whence the collective verify signal is output in its construction of the claim phrase. To do so would improperly load up surrounding claim language into the construction of a single phrase.").
CAAS's proposed construction is also flawed in that it fails to specify that "correlation value" is not merely an "amount of correlation," but rather a number—typically on a scale of zero to one—that indicates an amount of correlation. (See id. at 11:60-13:3.) This distinction is important because there could be other ways to measure correlation—for instance, by verbal description—but the specification makes clear that the Patent contemplates a numerical representation of the amount of correlation. (See id.) The court accordingly alters CAAS's proposed construction to clarify that the "correlation value" must be a number. The court construes "correlation value" to mean "a number indicating an amount of correlation."
3. Disputed Term Seven: "rendering the special information unintelligible"
The term "rendering the special information unintelligible" appears in claims 1, 8, 10, and 14 of the Patent. (Patent at 20:58-59, 21:23-25, 21:48-49, 22:22-23.) The parties dispute whether the term warrants construction and if so, the appropriate language.
CAAS's Proposed Construction: Based on the parties' agreed constructions of "special information" and "unintelligible," CAAS argues in its briefing that no further construction is necessary. (CAAS Op. Br. at 13.) However, at oral argument, CAAS indicated that rather than decline to construe the term, the court should adopt the first half of Envision's proposed construction: "processing a voice recording or speech signal containing special information to make the special information impossible to understand." (See also CAAS Op. Br. at 15 ("[T]here is no objection to the first portion of Defendant's construction . . . [,] which is 'processing a voice recording or speech signal containing special information to make the special information impossible to understand'. [sic]").)
Envision's Proposed Construction: "processing a voice recording or speech signal containing special information to make the special information impossible to understand, by manipulating or transforming data representing the speech signal from one form into another." (Id.)
The court rejects Envision's attempt to limit this term to instances when data is "manipulat[ed] or transform[ed] . . . from one form into another." (Id.) "Even when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using 'words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.'" Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906 (quoting Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327).
Here, the specification expressly contemplates a broader understanding of what it takes to "render[] the special information unintelligible" than Envision advocates. Indeed, the language Envision cites in support of its argument that "all of the examples . . . include some type of manipulation or transformation of the data" does not support that conclusion. (Envision Op. Br. at 17-18 (citing Patent at 8:55-67).) One example expressly contemplated by that specification excerpt is that a "zero amplitude signal (erase) . . . is recorded . . . in place of . . . the segment of the voice recording rendering the special information unintelligible." (Patent at 8:60-64.) This process can be performed "before the voice recording is created"—in other words, "in real-time or near real-time." (Id. at 8:38-39.) The court cannot square this embodiment with Envision's argument that the Patent "never discloses or even suggests that special information can be rendered unintelligible by not recording the information in the first place." (Envision Op. Br. at 17 (emphasis in original).) Envision fails to persuade the court that there is a relevant distinction between ceasing recording and recording silence, both of which are methods of "rendering the [personal, private, confidential and/or sensitive information within a speech signal, depending on the context of a verbal interaction] [impossible to understand]." See supra n.2.
Further intrinsic evidence supports the conclusion that deletion is one way to render special information unintelligible. The Patent description indicates that metadata might be attached to the voice recording to indicate, inter alia, whether "special information has been encrypted, deleted, masked, etc." (Patent at 6:39-40.) This section of the specification supports the interpretation that "delet[ion]" is one method of rendering special information unintelligible and further counsels against narrowing the term as Envision proposes. (See id. at 6:37-40.) In sum, the specification does not "demonstrate[] a clear intention to limit the claim scope" in the fashion Envision advocates. Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906.
At oral argument, Envision argued that the plain meaning of "rendering" requires action, and that this meaning would exclude a passive method such as not recording the special information. The court rejects this argument for two reasons. First, Envision failed to properly raise the argument by omitting it from both of its briefs, leaving CAAS insufficient opportunity to respond. (See Envision Op. Br. at 17-18; Envision Resp. Br. at 8-9.) Second, the argument fails on its merits. The parties have agreed to construe "unintelligible" as "impossible to understand." See supra n.2. Contrary to Envision's argument, not recording an audio signal comports with the plain meaning of "rendering" the signal "impossible to understand." The Patent specifications expressly contemplate such real-time "rendering . . . unintelligible." (Patent at 8:39.) The court therefore rejects Envision's plain meaning argument as a basis to narrow the meaning of this term.
Based on this conclusion, it is not obvious that this term warrants construction. CAAS's revised proposed construction—to adopt the first half of Envision's proposed construction—replaces "rendering . . . unintelligible" with "processing . . . to make . . . impossible to understand." "Impossible to understand" is the parties agreed definition of "unintelligible," meaning CAAS's proposed construction effectively replaces "rendering" with "processing to make." Although this definition is accurate in the context of the Patent, it is also a commonly understood meaning of "rendering," and it is therefore unclear how the proposed construction would contribute anything "but meaningless verbiage to the definition of the claimed invention." Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 113 F.3d 1149, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
However, CAAS and Envision at least implicitly agree that some construction of the term would add clarity, and the court finds CAAS's revised proposed construction to accurately—if verbosely—construe the term. Accordingly, the court construes "rendering the special information unintelligible" to mean "processing a voice recording or speech signal containing special information to make the special information impossible to understand."
4. Disputed Terms That Do Not Warrant Construction
A threshold issue in claim construction is whether the claim term needs to be construed at all. See, e.g., Hastings v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 729, 733 (Fed. Cl. 2007). The district court need not "repeat or restate every claim." U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather, "[c]laim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims . . . ." Id.; see also Harris, 113 F.3d at 1152 (declining to adopt a proposed construction that "would contribute nothing but meaningless verbiage to the definition of the claimed invention"); Hastings, 78 Fed. Cl. at 733 ("[I]f a claim element is clear on its face, or at least if the parties' constructions would serve to obfuscate or warp its meaning, then the court may decline to construe the element."). If the claim language is "clear on its face," the court's "consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a deviation from the clear language of the claims is specified." Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582) (explaining that the court "may consider the patent specification . . . [or] the prosecution history, if it is in the record, for evidence of an intentional deviation from the plain meaning of a claim term").
In light of the three agreed constructions, see supra n.2, and the court's construction of three disputed terms, see supra § III.B., the court concludes that the remaining four disputed terms do not warrant construction.
a. Disputed Term Two: "evaluating the motion of a pointing device"
The term "evaluating the motion of a pointing device" appears in claim 1 of the Patent. (Patent at 20:55.) The parties dispute whether the term warrants construction.
CAAS's Proposed Construction: Based on the parties' agreed construction of "pointing device" and the court's construction of "motion of a pointing device," no further construction is necessary. (CAAS Op. Br. at 9.)
Envision's Proposed Construction: "analyzing movement of a pointing device between areas on a user interface screen." (Envision Op. Br. at 11.)
The parties principally dispute this term to generate another battleground over the proper construction of "motion of a pointing device." Envision proposes construing "evaluating" to mean "analyzing" and then inserts its proposed construction for "motion of a pointing device." (Compare id. with id. at 8.) The court rejected Envision's proposed construction of "motion of a pointing device" and construed that term to mean "input that comes from a pointing device and controls the placement of a cursor or pointer on a computer screen." See supra § III.B.1. Accordingly, the only analysis remaining for this term is whether "evaluating" has a meaning in the context of the Patent of this term that differs from its plain and ordinary meaning.
Envision provides minimal and unconvincing support for the proposition that in the context of the Patent, "analyzing" clarifies or more accurately construes the term "evaluating." (See Envision Op. Br. at 11.) Envision concedes that the term "evaluating" does not appear in the Patent but nonetheless argues that its proposed construction is "consistent with the examples [of evaluating] provided by the specification." (Id.) Specifically, Envision contends that Figures 7 and 8 evince "some form of analysis." (Id.) However, just as Figures 7 and 8 evince "some form of analysis" of the motion of the pointing device, they evince "some form of evaluation. (See id.) Moreover, in its briefing, Envision omits any effort to differentiate "analyzing" from "evaluating." (Id. at 11-12; see also Envision Resp. Br. at 5.) At oral argument, Envision argued that "analyzing" makes clearer the numerical nature of the "evaluating" process. The court disagrees with this differentiation of the two words. "Evaluating" incorporates an element of valuation, whereas "analyzing" has broader meaning in this context. As illustrated by the specifications, the end result of this second step of claim 1 results in a "correlation value." (Patent at 20:58.) The court is therefore not persuaded by Envision's interpretive argument.
Envision's argument that declining to construe this term will minimize its import is also unpersuasive. (See Envision Op. Br. at 11-12; Envision Resp. at 5.) The court need not "repeat or restate every claim term in order to comply with the ruling that claim construction is for the court." U.S. Surgical Corp., 103 F.3d at 1568. Rather, claim construction is a method of resolving "disputed meanings and technical scope." Id. Because a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand "evaluating" to have its plain and ordinary meaning, the court declines to construe this term.
b. Disputed Term Three: "correlating"
The term "correlating" or some permutation thereof appears in claims 1, 8, 10 ("correlate"), 14 ("correlate"), and 17 ("correlation") of the Patent. (Patent at 20:55, 21:15, 21:19, 21:42, 22:17, 22:33.) The parties dispute whether the term warrants construction and if so, the appropriate language.
This list excludes the locations in which "correlation," a permutation of "correlating," appears as part of the term "correlation value," which the court construed above. See supra § III.B.2. --------
CAAS's Proposed Construction: If the term warrants construction, it should be construed as "to establish a mutual or reciprocal relation between." (CAAS Op. Br. at 10.)
Envision's Proposed Construction: "establishing a correspondence between the motion of the pointing device and a portion of the speech signal." (Envision Op. Br. at 12.)
Envision's proposed construction suffers the same flaw as its proposed construction of "correlation value," in that Envision seeks to incorporate context that is expressly included in the claim's language. See supra § III.B.2. (citing Symantec Corp., 2013 WL 752472, at *2); Audionics Sys., Inc. v. AAMP of Fla., Inc., No. CV 12-10763 MMM (JEMx), 2013 WL 9602634, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2013) ("This construction is repetitive and incoherent because it purports to define what the device can be programmed to do . . . , when the claims themselves specify, in more precise terms, what it is that the device can be programmed to do . . . ."). Claim 1 expressly states that the Invention correlates "the motion of the pointing device" with "at least a part of the speech signal." (Patent at 20:55-56.) Including the referents that are correlated in the definition of the term "correlating" would render redundant the express inclusion of those referents in claim 1. Furthermore, limiting "correlating" to refer only to "the motion of the pointing device and a portion of the speech signal" would be inconsistent with its use elsewhere in the Patent. For instance, claim 8 refers to "correlating first image data from a user interface with second image data from the user interface." (Id. at 21:15-16.)
CAAS equivocates on whether construction is warranted. (CAAS Op. Br. at 10.) If it is warranted, CAAS advocates that the court use the definition referenced in the prosecution history. (Id.) The definition that CAAS proposes, which is quoted in the prosecution history, comes from Merriam Webster's online dictionary. (Vowell Decl. (Dkt. # 28) ¶ 4, Ex. 2 at 13.) However, the proposed amendment in which this definition appears does not expressly adopt the definition as pertinent to the Patent, instead using the definition to differentiate the Patent from another, preexisting patent. (Id.)
To the extent the definition from Merriam Webster's online dictionary reflects the definition intended in the Patent, it further demonstrates that "correlating" is not used differently in the Patent than it is in common language. Claim construction is required only "when the meaning or scope of technical terms and words of art is unclear . . . and requires resolution to determine" the issue. U.S. Surgical Corp., 103 F.3d at 1568. Here, the meaning of "correlating" is "clear on its face," there is no evidence it takes on a meaning other than its ordinary one, and a layperson can readily understand that meaning. Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1331. Accordingly, the court declines to construe "correlating."
c. Disputed Term Five: "determining a correlation value for the special information"
The term "determining a correlation value for the special information" appears in claims 1, 8, 10, and 14 of the Patent. (Patent at 20:56-57, 21:21-22, 21:46-47, 22:19-20.) The parties dispute whether the term warrants construction.
CAAS's Proposed Construction: Based on the parties' agreed construction of "special information" and the court's construction of "correlation value," no further construction is necessary. (CAAS Op. Br. at 12.)
Envision's Proposed Construction: "assigning a numerical value to the likelihood that special information is being added as part of a voice recording or speech signal based on the movement of a pointing device between predetermined areas on a user interface screen." (Envision Op. Br. at 15.)
Envision's proposed construction incorporates much of its proposed construction for the term "correlation value," which the court rejected above. See supra § III.B.2. Further, the parties agreed to a construction of special information. See supra n.2. The only unresolved dispute pertaining to this term, therefore, is whether "determining" should be construed as "assigning." (See id.; CAAS Op. Br. at 12.)
Envision does not make an affirmative argument that "assigning" more accurately construes the action in this term than does "determining." (See Envision Op. Br. at 15.) Instead, Envision argues that declining to construe the term would "place[] almost no limits on what sorts of operations are covered by the claimed step 'determining a correlation value.'" (Id.) As an example, Envision posits that under CAAS's proposed construction, it might be "sufficient for an infringer to determine any value related to the special information, such as the time of day, amount or length of information, data rate, or the like." (Id.) To the contrary, declining to construe this term does not leave it open to any of the examples Envision suggests. The term expressly states that it only extends to determining a "correlation value"—a term that the court has construed herein. (Patent at 20:56-57); see also supra § III.B.2. As the court articulated when construing "correlation value," see supra § III.B.2., the surrounding claim language makes clear that the correlation value represents the relationship between "motion of a pointing device associated with the area" (Patent at 20:52-54) and "at least a part of the speech signal that corresponds with special information" (id. at 20:56-57). It is thus not "sufficient for an infringer to determine any value related to the special information." (Envision Op. Br. at 15.)
In light of the other, construed terms, the court need only construe "determining a correlation value for the special information" if "determining" carries a special meaning in the context of the Patent or in the context of this phrase. See U.S. Surgical Corp., 103 F.3d at 1568 (requiring construction only where the "meaning or scope of technical terms and words of art is unclear . . . and requires resolution to determine" the issues before the court). Here, the term itself makes clear is that the correlation value, once "determin[ed]," is assigned to (or associated with) the special information. (Patent at 20:57.) The court finds no further clarification is warranted and accordingly declines to construe this term.
d. Disputed Term Six: "applying a threshold to the correlation value"
The term "applying a threshold to the correlation value" appears in claims 1, 8, 10, and 14 of the Patent. (Patent at 20:58, 21:23, 21:48, 22:22.) The parties dispute whether the term warrants construction.
CAAS's Proposed Construction: Based on the court's construction of "correlation value," no further construction is necessary. (CAAS Op. Br. at 12.)
Envision's Proposed Construction: "comparing the correlation value to a numerical threshold value to identify portions of a voice recording or speech signal containing special information." (Envision Op. Br. at 16.)
Envision correctly identifies that "[t]he essence of the 'applying' operation . . . is comparing one value to another as a type of trigger for rendering data unintelligible." (Envision Op. Br. at 16.) However, as a matter of ordinary language, "applying a threshold" to a value entails comparing the threshold to the value. In other words, "applying a threshold," as used in the Patent, is not a technical term or a word of art. See U.S. Surgical Corp., 103 F.3d at 1568. Furthermore, the subsequent language of claim 1—"rendering the special information unintelligible when the correlation value satisfies the threshold"—makes it clear that the comparison Envision seeks to highlight occurs. (Patent at 20:58-59.)
The latter half of Envision's proposed construction—"to identify portions of a voice recording or speech signal containing special information"—conveys the purpose of applying the threshold. (See Envision Op. Br. at 16.) However, the surrounding text of claim 1 already makes clear that "when the correlation value satisfies the threshold," the special information is "render[ed] unintelligible." (Patent at 20:58-59.) This component of Envision's construction therefore also adds nothing but redundancy to the plain language of the term. See Symantec Corp., 2013 WL 752472, at *2.
The court rejects Envision's proposed construction because it would only add "meaningless verbiage to the definition of the claimed invention." Harris Corp., 114 F.3d at 1152. Moreover, because "the claim language is clear on its face," the court's "consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a deviation from the clear language of the claims is specified." Compuserve, 256 F.3d at 1331. The only intrinsic evidence either party cites is part of the Patent description that explains how an "algorithm . . . can be configured to initiate processing part of a voice recording when an instantaneous correlation coefficient rises above a predetermined threshold." (Envision Op. Br. at 16 (quoting Patent at 12:31-41).) This embodiment is consistent with a straightforward reading of the term itself and thus bolsters the court's conclusion not to deviate from the plain claim language. Accordingly, the court declines to construe this term.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court rules as follows:
(1) the court CONSTRUES "motion of a pointing device" to mean "input that comes from a pointing device and controls the placement of a cursor or pointer on a computer screen";
(2) the court DECLINES TO CONSTRUE "evaluating the motion of a pointing device";
(3) the court DECLINES TO CONSTRUE "correlating";
(4) the court CONSTRUES "correlation value" to mean "a number indicating an amount of correlation";
(5) the court DECLINES TO CONSTRUE "determining a correlation value for the special information";
(6) the court DECLINES TO CONSTRUE "applying a threshold to the correlation value"; and // // // //
(7) the court CONSTRUES "rendering the special information unintelligible" to mean "processing a voice recording or speech signal containing special information to make the special information impossible to understand."
Dated this 6th day of June, 2016.
/s/_________
JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge